I. Singminji sigi p'yŏn -- II. Chŏnhwan'gi ŭi iron oe.

Predominantly on Tibetan Buddhist doctrines and philosophy.

Exegetical works on Buddhist doctrines and philosophies according to the interpretation of Sa-skya-pa sect.

Edmund Husserl published in his lifetime only works which represent a compilation of individual phenomenological analyses or which have the character of an introduction to his phenomenology. It always made him uneasy that he did not publish any systematic work in phenomenology. In his later years, from the beginning of the 1920s, he tried several times to write such a work, but in vain. The masterplan for this work, which his assistant Eugen Fink sketched out in 1930/31 is preserved. According (...) to this plan, the Phänomenologie der Instinkte has attracted very little attention in Husserl studies until now, takes a central and fundamental position in the whole system of his mature transcendental phenomenology. In this book, Nam-In Lee reconstructs the Phänomenologie der Instinkte on the basis of the already published works and, above all, of the unpublished manuscripts of Husserl. Moreover, he draws out the consequences which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte bears for the whole system of phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology, in its form of a genetic phenomenology of which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte is the concluding part, can, according to him, no longer be considered as one-sided philosophy of consciousness in the traditional sense, as it has often been thought of hitherto. Thus, the author presents a new face of phenomenology; one which has scarcely been noticed in the field of Husserl studies until now. (shrink)

This paper will deal with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. First, through an analysis of a passage found in Logical Investigations, I will show Husserl''s earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. I will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl''s works written after the 1920''s, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as a practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized (...) as a practical philosophy. I make this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is a practical philosophy, first, in the sense that it investigates the various forms of practical intentionality and, second, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality. (shrink)

Collection of lectures delivered by author at Beijing University on Buddhist philosophy and its relevant questions/answers.

For Gibson, sensory stimulation is neither the cause nor a component of perception, but merely incidental. Perception is based on the pickup of information, which occurs when purposeful observers actively seek information. I present a case in which only with the active sampling of the ambient optical flow field can observers extract the requisite information for the control of locomotion.

The oriental culture has generally been known to bloom in China in regional framework, and established the form of a country in ancient times, and continuously develop as Yu (虞) / Xia (夏) / Yin (殷) [Shang=商] / Zhou (周) in periodical framework. There are several documents to discover the origin along with archaeological and cultural configuration related to prehistory tales or the history of tribal settlement in ancient times. Unfortunately, however, there were few outputs that unveiled the original source (...) in cultural or theoretical angles. Generally, a certain race and a local culture can be a good resource to be considered, the base of ideology, and further, the root of philosophy in a country. It can be found that, in comparison with pre-history legends and archaeological research results, the source of Chinese philosophy is mainly composed of exterior cultures from foreign settlers rather than its own one. In short, it is possible to setup the preposition or hypothesis that the source of Chinese philosophy and thoughts was not from Han (漢) race, but from old Dongyi (東夷) race. Thus, it is necessary to study deeply on that point as a key clue, linking the characteristics of Zhouyi (周易) philosophy' which is the origin of Chinese philosophy to Dongyi culture. As mentioned in the passages above, it was demonstrated that the fundamental issue of Yi philosophy lies in the principle of time operation in Tiantao (天道), and the formulation of Yi philosophy, and through the analysis of fourteen saints in the process of review of Shengtong, (聖統) the stream of old saints by the principle of Lishu (曆數) more than half of saints were from Dongyi family. In addition, the historical fact that the Dongyi tribe had raised the Yin (Shang) culturewhich mainly formed the base of Chinese cultures as a ancient dynasty shows the deep relation between Zhouyi and the Dongyi culture, and further, it seems that the relation was from the tribe's realization of the principle of time operation of Heaven which had been accumulated for a long time as the culture of agricultural settlement, the conceptual characteristics in the Dongyi culture, and it can be found that the cultural characteristics are in connection with Yi philosophy which considers the principle of time operation in Tiantao as the fundamental ground. It also can be detected that they have connection with the original meaning ofseveral concepts in Yixue (易學) and the culture which emphasize the bottom line of the nature of time. This study focused on questioning issues of these findings as a preliminary research in order to prepare for the formal works which will scrutinize the details of circumstances. In brief, the fact that the fundamental issue of Yi philosophy which is the source of Chinese philosophy lies in the nature of time in the operation of Tiantao should be demonstrated, and the matter that the root was from the Dongyi family who had lived in the north-eastern area in the ancient period and had raised the culture which stressed the principle of time operation as the agricultural settlement culture, and moved to the central area of old China should be unveiled through the trace, which, in the future, might be able to enlighten roots of thoughts in Chinese philosophy in the right course, and make them realize that the work process which is being operated in the north-eastern part would be of no use in the after all. (shrink)

It is the aim of this paper to assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 1, I will summarize Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 2, I will delineate Husserl’s concept of experience and in Sect. 3, I will try to define the concept of evidence in Husserl. In Sect. 4–6, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concepts of evidence and show that Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence is out of the (...) mark, since it is based on a total misunderstanding of Husserl’s concepts of evidence. (shrink)

Philosophical meditation and images of science.

Lecture on pursuing proper undertsanding of Buddhist moral ethics versus scientific education.

