For ten years, between 1903 and 1913, Gertrude Stein saw human relationships as painful mathematical puzzles in need of solutions. Again and again, she converted the predicaments of her personal life into literary material, the better to solve and to exorcise them. The revelation that relationships had a structural quality came to her during the composition of Q.E.D. , when she grasped the almost mathematical nature of her characters' emotional impasse. Stein's persona in the novel comments on their triangular affair, (...) "Why it's like a piece of mathematics. Suddenly it does itself and you begin to see."1 The theory encouraged her to examine such situations as if they were case histories: she continued to study the same piece of mathematics from different angles in Fernhurst , Three Lives , and The Making of Americans . But whatever the sexual arrangements in these triangles, the powerful generally managed to impose their wills upon the less powerful, and the triangles resolved themselves into oppositional structures, pitting two against one. Gradually, when the couple began to replace the triangle as her structural model, Stein composed numerous verbal portraits of couples and their relationships. In two of these, "Ada" and "Two Women," Stein applied her general theory of relationships to the particular puzzle of female friendships because, I think, she felt that women's characters were most intensely molded in same-sex involvements. Although she attempted to "prove" these theories in distanced, deliberately depersonalized prose, we as readers must examine "the complex interplay of self-discovery and writing" from which her portraits emerged.2Stein's portraits of women entangled in familial and erotic bonds seem to invite us into "the process whereby the self creates itself in the experience of creating art"; to read them, we must "join the narrator in reconstructing the other woman by whom we know ourselves."3 This task of reconstruction implies that we must also rethink the place of biography—generally dismissed by New Criticism and its subsequent post-structuralist permutations as "mere" biography—in feminist critical projects. If it is true that "in reading as in writing, it is ourselves that we remake," then feminist critics have a special stake in understanding the biographical, and autobiographical, impulses at work in these activities.4 Stein's portraits, which hover between fiction and biography, raise important questions about the ways in which biographical information can justify our suspicion that female writers may be "closer to their fictional creations than male writers are."5 Recently, feminist critics have adapted psychoanalytic theory to examine the particular closeness of female characters in women's writing or to suggest a related closeness between the female author and her characters. We find it useful to speak of the pre-Oedipal structures and permeable ego boundaries that seem to shape women's relationships. Although Stein used very different psychological paradigms, she approached these same issues in her own studies of female friendships. Realizing that she preferred to write about women, she observed, "It is clearer…I know it better, a little, not very much better."6 In spite of her qualifications, she knew that she could see the structuring principles of relationships with greater clarity when writing from her own perspective.1. Stein, "Fernhurst," "Q.E.D.," and Other Early Writings, ed. Leon Katz , p. 67.2. Elizabeth Abel, "Reply to Gardiner," Signs 6 : 444. For a very useful critical discussion of this complex issue, see Abel, "Merging Identities: The Dynamics of Female Friendship in Contemporary Fiction by Women," and Judith Kegan Gardiner, "The es of dentity: a Response to Abel on 'Merging Identities,'" in the same issue of Signs .3. Gardiner, "The es of dentity," p. 442.4. Jonathan Morse, "Memory, Desire, and the Need for Biography: The Case of Emily Dickinson," The Georgia Review 35 : 271. See also J. Gerald Kennedy's suggestive remarks on the "tension between personal confession and implacable theory" in Barthes' later work .5. Abel, "Reply to Gardiner," p. 444.6. Stein, The Making of Americans, cited in Richard Bridgeman, Gertrude Stein in Pieces , p. 78.Carolyn Burke, an Affiliated Scholar at the Center for Research on Women, Stanford University, has published articles on French feminist writing and on Mina Loy, whose biography she is now completing. The theoretical implications of this essay will be explored in her related study in progress on feminist biography. (shrink)

We prove the following theorem: For a partially ordered set Q such that every countable subset of Q has a strict upper bound, there is a forcing notion satisfying the countable chain condition such that, in the forcing extension, there is a basis of the null ideal of the real line which is order-isomorphic to Q with respect to set-inclusion. This is a variation of Hechler’s classical result in the theory of forcing. The corresponding theorem for the meager ideal was (...) established by Bartoszyński and Kada. (shrink)

