In addition to a person's character and training, the organization's ethical work climate (EWC) can assess how the organization influences an individual's ethical decision-making process by examining the individuals' perception of "what is the right thing to do" in a particular organizational environment. Relatively little research has explored which EWCs dominate military units and the impact of organizational role and environmental uncertainty on individuals in the military and their ethical decision making. In this study, we examined the (...) predominant EWCs among military units and found that certain organizational influences are associated with the specific EWCs. Based on these discoveries, we discuss the implications of EWC studies and the influence of organizational role and environmental uncertainty for researchers, as well as military leaders. (shrink)

In this article, I use Plato's functional account of justice and temperance in the Republic to contend that military units have at least two virtues that are not reducible to the virtues of the individuals in the units. Specifically, I use Plato's discussion of justice and temperance in the city-state to focus on the nature of these virtues in military units. I support my thesis by pointing out the value of attributing them to military (...) units and by indicating some of the ways that modern militaries currently promote the states that Plato identifies as justice and temperance. By understanding these virtues and the ways that they can be promoted, the performance of units can be improved. (shrink)

This article introduces the Culturally Meaningful Networks (CMN) approach. Following a pragmatist perspective of social mechanisms more broadly, it develops and demonstrates an approach to understanding networks that incorporates both structure and meaning and that leverages time to understand how these aspects influence each other. I apply this approach to investigate a longstanding puzzle about why some of those who leave military service for civilian life fare well, and others badly. In a mixed-methods analysis, I follow a sample of (...) individuals moving through the transition from military to civilian life in the contemporary United Kingdom. I find that the higher the proportion of alters (i.e., “contacts”) with a military background in the networks of leavers before discharge, the worse they fare after discharge. The CMN approach helps me locate a specific structural embedding that explains the presence or absence of durable cultural frames that set the context for the actual experience of the transition and cause problems during it. Attention to the temporal unfolding of network structure and social meaning is essential to bringing out this finding. By re-embedding networks within people’s experiences over time, the CMN approach helps grasp the distinctions by which leavers understand their interactions. I conclude by arguing that the CMN approach has implications for network sociology and cultural sociology that go beyond this substantive case. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that the nature of military operations is one of such character that no matter how well you prepare there will still be an expectation of having to deal with the unknown and unforeseen. Accordingly, there seem to be reasons for arguing that preparations for the unpredictable should play a critical role in military education. Yet, military education as we know it seems to be characterized by a rather classic modernist view on education, which (...) promotes an environment of learning that embraces uniformity and enhances scenario based pre-planned drills as ways of conducting military operations. In this paper I will argue an alternative perspective, one that embraces difference rather than uniformity as a means of developing military units and their soldiers. In doing so I will ground my argument in the academic discourse on postmodern education. It is my understanding that educational practices prone to postmodern thinking are embedded in narratives sensitive to constructivism, complexity and contextualism, and thus use emancipation, deconstruction, vocabulary, dialogue, diversity and aesthetics as pedagogical strategies in their creation of ‘new’ meaning. A discussion of these strategies in relation to the topic of ‘the unpredictable’ constitutes the main body of this paper. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that the nature of military operations is one of such character that no matter how well you prepare there will still be an expectation of having to deal with the unknown and unforeseen. Accordingly, there seem to be reasons for arguing that preparations for the unpredictable should play a critical role in military education. Yet, military education as we know it seems to be characterized by a rather classic modernist view on education, which (...) promotes an environment of learning that embraces uniformity and enhances scenario based pre-planned drills as ways of conducting military operations. In this paper I will argue an alternative perspective, one that embraces difference rather than uniformity as a means of developing military units and their soldiers. In doing so I will ground my argument in the academic discourse on postmodern education. It is my understanding that educational practices prone to postmodern thinking are embedded in narratives sensitive to constructivism, complexity and contextualism, and thus use emancipation, deconstruction, vocabulary, dialogue, diversity and aesthetics as pedagogical strategies in their creation of ‘new’ meaning. A discussion of these strategies in relation to the topic of ‘the unpredictable’ constitutes the main body of this paper. (shrink)

In 2011, Egypt witnessed more protests than any other country in the world: the beginning of a revolutionary process that would unfold in three waves of revolution, followed by two waves of counterrevolution. In addition to providing new and unprecedented empirical data, the book makes two theoretical contributions. First, a new framework is presented for analyzing the state apparatus in Egypt that is based on four pillars of regime support which can either prop up or press upon whoever is in (...) power: the Egyptian military, the business elite, the United States, and the multi-headed opposition. Secondly, the book brings together the literature on bottom-up revolutionary movements and top-down military coups, and introduces the concept of a coup from below in contrast to the revolution from above that took place under Gamal Abdel Nasser. (shrink)

