Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties

In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception (2018)
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Outside of philosophy, ‘intuition’ means something like ‘knowing without knowing how you know’. Intuition in this broad sense is an important epistemological category. I distinguish intuition from perception and perception from perceptual experience, in order to discuss the distinctive psychological and epistemological status of evaluative property attributions. Although it is doubtful that we perceptually experience many evaluative properties and also somewhat unlikely that we perceive many evaluative properties, it is highly plausible that we intuit many instances of evaluative properties as such. The resulting epistemological status of evaluative property attributions is very much like it would be if we literally perceived such properties.



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Jack Lyons
University of Glasgow

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