In The Philosophy of Change, the distinguished scholar of Chinese philosophy Chung-ying Cheng advances our understanding of the Yijing by analyzing its philosophy in comparison to Western philosophical traditions. Cheng focuses on critically comparing philosophies of science, religion, and metaphysics in Leibniz, Whitehead, Neville, and Cobb alongside classical Chinese views on reality, divinity, knowledge, and morality. The book begins and ends with questions related to the character of Chinese metaphysical traditions, which contrast with the mainline metaphysical traditions found (...) in Western Europe and North America. Cheng argues throughout the book that the philosophical underpinnings of basic concepts in Chinese culture are ultimately rooted in key claims found within the Yijing 易經 and one of its standard commentaries, the Yizhuan 易傳. The book serves as a complementary volume to the author's previous book, The Primary Way: Philosophy of the Yijing, which lays out a comprehensive and systematic philosophy based on the symbolism and text of the classical document and its traditional commentaries. (shrink)

本书共分为三个部分:即书信、论文和附录。第一部分是钱学森和大家来往的信件,共收入来往书信近480封,其中包括钱学森给大家的信件233封。第二部分是论文。收入钱学森院士有关建筑科学的著作9篇,从这些论文 中可以领会到钱学森建筑科学思想的精髓。本书也收入了作者撰写的文章,反映了作者对钱学森建筑科学思想的研究和探索。最后部分是附录.

This paper gives a definition of self-reference on the basis of the dependence relation given by Leitgeb (2005), and the dependence digraph by Beringer & Schindler (2015). Unlike the usual discussion about self-reference of paradoxes centering around Yablo's paradox and its variants, I focus on the paradoxes of finitary characteristic, which are given again by use of Leitgeb's dependence relation. They are called 'locally finite paradoxes', satisfying that any sentence in these paradoxes can depend on finitely many sentences. I prove (...) that all locally finite paradoxes are self-referential in the sense that there is a directed cycle in their dependence digraphs. This paper also studies the 'circularity dependence' of paradoxes, which was introduced by Hsiung (2014). I prove that the locally finite paradoxes have circularity dependence in the sense that they are paradoxical only in the digraph containing a proper cycle. The proofs of the two results are based directly on König's infinity lemma. In contrast, this paper also shows that Yablo's paradox and its nested variant are non-self-referential, and neither McGee's paradox nor the omega-cycle liar paradox has circularity dependence. (shrink)

This paper gives a definition of self-reference on the basis of the dependence relation given by Leitgeb (J Philos Logic 34(2):155–192, 2005), and the dependence digraph by Beringer and Schindler (Reference graphs and semantic paradox, 2015. https://www.academia.edu/19234872/reference_graphs_and_semantic_paradox). Unlike the usual discussion about self-reference of paradoxes centering around Yablo’s paradox and its variants, I focus on the paradoxes of finitary characteristic, which are given again by use of Leitgeb’s dependence relation. They are called ‘locally finite paradoxes’, satisfying that any sentence in (...) these paradoxes can depend on finitely many sentences. I prove that all locally finite paradoxes are self-referential in the sense that there is a directed cycle in their dependence digraphs. This paper also studies the ‘circularity dependence’ of paradoxes, which was introduced by Hsiung (Logic J IGPL 22(1):24–38, 2014). I prove that the locally finite paradoxes have circularity dependence in the sense that they are paradoxical only in the digraph containing a proper cycle. The proofs of the two results are based directly on König’s infinity lemma. In contrast, this paper also shows that Yablo’s paradox and its ∀∃\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\forall \exists $$\end{document}-unwinding variant are non-self-referential, and neither McGee’s paradox nor the ω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\omega $$\end{document}-cycle liar has circularity dependence. (shrink)