The military service of combat soldiers may pose many threats to their well being and often take a toll on body and mind, influencing the physical and emotional make-up of combatants and veterans. The current study aims to enhance our knowledge about the combat experiences and the challenges that female soldiers face both during and after their service. The study is based on qualitative methods and narrative analysis of in-depth semi-structured personal interviews with twenty military veterans. It aims (...) to analyze the narratives of American and Israeli female combat soldiers regarding their military service, with emphasis on the soldiers’ descriptions, in their own words, about their difficulties, challenges, coping and successes during their service and transition to civilian life. A recurring theme in the interviews with the veterans of both militaries was the need to be heard and the fact that societies, therapists, and military institutions do not always truly listen to female veterans’ experiences and are not really interested in what actually ails them. Our research suggests that conventional methods used in research relating to veterans might at times be inadequate, because the inherent categorization might abstract, pathologize, and fragment a wide array of soldiers’ modes of post-combat being. Moreover, female veterans’ voices will not be fully heard unless we allow them to be active participants in generating knowledge about themselves. (shrink)

US military intervention and covert action is a significant contributor to global injustice. Discussion of this contributor to global injustice is relatively common in social justice movements. Yet it has been ignored by the global justice literature in political philosophy. This paper aims to fill this gap by introducing the topic into the global justice debate. While the global justice debate has focused on inter-national and supra-national institutions, I argue that an adequate analysis of US military and covert (...) action must focus on domestic institutions of the US. I describe many such institutions including industry lobbying, the ubiquity of US military bases abroad, US programs for training foreign militaries, secrecy of the intelligence and military agencies, pliant news media and government propaganda.<br>. (shrink)

The United States Department of Defense has, for at least 20 years, held the stated intention to enhance active military personnel (“warfighters”). This intention has become more acute in the face of dropping recruitment, an aging fighting force, and emerging strategic challenges. However, developing and testing enhancements is clouded by the ethically contested status of enhancements, the long history of abuse by military medical researchers, and new legislation in the guise of “health security” that has enabled the Department (...) of Defense to apply medical interventions without appropriate oversight. This paper aims to reconcile existing legal and regulatory frameworks on military biomedical research with ethical concerns about military enhancements. In what follows, we first outline one justification for military enhancements. The authors then briefly address existing definitional issues over what constitutes enhancement before addressing existing research ethics regulations governing military biomedical research. Next, they argue that two common justifications for rapid military innovation in science and technology, including enhancement, fail. These justifications are (a) to satisfy a compelling military need and (b) strategic dominance. The authors then turn to an objection that turns on the idea that we need not have these justifications if warfighters are willing to adopt enhancement, and argue that laissez-faire approaches to enhancement fail in the context of the military due to pressing and historically significant concerns about coercion and exploitation. The paper concludes with what is referred to as the “least-worst” justification: Given the rise of untested enhancements in civilian and military life, we have good reason to validate potential enhancements even if they do not satisfy reasons (a) or (b) above. (shrink)

The phenomenon of war occupies one of the leading places in socio-philosophical and cultural studies. War also has an ambiguous position in human life. On the historical map we see the ongoing waves of armed conflicts, which inevitably lead to fatal consequences for countries, peoples and human beings. War mainly appears in the form of horrors and tragedies. However, in philosophical studies, war is considered from different angles. Philosophers often emphasize the ambiguity and multidimensionality of war. In this work, the (...) authors analyze the phenomenon of war, given a certain “attractiveness” and even the “necessity” of this phenomenon for humans. The authors also summarize the available range of answers to the question of where the desire for violence comes from, that is, the so-called “thirst for war”. It is this desire that gives rise to a constant stay of people in a state of war. The results of this study show that war is indeed an important phenomenon, which can also be considered one of the fundamental attributes of human nature. Analyzing various approaches that explain the causes of war the authors note that the source of any armed conflict is precisely the “militancy” in the very essence of homo sapiens. Human beings must constantly fight for their existence. And such a struggle often takes various forms, which can be considered as concrete variants of the same phenomenon. This phenomenon at the theoretical and philosophical level is fixed in the concept of war. Despite the natural sense of horror that the word “war” evokes at the level of everyday consciousness, pain and hope, death and freedom, faith in human and the justice of the universe, as well as a willingness to fight for this justice, are simultaneously hidden under this “ language shell”. All these internally contradictory meanings are united within the framework of the philosophically processed concept of war, and are also embodied in many different “wars” that a person constantly wages due to his / her specific “being structure”. Human, therefore, is a “warring creature,” or, as the authors propose to denote this feature, “homo militaris”. (shrink)

