When designing public policies, decision makers often rely on their own behavioral preferences. Pepper & Nettle's theory suggests that these preferences are unlikely to be appropriate when applied to a different environment. This theory has profound implications for the design and ethics of public policies.
In order to at least begin addressing the extensive the problem of moral clarity in aiding the deprived to some degree, I first argue that the duty to aid the deprived is not merely a charitable one, dependent on the discretion, or the arbitrary will, of the giver (1). Then, before further analysing the individual duty to aid, I critically examine whether deprivation is better alleviated or remedied through the duties of corrective justice. I argue that the perspective of (...) corrective justice is important, but not sufficient when it comes to dealing with deprivation (2). I then argue that non-domination cannot serve as a first-order principle of justice. It is too minimalistic, since it would not require duties of justice where deprivation exists, but dominating relations and institutions do not. (3). Going back to the individual duty to help, I argue that the duties to aid the needy must be assessed according to the situation at hand (4). In order to avoid meaninglessness and morality’s excessive demands, one should be able to identify the responsible agents by constructing a shared and, in the last resort, institution-based duty to help (5). The institutional approach in this paper argues that we should create and reform institutions in order to realize the pre-existing requirement to alleviate global deprivation. This is a form of “global political justice” that does not start with politics, but ends with global political institutions. (shrink)
Deprivation and Freedom investigates the key issue of social deprivation. It looks at how serious that issue is, what we should do about it and how we might motivate people to respond to it. It covers core areas in moral and political philosophy in new and interesting ways, presents the topical example of disability as a form of social deprivation, shows that we are not doing nearly enough for certain sections of our communities and encourages that we (...) think differently about how we should best organise our societies in the future. The book develops a comprehensive yet refreshingly simple account of human freedom, which shows how the ability to realise our freedom is partly definitive of freedom itself. That account conclusively illustrates how many deprivations represent remediable inequalities of important and very basic human freedoms, posing the question as to why societies continue to do so little about them. In answering that question, Hull shows how the idea of social exclusion is misleading and, instead, tackles the far more pertinent and challenging issue of societies' failure to include. The moral seriousness of non-inclusion, the failure to provide for freedom, is evaluated via critical discussion of a variety of central themes and distinctions in ethical and political theory. The author shows how such themes and distinctions comprise a framework for evaluating a raft of social issues, in turn providing a unique resource for students of moral, political and applied philosophy. The book concludes with an innovative, challenging and effective combination of analytic and continental styles, so to address the critical question of how we might actually motivate constructive social change. In doing so, it shows how a variety of approaches can work successfully together to provide an emphatic case for greater social inclusion. Deprivation and Freedom shows how even fairly modest claims about social provision illustrate that we should be doing a lot more about social deprivation than we are now. It should be of interest to anyone who is concerned with questions about the type of society in which they live, what it says about us to continue as we are - and how we might motivate realistically achievable social change. (shrink)
_Deprivation and Freedom _investigates the key issue of social deprivation. It looks at how serious that issue is, what we should do about it and how we might motivate people to respond to it. It covers core areas in moral and political philosophy in new and interesting ways, presents the topical example of disability as a form of social deprivation, shows that we are not doing nearly enough for certain sections of our communities and encourages that we think (...) differently about how we should best organize our societies in the future. The book develops a comprehensive yet accessible account of human freedom, which shows how the ability to realise our freedom is partly definitive of freedom itself. That account conclusively illustrates how many deprivations represent remediable inequalities of important and very basic human freedoms, posing the question as to why societies continue to do so little about them. In answering that question, Richard J. Hull shows how the idea of social exclusion is misleading and, instead, tackles the far more pertinent and challenging issue of societies' failure to include. The moral seriousness of non-inclusion, the failure to provide for freedom, is evaluated via critical discussion of a variety of central themes and distinctions in ethical and political theory. The author shows how such themes and distinctions comprise a framework for evaluating a raft of social issues, in turn providing a unique resource for students of moral, political and applied philosophy. The book concludes with an innovative, challenging and effective combination of analytic and continental styles, so to address the critical question of how we might actually motivate constructive social change. In doing so, it shows how a variety of approaches can work successfully together to provide an emphatic case for greater social inclusion. _Deprivation and Freedom _shows how even fairly modest claims about social provision illustrate that we should be doing a lot more about social deprivation than we are now. It should be of interest to anyone who is concerned with questions about the type of society in which they live, what it says about us to continue as we are – and how we might motivate realistically achievable social change. (shrink)
_Deprivation and Freedom_ investigates the key issue of social deprivation. It looks at how serious that issue is, what we should do about it and how we might motivate people to respond to it. It covers core areas in moral and political philosophy in new and interesting ways, presents the topical example of disability as a form of social deprivation, shows that we are not doing nearly enough for certain sections of our communities and encourages that we think (...) differently about how we should best organise our societies in the future. The book develops a comprehensive yet refreshingly simple account of human freedom, which shows how the ability to realise our freedom is partly definitive of freedom itself. That account conclusively illustrates how many deprivations represent remediable inequalities of important and very basic human freedoms, posing the question as to why societies continue to do so little about them. In answering that question, Hull shows how the idea of social exclusion is misleading and, instead, tackles the far more pertinent and challenging issue of societies' failure to include. The moral seriousness of non-inclusion, the failure to provide for freedom, is evaluated via critical discussion of a variety of central themes and distinctions in ethical and political theory. The author shows how such themes and distinctions comprise a framework for evaluating a raft of social issues, in turn providing a unique resource for students of moral, political and applied philosophy. The book concludes with an innovative, challenging and effective combination of analytic and continental styles, so to address the critical question of how we might actually motivate constructive social change. In doing so, it shows how a variety of approaches can work successfully together to provide an emphatic case for greater social inclusion. _Deprivation and Freedom_ shows how even fairly modest claims about social provision illustrate that we should be doing a lot more about social deprivation than we are now. It should be of interest to anyone who is concerned with questions about the type of society in which they live, what it says about us to continue as we are - and how we might motivate realistically achievable social change. (shrink)
This paper proposes relative and absolute measures of deprivation using social satisfaction functions. The relative measure gives us the amount by which social satisfaction can be increased in proportional terms by redistributing incomes equally. We also demonstrate the existence of a relationship between summary indices of deprivation and social satisfaction.