Introduction : a search for icons -- Burke in brief : a "philosophical" primer -- Old seeds, new soil : the land of Paine -- John and J.Q. Adams : federalist persuasions -- Democratic America : the ethos of liberalism -- American Whigs : a conservative response -- The Gilded Age : eclectic interpretations -- Theodore Roosevelt : blazing forward, looking backward -- Woodrow Wilson : confronting American maturity -- Modern times : conjunctions and consensus -- Natural law : (...) a neo-traditionalist revival -- The Cold War : existential threat redux -- Contemporary conservatives : victories and illusions -- Conclusion : a world without fathers. (shrink)

In this study, an attempt is made to understand why Burke at the same time refers to the natural law and to the principle of inheritance as moral standards for the human will. Indeed, the latter principle implies reverence to a particular tradition, whereas natural law is a universal standard, binding all people. First, the meaning of the principle of inheritance in Burke's critique of the French Revolution is explained, and next the conception of the natural law he (...) implicitly adopts. In the latter, the close link between the doctrine of the natural law and the doctrine of prudence deserves our particular attention. It is the task of prudence to give concrete form to the natural law in a way of life and a constitution, by adapting it to the concrete circumstances of a particular society. For Burke, however, this adaptation is the work of the practical reason of many generations and many individuals. Man's individual reason is too limited to invent a good social order. The latter is rather the unintended consequence of a process of bargaining and accommodation. It is thus wise and natural for Burke that people bend their eyes to the tradition as to an instantiation of the natural law. In normal circumstances, individuals do not need to appeal immediately to the principles of natural law. In the next section then, it is shown that it is Burke's conception of Providence which enables him to believe that the tradition represents here and now the natural law. Moreover, the practical substitution of the natural law by the principle of inheritance affects Burke's understanding of prudence. Prudence no longer receives its moral direction in the first place from the natural affections but from the prejudices. The habituation to a way of life and culture provides people with a practical knowledge of what is good here and now. They learn to act in a habitual manner without needing an abstract and universal theory. According to Burke, only 'narrative discourses', interpreting and articulating the 'spirit' of the constitution can have some meaning for the practical direction of our lives. The study ends in an interrogation of this last point. Doesn't a community ever need a universal and abstract theory in order to go on living as a moral community ? And what can it expect from such a moral, c.q. political theory? (shrink)

When a person acts from ignorance, he is culpable for his action only if he is culpable for the ignorance from which he acts. The paper defends the view that this principle holds, not just for actions done from ordinary factual ignorance, but also for actions done from moral ignorance. The question is raised whether the principle extends to action done from ignorance about what one has most reason to do. It is tentatively proposed that the principle holds in full (...) generality. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: 1 A Question about Composition 2 Some Answers 3 How Shall We Decide? 4 Common Sense and Unrestricted Composition 5 Common Sense and Compositional Nihilism 6 Compositional Nihilism and the Self 7 The Appeal to Science 8 Problem or Pseudoproblem? What To Do?