Military reproductive health policies affect large numbers of women. In 2006 servicewomen numbered nearly 350,000 and comprised 14.5% of active-duty forces and 17.4% of the reserve force. In addition, approximately 165,000 female dependents of active duty military personnel and 157,000 female dependents of reserve duty personnel are between the ages of 12 and 22 and are eligible for military health care services. Dependents of military personnel are eligible for military health care coverage until age 21, (...) or up to the age of 23 if considered a full-time student.About 10% of active duty female servicemembers become pregnant each year. Pregnant servicewomen are considered non-deployable and are usually not assigned to overseas commands. Pregnant women in the Army, the service branch with the greatest number of women on active duty, can choose to remain on active duty, request temporary leave from service, or request separation from service. Separation options include either discharge, honorable or uncharacterized depending on rank, or transfer to individual ready reserve. (shrink)

This presentation discusses why just war theory is in need of just military preparedness (jus ante bellum) as a new category of just war thinking and it articulates six principles of just military preparedness. The paper concludes that the United States fails to satisfy any of these principles and addresses how this bears on the application of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum norms to possible future American military interventions.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become nearly ubiquitous in modern society, from components of mobile applications to medical support systems, and everything in between. In societally impactful systems imbued with AI, there has been increasing concern related to opaque AI, that is, artificial intelligence where it is unclear how or why certain decisions are reached. This has led to a recent boom in research on “explainable AI” (XAI), or approaches to making AI more explainable and understandable to human users. In the (...) military domain, numerous bodies have argued that autonomous and AI-enabled weapon systems ought not incorporate unexplainable AI, with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United States Department of Defense both explicitly including explainability as a relevant factor in the development and use of such systems. In this article, I present a cautiously critical assessment of this view, arguing that explainability will be irrelevant for many current and near-future autonomous systems in the military (which do not incorporate any AI), that it will be trivially incorporated into most military systems which do possess AI (as these generally possess simpler AI systems), and that for those systems with genuinely opaque AI, explainability will prove to be of more limited value than one might imagine. In particular, I argue that explainability, while indeed a virtue in design, is a virtue aimed primarily at designers and troubleshooters of AI-enabled systems, but is far less relevant for users and handlers actually deploying these systems. I further argue that human–machine teaming is a far more important element of responsibly using AI for military purposes, adding that explainability may undermine efforts to improve human–machine teamings by creating a prima facie sense that the AI, due to its explainability, may be utilized with little (or less) potential for mistakes. I conclude by clarifying that the arguments are not against XAI in the military, but are instead intended as a caution against over-inflating the value of XAI in this domain, or ignoring the limitations and potential pitfalls of this approach. (shrink)

Women's access to reproductive health care is an ongoing source of conflict in U.S. politics; however, women in the military are often overlooked in these debates. Reproductive health care, including family planning, is a fundamental component of health care for women. Unintended pregnancy carries substantial health risks and financial costs, particularly for servicewomen. Compared with their civilian counterparts, women in the military experience greater challenges in preventing unwanted pregnancy and have less access to contraceptive services and abortion. Current (...) military policies, federal laws, and health care practices are not always consistent with evidence-based research and patient-centered care. A multidisciplinary effort on the part of military personnel, lawmakers, and health care providers is needed to eliminate these disparities. We discuss recommendations in the following categories: improving contraceptive education and adherence, expanding research, broadening access to the full range of contraceptive options including emergency contraception, and ensuring access to safe abortion. (shrink)

Recently in Porter v. McCollum, the United States Supreme Court, citing “a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service,” held that a defense lawyer’s failure to present his client’s military service record as mitigating evidence during his sentencing for two murders amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The purpose of this Article is to assess, from the just deserts perspective, the grounds to believe that veterans who commit crimes are to be blamed less by (...) the State than offenders without such backgrounds. Two rationales for a differential treatment of military veterans who commit crimes are typically set forth. The Porter Court raised each, stating that we should treat veterans differently “in recognition of” both “their service” and “the intense stress and mental and emotional toll” of combat. The former factor suggests there being a “social contributions” or gratitude-based discount, whereas the latter factor points towards a “mental disturbance” discount. This Article analyzes the two accounts and raises some doubts about both. This Article then argues that a military veteran who commits a crime should not be blamed to the full extent of his blameworthiness, not necessarily because of his mental capacity nor because of his social contribution, but because the State’s hand in producing his criminality undermines its standing to blame him. (shrink)