The analysis of approaches to understanding of jural facts is accomplished in the article. The definition of right depriving jural facts in civil law is brought. It’s researched the classical for Roman-Germany legal system reasons for deprivation of right of property and the concrete actions or events that deprive such a right are analyzed. All examined facts of property rights deprivation could be classified and arranged into four basic groups: cessation of the property existance (destruction of property), cessation (...) of the owner existance (death of a natural person, liquidation of the legal entity), transaction on alienation (alienation of the property by the owner, requisition), administrative act (abandonement of the property by the owner, foreclosure on the property for the owner obligations, seizure). Such deprivation of property rights as termination of the right to property, which can not belong to the person, and the compulsory acquisition may occur through jural facts like seizure or administrative act. In the case of requisition termination of right takes place directly at the moment the relevant administrative act comes into force. In other words only destruction of property, death of a natural person or legal entity liquidation can be regarded totally as depriving jural facts. All jural facts of right of property deprivation can be grouped but can not be reduced to basic groups. The law model must determine the circumstances under which the model will lead to the desired legal result, otherwise the legal facts were too extensive and could take place even in undesirable cases. In this context these circumstances are conditions of jural fact o occurence. That is why, for example, "termination of the right to property, which can not belong to the person" is only a general name of right-depriving jural fact or even a specific mechanism of depriving the right itself, and therefore includes in its content as well as the actual jural fact and conditions of its occurence. In conclusion all the right-depriving jural facts are divided into unconditional, those which occurence is not associated with additional conditions established by rule of law (death of natural person, destruction of property) and conditional, the result of which is achieved only under certain circumstances (conditions). (shrink)
Here I respond to Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s “The Evil of Death: A Reply to Yi.” They developed an influential strategy in defense of the deprivation account of death’s badness against the Lucretian symmetry problem. The core of their argument consists in the claim that it is rational for us to welcome future intrinsic goods while being indifferent to past intrinsic goods. Previously, I argued that their approach is compatible with the evil of late birth insofar (...) as an earlier birth would have generated more goods in the future. In reply, Brueckner and Fischer argue that my critique fails to appreciate an important aspect of their thought experiment, which aims only to show that the deprivation of past goods per se is not bad for us. Thus, purportedly, my critique poses no threat to their view. Here I argue that since the deprivation account explains the evil of death with recourse to how one’s life would have fared had one lived longer, it ought to respond to the symmetry problem with reference to how one’s life would have fared had one been born earlier. However, it is not generally true that the life one would have had with an earlier birth is not preferable to one’s actual life, because in many cases such a life would contain more future goods. (shrink)
Among sociology’s normative narratives, alienation figures as one of the most captivating, influential and contested. Anchored in Hegel and Marx, the idea of alienation generated valuable theoretical and empirical tools for explanation as well as offering a normative critique of modernity. However, I argue that the concept of alienation needs to be reconstructed, suggesting that it can be renewed via Amartya Sen’s idea of capability deprivation. The article seeks to accomplish the dual task of showing what capability deprivation (...) can replace in the standard accounts of alienation and what can be productively retained. It reconstructs alienation’s normative core, discussing it within the context of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s versions of capabilities. Having already inaugurated a novel research program in economics and political philosophy, the article proposes that the capabilities approach can contribute to improving sociological reasoning on pressing social problems and can serve as an explanatory partner to sociology’s scientific tools. I argue, therefore, that the explanatory power and normative appeal of the concept of alienation has waned considerably and that whatever correct intuitions about human sociality supported it and gave it its impetus for several decades no longer continue do so. (shrink)
‘DU bist Radio’ (DBR) is an award winning [DBR has been awarded with the “Catholic Media Award of the German Bishops Conference, Prädikat WERTvoll” (2011), the Suisse “Media Prize Aargau/Solothurn” (2010), the German “Alternative Media Award” (2009) and was nominated for the “Prix Europa” (2009)] monthly radio format that goes on air on three Swiss radio stations. The purpose of this program which was first broadcast in 2009 is the development of a new media format which—without applying any journalistic (or (...) other) filter and influence—conveys authenticity of expression amongst society’s most vulnerable fellow citizens such as patients, clients and the socially deprived. So-called marginal groups are encouraged to speak for themselves, as a possible paradigm case for encouraging the inclusion of patients’ and relatives’ “unfiltered” voices in general and in clinical ethics as well. Before handing over the microphone to the groups in focus, a team of journalists, educated in medical ethics, over a period of 4 days, teaches them on-site radio skills and craft. Once this task is completed and the actual production of the broadcast begins, the media crew does not exert any influence whatsoever on the content of the 1-h program. Thus, the final product is solely created and accounted for by the media-inexperienced participants, leading to unforeseen and often surprising results. It is discussed that the DBR approach of fostering authenticity of expression can serve as an enhancement to today’s respect and autonomy oriented field of medical ethics. (shrink)