According to the revision theory of truth, the paradoxical sentences have certain revision periods in their valuations with respect to the stages of revision sequences. We find that the revision periods play a key role in characterizing the degrees of paradoxicality for Boolean paradoxes. We prove that a Boolean paradox is paradoxical in a digraph, iff this digraph contains a closed walk whose height is not any revision period of this paradox. And for any finitely many numbers greater than 1, (...) if any of them is not divisible by any other, we can construct a Boolean paradox whose primary revision periods are just these numbers. Consequently, the degrees of Boolean paradoxes form an unbounded dense lattice. The area of Boolean paradoxes is proved to be rich in mathematical structures and properties. (shrink)

According to the revision theory of truth, the binary sequences generated by the paradoxical sentences in revision sequence are always unstable. In this paper, we work backwards, trying to reconstruct the paradoxical sentences from some of their binary sequences. We give a general procedure of constructing paradoxes with specific binary sequences through some typical examples. Particularly, we construct what Herzberger called “unstable statements with unpredictably complicated variations in truth value.” Besides, we also construct those paradoxes with infinitely many finite primary (...) periods but without any infinite primary period, those with an infinite critical point but without any finite primary period, and so on. This is the first formal appearance of these paradoxes. Our construction demonstrates that the binary sequences generated by a paradoxical sentence are something like genes from which we can even rebuild the original sentence itself. (shrink)

There is a considerable scholarly discussion regarding how Islamic values influence CSR, but prior studies remain fragmented and scattered across several fields. This paper, therefore, aims to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the impacts of Islamic values on CSR by conducting a systematic literature review of 84 relevant publications from 1995 through 2020. The results of a thematic analysis show that there are four underlying themes to consider when explaining the influence of Islamic values on CSR: (1) Islamic narratives (...) promoting CSR, (2) Islam-based CSR, (3) Islamic financial institutions as enablers of CSR, and (4) stakeholders’ perspectives on how Islamic values influence CSR. This study contributes to the CSR literature by providing a systematic understanding of how Islamic values influence CSR and by identifying current challenges and promising directions for future exploration along this line of inquiry. (shrink)

The representational epistemic approach to the design of visual displays and notation systems advocates encoding the fundamental conceptual structure of a knowledge domain directly in the structure of a representational system. It is claimed that representations so designed will benefit from greater semantic transparency, which enhances comprehension and ease of learning, and plastic generativity, which makes the meaningful manipulation of the representation easier and less error prone. Epistemic principles for encoding fundamental conceptual structures directly in representational schemes are described. The (...) diagrammatic recodification of probability theory is undertaken to demonstrate how the fundamental conceptual structure of a knowledge domain can be analyzed, how the identified conceptual structure may be encoded in a representational system, and the cognitive benefits that follow. An experiment shows the new probability space diagrams are superior to the conventional approach for learning this conceptually challenging topic. (shrink)

It is proved that Yablo’s paradox and the Liar paradox are equiparadoxical, in the sense that their paradoxicality is based upon exactly the same circularity condition—for any frame ${\mathcal{K}}$ , the following are equivalent: (1) Yablo’s sequence leads to a paradox in ${\mathcal{K}}$ ; (2) the Liar sentence leads to a paradox in ${\mathcal{K}}$ ; (3) ${\mathcal{K}}$ contains odd cycles. This result does not conflict with Yablo’s claim that his sequence is non-self-referential. Rather, it gives Yablo’s paradox a new significance: (...) his construction contributes a method by which we can eliminate the self-reference of a paradox without changing its circularity condition. (shrink)

A relativized version of Tarski's T-scheme is introduced as a new principle of the truth predicate. Under the relativized T-scheme, the paradoxical objects, such as the Liar sentence and Jourdain's card sequence, are found to have certain relative contradictoriness. That is, they are contradictory only in some frames in the sense that any valuation admissible for them in these frames will lead to a contradiction. It is proved that for any positive integer n, the n-jump liar sentence is contradictory in (...) and only in those frames containing at least an n-jump odd cycle. In particular, the Liar sentence is contradictory in and only in those frames containing at least an odd cycle. The Liar sentence is also proved to be less contradictory than Jourdain's card sequence: the latter must be contradictory in those frames where the former is so, but not vice versa. Generally, the relative contradictoriness is the common characteristic of the paradoxical objects, but different paradoxical objects may have different relative contradictoriness. (shrink)