The Dreaming Mind provides an insightful, interdisciplinary approach to the study of dreaming, exploring its nature and examining some of the implications of dream states for theories of consciousness, cognition and the self. Offering an integrative approach into our understanding of dreams and the mind, it is essential reading for students and researchers of consciousness, dreams, philosophy and cognitive sciences, as well as anyone who is curious about dreaming.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:131. THE HUME LITERATURE FOR 1978 The Hume Literature from 1925 to 1976 has been thoroughly covered in my book Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship : A Bibliographical Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 1978; J¿ 5.50), which also lists the main earlier writings on Hume. Publications of the year 1977 were listed in Hume Studies last November. What follows here will bring the record up to the end of 1978. (...) Readers are invited to inform me of any omissions, and to send me offprints of their own articles. The intention is to maintain a complete bibliographical record of critical work on Hume, by the regular publication in Hume Studies of an annual bibliography covering the previous year, with addenda consisting of items omitted through ignorance in previous years. References to recently-appearing reviews (of books from earlier lists) are given at the end. The following abbreviations of journal titles are used here: APQAmerican Philosophical Quarterly JHIJournal of the History of Ideas JHPJournal of the History of Philosophy JPJournal of Philosophy PASProceedings of the Aristotelian Society PBPhilosophical Books PQPhilosophical Quarterly PRPhilosophical Review RIPRevue Internationale de Philosophie RMReview of Metaphysics TLSTimes Literary Supplement Other abbreviations should be obvious enough, and mainly follow the British Standard (no. 4148). ANSCOMBE, G. E. M. 'Rules, Rights, and Promises', Midwest Studies in Phil. 3, 318-23. ARMSTRONG, D. M. Universals and Scientific Realism, vol. 2: A Theory of Universals, 85-90. Cambridge. ATTFIELD, R. God and the Secular, esp. chs. 5-6. Cardiff. 132. BAIER, A. 'Hume's Analysis of Pride', JP 75, 27-40. (on Davidson 1976) BALDI, M. 'Le edizioni italiane dei Saggi economici di David Hume', Riv. crit. Stor. FiI. 33, 275-96. BARNOUW, D. 'Skepticism as a Literary Mode - Hume, David and Musil, Robert', Mod. Lang. Notes 93, 852-70. BASU, D. K. 'Who is the Real Hume in the Dialogues?', Indian Phil. Q. 6, 21-8. BEAUCHAMP. see ROBINSON. BECK, L. W. Essays on Kant and Hume. New Haven & London, (includes reprints of his 1967a and b, and 1974, and the first Eng. tr. of his 1969; also a new paper,? Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant', on pp. Ill ff) BLACKMAN, L. L. 'The Logical Impossibility of Miracles in Hume', Int. J. Phil. Relig. 9, 179-87. BOSS, G. "1I Promise": Les fonctions du langage chez Hume et Austin', Revue Théol. et Phil. 110, 29-48. BRACKEN, H. M. 'Bayle, Berkeley, and Hume', EighteenthCentury Studies 11, 227-45. BROWNSEY, P. F. 'Hume and the Social Contract', PQ 28, 132-48. BURKE, J. J. 'Hume's History of England: Waking the English from a Dogmatic Slumber', Studies in 18th-century Culture 7, 235-50. CAPALDI, N. 'Hume as Social Scientist', RM 32, 99-123. CARNIE, R. H. 'The Hume-Hailes Relationship', Forum for Mod. Lang. Studies 14, 289-303. CARTWRIGHT, N. 'Comments on Wesley Salmon's "Science and Religion..."', Phil. Studies 33, 177-83. COHEN, Benjamin. 'Contrariety and Causality in Hume', Hume Studies 4, 29-39. CONNIFF, J. 'Hume on Political Parties: The Case for Hume as a Whig', Eighteenth-Century Studies 12, 150-73. CUMMINS, R. 'The Missing Shade of Blue', PR 87, 548-65. DOUBLE, R. 'Hume's Empirical Argument for Empiricism', Sth J. Phil. 16, 329-38. 133. ERDE, E. L. 'Founding Morality: "Hume v. Plato" or "Hume & Plato"?', S. -west. J. Phil. 9, 19-25. FARR, J. 'Hume, Hermeneutics, and History: A "Sympathetic" Account', Hist. & Theory 17, 285-310. FLEW, A. 'Inconsistency within a Reconciling Project', Hume Studies 4, 1-6. GASKIN, J. C. A. Hume's Philosophy of Religion, (xi, 188 pp.* London. [Times Higher Ed. Suppl. 21 July (1978), 17; TLS 28 July (1978), 863; RB 20 (1979), 68-71] GINSBERG, R. 'Hume and the Social Contract', EighteenthCentury Life 4, 91-4. GUPTA, G. 'Another Look at the Buddha-Hume "Connection"', Indian Phil. Q. 5, 371-86. GUPTA, R. 'Certain Aspects of the Causal Theories of the Buddhist, Hume and Mill', Indian Phil. Q. 5, 319-35. HAAKONSSEN, K. 