Military technology is difficult to restrain for many reasons. Military forces and associated technology serve important functions in the foreign policy of states. Military technology is also pursued to enhance military capability and cost-effectiveness of military forces, to ensure that one's own forces outperform those of an adversary, to play symbolic roles, and to preserve or improve stability in the international system. In addition, new military technology and new systems are advocated by military (...) services and military equipment manufacturers for organizational and economic as well as strategic reasons. To date, arms control agreements have not significantly restrained innovation in military technology, nor are they likely to do so in the future. This is a result of asymmetries between the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union and of the intrinsic difficulties of designing arms control agreements that restrain technological innovation m ways that are both meaningful and verifiable. Although the difficulty of restraining military technology should temper expectations for both nuclear and con ventional arms control, there is no reason to believe that meaningful arms control will be rendered impossible as a consequence. (shrink)

United States military medical ethics evolved during its involvement in two recent wars, Gulf War I (1990–1991) and the War on Terror (2001–). Norms of conduct for military clinicians with regard to the treatment of prisoners of war and the administration of non-therapeutic bioactive agents to soldiers were set aside because of the sense of being in a ‘new kind of war’. Concurrently, the use of radioactive metal in weaponry and the ability to measure the health consequences of (...) trade embargos on vulnerable civilians occasioned new concerns about the health effects of war on soldiers, their offspring, and civilians living on battlefields. Civilian medical societies and medical ethicists fitfully engaged the evolving nature of the medical ethics issues and policy changes during these wars. Medical codes of professionalism have not been substantively updated and procedures for accountability for new kinds of abuses of medical ethics are not established. Looking to the future, medicine and medical ethics have not articulated a vision for an ongoing military-civilian dialogue to ensure that standards of medical ethics do not evolve simply in accord with military exigency. (shrink)

Medical ethics prohibits caregivers from discriminating and providing preferential care to their compatriots and comrades. In military medicine, particularly during war and when resources may be scarce, ethical principles may dictate priority care for compatriot soldiers. The principle of nondiscrimination is central to utilitarian and deontological theories of justice, but communitarianism and the ethics of care and friendship stipulate a different set of duties for community members, friends, and family. Similar duties exist among the small cohesive groups that typify (...) many military units. When members of these groups require medical care, there are sometimes moral grounds to treat compatriot soldiers ahead of enemy or allied soldiers regardless of the severity of their respective wounds. (shrink)

South African Military Professionalism: Some Critical Observations and Threats -- Threats to Professionalism in the United States Military -- Higher Education and the Profession of Arms: Explaining the Logic -- Military Professionalism -- An Organizational Challenge by Itself -- The Challenge of Maintaining Military Professionalism in the Face of Transformation: The Indonesian Army Experience -- Threats and Opportunities for Military Professionalism from Social Media -- The Profession of Arms and the Promotion of Ethics: The profession (...) of Arms and the Challenge of Ethics -- The New Economic Togetherness: Globalization of Economics and Some Implications for Security and the Military Profession -- Displaced Pride: Attacking Cynicism at the United States Air Force Acedemy -- Military Professionalism of the Swedish Armed Forces in the 21st Century -- The Dynamic Five-Factor Model as a Compass for Military Professionalism: A Comparison Between Switzerland and the Netherlands -- Complacency: A Threat to (Canadian) Military Professionalism. (shrink)

This paper rejects most aspects of John W. Lango and Eric Patterson’s proposal that the United States should plan for a possible intervention in Sudan on secessionist and humanitarian grounds and announce this planning as a deterrent to the central government of Sudan attacking the people of South Sudan if they would opt in a January 2011 referendum for independence. I argue that secession is not a just cause for armed intervention and that, rightfully, neither the American people nor many (...) of its men and women in uniform would be prepared to engage in an intervention that might easily escalate. I also caution that American intervention against an Islamic regime might have high global security costs. For the sake of avoiding these negative consequences and harm to the people of Sudan, available nonviolent policy alternatives should be pursued. Still, I grant that the global community should intervene in Sudan if mass slaughter of civilians were to occur as a result of renewed hostilities between North and South Sudan. My objections to Lango and Patterson’s intervention proposal appeal to jus ad bellum principles as well as just military preparedness (jus ante bellum) principles. (shrink)