This paper is motivated by a question of naturalized epistemology of W. V. Quine and the question is how a naturalistic account gives rise to theoretical understanding with its realistic ontology. I concentrate on the possibility of the principle of reification by way of interpretation and the point is how we interpret interpretation in a naturalistic account. First, we must distinguish between Quine and Carnap based upon the distinction of interpretation versus reduction. Second, we should take seriously the function of (...) observation and the consequent interpretation with regard to reality and ontological understanding. This article also exams the positions of Descartes, Kant and recent philosophers Gadamer and Davidson. In doing so, some test cases of interpretation analyze in particular the case of “anomalous monism”. Finally, this paper makes effort to focus on quantum mechanics as an object of naturalistic interpretation, although it is itself a naturalistic interpretation of classical physics and relativity based upon observation of new features of reality. In conclusion, the Yijing philosophy of change is cited as a possible, useful and meaningful interpretation of quantum mechanics just as quantum mechanics could be a useful and meaningful interpretation of the Yijing’s onto-cosmology (which theory I had established two decades ago). (shrink)

Quite different from translation for general purposes, transplanted legal discourse is often unmatchable to the target discourse community. In reality, exact equivalence could not be found in terms of translation in legal transplant, which means the major task of translation in legal transplant is to solve lacunae, discursive gaps between the source text and the target text. In legal translation, a lacuna seems to constitute a factor of untranslatability. This paper, based on a study of four cases, argues that equivalence (...) can be achieved within the proposed Translational Triangle. The sociosemiotic approach is adopted in this study to explore the complexity in legal translation, and provide insights into legal translation, both theoretically and practically. (shrink)

Among the categories of the telecom and internet frauds, the online romance scam is of particular concern for its sharp rise of victim numbers and the huge amount of cost. A social semiotic approach could be used to investigate the victim identity of the online romance scam from the aspects of the (re)construction and interpretation of discursive practices. The range of papers in this section shows that the study of text, context and the way that people use semiotic resources to (...) produce communication, to create and manage events and to interpret them. (shrink)

What is wisdom? What does a wise person know? Can a wise person know how to act and live well without knowing the whys and wherefores of his own action? How is wisdom acquired? This Element addresses questions regarding the nature and acquisition of wisdom by developing and defending a skill theory of wisdom. Specifically, this theory argues that if a person S is wise, then (i) S knows that overall attitude success contributes to or constitutes well-being; (ii) S knows (...) what the best means to achieve well-being are; (iii) S is reliably successful at acting and living well (in light of what S knows); and (iv) S knows why she is successful at acting and living well. The first three sections of this Element develop this theory, and the final two sections defend this theory against two objections to the effect that there are asymmetries between wisdom and skill. (shrink)

Genre has been a critical issue in discourse analysis as well as in other disciplines. Based on a literature review of the concept of genre and taking judgments as one type of genre in legal settings, the present study provides a corpus-based insight into the nature of genre. The literature review per se reveals that genre has one typical feature of a sign, that is, being subject to multiple and alternative interpretations; in other words, genre as a sign may have (...) various interpretants. The present study unravels the actual generic structures, distinguishes different types of generic structures within the given genre, and then defines the dominant generic structure of judgments in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China. This study also examines and contrasts the generic structure potential of judgments in each jurisdiction. In addition, the variation of Mainland China's judgments over time is briefly discussed. Comparing the generic structures of judgments among the three jurisdictions, as well as the structures of judgments in Mainland China over time, the paper argues that genre also has the essential features of a sign, that is, the characteristics of temporality and spatiality. (shrink)