'Hume's Obligations', Hume Studies 4, 7-17. HACKING, I. 'Hume's Species of Probability', Phil. Studies 33, 21-37. HALL, R. Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship: A bibliographical guide. (x, 150 pp.) Edinburgh. [British Book News... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:86. THE HUME LITERATURE FOR 1977 In my recently-published book, Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 1978; ^ 5.50), the reader will find a thorough coverage of the Hume literature from 1925 to 1976, with lists of the main earlier writings on Hume, all indexed by author, language, and subject. What follows here will bring the record up to the end of 1977.· Readers (...) are invited to inform me of any omissions. The intention is to maintain a complete bibliographical record of critical work on Hume, by the regular publication in Hume Studies of an annual bibliography covering the previous year, with addenda consisting of items omitted through ignorance in previous years. The following abbreviations of journal titles are used here: APQ American Philosophical Quarterly JHI Journal of the History of Ideas JHP Journal of the History of Philosophy JP Journal of Philosophy PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society PB Philosophical Books PBA Proceedings of the British Academy PQ Philosophical Quarterly PR Philosophical Review RIP Revue Internationale de Philosophie RM Review of Metaphysics TLS Times Literary Supplement Other abbreviations should be obvious enough, and mainly follow the British Standard. ÄRDAL, P. S. 'Convention and Value',in G. P. Morice, David Hume, Bicentenary Papers,51-68. Edinburgh. ÁRDAL, P. S. 'Another Look at Hume'sAccount of Moral Evaluation', JHP 15, 405-21. 87. BERK, E.? Note on Hume's Treatise I. iv. 1', Mind 86, 118-19. BERLIN, I. 'Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism', in Morice, op. cit., 95-116. BERRY, C. J. 'From Hume to Hegel: The Case of the Social Contract', JHI 38, 691-703. BOTWINICK, A.? Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism', JHP 15, 423-35. BRADLEY, M. C. 'Stove on Hume', Australas. J. Phil. 55, 69-73. BRANDT, R. 'The Beginnings of Hume's Philosophy', in Morice, op. cit., 117-27. BRICKE, J. 'Hume on Self-Identity, Memory and Causality', in Morice, op. cit., 167-74. BRITTON, K. 'Hume on some Non-Natural Distinctions', in Morice, op. cit., 205-9. BURKS, A. W. Chance, Cause, Reason, esp. 128-42 ('Hume's thesis on the justification of induction'). Chicago. CASSIDY, J. 'The Nature of Hume's Inductive Scepticism: A Critical Notice', Ratio 19, 47-54. (on Stove 1973) COHEN, E. D. 'Hume's Fork', Sth. J. Phil. 15, 443-55. CONNON, R. W. 'The Textual and Philosophical Significance of Hume's MS Alterations to Treatise III ', in Morice, op. cit., 186-204. [PQ 28 (1978), 265-8] CONNON, R. W. & POLLARD, M. On the Authorship of "Hume's" Abstract', PQ 27, 60-6. CORSANO, A. 'Vico et Hume face au problème religieux', Archives de Phil. 40, 241-50. DAVIE, G. E. 'Edmund Husserl and "the as yet, in its most important respect, unrecognised greatness of Hume",' in Morice, op. cit., 69-76. DAVIS, J. W. 'Hume on Qualitative Content', in Morice, op. cit., 175-80. DELEULE, D. Hume, Lettre d'un Gentilhomme à son ami d'Edimbourg, présentation, traduction et notes. Paris. (French translation, with facing original, of A Letter from a Gentleman, Edinburgh, 1745) 88. DÉME", N. 'La Méthode Newtonienne et les Lois Empiriques de l'Anthropologie dans Traité II', in Morice, op. cit., 139-45. FORBES, D. 'Hume's Science of Polities', in Morice, op. cit., 39-50. FORCE, J. E. 'Hume in the Dialogues, the Dictates of Convention, and the Millennial Future State of Biblical Prophecy', S. -west. J. Phil. 8, 131-41. GAWLICK, G. 'Hume and the Deists: a Reconsideration', in Morice, op. cit., 128-38. GLOSSOP, R. J. 'In defence of David Hume', Australas. J. Phil. 55, 59-63. GLOUEERMAN, M. 'Hume on Modes', Hume Studies 3, 32-50. GUPTA, B. 'Buddha and Hume: A Popular Comparison Revisited ', Int. Phil. Q. 17 (1977), 135-46. HALL, R. 'The Hume Literature for 1976', Hume Studies 3, 94-102. HEALY,. M. 'Substance and Spiritual Substance - A criticism of David Hume', Alethe ia (Irving, Texas) 1 (1977), 159-83. HEDENIUS, I. Filosofien i ett föränderligt samhälle, 37-59 ( ' Värdeteorierna hos Hume': the value-theories in Hume). Stockholm. HINCKFUSS, I. 'Stove, Induction and the Irish', Australas. J. Phil. 55, 64-8. HISKES... (shrink)

