A violation of Bell’s inequalities is generally considered to be the Holy Grail of experimental proof that a specific natural phenomenon cannot be explained in a classical framework and is based on a non-boolean structure of predications. Generalized quantum theory allows for such non-boolean predications. We formulate temporal Bell’s inequalities for cognitive two-state systems and indicate how these inequalities can be tested. This will introduce the notion of temporally non-local measurements. The Necker-Zeno model for bistable perception predicts a (...) violation of these temporal Bell’s inequalities. (shrink)

The idea of complementarity already appears in William James’ (1890a, p. 206) Principles of Psychology in the chapter on “the relations of minds to other things”. Later, in 1927, Niels Bohr introduced complementarity as a fundamental concept in quantum mechanics. It refers to properties (observables) that a system cannot have simultaneously, and which cannot be simultaneously measured with arbitrarily high accuracy. Yet, in the context of classical physics they would both be needed for an exhaustive description of the system.

A novel conceptual framework for theoretical psychology is presented and illustrated for the example of bistable perception. A basic formal feature of this framework is the non-commutativity of operations acting on mental states. A corresponding model for the bistable perception of ambiguous stimuli, the Necker–Zeno model, is sketched and some empirical evidence for it so far is described. It is discussed how a temporal non-locality of mental states, predicted by the model, can be understood and tested.

1 – Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health, Wilhelmstr. 3a, 79098 Freiburg, Germany 2 – Parmenides Center, Via Mellini 26-28, 57031 Capoliveri, Italy 3 – Department of Ophtalmology, University of Freiburg, Killianstr. 5, 79106 Freiburg, Germany 4 – Institute of Physics, University of Freiburg, Hermann- Herder -Str. 3, 79104 Freiburg, GermanyThe “Necker-Zeno model”, a model for bistable perception inspired by the quantum Zeno effect, was previously used to relate three basic time scales of cognitive relevance (...) to one another in a quantitative manner. In this paper, the model predictions are compared with experimental results obtained under discontinuous presentation of an ambiguous stimulus. In addition to earlier results for long inter-stimulus intervals, we show that the reversal dynamics according to the Necker-Zeno model is also in agreement with new results for short inter-stimulus intervals. Moreover, we refine the model in such a way that it accounts for the distribution of “dwell times”. Finally, we indicate applications concerning the modification of cognitive time scales under conditions of psychopathological impairments and meditationinduced modes of awareness. ∗Address correspondence to this author at the Theory Division of the Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology, Wilhelmstr. 3a, D–79098 Freiburg, Germany; E-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Field dependence-independence (FDI) is a widely studied dimension of cognitive styles designed to measure an individual’s ability to identify embedded parts of an organized visual field as entities separate from that given field. The research aims to determine whether the brain activity features that are considered to be perceptual switching indicators could serve as robust features, differentiating Field-Dependent (FD) from Field-Independent (FI) participants. Previous research suggests that various features derived from event related potentials (ERP) and frequency features are associated with (...) the perceptual reversal occurring during the observation of a bistable image. In this study, we combined these features in the context of a different experimental scheme using ambiguous and unambiguous stimuli during participants’ perceptual observations. We assessed the participants’ FD-I classification with the use of the Hidden Figures Test (HFT). Results show that the peak amplitude of the frontoparietal positivity, the late positive deflection in frontal and parietal areas, is higher for the FD group at specific locations of the left lobe, whereas it occurs later for the FD group at the central and occipital electrodes. Additionally, the FD group exhibits higher levels of gamma power before stimulus onset at channel TP10 and higher gamma power during reversal at the right centroparietal electrodes (T8, CP6 and TP10). The peak amplitude of the reversal positivity, the positive deflection during the reversal, is higher for the FD group at the rear right lobe (P4). (shrink)

Aging is accompanied by stereotyped changes in functional brain activations, for example a cortical shift in activity patterns from posterior to anterior regions is one hallmark revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of aging cognition. Whether these neuronal effects of aging could potentially contribute to an amelioration of or resistance to the cognitive symptoms associated with psychopathology remains to be explored. We used a visual illusion paradigm to address whether aging affects the cortical control of perceptual beliefs and biases. (...) Our aim was to understand the effective connectivity associated with volitional control of ambiguous visual stimuli and to test whether greater top-down control of early visual networks emerged with advancing age. Using a bias training paradigm for ambiguous images we found that older participants (n = 16) resisted experimenter-induced visual bias compared to a younger cohort (n = 14) and that this resistance was associated with greater activity in prefrontal and temporal cortices. By applying Dynamic Causal Models for fMRI we uncovered a selective recruitment of top-down connections from the middle temporal to Lingual gyrus (LIN) by the older cohort during the perceptual switch decision following bias training. In contrast, our younger cohort did not exhibit any consistent connectivity effects but instead showed a loss of driving inputs to orbitofrontal sources following training. These findings suggest that perceptual beliefs are more readily controlled by top-down strategies in older adults and introduce age-dependent neural mechanisms that may be important for understanding aberrant belief states associated with psychopathology. (shrink)

