Boolean Paradoxes and Revision Periods

Studia Logica 105 (5):881-914 (2017)
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Abstract

According to the revision theory of truth, the paradoxical sentences have certain revision periods in their valuations with respect to the stages of revision sequences. We find that the revision periods play a key role in characterizing the degrees of paradoxicality for Boolean paradoxes. We prove that a Boolean paradox is paradoxical in a digraph, iff this digraph contains a closed walk whose height is not any revision period of this paradox. And for any finitely many numbers greater than 1, if any of them is not divisible by any other, we can construct a Boolean paradox whose primary revision periods are just these numbers. Consequently, the degrees of Boolean paradoxes form an unbounded dense lattice. The area of Boolean paradoxes is proved to be rich in mathematical structures and properties.

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Ming Hsiung
Zhongshan University

Citations of this work

What Paradoxes Depend on.Ming Hsiung - 2018 - Synthese:1-27.
What paradoxes depend on.Ming Hsiung - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):887-913.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Paradoxes and contemporary logic.Andrea Cantini - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Designing Paradoxes: A Revision-theoretic Approach.Ming Hsiung - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (4):739-789.

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How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4):399 - 410.

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