It is a classical result of Mortimer that $L^2$ , first-order logic with two variables, is decidable for satisfiability. We show that going beyond $L^2$ by adding any one of the following leads to an undecidable logic:– very weak forms of recursion, viz.¶(i) transitive closure operations¶(ii) (restricted) monadic fixed-point operations¶– weak access to cardinalities, through the Härtig (or equicardinality) quantifier¶– a choice construct known as Hilbert's $\epsilon$ -operator.In fact all these extensions of $L^2$ prove to be undecidable both for satisfiability, (...) and for satisfiability in finite structures. Moreover most of them are hard for $\Sigma^1_1$ , the first level of the analytical hierachy, and thus have a much higher degree of undecidability than first-order logic. (shrink)

Probes the nature of linguistic or symbolic action as it relates to specific novels, plays, and poems.

When we dream, we feel emotions in response to objects and events that exist only in the dream. One key question is whether these emotions can be said to be “essentially unfitting”, that is, always inappropriate to the evoking scenario. However, how we evaluate dream emotions for fittingness may depend on the model of dreams we adopt: the imagination or the hallucination model. If fittingness requires a match between emotion and evaluative properties of objects or events, it is prima facie (...) plausible that dream emotions could fail to fit under the imagination model because it is unfitting to have an emotion toward an object we do not believe to be real. Under the hallucination model, dream emotions could be unfitting because their objects do not exist but we believe them to be real. More nuance, however, is required. By comparing dream emotions with the emotions we experience while imagining, engaging with fiction, and hallucinating, we conclude that although there are compelling arguments in support of the claim that dream emotions are essentially unfitting, these arguments are not entirely convincing, and it is more plausible that particular dream emotions can be assessed for fittingness under either model of dreaming. (shrink)

This volume is the first ever English translation of Kant's last major work, the so-called Opus Postumum, a work Kant himself described as his 'chef d'oeuvre' and as the keystone of his entire philosophical system. It occupied him for more than the last decade of his life. Begun with the intention of providing a 'transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics,' Kant's reflections take him far beyond the problem he initially set out to solve. In fact, he (...) reassesses a whole series of fundamental topics of transcendental philosophy: the thing in itself, the nature of space and time, the concept of the self and its agency, the idea of God, and the unity of theoretical and practical reason. Though never completed, the text reaches a logical albeit not fully developed, conclusion. (shrink)

We show that the existential preservation theorem fails for two-variable first-order logic FO2. It is known that for all k ≥ 3, FOk does not have an existential preservation theorem, so this settles the last open case, answering a question of Andreka, van Benthem, and Németi. In contrast, we prove that the homomorphism preservation theorem holds for FO2.

This paper appeared in Petrus's reader On Human Persons. It can be downloaded from the third entry down from this one.

The objective of this article is to review extant empirical studies of empathy in narrative reading in light of (i) contemporary literary theory, and (ii) neuroscientific studies of empathy, and to discuss how a closer interplay between neuroscience and literary studies may enhance our understanding of empathy in narrative reading. An introduction to some of the philosophical roots of empathy is followed by tracing its application in contemporary literary theory, in which scholars have pursued empathy with varying degrees of conceptual (...) precision, often within the context of embodied/enactive cognition. The presentation of empirical literary studies of empathy is subsequently contextualized by an overview of psychological and neuroscientific aspects of empathy. Highlighting points of convergence and divergence, the discussion illustrates how findings of empirical literary studies align with recent neuroscientific research. The article concludes with some prospects for future empirical research, suggesting that digitization may contribute to advancing the scientific knowledge of empathy in narrative reading. (shrink)