Eye-related movements such as blinks and microsaccades are modulated during bistable perceptual tasks. However, if they play an active role during internal perceptual switches is not known. We conducted two experiments involving an ambiguous plaid stimulus, wherein participants were asked to continuously report their percept, which could consist of either unidirectional coherent or bidirectional component movement. Our main results show that blinks and microsaccades did not facilitate perceptual switches. On the contrary, a reduction in eye movements preceded the perceptual (...) switch. Blanks, on the other hand, thought to mimic the retinal consequences of a blink, consistently led to a switch. Through the timing of the blank-introduced perceptual change, we were able to estimate the delay between the internal switch and the response. This delay further allowed us to evaluate that the reduction in blink probability co-occurred with the internal perceptual switch. Additionally, our results indicate that distinct internal processes underlie the switch to coherent vs. component percept. Blanks exclusively facilitated a switch to the coherent percept, and only the switch to coherent percept was followed by an increase in blink rate. In a second study, we largely replicated the findings and included a microsaccade analysis. Microsaccades only showed a weak relation with perceptual switches, but their direction was correlated with the perceived motion direction. Nevertheless, our data suggests an interaction between microsaccades and blinks by showing that microsaccades were differently modulated around blinks compared with blanks. This study shows that a reduction in eye movements precedes internal perceptual switches indicating that the rate of blinks can set the stage for a reinterpretation of sensory input. While a perceptual switch based on changed sensory input usually leads to an increase in blink rate, such an increase was only present after the perceptual switch to coherent motion but absent after the switch to component percept. This provides evidence of different underlying mechanism or internal consequence of the two perceptual switches and suggests that blinks can uncover differences in internal percept-related processes that are not evident from the percept itself. (shrink)

Bistable figures provide a fascinating window through which to explore human visual awareness. Here we demonstrate for the first time that the semantic context provided by a background auditory soundtrack can modulate an observer’s predominant percept while watching the bistable “my wife or my mother-in-law” figure . The possibility of a response-bias account—that participants simply reported the percept that happened to be congruent with the soundtrack that they were listening to—was excluded in Experiment 2. We further demonstrate that (...) this crossmodal semantic effect was additive with the manipulation of participants’ visual fixation , while it interacted with participants’ voluntary attention . These results indicate that audiovisual semantic congruency constrains the visual processing that gives rise to the conscious perception of bistable visual figures. Crossmodal semantic context therefore provides an important mechanism contributing to the emergence of visual awareness. (shrink)

In this study, voluntary and involuntary visual attention focused on different interpretations of a bistable image, were investigated using magnetoencephalography. A Necker cube with sinusoidally modulated pixels' intensity in the front and rear faces with frequencies 6.67 Hz and 8.57 Hz, respectively, was presented to 12 healthy volunteers, who interpreted the cube as either left- or right-oriented. The tags of these frequencies and their second harmonics were identified in the average Fourier spectra of the MEG data recorded from the (...) visual cortex. In the first part of the experiment, the subjects were asked to voluntarily control their attention by interpreting the cube orientation as either being on the left or right. Accordingly, we observed the dominance of the corresponding spectral component, and voluntary attention performance was measured. In the second part of the experiment, the subjects were asked to focus their gaze on a red marker at the center of the cube image without putting forth effort in its interpretation. The alternation of the dominant spectral energies at the second harmonics of the stimulation frequencies was treated as changes in the cube orientation. Based on the results of the first experimental stage and using a wavelet analysis, we developed a method which allowed us to identify the currently perceived cube orientation. Finally, we characterized involuntary attention using the distribution of dominance times when focusing attention on one of the cube orientations, which was related to voluntary attention performance and brain noise. In particular, we confirmed our hypothesis that higher attention performance is associated with stronger brain noise. (shrink)

It is proposed that subconscious retro-predictions in conjunction with brain state update cycles are instrumental in the physiological generation of conscious sensations and perceptions, and in all abstract thought. In this paper the hypothesis is supported by conducting a detailed a re-evaluation of the self-referential statements in Set Theory and Formal Logic known as antinomies. This study concludes that the recursive behavior exhibited by abstract enigmas such as "Russell’s Paradox" is analogous to the oscillations typical of bistable perceptual phenomena.

