Equiparadoxicality of Yablo’s Paradox and the Liar

Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (1):23-31 (2013)
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Abstract

It is proved that Yablo’s paradox and the Liar paradox are equiparadoxical, in the sense that their paradoxicality is based upon exactly the same circularity condition—for any frame ${\mathcal{K}}$ , the following are equivalent: (1) Yablo’s sequence leads to a paradox in ${\mathcal{K}}$ ; (2) the Liar sentence leads to a paradox in ${\mathcal{K}}$ ; (3) ${\mathcal{K}}$ contains odd cycles. This result does not conflict with Yablo’s claim that his sequence is non-self-referential. Rather, it gives Yablo’s paradox a new significance: his construction contributes a method by which we can eliminate the self-reference of a paradox without changing its circularity condition

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Ming Hsiung
Zhongshan University

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References found in this work

Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
What Truth Depends on.Hannes Leitgeb - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.
Truth and reflection.Stephen Yablo - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (3):297 - 349.
Yablo’s paradox.Graham Priest - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):236–242.

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