Psychiatry is enormously complex. One of its main difficulties is how to connect the wide diversity of factors that may cause or contribute to the problems at hand, factors ranging from traumatic experiences, dysfunctional neurotransmitters, existential worries, economic deprivation, and social exclusion, to genetic bad luck. Interventions are also diverse, with options including chemical or electrical treatment, therapies aimed at behavior change and those promoting insight. Much is still unknown: what are the causal pathways, which interventions work best for (...) which patients and why?In practice, many mental health care professionals work holistically in a pragmatic and eclectic way. Without using any explicit... (shrink)
IN THIS ESSAY I ENGAGE THE DEBATE AMONG THEOLOGIANS, PHILOSOphers, and economists on the proper role of self-interest in the pursuit of economic well-being. Often, neither economists' use of self-interest nor critics' rejection of it is carefully specified. I consider conditions under which acting in one's self-interest is theologically and morally proper. Specifically, I argue that for socioeconomically disadvantaged persons, increased exercise of self-interest should not be regarded as sinful but as a fitting expansion of agency and well-being. Contextual factors (...) of distribution and the quality of social relations must inform any analysis of self-interest. I introduce a theological perspective on self-interest within an egalitarian Christian framework and suggest ways in which this approach enables further theological and ethical reflection on the proper role of self-interest. (shrink)
The emergence of the two great late modern crises—economic and environmental—has prompted calls for a return to Marx. This article describes a Marxian account of the 2008 economic crisis relating it to the phenomena of job polarization, de-industrialization, the decline of the middle class, and political populism in Europe and elsewhere. These are argued to spring from political mobilization due to certain kinds of capability deprivations as understood in Amartya Sen’s capability approach. The article demonstrates the continued relevance of (...) Marx for philosophy of the social sciences as well as for a better understanding of the future challenge of maintaining societal stability in the West. (shrink)
Domestic violence is one of the most serious forms of violation of basic human freedoms and rights regardless of ethnicity, gender, religion, and status. A reflection on many international statistics shows that women are the most frequent victims of domestic violence. Based on the definition of the phenomenon of domestic violence, the forms of abuse, the manner how violence is treated, the possibility of children, men, extramarital spouses, brothers, sisters, and old people living in an extended domestic community, of also (...) being victims is not excluded. Since domestic violence is not only a national problem but a worldwide problem, international organizations have worked towards the eradication of this phenomenon by sanctioning it in various international conventions. Also, the legal systems of many countries prohibit and sanction domestic violence by special laws obliging the state authorities to act in all situations when there are indications that there are direct or indirect violent acts in a family. In this paper, the authors present only the domestic violence against children as an evident problem in families, but which is often unreported. The legal frameworks of the Republic of North Macedonia and Republic of Kosovo are presented in this paper with the aim to describe the material-legal and procedural-legal treatment of domestic violence by pointing out the failure of the state authorities in implementing the laws on protection and prevention of this phenomenon. The authors take the approach of only treating the legal consequences of child abuse by parents that in both legislations is deprivation of parental rights for the violent parent. They conclude that the state authorities should intensify their work in taking control measures towards all the families where there are suspicions that the parental rights are neglected, and the child is abused. Because many cases of abuse have not been detected or reported, and in both countries a special study especially on domestic violence against children does not exist, the possibility that the number for this type of child abuse is great. (shrink)