Recently, approach-avoidance tendencies and visual perception biases have been increasingly studied using bistable point-light walkers (PLWs). Prior studies have found a facing-the-viewer bias when one is primed with general threat stimuli (e.g. angry faces), explained by the “error management theory”, as failing to detect a threat as approaching is riskier than the opposite. Importantly, no study has explored how disease threat – linked to the behavioural immune system – might affect this bias. This study aimed to explore whether (...) disease-signalling cues can alter how we perceive the motion direction of ambiguous PLWs. Throughout 3 experiments, participants indicated the motion direction of a bistable PLW previously primed with a control or disease-signalling stimuli – that is, face with a surgical mask (Experiment 1), sickness sound (Experiment 2), or face with a disease cue (Experiment 3). Results showed that sickness cues do not significantly modulate the perception of approach-avoidance behaviours. However, a pattern emerged in Experiments 2 and 3, suggesting that sickness stimuli led to more facing away percepts. Unlike other types of threat, this implies that disease-related threat stimuli might trigger a distinct perceptual bias, indicating a preference to avoid a possible infection source. Nonetheless, this finding warrants future investigations. (shrink)

Spontaneous eye blinks are modulated around perceptual events. Our previous study, using a visual ambiguous stimulus, indicated that blink probability decreases before a reported perceptual switch. In the current study, we tested our hypothesis that an absence of blinks marks a time in which perceptual switches are facilitated in‐ and outside the visual domain. In three experiments, presenting either a visual motion quartet in light or darkness or a bistable auditory streaming stimulus, we found a co‐occurrence of blink rate (...) reduction with increased perceptual switch probability. In the visual domain, perceptual switches induced by a short interruption of visual input (blank) allowed an estimate of the timing of the perceptual event with respect to the motor response. This provided the first evidence that the blink reduction was not a consequence of the perceptual switch. Importantly, by showing that the time between switches and the previous blink was significantly longer than the inter‐blink interval, our studies allowed to conclude that perceptual switches did not happen at random but followed a prolonged period of nonblinking. Correspondingly, blink rate and switch rate showed an inverse relationship. Our study supports the idea that the absence or presence of blinks maps perceptual processes independent of the sensory modality. (shrink)

We use the hierarchical nature of Bayesian perceptual inference to explain a fundamental aspect of the temporality of experience, namely the phenomenology of temporal flow. The explanation says that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception stems from probabilistic inference that the present cannot be trusted. The account begins by describing hierarchical inference under the notion of prediction error minimization, and exemplifies distrust of the present within bistable visual perception and action initiation. Distrust of the present (...) is then discussed in relation to previous research on temporal phenomenology. Finally, we discuss how there may be individual differences in the experience of temporal flow, in particular along the autism spectrum. The resulting view is that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception results from an internal, inferential process. (shrink)

The way we represent and perceive time has crucial implications for studying temporality in conscious experience. Contrasting positions posit that temporal information is separately abstracted out like any other perceptual property through specialized mechanisms or that time is represented through the temporality of experiences themselves. To add to this debate, we investigate alterations in felt time in conditions where only conscious visual experience is altered through perceptual switches while a bistable figure remains physically unchanged. We predicted that if perceived (...) time is a function of temporally evolving conscious content, then a break in it (here via a perceptual switch) would also lead to a break in felt time. In three experiments, we showed participants a Necker cube that was manipulated to induce a perceptual switch (experiments 1(a) and 1(b)) or left to switch on its own (experiment 2). We asked participants to report both perceptual switches and felt durations (experiments 1(a) and 2) or only estimate time (experiment 1(b)). Over these three experiments, we find evidence of contraction of felt time in trials with a perceptual switch, consistent with the idea that perceived time is a function of temporally evolving conscious experience. Additionally, we present a phenomenological demonstration to support our empirical data. Overall, the study provides evidence for temporal mirroring and isomorphism in visual experience, arguing for a link between the timing of experience and time perception. (shrink)