The so-called Baldwin Effect generally says how learning, as a form of ontogenetic adaptation, can influence the process of phylogenetic adaptation, or evolution. This idea has also been taken into computation in which evolution and learning are used as computational metaphors, including evolving neural networks. This paper presents a technique called evolving self-taught neural networks – neural networks that can teach themselves without external supervision or reward. The self-taught neural network is intrinsically motivated. Moreover, the self-taught neural network is the (...) product of the interplay between evolution and learning. We simulate a multi-agent system in which neural networks are used to control autonomous agents. These agents have to forage for resources and compete for their own survival. Experimental results show that the interaction between evolution and the ability to teach oneself in self-taught neural networks outperform evolution and self-teaching alone. More specifically, the emergence of an intelligent foraging strategy is also demonstrated through that interaction. Indications for future work on evolving neural networks are also presented. (shrink)

It is the aim of this paper to develop the phenomenology of phronesis through a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis by employing different kinds of phenomenological reductions. In section 1, I will show that phenomenological reduction is identical with a change of attitude and that we have to employ different kinds of phenomenological reductions in order to interpret Aristotle’s theory of phronesis phenomenologically. In section 2, employing different kinds of phenomenological reductions, I will attempt to develop the phenomenological (...) psychology of phronesis through a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis. In section 3, employing different kinds of intersubjective reductions, I will clarify intersubjective aspects of phronesis. In section 4, adopting these insights, I will try to resolve two of the many difficulties of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis. In section 5, I will conclude with two remarks concerning the future tasks of the phenomenology of phronesis. (shrink)

In this paper, I will examine the possibility of first philosophy from a phenomenological point of view. I will do this by assessing Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 1, I will delineate Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 2, I will introduce Levinas’s conception of ethics as first philosophy and sketch out his criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 3, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception and show that from (...) a phenomenological point of view, it is possible to develop first philosophy only in a relative sense and not in an absolute sense. The possibility of first philosophy in a relative sense implies that both Husserl’s and Levinas’s conceptions of first philosophy have some limitations and should be revised, since in a certain way, they are each conceived from an absolute point of view. In Sect. 4, I will show that the conception of first philosophy in a relative sense is a phenomenological one and sketch out some basic features of first philosophy in a relative sense. (shrink)

In Speech and Phenomena and other works, Derrida criticizes Husserl’s phenomenology and attempts to pave the way to his deconstructive philosophy. The starting point of his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology is his assessment of the latter’s phenomenology of language developed in the Logical Investigations. Derrida claims that Husserl’s phenomenology of language in the Logical Investigations and the subsequent works is guided by the premise of the metaphysics of presence. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, it (...) aims to show that Derrida’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of language is off the mark and, on the other hand, it aims to reveal that the phenomenology of language goes far beyond the scope of the Derridian deconstructive philosophy of language. (shrink)

In this article, the author attempts to explain, the occurrence of Husserl and Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of phenomenology there is a fundamental similarity. I have taken the approach is to analyze the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger's interpretation of the occurrence of the phenomenon of learning among the "place" concept. The author describes the place as a transcendental phenomenology of Husserl's main themes occur, and occur as the body phenomenology of Heidegger's interpretation of the main issues between the two fundamentally (...) identical. As between the two identical, Husserl's transcendental subjectivity as the transcendental place of the load are, in Heidegger's place as a body load there who have basically similar. Furthermore, Husserl and Heidegger on the concept of the world the concept of the transcendental field, as well as Husserl's "consciousness of the world and the occurrence of the construct" and Heidegger's "understanding and interpretation", a fundamentally similar. In this paper, I will attempt to show that there is a fundamental similarity between Husserl's genetic phenomenology and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. I will do this by analyzing the concept of "genesis" in Husserl's genetic phenomenology and also in Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. I will show that there is a fundamental similarity between the transcendental genesis as the main topic of Husserl's genetic phenomenology and the ontological genesis as the main topic of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. Due to the similarity between them, there is a fundamental similarity between Husserl's transcendental subjectivity as the bearer of the transcendental genesis and Heidegger's Dasein as the bearer of the ontological genesis. Moreover, there is a fundamental similarity Husserl's concept of the world and Heidegger's concept of the a priori field, between "world consciousness and genetic constitution" in Husserl and "understanding and interpretation "in Heidegger. (shrink)

The main result of this paper, built on previous work by the author and T. Wilson, is the proof that the theory “ADR+DC + there is an R-complete measure on Θ” is equiconsistent with “ZF+DC+ ADR + there is a supercompact measure on ℘ω1(℘(R))+Θ is regular.” The result and techniques presented here contribute to the general program of descriptive inner model theory and in particular, to the general study of compactness phenomena in the context of ZF+DC.

The main result of this paper is Theorem, which shows that it is possible for derived models to satisfy “ω1 is ‐supercompact”. Other constructions of models of this theory are also discussed; in particular, Theorem constructs a normal fine measure on and hence a model of “Θ is regular”+“ω1 is ‐supercompact” from a model of “Θ is measurable”.

In this paper, we explore the structure theory ofL under the hypothesisL ⊧ “AD +μis a normal fine measure on” and give some applications. First we show that “ ZFC + there existω2Woodin cardinals”1has the same consistency strength as “ AD +ω1is ℝ-supercompact”. During this process we show that ifL ⊧ AD then in factL ⊧ AD+. Next we prove important properties ofL including Σ1-reflection and the uniqueness ofμinL. Then we give the computation of full HOD inL. Finally, we use (...) Σ1-reflection and ℙmaxforcing to construct a certain ideal on that has the same consistency strength as “ZFC+ there existω2Woodin cardinals.”. (shrink)

We investigate the compatibility of $$I_0$$ with various combinatorial principles at $$\lambda ^+$$, which include the existence of $$\lambda ^+$$ -Aronszajn trees, square principles at $$\lambda $$, the existence of good scales at $$\lambda $$, stationary reflections for subsets of $$\lambda ^{+}$$, diamond principles at $$\lambda $$ and the singular cardinal hypothesis at $$\lambda $$. We also discuss whether these principles can hold in $$L(V_{\lambda +1})$$.