It has been argued by Hull and others that a remnant of essentialism impeded taxonomic progress until systematists abandoned attempting to define taxa on the basis of characters necessary and sufficient for group membership. The advent of cladistics suggests instead that it is an essentialistic view of characters, not of taxa, that should be abandoned, and that only a transformational view of characters allows evolutionary novelties to be identified, much less explained. Conventional Darwinian explanations are not tautologous but are difficult (...) to test and scarcely explain evolutionary novelties, probably because of their emphasis on genetic rather than epigenetic (developmental) processes. (shrink)

The central thesis of this paper is that contemporary theoretical physics is grounded in philosophical presuppositions that make it difficult to effectively address the problems of subject-object interaction and discontinuity inherent to quantum gravity. The core objectivist assumption implicit in relativity theory and quantum mechanics is uncovered and we see that, in string theory, this assumption leads into contradiction. To address this challenge, a new philosophical foundation is proposed based on the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger. Then, through (...) the application of qualitative topology and hypernumbers, phenomenological ideas about space, time, and dimension are brought into focus so as to provide specific solutions to the problems of force-field generation and unification. The phenomenological string theory that results speaks to the inconclusiveness of conventional string theory and resolves its core contradiction. (shrink)

The most majestic scientific achievement, of this century in mathematical beauty, axiomatic consistency, and experimental verifications has been special relativity with its unitary structure at the operator level, and canonical structure at the classical levels, which has turned out to be exactly valid for point particles moving in the homogenenous and isotropic vacuum (exterior dynamical problems). In recent decades a number of authors have studied nonunitary and noncanonical theories, here generally calleddeformations for the representation of broader conditions, such as extended (...) and deformable particles moving within inhomogeneous and anisotrophic physical media (interior dynamical problems). In this paper we show that nonunitary deformations, including, q-, k-, quatum-, Lie-isotopic, Lie-admissible, and other deformations, even thoughmathematically correct, have a number of problematic aspects ofphysical character when formulated on conventional spaces over conditional fields, such as lack of invariance of the basic space-time units, ambiguous applicability to measurements, loss of Hermiticity-observability in time, lack of invariant numerical predictions, loss of the axions of special relativity, and others. We then show that the classical noncanonical counterparts of the above nonunitary deformations are equally afflicted by corresponding problems of physical consistency. We also show that the contemporary formulation of gravity is afflicted by similar problematic aspects because Riemannian spaces are noncanonical deformations of Minkowskian spaces, thus having noninvariant space-time units. We then point out that new mathematical methods, calledisotopies, genotopies, hyperstructures and their isoduals, offer the possibilities of constructing a nonunitary theory, known asrelativistic hadronic mechanics which: (1) is as axiomatically consistent as relativistic quantum mechanics, (2) preserves the abstract axioms of special relativity, and (3) results in a completion of the conventional mechanics much along the celebrated Einstein-Podolski-Rosen argument. A number of novel applications are indicated, such as a geometric unification of the special and general relativity via the isominkowskian geometry in which the two relativities are differentiated via the invariant basic unit, while preserving conventional Riemannian metrics, Einstein's field equations, and related experimental verifications; a novel operator form of gravity verifying the axioms of relativistic quantum mechanics under the universal isopoincaré symmetry; a new structure model of hadrons with conventional massive particles as physical constituents which is compatile with composite quarks and with established unitary classifications; and other novels applications in nuclear physics, astrophysics, theoretical biology, and other fields. The paper ends with the proposal of a number of new experiments, some of which may imply new practical applications, such as conceivable new forms of recycling nuclear waste. The achievement of axiomatic consistency in the study of the above physical problems has been possible for the first time in this paper thanks to mathematical advances that recently appeared in a special issue of theRendiconti Circolo Matematico Palermo, and in other journals identified in the Acknowledgements. (shrink)

Aristotle offers several arguments in Physics viii.8 for his thesis that, when something moves back and forth, it does not undergo a single motion. These arguments occur against the background of a sophisticated theory, expounded in Physics v—vi, of the basic structure of motions and of other continuous entities such as times and magnitudes. The arguments in Physics viii.8 stand in a complex relation to that theory. On the one hand, Aristotle evidently relies on the theory in a number of (...) crucial steps. Yet in other steps he seems to contradict or misapply the theory. This situation offers the occasion to examine Aristotle’s views about some fundamentals in the metaphysics of motion, while also raising questions about the unity of the text which has come down to us as the Physics. (shrink)