The paper is focused on the concept of perceptual relation according to experimental phenomenology, belonging to Gestaltist and ecological traditions. First of all, it will be shown the meaning of “relation” in the perceptual domain, including a specific definition of object and subject. For this purpose, the paper will present the difference with the representationalist perspective, which challenges immediate experience and the perception of unified objects. Secondly, the concept of “perceptual relation” will be compared to the idea of Gestalttheorie’s (...) “intrinsic relation”. It will be sustained that perceptual relations do not concern only connections between the parts and the whole of a configuration, but they extend to otherness, namely perceptual object, other subjects, and the Umwelt. For this purpose, the paper will provide some examples of ambiguity of the relation ground-figure, especially reversible and bistable figures. (shrink)

We propose an empirical mode decomposition (EMD-) based method to extract features from the multichannel recordings of local field potential (LFP), collected from the middle temporal (MT) visual cortex in a macaque monkey, for decoding its bistable structure-from-motion (SFM) perception. The feature extraction approach consists of three stages. First, we employ EMD to decompose nonstationary single-trial time series into narrowband components called intrinsic mode functions (IMFs) with time scales dependent on the data. Second, we adopt unsupervised K-means clustering (...) to group the IMFs and residues into several clusters across all trials and channels. Third, we use the supervised common spatial patterns (CSP) approach to design spatial filters for the clustered spatiotemporal signals. We exploit the support vector machine (SVM) classifier on the extracted features to decode the reported perception on a single-trial basis. We demonstrate that the CSP feature of the cluster in the gamma frequency band outperforms the features in other frequency bands and leads to the best decoding performance. We also show that the EMD-based feature extraction can be useful for evoked potential estimation. Our proposed feature extraction approach may have potential for many applications involving nonstationary multivariable time series such as brain-computer interfaces (BCI). (shrink)

Stimuli that resemble humans, but are not perfectly human-like, are disliked compared to distinctly human and nonhuman stimuli. Accounts of this “Uncanny Valley” effect often focus on how changes in human resemblance can evoke different emotional responses. We present an alternate account based on the novel hypothesis that the Uncanny Valley is not directly related to ‘human-likeness’ per se, but instead reflects a more general form of stimulus devaluation that occurs when inhibition is triggered to resolve conflict between competing stimulus-related (...) representations. We consider existing support for this inhibitory-devaluation hypothesis and further assess its feasibility through tests of two corresponding predictions that arise from the link between conflict-resolving inhibition and aversive response: 1) that the pronounced disliking of Uncanny-type stimuli will occur for any image that strongly activates multiple competing stimulus representations, even in the absence of any human-likeness, and 2) that the negative peak of an ‘Uncanny Valley’ should occur at the point of greatest stimulus-related conflict and not (in the presence of human-likeness) always closer to the ‘human’ end of a perceptual continuum. We measured affective responses to a set of line drawings representing nonhuman animal-animal morphs, in which each continuum midpoint was a bistable image (Exp. 1), as well as to sets of human-robot and human-animal computer-generated morphs (Exp. 2). Affective trends depicting classic Uncanny Valley functions occurred for all continua, including the nonhuman stimuli. Images at continua midpoints elicited significantly more negative affect than images at endpoints, even when the continua included a human endpoint. This illustrates the feasibility of the inhibitory-devaluation hypothesis and the need for further research into the possibility that the strong dislike of Uncanny-type stimuli reflects the negative affective consequences of cognitive inhibition. (shrink)

This paper analyzes how conflicts of perspective are resolved in the field of the human sciences. Examples of such conflicts are the duality between the actor and spectator standpoints, or the duality of participancy between a form of social life and a socio-anthropological study of it. This type of duality look irreducible, because the conflicting positions express incompatible interests. Yet, the claim of incommensurability is excessive. There exists a level of mental activity at which dialogue and resolution are possible. Reaching (...) this level only implies that one comes back to a state of undetermination between situations and interests whose best model is a superposition of states in generalized quantum theory. Some applications of this strategy of going back below the point of state reduction , from the psychology of perception to the history of civilization, are presented. (shrink)

Moving from the structure of rites of passage, since Arnold Van Gennep’s renowned work (1909), to the essence of liminality captured by Victor Turner (1967), I propose a neurocognitive anthropological approach dealing with the bistable liminality found in human narrative imaginaries. In a brain-culture nexus, I will examine the liminal phase of the rites of passage by drawing on the enactive cognitive bistability property of the human brain. Recalling that the fundamental property of bistable systems is the alternation (...) of two distinct states of stable equilibrium, I propose a model that identifies the neurocognitive bases on which the transcultural variations of narrative motifs related to metamorphosis can be woven. (shrink)