Does being green facilitate product innovation? This study examines whether green management in firms operating in China fosters radical product innovation to a greater extent than it does incremental product innovation and investigates the underlying institutional mechanisms involved in the relationship between green management and product innovation. The findings show that green management is more likely to lead to radical product innovation than to incremental product innovation. Moreover, government support as a formal institutional benefit more strongly mediates the effect of (...) green management on radical product innovation than its effect on incremental product innovation; whereas social legitimacy as an informal institutional benefit more strongly mediates the effect of green management on incremental product innovation than its effect on radical product innovation. These findings provide important implications for explaining how firms employ green management to facilitate product innovation. (shrink)

The unwinding that Cook, 767–774 2004) proposed is a simple but powerful method of generating new paradoxes from known ones. This paper extends Cook’s unwinding to a larger class of paradoxes and studies further the basic properties of the unwinding. The unwinding we study is a procedure, by which when inputting a Boolean modal net together with a definable digraph, we get a set of sentences in which we have a ‘counterpart’ for each sentence of the Boolean modal net and (...) each point of the digraph. What is more, whenever a sentence of the Boolean modal net says another sentence is necessary, then the counterpart of the first sentence at a point correspondingly says the counterparts of the second one at all accessible points of that point are all true. The output of the procedure is called ‘the unwinding of a Boolean modal net on a definable digraph’. We prove that the unwinding procedure preserves paradoxicality: a Boolean modal net is paradoxical on a definable digraph, iff the unwinding of it on this digraph is also paradoxical. Besides, the dependence digraph for the unwinding of a Boolean modal net on a definable digraph is proved to be isomorphic to the unwinding of the dependence digraph for the Boolean modal net on the previous definable digraph. So the unwinding of a Boolean modal net on a digraph is self-referential, iff the Boolean modal net is self-referential and the digraph is cyclic. Thus, on the one hand, the unwinding of any Boolean modal net on an acyclic digraph is non-self-referential. In particular, the unwinding of any Boolean modal net on \ is non-self-referential. On the other hand, if a Boolean modal net is paradoxical on a locally finite digraph, the unwinding of it on that digraph must be self-referential. Hence, starting from a Boolean modal paradox, the unwinding can output a non-self-referential paradox only if the digraph is not locally finite. (shrink)

本书以欧洲的社会政治、经济历史为背景,以技术史为基础,以欧洲哲学史的历史脉络为主线,研究从古希腊到19世纪中叶哲学的技术思想,揭示出技术哲学由萌芽到产生的历史过程。.

The skill model of wisdom argues that practical wisdom can be best understood in terms of practical skill or expertise, and the model is thought to have the characteristic of focusing on how wise people think rather than how wise people feel. However, from the perspective of Kunzmann and Glück, “it is time for an ‘emotional revolution’ in wisdom research, which will contribute to a more balanced view on wisdom that considers emotional factors and processes as equally typical of wisdom (...) as are cognitive and reflective factors” (Kunzmann U, Gluck J [2019] Wisdom and emotion. In: Sternberg R, Gluck J (eds) The cambridge handbook of wisdom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 575–601). Kunzmann and Glück’s appeal for this emotional revolution is significant and intriguing because the inclusion of an explanation of the role of emotion in wisdom can contribute to developing the skill model of wisdom into a more comprehensive framework that recognizes the intricate relation between wisdom and emotions. In this paper, I shall propose and develop a skill account of the emotions of the wise to serve as a supplement to the skill model of wisdom. According to this account, first, at the critical level, having emotions and emotional competence as elements is not essential to wisdom; second, at the theoretical level, a wise person feels an emotion E if and only if E is strategically rational for the wise person; and third, at the metatheoretical level, the primary aim of the skill account is to explain why wise people feel in a particular way rather than to describe how wise people feel. (shrink)

