Philosophical meditation and images of science.

Literal explanation of the ʼJam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa Ṅag-dbaṅ-brtson-ʼgrus's text Grub mthaʼi rnam par bźag pa ʼkhrul spoṅ gdoṅ lṅaʼi sgra dbyaṅs kun mkhyen lam bzaṅ gsal baʼi rin chen sgron me, deals on comparative study of the philosophical systems (siddhānta) of Buddhism and Hinduism.

Exegetical works on Buddhist doctrines and philosophies according to the interpretation of Sa-skya-pa sect.

Predominantly on Tibetan Buddhist doctrines and philosophy.

Explanatory notes on the philosophical positions (sidhānta) of Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism with Hinduism.

Collection of lectures delivered by author at Beijing University on Buddhist philosophy and its relevant questions/answers.

Lecture on pursuing proper undertsanding of Buddhist moral ethics versus scientific education.

Commentary on Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dgaʼ-rgyal-mtshanʼs Tshad ma rigs gter, treatise on Buddhist logic.

Commentary on the Tshad ma rigs gter of Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dgaʾ-rgyal-mtshan; dealing with Buddhist logic.

Exegetical notes on the explanation of philosophical positions (siddhānta) of the Vaibhāsika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism with Hinduism based on the Dkon-mchog ʾJigs-med-dbaṅ-po's text.

Buddhits logical debates according to Kagyudpa school of Tibetan Buddhism.

On elementary Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Self learning book for beginner on Buddhist debate and dialectic.

Study on critical points of Buddhist dialectic and debating.

Exegesis on Buddhist logic and dialectical study; includes fundamental principles of Buddhist philosophy.

Root text with two commentaries i.e. Sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas paʾi dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par ʾgrel pa tshad ma rigs paʾi gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa by Go-rams-pa Bsod-nams-seṅ-ge and Tshad ma rigs paʾi gter gyi mchan ʾgrel sde bdun gsal baʾi sgron me by ʾJam-dbyaṅs Blo-gter-dbaṅ-po on principles of Buddhist logic.

Annotations to the Dbu ma'i spyi don zab don gsal ba'i sgron me by Paṇ-chen Bsod-nams-grags-pa, 1478-1554.

This essay presents a critique of dialetheist readings of Madhyamaka based on the philosophy of the fifteenth-century Tibetan scholar, Gorampa Sonam Senge (Go rams pa bSod nams Seng ge) (1429-1489). In brief, dialetheism is the acceptance that in a logical system there can be at least some cases in which a statement and its negation are true; that is, it involves the acceptance of true contradictions. Jay Garfield and Graham Priest's "Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought" attempts to (...) reconcile apparent contradictions in Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka writings by appealing to dialetheism.1 Tom Tillemans' response to that article, "How do Mādhyamikas Think?" advocates an interpretation of Nāgārjuna that relies on a weaker .. (shrink)

I. Singminji sigi p'yŏn -- II. Chŏnhwan'gi ŭi iron oe.

On Buddhist doctrinal and philosophical interpretation of Sakyapa tradition.

Collected works of ʼJam-dbyaṅs Blo-gter-dbaṅ-po on Nyingmapa and Sakyapa doctrines, philosophy, rituals etc.

Critical analysis on essential points of the seven texts of Buddhist logic (Sapta Pramāṇaśāstra).

Edmund Husserl published in his lifetime only works which represent a compilation of individual phenomenological analyses or which have the character of an introduction to his phenomenology. It always made him uneasy that he did not publish any systematic work in phenomenology. In his later years, from the beginning of the 1920s, he tried several times to write such a work, but in vain. The masterplan for this work, which his assistant Eugen Fink sketched out in 1930/31 is preserved. According (...) to this plan, the Phänomenologie der Instinkte has attracted very little attention in Husserl studies until now, takes a central and fundamental position in the whole system of his mature transcendental phenomenology. In this book, Nam-In Lee reconstructs the Phänomenologie der Instinkte on the basis of the already published works and, above all, of the unpublished manuscripts of Husserl. Moreover, he draws out the consequences which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte bears for the whole system of phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology, in its form of a genetic phenomenology of which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte is the concluding part, can, according to him, no longer be considered as one-sided philosophy of consciousness in the traditional sense, as it has often been thought of hitherto. Thus, the author presents a new face of phenomenology; one which has scarcely been noticed in the field of Husserl studies until now. (shrink)

This paper will deal with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. First, through an analysis of a passage found in Logical Investigations, I will show Husserl''s earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. I will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl''s works written after the 1920''s, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as a practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized (...) as a practical philosophy. I make this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is a practical philosophy, first, in the sense that it investigates the various forms of practical intentionality and, second, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality. (shrink)

It is the aim of this paper to assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 1, I will summarize Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 2, I will delineate Husserl’s concept of experience and in Sect. 3, I will try to define the concept of evidence in Husserl. In Sect. 4–6, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concepts of evidence and show that Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence is out of the (...) mark, since it is based on a total misunderstanding of Husserl’s concepts of evidence. (shrink)

Buddist literature; explanatory commentaries on Tantra philosophy, and commentary on the Mañjuśrīnāmasaṅgīti (Praise to Manjushri).

Critical study on philosophical concept of Buddhist logic interpreted by prominent Buddhist logicians; contributed articles.

Collection of texts on dialectial study of Buddhist logic.

In Speech and Phenomena and other works, Derrida criticizes Husserl’s phenomenology and attempts to pave the way to his deconstructive philosophy. The starting point of his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology is his assessment of the latter’s phenomenology of language developed in the Logical Investigations. Derrida claims that Husserl’s phenomenology of language in the Logical Investigations and the subsequent works is guided by the premise of the metaphysics of presence. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, it (...) aims to show that Derrida’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of language is off the mark and, on the other hand, it aims to reveal that the phenomenology of language goes far beyond the scope of the Derridian deconstructive philosophy of language. (shrink)

On correct method of understanding various Buddhist philosophical concepts according to sutras and tantras in accordance with Karmapa VIII Mi-bskyod-rdo-rje interpreation.