La naturaleza interdisciplinar del "enfoque de las capacidades" ha hecho que su estudio se encuentre diseminado en un amplio espectro de revistas. Así el CA se ha asentado en las áreas de la filosofía política o la economía del desarrollo, y ha ampliado su alcance al ser utilizado como marco teórico para la creación de indicadores sobre la privación, la calidad de vida o la salud, o bien para abordar las cuestiones de la educación superior o el impacto de la (...) tecnología en la vida de las personas. Se ofrece una visión general sobre los principales conceptos empleados en ese enfoque, buscando distinguir las propuestas de A. Sen y M. Nussbaum, con el fin de analizar la idea de sostenibilidad y su incorporación en la agenda del enfoque. The interdisciplinary nature of the "Capability Approach" has resulted in its dissemination in a broad range of journals. As a result, the CA has spread to political philosophy and economic development and its scope has been expanded to be used as a theoretical framework in the creation of indicators on deprivation, quality of life or health. It has also been used to approach issues of higher education and the impact of technology on people's lives. The article offers an overview of the main concepts used in this approach, seeking to differentiate A. Sen and M. Nussbaum's proposals, in order to analyze sustainability and its inclusion in the approach agenda. (shrink)
A Note on Complaints and Deprivation.Antonio Abatemarco - 2010 - In Marisa Faggini, Concetto Paolo Vinci, Antonio Abatemarco, Rossella Aiello, F. T. Arecchi, Lucio Biggiero, Giovanna Bimonte, Sergio Bruno, Carl Chiarella, Maria Pia Di Gregorio, Giacomo Di Tollo, Simone Giansante, Jaime Gil Aluja, A. I͡U Khrennikov, Marianna Lyra, Riccardo Meucci, Guglielmo Monaco, Giancarlo Nota, Serena Sordi, Pietro Terna, Kumaraswamy Velupillai & Alessandro Vercelli (eds.), Decision Theory and Choices: A Complexity Approach. Springer Verlag Italia. pp. 213--219.details
The publication of Gillian Brock's Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account in 2009 and of Richard Miller's Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power in 2010 have created an important occasion for reassessing the discourse about global justice that has arisen in the last decade. Above all, these books have moved the debate about what constitutes global justice in an exciting new direction by introducing important considerations previously lacking. But most essentially, these books give us an opportunity to assess whether (...) the concept of global justice is amenable, not only to exercises in liberal moral thinking, but also to radical social theorizing about deprivation and powerlessness on the international scale. Is there a new paradigm of radical global justice?While I will argue that, ultimately, neither author makes a definitive break with the liberal paradigm, this is not so much a result of faintheartedness or failure of imagination as a deficiency with the concept of global justice itself. I think it may turn out, once these exciting new works have been fully digested, that they are actually pointing the way beyond concern for global justice, in any sense of the term currently extant. What may lie "beyond" global justice will be the object of some brief speculations at the end of this essay. (shrink)
Il s’agira d’aborder dans cette contribution l’œuvre de Carl Andre en tant qu’arrangement de pièces combinatoires, selon des ensembles minimaux qui se parcourent, dont l’expérience et littéralement la compréhension ne peuvent se faire qu’à partir du déplacement physique du visiteur. Un déplacement qui prend son impulsion à partir du sol, départ de la sculpture mais aussi plan selon lequel la plus existentielle des dimensions se donne, condition fondatrice de l’habiter humain. Si l’installation a souvent été considérée comme une extension des (...) pratiques de l’assemblage et du collage, c’est-à-dire en fonctionnant selon des principes d’association, de contamination et de télescopage, le travail de Carl Andre pose de manière très radicale et rigoureuse les conditions mêmes qui rendent possible toute installation : la mise en tension sans cesse renouvelée d’une proximité et d’un lointain qui fonde l’horizon d’un spectateur toujours dessaisi de ce qui ad-vient, l’avènement de la corporéité en tant que mouvement, des prises sensori-motrices sans cesse reconduites et indexées sur la perception des objets qui occupent l’espace et le redistribuent, enfin la nature éminemment trajective de cette catégorie d’œuvre que l’on tente de définir par le terme d’installation. Les environnements sculpturaux proposés par l’artiste américain donnent lieu, ils instituent l’espace et l’ouvrent, ils sont autant de places à investir. In this contribution, we will deal with the works by Carl Andre as an arrangement of combinatory parts, according to minimal sets you can go by whose experience and literally the understanding can only be made from the visitor’s physical moves. A movement that origins from the ground, the start of the sculpture but also a map according to which the most existential of dimensions emerges, the founding condition of human beings. If the installation has often been considered an extension of assembly and collage habits, that is to say functioning according to association, contamination and going back and forth principles, the works by Carl Andre set the very conditions which make any kind of installation possible in an extremely radical and strict way: the forever renewed focus of a proximity and a distance which founds the horizon for a spectator who keeps being deprived of what will come, the surge of corporeality as a movement, of forever renewed sensorimotor grips indexed to the perception of objects which fill space and redistribute it, and at last the trajective nature of this kind of works one tends to define by the word of installation. The sculptural environment offered by the American artist gives place, they institute space and widen it, they are as many places to invest. (shrink)
When it comes to the development of communication networks and the global information society, UNESCO is torn between its will to defend the free flow of thoughts, the pluralism of cultures, and the need for regulation of exchanges, if it wants to defend development in the most deprived countries. Behind rhetorical conflicts which mask diplomatic stakes, it seems that the organization seeks today to trace an original, but problematic, path regarding communication policies.