A remarkable amount of the most innovative, significant, and lasting historical writing of the twentieth century has been produced in France, much of it the work of a group of historians associated with the journal Annales. Founded in 1929, Annales promoted a new kind of history based on three central aims: to substitute a problem-orientated analytical history for a traditional narrative of events; to embrace the history of the whole range of human activities rather than concentrate on political history; and, (...) in order to achieve the first two aims, to collaborate fully with other disciplines - notably geography, sociology, psychology, economics, linguistics, and anthropology. The critical history describes, analyzes, and evaluates the achievements of the Annales school, combining chronological and thematic approaches. The author distinguishes three generations in the history of the Annales movement. In the first phase, from the 1920's to 1945, the movement was small, radical, and subverse, fighting a guerrilla action against traditional political history and the history of events. Its leaders, and the founders of Annales, were Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch. After the Second World War, the movement's rebels took over the historical establishment. During this second phase, which lasted until about 1968, the movement was most nearly a school, with distinctive concepts and methods, and was presided over by the towering figure of Fernand Braudel. The third phase of the movement, which continues today, is marked by fragmentation. Its influence in France had become so great that it lost much of its distinctiveness, and no strong figures appeared to give the movement the inspiration and direction that Febvre, Bloch, and Braudel had provided. Some members of the group even returned to political history and to the narrative of events. The cycle was complete - the rebels became the establishment and were in turn rebelled against. (shrink)

Abstract This paper illustrates how Aristotle's topological theses about change in Physics 5-6 can help address metaphysical issues. Two distinctions from Physics 5. 1 are discussed: changing per se versus changing per aliud ; motion versus change. Change from white to black is motion and alteration, whereas change from white to not white is neither. But is not every change from white to black identical with a change from white to not white? Theses from Physics 6 refute the identity. Is (...) change from white to black at least accompanied by change from white to not white? Perhaps, but given further theses from Physics 6, this supposition yields unwelcome consequences. Most likely, when something changes from white to black it changes merely per aliud , not per se , from white to not white. Genuine change between white and not white is found elsewhere; its admission has bearing on Aristotle's theory of perception. (shrink)

This paper considers the temporal experience constituted by prohibitions against sleep that target individuals who are unhoused and sleep outside. More specifically, drawing on Cressida Heyes’s account of sleep and anaesthetic time in Anaesthetics of Existence, this paper develops a preliminary account of punctuated time as a form of time poverty that is acute for those who must sleep outside. It is argued that such prohibitions against sleep work to anchor an individual in a totalizing presence, thereby instituting a temporal (...) annihilation of subjectivity. Accordingly, this paper suggests that the particular experience of punctuated time endured by individuals who are unhoused can be understood as a violent interruption of subjectivity that pushes them to the edge of lived time. (shrink)

For Hegel, the ideal relation that two self-conscious beings might have to each other is one of reciprocal mutual recognition. According to Hegel, “a self-consciousness exists for [another] consciousness.” That is, self-consciousness is defined by its being recognized as self-conscious by another self-consciousness. In one formulation, Robert Pippin says that this means that “being a free agent consists in being recognized as one.” However, at the same time, Hegel values self-determination, which suggests a fundamental independence from others. The formative activity (...) of Bildung, writes Frederick Neuhouser, “is not simply formative experience of any type, but formative experience that has a specific end, namely, self-determination.” The fully educated Hegelian moral subject is self-determining, and is capable of making and pursuing its own ends. In this paper, after diagnosing some misreadings of Hegel’s concept of mutual recognition, I will show that the very possibility of self-determination is undermined by the doctrine of mutual recognition, not by consciousness becoming subject to the recognition bestowed by others, but rather because of the very nature of its own act of recognition itself. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article offers an account of cis sense in order to draw attention to the relation between meaning-making and cisnormativity. By drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of institution and phenomenological considerations of habit, it is argued that cis sense is a mode of perception that institutes and sediments an individual and social habit of the third-person conferral of gender that occludes gender variance and creates the social conditions necessary for transphobia. This consideration of cis sense challenges the mainstream conception of (...) cis as an identity category, highlighting instead that it is a habitual disposition, and gestures to the significance of trans sense as an alternative institution of gendered meaning. (shrink)