Tarski's theorem essentially says that the Liar paradox is paradoxical in the minimal reflexive frame. We generalise this result to the Liar-like paradox $\lambda^\alpha$ for all ordinal $\alpha\geq 1$. The main result is that for any positive integer $n = 2^i(2j+1)$, the paradox $\lambda^n$ is paradoxical in a frame iff this frame contains at least a cycle the depth of which is not divisible by $2^{i+1}$; and for any ordinal $\alpha \geq \omega$, the paradox $\lambda^\alpha$ is paradoxical in a frame (...) iff this frame contains at least an infinite walk which has an arbitrarily large depth. We thus get that $\lambda^n$ has a degree of paradoxicality no more than $\lambda^m$ iff the multiplicity of 2 in the (unique) prime factorisation of $n$ is no more than that in the prime factorisation of $m$; and all tranfinite $\lambda^\alpha$ has the same degree of paradoxcality but has a higher degree of paradoxicality than any $\lambda^n$. (shrink)

This article is a lecture note I wrote for my philosophy of mathematics course. Its main task is to explain the main ideas of Gupta's acceptable model proposed in his paper [J. Philos. Logic 11(1), 1–60, 1982]. I aim to provide detailed information on a result established by Gupta. On the one hand, I hope this explanation can be helpful for those who are learning Gupta's acceptable model, and on the other hand, I also hope to provide a guide for (...) beginners to interpret literature. (shrink)

Cook regards Sorenson’s so-called ‘the no-no paradox’ as only a kind of ‘meta-paradox’ or ‘quasi-paradox’ because the symmetry principle that Sorenson imposes on the paradox is meta-theoretic. He rebuilds this paradox at the object-language level by replacing the symmetry principle with some ‘background principles governing the truth predicate’. He thus argues that the no-no paradox is a ‘new type of paradox’ in that its paradoxicality depends on these principles. This paper shows that any theory is inconsistent with the T-schema instances (...) for the no-no sentences, plus the T-schema instance for a Curry sentence associated with the symmetry of the no-no sentences. It turns out that the no-no paradox still depends on the problematic instances of the T-schema in a way that the liar paradox does. What distinguishes the no-no paradox is the T-schema instance for the above Curry sentence, which encodes Sorensen’s symmetry principle at the object-language level. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers have contributed to the development of the skill model of wisdom, according to which practical wisdom is practical skill. However, the model appears to be limited in its explanatory power, since there are asymmetries between wisdom and skill: A person with practical wisdom can and should deliberate about the end being pursued; by contrast, a person with a particular practical skill cannot deliberate about the end of the skill, and even if she can, she is not required to (...) do so. In this paper, I undermine these widely held asymmetries by elucidating the unnoticed nature of skill. (shrink)

Chinese culture is a lively and active organism. If we are to get to the real image of Chinese culture, we should take as a starting point the first passage of the Chung-yung [Doctrine of the Mean], which expounds its basic principles: "That which Heaven has decreed is called Nature, to follow that Nature is called tao [way] and to cultivate the tao is called instruction." This passage uses three phrases and one breath; these three phrases have a unified nature (...) which cannot be separated and which constitute one long sentence. Because of this, the words as a whole lead people to think of a richly vital and great tree which has the will of Heaven as its roots, human nature as its shoots, the tao as its trunk, and cultural instruction as its branches, leaves, and blossoms. As for the fruit, in terms of the individual, it is the achievement of a completely beautiful character, and in terms of the masses of the people, it is the ordering of the country and the pacification of the realm, the progression from the era of peace under the ancient kings to the age of the Grand Unity [ta-t'ung]. (shrink)

We can classify the (truth-theoretic) paradoxes according to their degrees of paradoxicality. Roughly speaking, two paradoxes have the same degrees of paradoxicality, if they lead to a contradiction under the same conditions, and one paradox has a (non-strictly) lower degree of paradoxicality than another, if whenever the former leads to a contradiction under a condition, the latter does so under the same condition. In this paper, we outline some results and questions around the degrees of paradoxicality and summarize recent progress.