Abstract According to the DeprivationApproach, the evil of death is to be explained by the fact that death deprives us of the goods we would have enjoyed if we had lived longer. But the DeprivationApproach confronts a problem first discussed by Lucretius. Late birth seems to deprive us of the goods we would have enjoyed if we had been born earlier. Yet no one is troubled by late birth. So it’s hard to see why (...) we should be troubled by its temporal mirror image, early death. In a 1986 paper, Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer appealed to a version of Derek Parfit’s “Bias toward the Future”; they claimed that early death deprives us of future goods that we care about, while late birth deprives us of past goods that we don’t care about. In this paper I show that the Brueckner–Fischer principle is open to several possible interpretations, but that it does not solve the Lucretius problem no matter how we understand it. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9766-6 Authors Fred Feldman, Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Amherst, MA 01003, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)
The emerging international biomedical law tends to recognise the right not to know one’s genetic status. However, the basis and conditions for the exercise of this right remain unclear in domestic laws. In addition to this, such a right has been criticised at the theoretical level as being in contradiction with patient’s autonomy, with doctors’ duty to inform patients, and with solidarity with family members. This happens especially when non-disclosure poses a risk of serious harm to the patient’s relatives who, (...) without that vital information, could be deprived of preventive or therapeutic measures. This paper argues, firstly, that individuals may have a legitimate interest in not knowing their genetic make up to avoid serious psychological consequences; secondly, that this interest, far from being contrary to autonomy, may constitute an enhancement of autonomy; thirdly, that the right not to know cannot be presumed, but must be “activated” by the individual’s explicit choice, and fourthly, that this is not an absolute right, in the sense that it may be restricted when disclosure to the patient is necessary in order to avoid a risk of serious harm to third persons. (shrink)
The last decade has seen a surge of interest and investment in green social prescribing, however, both healthcare and social enterprise has been impacted by the COVID-19 crisis, along with restricted access to public green spaces. This study examines the challenges and opportunities of delivering green social prescribing during and in the aftermath of COVID-19, in the light of goals of green social prescribing to improve mental health outcomes and reduce health inequalities. Thirty-five one-to-one interviews were conducted between March 2020 (...) and January 2022. Interviewees included Link Workers and other social prescribers, general practitioners, managers, researchers, and volunteers working in urban and rural Scotland and North East England. Interview transcripts were analyzed in stages, with an inductive approach to coding supported by NVivo. Findings revealed a complex social prescribing landscape, with schemes funded, structured, and delivered diversely. Stakeholders were in general agreement about the benefits of nature-based interventions, and GPs and volunteers pointed out numerous benefits to participating in schemes such as parkrun. Link Workers were more circumspect about suggesting outdoor activities, pointing out both psychological and practical obstacles, including health anxieties, mobility issues, and transport deficits. Exacerbated by the pandemic, there was a way to go before older and/multi-morbidity clients would feel comfortable and safe to socialize in open air spaces. Our findings support the premise that time spent in open green spaces can alleviate some of the negative mental health effects compounded by the pandemic. However, the creation of healthy environments is complex with population health intrinsically related to socioeconomic conditions. Social disadvantage, chronic ill health and health crises all limit easy access to green and blue spaces, while those in the most socially economically deprived areas receive the lowest quality of healthcare. Such health inequities need to be borne in mind in the planning of schemes and claims around the potential of future nature-based interventions to reduce health inequalities. (shrink)
Recent editions of diagnostic manuals in psychiatry have focused on providing quick and efficient operationalized criteria. Notwithstanding the genuine value of these classifications, many psychiatrists have argued that the operationalization approach does not sufficiently accommodate the rich and complex domain of patients’ experiences that is crucial for clinical reasoning in psychiatry. How can we increase the role of phenomenology in the process of diagnostic reasoning in psychiatry? I argue that this could be done by adopting a clinical staging (...) class='Hi'>approach in diagnostic reasoning in psychiatry. The approach has the resources to include the progressive nature of patients’ experiences to a much greater degree than is currently practiced. It can address the recent plea for increasing the role of phenomenology in psychiatric diagnosis by offering a model for clinical reasoning that goes beyond the operationalized, static criteria of diagnostic manuals, without depriving us of their benefits. (shrink)
According to the “deprivationapproach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman (inspired by Thomas Nagel) and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal (...) non-existence is relevantly different from death. This paper criticizes these responses. (shrink)
A passive brain–computer interface based upon functional near-infrared spectroscopy brain signals is used for earlier detection of human drowsiness during driving tasks. This BCI modality acquired hemodynamic signals of 13 healthy subjects from the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of the brain. Drowsiness activity is recorded using a continuous-wave fNIRS system and eight channels over the right DPFC. During the experiment, sleep-deprived subjects drove a vehicle in a driving simulator while their cerebral oxygen regulation state was continuously measured. Vector phase analysis (...) was used as a classifier to detect drowsiness state along with sleep stage-based threshold criteria. Extensive training and testing with various feature sets and classifiers are done to justify the adaptation of threshold criteria for any subject without requiring recalibration. Three statistical features along with six VPA features were used. The average accuracies for the five classifiers are 90.9% for discriminant analysis, 92.5% for support vector machines, 92.3% for nearest neighbors, 92.4% for both decision trees, and ensembles over all subjects’ data. Trajectory slopes of CORE vector magnitude and angle: m and m are the best-performing features, along with ensemble classifier with the highest accuracy of 95.3% and minimum computation time of 40 ms. The statistical significance of the results is validated with a p-value of less than 0.05. The proposed passive BCI scheme demonstrates a promising technique for online drowsiness detection using VPA along with sleep stage classification. (shrink)