Mitotic entry and exit are switch‐like transitions that are driven by the activation and inactivation of Cdk1 and mitotic cyclins. This simple on/off reaction turns out to be a complex interplay of various reversible reactions, feedback loops, and thresholds that involve both the direct regulators of Cdk1 and its counteracting phosphatases. In this review, we summarize the interplay of the major components of the system and discuss how they work together to generate robustness, bistability, and irreversibility. We propose that it (...) may be beneficial to regard the entry and exit reactions as two separate reversible switches that are distinguished by differences in the state of phosphatase activity, mitotic proteolysis, and a dramatic rearrangement of cellular components after nuclear envelope breakdown, and discuss how the major Cdk1 activity thresholds could be determined for these transitions. (shrink)

In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences (...) ever justify evaluative judgments? Are experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgments? (3) Questions about Value Theory and Evaluative Perception: Is the existence of evaluative experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of value experience? (shrink)

Research on moral distress has paid limited attention to nurses’ responses and actions. In a survey of nurses’ perceptions of moral distress and ethical climate, 292 nurses answered three open-ended questions about situations that they considered morally distressing. Participants identified a range of situations as morally distressing, including witnessing unnecessary suffering, being forced to provide care that compromised values, and negative judgments about patients. They linked these situations to contextual constraints such as workload and described responses, including feeling incompetent and (...) distancing themselves from patients. Participants described considerable effort to effect change, calling into question the utility of defining moral distress as an “inability to act due to institutional constraints” or a “failure to pursue a right course of action.” Various understandings of moral distress operated, and action was integral to their responses. The findings suggest further conceptual work on moral distress and effort to support system-level change. (shrink)

abstract: Anaxagoras is notorious for his view that every perception is accompanied by pain but that not all concurrent pains are distinctly felt by the perceiving subject. This thesis is reported and criticized by Aristotle's heir Theophrastus in his De Sensibus. Traditionally, scholars believe that Theophrastus rejects Anaxagoras's thesis of the ubiquity of pain as counterintuitive, with the appeal to unfelt pain looking like a desperate category mistake given that pain is nothing but a feeling. Contra the traditional view, (...) this paper argues that Theophrastus neither aims to defend ordinary phenomenology nor is bothered by the concept of unfelt pain; instead, he develops a series of new Aristotelian arguments to defend a controversial, optimistic picture about the distribution of affective qualities in animal life. More than a supplement to Aristotle's psychology, his engagement with Anaxagoras reveals an important yet often ignored ethical concern behind the Peripatetic philosophy of perception. (shrink)

Husserl seems to have devoted roughly equal amounts of energy and pages to the description of perception, judgement, and imagination. By “description,” he meant the analysis of the traits and components of mental states or acts and their objects. As his views changed over the years about the nature of intentionality and philosophy, the descriptive psychology of the Logical Investigations (1900/01) gave way to descriptive programmes in which the objects of perception and of judgement were conceived of in (...) terms of a new, analytic framework; in particular Husserl lost interest in describing the things and processes in the real world that are the objects of perception and judgement and so too in describing their relations to these acts. His new analytic framework, particularly as it applies to perception, has been thoroughly expounded and discussed in the literature. My aim here is to expound Husserl's first descriptions of perception within the framework of the Investigations and to incorporate as far as possible his later descriptive results to the extent that these are separable from his later turn to idealism. (shrink)

Outside of philosophy, ‘intuition’ means something like ‘knowing without knowing how you know’. Intuition in this broad sense is an important epistemological category. I distinguish intuition from perception and perception from perceptual experience, in order to discuss the distinctive psychological and epistemological status of evaluative property attributions. Although it is doubtful that we perceptually experience many evaluative properties and also somewhat unlikely that we perceive many evaluative properties, it is highly plausible that we intuit many instances of evaluative (...) properties as such. The resulting epistemological status of evaluative property attributions is very much like it would be if we literally perceived such properties. (shrink)

Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the (...) realist contention that these direct objects of perception are the persisting mind-independent physical objects we all know and love. (shrink)

In Perception: First Form of Mind, Tyler Burge develops an understanding of the most primitive type of representational mind: perception. Focusing on its form, function, and underlying capacities, as indicated in the sciences of perception, Burge provides an account of the representational content and formal representational structure of perceptual states, and develops a formal semantics for them. The account is elaborated by an explanation of how the representational form is embedded in an iconic format. These structures are (...) then situated in current theoretical accounts of the processing of perceptual representations, with an emphasis on the formation of perceptual categorizations. An exploration of the relationship between perception and other primitive capacities-conation, attention, memory, anticipation, affect, learning, and imagining-clarifies the distinction between perceiving, with its associated capacities, and thinking, with its associated capacities. Drawing on a broad range of historical and contemporary research, rather than relying on introspection or ordinary talk about perception, Perception: First Form of Mind is a scientifically rigorous and agenda-setting work in the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