The formation of the chaplaincy movement in the context of the formation of independent Ukraine (after 1991) required the solution of a number of issues, primarily of a conceptual nature. The initiators of the restoration of chaplaincy faced the underestimation of the chaplaincy factor, the risks of transferring interfaith disputes to the military environment. In fact, it was a question of finding their own model of chaplaincy service, which would provide an optimal model for organizing the work of chaplains. (...) The authors propose to divide the development of the chaplaincy movement in independent Ukraine into three stages, which differ not only chronologically but also in their characteristics. The first stage (1991-2005) was characterized by a rethinking of the role and place of religion in the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The idea of a chaplaincy service was revived primarily on the basis of the volunteer movement. Volunteers also encouraged churches to form appropriate structures that would be responsible for chaplaincy work. At this stage, the driving force behind the formation of the chaplaincy movement was the unstable informal ties between church and security forces in Ukraine. With the advent of the first legal acts that regulated the search for optimal models for creating the chaplaincy institute, the second stage of development of the chaplaincy movement in Ukraine began. It lasted from 2006 to 2013. During this time, regulations were developed and implemented that institutionalized the relationship between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the country's largest churches and religious organizations. The third stage began with the beginning of the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine in 2014 and continues to this day. The annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine created the need to sharply increase the number of chaplains and to legalize them in military institutions. Already in 2015-2016, the formation of the state regulatory framework of the chaplaincy institute began and staff positions of chaplains in military units were introduced. On the other hand, there has also been a qualitative growth in the theoretical and practical training of chaplains and their material support. These processes show that the establishment of the institute of military chaplaincy in Ukraine has actually taken place. In each period, the authors highlight the problematic issues that government agencies and religious organizations addressed in organizing the chaplaincy movement. Particular attention was paid to the attempts of activists to form their own model of chaplaincy ministry and the problematic issues of improving the quality of chaplains' training. In particular, it was pointed out that the best way for Ukraine is to organize separate chaplaincy faculties in the country's higher educational institutions to train specialists at the level of world standards. (shrink)

To monopolize the scientific data gained by Japanese physicians and researchers from vivisections and other barbarous experiments performed on living humans in biological warfare programs such as Unit 731, immediately after the war the United States government secretly granted those involved immunity from war crimes prosecution, withdrew vital information from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and publicly denounced otherwise irrefutable evidence from other sources such as the Russian Khabarovsk trial. Acting in “the national interest” and for (...) the security of the US, authorities in the US tramped justice and morality, and engaged in what the English common law tradition clearly defines as “complicity after the fact.” To repair this historical injustice, the US government should issue an official apology and offer appropriate compensation for having covered up Japanese medical war crimes for six decades. To help prevent similar acts of aiding principal offender in the future, international declarations or codes of human rights and medical ethics should include a clause banning any kind of complicity in any unethical medicine—whether before or after the fact—by any state or group for whatever reasons. (shrink)

During the 1944 Warsaw Uprising Witold Kieżun served in the Home Army’s “Harnaś” [Highlander] Special Unit. During an assault on the Polish Post he personally took 14 Germans prisoner, seizing large quantities of arms. He also singlehandedly damaged a German tank in the district Wola. A unit under his command captured the parish office of the Holy Cross Church and a heavy machinegun, and was the first to enter the city’s police headquarters, where it seized another heavy gun.During the Uprising (...) Witold Kieżun was decorated with the Cross of Valor, he also received the Virtuti Militari from the hands of the Home Army Supreme Commander. (shrink)

US foreign policy became one of the most popular issues in public and academic discussions, particularly since George W. Bush was elected president. A lot has been said about the negative effects that the Bush administration had on the world's international relations and peace, mainly with regard to the restraints which are required by jus ad bellum. However, not much has been said about the damage that the Bush administration caused to the norms of jus in bello, by ignoring them (...) or turning a blind eye toward their violations. In this paper, I want to recall a few military and civil reasons which have been neglected for following the requirements of jus in bello by the fighting soldiers and the fighting unit, as well as by the belligerent state. (shrink)