The increasing role that new technologies play in intimate relationships has led to the emergence of a new form of couple violence, cyber dating abuse, especially among adolescents and young adults. Although this phenomenon has received increased attention, no research has investigated predictors of cyber dating abuse taking into account the interdependence of the two partners. The study examines adverse childhood experiences and early maladaptive schemas as possible predictors of young adults’ perpetrated and suffered cyber dating abuse. Adopting a dyadic (...)approach, mediational models in which adverse childhood experiences were assumed to be related to individual and partner’s cyber dating abuse through individual early maladaptive schemas were tested. 134 couples completed online self-reports of the variables of interest, including a bidimensional measure of cyber dating abuse assessing pressure-aggression and control-monitoring. Actor-partner interdependence mediation model analyses were conducted. Results indicated that the emotional deprivation schema mediated the association between adverse childhood experiences and cyber dating abuse, whereas the abandonment schema did not. Specifically, more frequent experiences of emotional abuse and physical neglect during childhood were indirectly related to increased likelihood of perpetrating cyber dating pressure-aggression as well as of perpetrating and suffering cyber dating control-monitoring in both males and females. These associations were mediated by a stronger internalization of the emotional deprivation schema and were supported by both self-reported and partner-reported data. Also, a strong and direct association was found between childhood exposure to intimate partner violence by the opposite-sex parent and cyber dating pressure-aggression by females or control-monitoring by both males and females. These findings help to clarify the potential negative effects of specific adverse childhood experiences and early maladaptive schemas on the tendency to perpetrate and suffer cyber abuse in romantic relationships. The implications for prevention and treatment programs are noted and avenues for future research are described. (shrink)
The purpose of this study is to examine the topic of older people in the world from the perspective of the Social Teaching of the Church. As explained in Christifideles Laici , the Catholic Church believes that the laity is summoned to pave the way for the arrival of God’s Kingdom, and people who are at an advanced age should still respond to God’s calling through their own unique way of contribution. In Familiaris Consortio it is emphasized that the Church (...) should help older people manifest their roles both in families and religious groups. Although it is mentioned in these two apostolic exhortations that older people are blessed with wisdom, it is not explained as they actually acquire such a blessing. In order to address this issue and elaborate on the meaning of older people’s wisdom, Grün’s theory on the nature of older people’s wisdom and where such a blessing comes from is made reference to in this study. Moreover, it is emphasized in the apostolic exhortation of Familiaris Consortio that older people are often marginalized in today’s industrialized and urbanized society and neglected in their families, while also enduring psychological and/or physical pain. Addressing this issue, the value of older people’s work and their unshirkable missions and duties are explained in the present study by examining the nature and value of man’s work as mentioned in Laborem Exercens . Sen’s “capability approach” is also utilized in the present study as a way to examine older people’s values and the deprivation of their capability, allowing an in-depth analysis of this topic. The findings of this study reveal that Grün’s theory of older people’s wisdom being shaped by their life-experiences is significantly complementary to the messages on older people in Christifideles Laici and Familiaris Consortio . While Sen’s capability approach does not offer a complete set of values or cultural system that solves this problem, the approach of “civilization of love” proposed in the Social Teaching of the Church is very useful in helping one contemplate on the problems faced by older people around the world. (shrink)
In order to assess and understand human behavior, traditional approaches to experimental design incorporate testing tools that are often artificial and devoid of corporeal features. Whilst these offer experimental control in situations in which, methodologically, real behaviors cannot be examined, there is increasing evidence that responses given in these contextually deprived experiments fail to trigger genuine responses. This may result from a lack of consideration regarding the material makeup and associations connected with the fabric of experimental tools. In a two-year (...) collaboration, we began to experiment with the physicality of testing tools using the domain of moral psychology as a case study. This collaboration involved thinkering and prototyping methods that included direct contact and consideration of the materials involved in experimentation. Having explored the embodied nature of morality, we combined approaches from experimental psychology, moral philosophy, design thinking, and computer science to create a new testing tool for simulated moral behavior. Although the testing tool itself generated fruitful results, this paper considers the collaborative methodology through which it was produced as a route to highlight material questions within psychological research. (shrink)
Global poverty measurement is important. It is used to allocate scarce resources, evaluate progress, and assess existing projects, policies, and institutional designs. But given the diversity of ways in which poverty is conceived, how can we settle on a conception and measure that can be used for interpersonal and inter-temporal global comparison? -/- This book lays out the key contemporary debates in poverty measurement, and provides a new analytical framework for thinking about poverty conception and measurement. Rather than trying to (...) find some essential meaning of poverty, the author recommends explicitly reflecting on the purposes served by the concept and the values that do and should inform our conceptions and measures. -/- After reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of five competing conceptions of poverty and their corresponding measures, the book concludes with specific recommendations for the future. Poverty measurement should be developed through a process of public reason that gives weight to the voices of those individuals who are most marginalized and deprived. The author suggests new values, desiderata, and candidate indicators that should be used in a pro-poor poverty measure. (shrink)
I argue that Islam provides very efficient ethical principles for dealing with the present ecological crisis, a crisis rooted in moral deprivation. I reject the maximization of benefits from natural resources without giving due consideration to the adverse environmental impact of such actions, and argue that this practice is based on injustices generated by factors like greed, extravagance, and ignorance, among others. So far, Western solutions of such problems have generally been based purely on materialistic approaches which place emphasis (...) on secular technological models without any linkage with metaphysical doctrines. Islam recognizes that man by virtue of his creation is a superior being, one for the service of whom the Earth was created; but at the same time man has been made responsible for any departure inhis behavior from the ways laid down by Almighty Allah. Man’s activities, according to Islam, must be based on the idea that this world is a transitory abode, and that man has to gain God’s favor in order to be able to find a better place in the other world. Hence, man's actions, as manifestations of his faith, must be properly and effectively administered, requiring justice, Taqwa, and appropriate knowledge and understanding of environmental problems. (shrink)
