I consider the contrast between Leibniz's relational concept of spacetime and Einstein's special and general theories of relativity. I suggest that there are two interpretations of Leibniz's view, which I call L1 and L2. L1 amounts to saying that there is no real inertial structure to spacetime, whereas in general relativity the inertial structure is dynamical or real in Lande's sense ; i.e., it can be ‘kicked’ and ‘kicks back,’ causing gravitational effects. If there is no real inertial structure to (...) space-time then, as Weyl points out, the concept of the relative motive of several bodies has no more foundation than the concept of absolute motion for a single body. Thus, L1 seems to be untenable. L2 is a more sophisticated view which rejects the geometrical aspect of Newtonian space-time as a container for events, but accepts the existence of a real structure which determines the inertial properties of matter. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Barbara Lariviere offers a very useful distinction between two ways of understanding the claims that Leibniz, or relational theorists in general, might wish to make about the nature of motion and the structure of space and time; viz., There is no real inertial structure to space-time.and There is a real inertial structure to space-time, but it is dynamical rather than absolute.Citing the authority of Weyl, the author argues that L1 is untenable; (...) indeed, the argument purports to show that if L1 were true, then there would be no coherent basis for a theory of motion, not even a relational theory. My main goal in this note is to point out why this argument is mistaken while at the same time sketching the real reason why the relational conception of motion is untenable. In addition I will offer a few remarks about the relevance of L2 to the absolute-relational controvery. (shrink)

This book examines the birth of the scientific understanding of motion. It investigates which logical tools and methodological principles had to be in place to give a consistent account of motion, and which mathematical notions were introduced to gain control over conceptual problems of motion. It shows how the idea of motion raised two fundamental problems in the 5th and 4th century BCE: bringing together being and non-being, and bringing together time and space. The first problem leads to the exclusion (...) of motion from the realm of rational investigation in Parmenides, the second to Zeno's paradoxes of motion. Methodological and logical developments reacting to these puzzles are shown to be present implicitly in the atomists, and explicitly in Plato who also employs mathematical structures to make motion intelligible. With Aristotle we finally see the first outline of the fundamental framework with which we conceptualise motion today. (shrink)

Originally published in 1920, this book was intended as a brief outline of psychoanalysis for those interested in the subject, but without the time to study the work of Freud and his followers first hand.

An extended analysis and account of the psychological/social/cognitive dynamics of intellectual controversy. The immediate focus is the recurrent failure of intellectual engagement, in encounters having to do with with truth, knowledge, language, science, and/or objectivity, between, on the one hand, rationalist-realist-objectivist philosophers and/or those they have instructed and, on the other hand, constructivist-pragmatist ("postmodern") theorists and/or those persuaded by their critiques and/or alternative views. Individual chapters examine critiques and defenses of objectivist-rationalist views in law, politics, literary studies, ethics, communication theory, (...) and philosophy of science. Theorists whose views are discussed critically at some length include legal scholar Robin West and philosophers Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, and Philip Kitcher. (shrink)

In a highly original rereading of the writings and seminars of Jacques Lacan, together with works of Freud and others, Cassin shows how psychoanalysis, like the sophists, challenges the very foundations of scientific rationality. In taking seriously equivocations, jokes, and unfinishable projects of interpretation, the analyst, like the sophist, allows performance, signifier, and inconsistency to reshape truth.

The essays in this volume offer an approach to the history of moral and political philosophy that takes its inspiration from John Rawls. All the contributors are philosophers who have studied with Rawls and they offer this collection in his honour. The distinctive feature of this approach is to address substantive normative questions in moral and political philosophy through an analysis of the texts and theories of major figures in the history of the subject: Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant and (...) Marx. By reconstructing the core of these theories in a way that is informed by contemporary theoretical concerns, the contributors show how the history of the subject is a resource for understanding present and perennial problems in moral and political philosophy. This outstanding collection will be of particular interest to historians of moral and political philosophy, historians of ideas, and political scientists. (shrink)

Anorexia nervosa is a very serious condition because of the suffering and loss of life that it causes. However, the wishes of the people directly involved can be strongly opposed. The person with severe AN may not want treatment, yet her family beseeches professionals to unilaterally intervene and clinical teams are divided over the defensibility of involuntary hospitalization and treatment. The metaphor of a crucible is used in this paper to help identify how much is at stake and how much (...) is in conflict when someone has AN. Frank cautions against ethical analyses that rely mostly on substantive principles or rules and institutional conflict resolution procedures. This paper applies his heuristic concepts of “ethics-as-substance” and “ethics-as-process” to a prototypical AN case to illustrate how process activities can expand understanding of, and responsiveness to, those who are living with this dire condition or those who are obligated to help. (shrink)

L'auteur conteste l'interprétation de Nietzsche qui met le corps "à la place de l'âme et de la conscience". Selon elle, le "concept de Dionysos" ne conduit pas à l'affirmation de la vie, mais à sa critique.

While public health ethics typically deals with issues wherein individual well-being competes with the population’s wellbeing, it also deals with competing groups’ well-being. Public health responses to the Chicago heat wave and Hurricane Katrina were strongly criticized, in part, because certain groups of people experienced far greater and longer-lasting losses compared to others. Diff erences in experience were largely due to socio-economic-political disadvantages or vulnerabilities. This article is written in light of the recent fi rst and second “waves” of the (...) H1N1 pandemic in Canada. Its focus is on people living in the community with a mental health or addiction problem during the pandemic and, more specifi cally, in the context of supplies of anti-viral medications and vaccines being limited. The article explores how certain social justice concerns may increase the risks of serious illness or death for these people and the kinds of compensatory responses that might be implemented. (shrink)

I present modifications of the notion of the a priori knowledge (beliefs) or justification executed in the recent epistemological conceptions, and discuss difficulties raised in their empiricist criticisms. Next, I discuss a naturalist and a metaphysical extreme approaches to the a priori , and give arguments against the need for the acceptance of the a priori versus a posteriori opposition. My arguments refer to contemporary philosophical processes: the abandonment of the abstract concept of the cognizing subject, the rejection of the (...) concept of language as a logical representational structure, and the demise of the ideal of episteme. (shrink)