In the 1980s, a number of philosophers argued that perception is analog. In the ensuing years, these arguments were forcefully criticized, leaving the thesis in doubt. This paper draws on Weber’s Law, a well-entrenched finding from psychophysics, to advance a new argument that perception is analog. This new argument is an adaptation of an argument that cognitive scientists have leveraged in support of the contention that primitive numerical representations are analog. But the argument here is extended to the (...) representation of non-numerical magnitudes, such as luminance and distance, and shown to apply to perception and not just cognition. The relevant sense of ‘analog’ is also clarified, and two powerful objections are addressed. Finally, the question whether perception’s analog vehicles are located in conscious experience is explored and related to a well-known controversy within psychophysics. (shrink)

"Berkeley's Analysis of Perception" is an internal analysis of the development and consequences of Berkeley's interpretation of the perceptual process. It seeks to show that the implications of Berkeley's understanding of perception lead to conclusions later formulated in phenomenalistic theories of perception.

This book offers solutions to two persistent and I believe closely related problems in epistemology. The first problem is that of drawing a principled distinction between perception and inference: what is the difference between seeing that something is the case and merely believing it on the basis of what we do see? The second problem is that of specifying which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., directly, or noninferentially, justified) and which are not. I argue that what makes a belief (...) a perceptual belief, or a basic belief, is not any introspectible feature of the belief but rather the nature of the cognitive system, or "module", that is causally responsible for the belief. Thus, even zombies, who in the philosophical literature lack conscious experiences altogether, can have basic, justified, perceptual beliefs. -/- The theories of perceptual and basic beliefs developed in the monograph are embedded in a larger reliabilist epistemology. I use this theory of basic beliefs to develop a detailed reliabilist theory: Inferentialist Reliabilism, which offers a reliabilist theory of inferential justification and which solves some longstanding problems for other reliabilist views by demanding inferential support for some—but not all—beliefs. The book is an instance of a thoroughgoingly naturalistic approach to epistemology. Many of my arguments have an empirical basis, and the view that I endorse reserves a central role for the cognitive sciences—in particular, cognitive neuroscience—in filling in the details of an applied epistemological theory. (shrink)

Ayant enquêté auprès de plusieurs jhākri/chamans de l’Himalaya népalais, nous avons pu explorer leur espace liminal, cet « entre-deux » qui sépare le monde des morts de celui des vivants. En cherchant à reconstituer la complexité des rapports entre pratiques rituelles et pratiques narratives des systèmes de croyance hindoue, nous avons considéré ce limen comme un lieu de passage, aux frontières fluides, pour des ontologies surnaturelles et des êtres humains aux pouvoirs exceptionnels, en l’occurrence ces jhākri népalais. À partir des (...) données ethnographiques concernant le rituel d’incorporation au cours duquel ces chamans himalayens peuvent fusionner avec leur esprit tutélaire, nous avons développé un modèle en nous basant sur une propriété du cerveau confirmée depuis la Gestalt : sa bistabilité cognitive enactive. L’incorporation, qui prend place en phase liminale, se déroule bien selon un cycle bistable, avec une alternance constante de deux expressions formelles, métemmorphoses, chacune potentiellement stable en mode fusionnel ou ségrégationnel. C’est là selon nous que réside tout le « secret » du succès de telles conceptions métemphysiques autour de la métemsomatose, hypertrophiée chez le jhākri passeur intra mundi en mode bistable. Our recent investigations among several jhākri/shamans from the Nepal Himalaya allowed us to identify a liminal “in-between” space, separating the world of the dead from the living one. From the relationship between ritual practices and narratives in Hindu beliefs, we can consider this limen, with fluid boundaries, as a crossing point for different supernatural ontologies and for a few human beings with exceptional powers, Nepalese jhākris. To cope with the ethnographic data about the incorporation ritual, when these shamans may fuse with their tutelary spirit, we had to dwell on a model repeatedly fed since Gestalt findings, endowing the brain with an enactive cognitive bistability property. This incorporation ritual which takes place in the liminal phase, evolves in such a bistability cycle, with two alternating morphings, each potentially stable in a fusion or segregation mode. Her lies the core for the success of such metemphysical concepts about metensomatosis, overdeveloped in the jhākri as a bistable intermediary intra mundi. (shrink)