This paper makes the point that Kierkegaard’s ideas concerning individuality cannot be understood clearly without placing them in the context of what I am calling ontological isolation. This means the radical deprivation by selfhood of every aspect of reality, to the point where not even the possibility or illusion of reality is available to the self. In this context the self is required to become itself, forming itself in and out of its own absolute nothingness, ontological destitution, or wrongness. (...) With this form of isolation as our investigative key, we unlock what Kierkegaard means by his command to become a self, where becoming itself, in absence of prior possibility, constitutes the reality of self, and why Kierkegaard places crucial emphasis, contrary to the tradition, on the priority of negativity. By having the self originate itself in “absolute difficulty,” or that wherein the act itself, or pure doing without result, is primary, Kierkegaard now replaces metaphysics with ethics in order of priority, and places the self inseparably in a world that responds directly to that act. I show here a parallel between Kierkegaard’s approach to ethical action with that of artistic creation of a kind of world, the work of art. In doing so I reveal the inadequacy of interpretations that would impose traditional forms of isolation, social and cosmic, on Kierkegaard, as some of his critics do, or that would place Kierkegaard’s ethics within traditional developmental models, as many of his sympathizers do. (shrink)
To answer whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, two different methods for justifying compatibilist conditions of responsibility have emerged in recent literature. First-person approaches, such as Hilary Bok's, appeal to the first-person experience of human agency to justify our practices of holding agents responsible. In contrast, T. M. Scanlon and Jay Wallace, following P. F. Strawson, begin with an account of the interpersonal significance of holding each other responsible in order to discern the conditions under which it is appropriate (...) to assign that significance to an agent's actions. In this dissertation, I evaluate these different methodologies, and I examine the details of each view in order to find a proper understanding of the conditions of responsibility and of the significance of responsibility judgments within our interpersonal lives. ;I argue that the backward-looking significance we attach to responsibility judgments, including those of blame and praise, can be captured only by an interpersonal approach. Specifically, I argue that the significance of responsibility is not found in the negative consequences or emotions that we associate with holding agents responsible. Rather, ascribing to an agent the status of being responsible is a form a deep respect, which has practical implications. I argue that our intuitions concerning victims of severely deprived childhoods are best accounted for if we recognize that ascription as a form of respect and we separate the question of whether an agent is responsible from considerations of appropriate punishments. ;With regard to the conditions of responsibility, I argue that practical reasoners should be considered responsible not only for their choices, but also for negligent omissions, moral beliefs, and certain emotional reactions, even if such phenomena are not based on their choices. In addition, I argue that compatibilists do not need to add the capacity to grasp distinctly moral reasons to the requirements of responsible agency because that capacity is entailed by the basic capacity to reason practically. I examine the psychological literature on psychopaths---agents who supposedly are practical reasoners without moral understanding---to counter an objection to my view. (shrink)
This paper considers the use of personal autonomy in making a request for physician-assisted suicide.1 The ethical question asks whether patients with diminished cognitive capacities possess the requisite capacities to provide informed consent so that a PAS request is granted. Diminishment in cognitive capacities, often seen as an impediment to personal autonomy, tends to thwart one's PAS request from being respected. The routine approach invokes immediate paternalistic interventions because the patient has diminished cognitive faculties that impede her personal autonomy (...) and thus deprives her of normative authority over her life.Exploring the conditions of autonomy that act as formal and substantive... (shrink)
Central capabilitarian theories of well-being focus exclusively on actual opportunities to attain states of being and doing that people have reason to value. Consequently, these theories characterise ill-being and disadvantage as deprivations of such opportunities and attainments. However, some well-being aspects are inherently negative. They make up the difference between not being well and being unwell in that they constitute ill-being. While disadvantage can be plausibly captured by deprivations, ill-being cannot be fully captured by them. I support this claim by (...) analysing cases involving inherently negative aspects of homelessness that are not mere deprivations of opportunities to attain beings and doings that people have reason to value. I conclude that ill-being is not only about what one cannot be and do, but also about one’s enduring, and opportunities to avoid, negative beings and doings. Theories and policies should reflect this to get things right, and to do right by people. (shrink)
Poverty, understood as basic capability deprivation, can only be solved through a process of expanding the freedoms that people value and have reason to value. This process can only begin if the capability to imagine and aspire for an altenative lifestyle worthy of human dignity is cultivated by an education program that develops both the capability to reason and to value. These two facets play a major role in the creative exercise of human agency. This program of humane education (...) can only come from an adequate description of the human agent as a persona that seeks to actualize itself based on his/her understanding of the good. Education must therefore seek to cultivate the capability to have an adequate conception of the good (normative) as well as the capability to constantly re-evaluate one’s conception of the good (evaluative) in order to freely and reasonably choose a life that one values and has reason to value. Education must therefore entail not merely the development of skills nor specialization in a particular field but must concentrate on the integration of the human person as a whole which leads to self-creative praxis. (shrink)
Death can be bad for an individual who has died, according to the “deprivationapproach,” by depriving that individual of goods. One worry for this account of death’s badness is the Lucretian symmetry argument: since we do not regret having been born later than we could have been born, and since posthumous nonexistence is the mirror image of prenatal nonexistence, we should not regret dying earlier than we could have died. Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer have developed (...) a response to the Lucretian challenge by arguing that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward posthumous and prenatal nonexistence. Recently, Jens Johansson has criticized the Brueckner/Fischer position, claiming that it is irrelevant whether it is actually rational to care about future pleasures but not past pleasures. What matters, according to Johansson, is whether it would be rational for us to care about past pleasures had we come into existence earlier. In this paper, I add to the conversation between Johansson and Brueckner/Fischer by suggesting a way to defend the latter side’s position in a way that has not yet been suggested. I do this by considering a suggestion of Johansson’s for interpreting the Brueckner/Fischer position and by arguing that Johansson’s worry for the position I consider is actually incoherent. (shrink)
En este artículo exploramos desde la literatura, por medio de Suenan timbres de Luis Vidales, la dinámica de las nacientes urbes colombianas que inician un proceso acelerado de modernización, carente de un desarrollo adecuado del pensamiento moderno, a la par con los nuevos avances materiales, lo que imposibilita debatir la pertinencia y el proceso de este tipo de transformaciones. Circunstancia que lleva a Colombia a experimentar los idiotismos de la modernización sin modernidad, impidiéndoles a los hombres entender las necesidades y (...) conflictos que genera el progreso. Estas aldeas de principios del siglo XX se convierten rápidamente en proyectos de ciudades determinadas por la aparición de nuevos objetos, creando una atmósfera móvil y ruidosa por oposición a la pasividad de las aldeas, realidad que nos recrea Vidales desde una poética comprometida con los cambios sociales y políticos como poeta de la crítica en Colombia. In this paper, from the literature of Luis Vidales’s Suenan timbres, we explore the dynamics of Colombian rising cities that initiate an accelerated modernization process, deprived of an appropriate development of modern thinking, along with the new material advances, which makes it impossible to debate the relevance and the process followed by these types of transformations. This situation leads Colombia to experience the idiotism of modernization without modernity, impeding men to understand the needs and conflicts generated by progress. These villages from twentieth century beginnings quickly turn into city projects determined by the arrival of new objects, creating a mobile and noisy atmosphere, opposed to villages’ passivity. From poetics committed to social and political change, Vidales recreates reality as a poet of criticism in Colombia. (shrink)
Deindustrialization is a major burden on workers’ health in many countries, calling for theoretically informed sociological analysis. Here, we present a novel neoclassical sociological synthesis of the lived experience of deindustrialization. We conceptualize industry as a social institution whose disintegration has widespread implications for the social fabric. Combining Durkheimian and Marxian categories, we show that deindustrialization generates ruptures in economic production, which entail job and income loss, increased exploitation, social inequality, and the disruption of services. These ruptures spill over to (...) the field of social reproduction, generating material deprivation, job strain, fatalism, increased domestic workload, anomie, community disintegration, and alienation. These ruptures in social reproduction are sources of psychosocial stress, through which deindustrialization gets embodied as ill health and dysfunctional health behavior. We substantiate this framework through the extensive qualitative thematic analysis of 82 life history interviews in Hungary’s rust belt. (shrink)
According to John Martin Fischer and Anthony Brueckner’s unique version of the deprivationapproach to accounting for death’s badness, it is rational for us to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. In previous work, I have defended this approach against a criticism raised by Jens Johansson by attempting to show that Johansson’s criticism relies on an example that is incoherent. Recently, Duncan Purves has argued that my defense reveals an incoherence not only in Johansson’s example (...) but also in Fischer and Brueckner’s approach itself. Here I argue that by paying special attention to a certain feature of Fischer and Brueckner’s approach, we can dispense of not only Johansson’s criticism but also of Purves’s objection to Fischer and Brueckner’s approach. (shrink)
John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have argued that a person’s death is, in many cases, bad for him, whereas a person’s prenatal non-existence is not bad for him. Their suggestion relies on the idea that death deprives the person of pleasant experiences that it is rational for him to care about, whereas prenatal non-existence only deprives him of pleasant experiences that it is not rational for him to care about. In two recent articles in The Journal of Ethics, (...) I have objected that it is irrelevant what it is in fact rational for the person to care about. Fischer and Brueckner have replied to my critique. In this paper I respond to their latest pair of replies. (shrink)
John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have argued that a person’s death is, in many cases, bad for him, whereas a person’s prenatal non-existence is not bad for him. Their suggestion relies on the idea that death deprives the person of pleasant experiences that it is rational for him to care about, whereas prenatal non-existence only deprives him of pleasant experiences that it is not rational for him to care about. Jens Johansson has objected to this justification of ‘The (...) Asymmetry’ between the badness of death and pre-natal non-existence on the grounds that what it is actually rational for us to care about is irrelevant to the question of whether the event is bad for us. Taylor Cyr has recently argued that Jens Johansson’s objection to Fischer’s and Brueckner’s position relies on an incoherent example, and is thus unsuccessful. I argue that Cyr’s attempt to defend Fischer and Brueckner in fact illustrates that their position is incoherent, and that Johansson’s objection therefore succeeds. (shrink)
According to the “deprivationapproach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly different (...) from death. This paper criticizes these responses. (shrink)
In defense of the DeprivationApproach to the badness of death against the Lucretian objection that death is relevantly similar to prenatal nonexistence, John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have suggested that whereas death deprives us of things that it is rational for us to care about, prenatal nonexistence does not. I have argued that this suggestion, even if correct, does not make for a successful defense of the DeprivationApproach against the Lucretian objection. My (...) criticism involved a thought experiment in which a person avoids being tortured. Recently, Taylor Cyr has defended Fischer and Brueckner’s approach, arguing that my thought experiment is incoherent. In this response, I question both the truth and relevance of Cyr’s incoherence claim. (shrink)
In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against (...) my critique. (shrink)
Abstract: The symmetry argument is an objection to the 'deprivationapproach'– the account of badness favored by nearly all philosophers who take death to be bad for the one who dies. Frederik Kaufman's recent response to the symmetry argument is a development of Thomas Nagel's suggestion that we could not have come into existence substantially earlier than we in fact did. In this paper, I aim to show that Kaufman's suggestion fails. I also consider several possible modifications of (...) his theory, and argue that they are unsuccessful as well. (shrink)