Abstract The institution of war is the broad framework of rules, norms, and organizations dedicated to the prevention, prosecution, and resolution of violent conflict between political entities. Important parts of that institution consist of the accountability arrangements that hold between armed forces, the political leaders who oversee and direct the use of those forces, and the people in whose name the leaders act and from whose ranks the members of the armed forces are drawn. Like other parts of the institution, (...) these arrangements are responsive to changes in military technology and needs, to geopolitical facts, and to moral and political norms. In particular, they are sensitive to the forms that military organization takes. Since the emergence of modern states in Europe some 500 years ago, there have been three main such forms: private providers?in the form of mercenaries, in early modern Europe?then professional standing armies, which in turn developed into citizen armies. Although elements of the three organizations have coexisted in many armies, the citizen army model has dominated until recently. That model brought with it a particular conception of the accountability relations between the army, the state, and the people. The state had authority over and directed the army, which was accountable to it. In turn the state was accountable for its use of the army to the people, on whose behalf it acted. The dominance of state authority over the military is now under strain, with the professional and private elements?in the form of private military and security companies (PMSCs)?having increasing importance. As those elements increase in power and presence, so it becomes more difficult to make the state accountable to the people for its use of the military, and more difficult for the people to act as a restraining force on the way in which the military used. In this essay, I outline and assess these developments?with particular emphasis on the emergence of PMSCs?in the light of a liberal view of (political) violence. The essay focuses on the situation in the United States, which possesses by far the most important military force in the world today, and in which the use of PMSCs is most developed. The paper has three main sections and a brief conclusion: the first section sketches the liberal view of violence and its implications for organizations dedicated to its use; the second outlines the salient characteristics of the three historically dominant forms of armies; and the third looks at the current situation in which the three forms coexist uneasily. (shrink)

In this paper I question the morality of U.S. military supremacy or hegemony in terms of what constitute the legitimate use of military force and the proper preparation for using such force. I first discuss in a somewhat synoptic fashion how American hegemonic military force has been justified in dishonest ways and wrongly executed. Next, I show that Just War Theory needs to be revised in order to come to a convincing assessment of U.S. military hegemony (...) and its use of military force. This leads me to propose “just military preparedness,” consisting of five principles of just military preparedness, as a new category of JWT. The failure of the United States to satisfy the principles puts into question its very capability of justly resorting to military force, of lawfully executing force, and of establishing a just peace after war. The principles also point to a more humane alternative of how the United States could meet security threats and sustain a peaceful international order. (shrink)

The trade and technological war initiated in 2018 between China and the United States has increased interest in the possible hegemonic succession. In this paper, starting from the concept of interstate hegemony, a comparative analysis of the material capabilities of each power in five areas: productive, technological, commercial, monetary-financial and military. This analysis makes it possible to quantify whether China can surpass the United States. As a result, it is concluded that China is far from surpassing the United States (...) in the military and monetary-financial areas, but it can compete in the productive, commercial, and certain critical technological sectors. (shrink)

To Serve With Honor should be required reading for all members of the officer corps of the United States military. Beyond that, it should be made required reading for all United States military academies, ROTC and officer candidate programs. This treatise on military ethics goes a long way in bridging the gap between the military and society's understanding of the military's ethical dilemma. It is a must for the student of military affairs. International Social (...) Science Review To Serve With Honor is the first book by an American to focus on the validity of current standards of military ethics in more than a century. This thoughtful study begins with the premise that the military profession is qualitatively different from any other profession. Author Richard Gabriel uses this assumption to address such vital questions as What are the limits of military obedience? and When does a soldier have an obligation to resist the orders of his superiors? (shrink)

On 12 May 1962, a frail Douglas MacArthur delivered his final public speech to the cadets at the United States Military Academy. A West Point graduate himself, MacArthur served as Superintendent of...

The Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service in the United Kingdom recently revoked a physician's license for failing to report treating a man who had been tortured and for failing to safeguard vulner...

Reflections on, and analysis of, ethical issues facing military service in the United States.

The article deals with the problem of military chaplaincy service formation in the period of independence of Ukraine as one of the priority directions of relations between the state and religious organizations in Ukraine. The current state of military pastoral care is analyzed directly in the context of Catholic churches activities in Ukraine in this aspect. In particular, the institutional component of the Catholic churches is clarified, statistics demonstrating the quantitative and percentage composition of the Catholic churches in (...) the religious network of Ukraine are provided. The results of sociological surveys of the religious situation in Ukraine and the identification of religiosity of the population in the context of Catholic churches are analyzed. The opinion of the population of Ukraine regarding the trust in religious organizations, religious leaders and the military formations of Ukraine is examined. The opinion of the population on the expediency of establishing a military chaplaincy institute in Ukraine is also clarified. The organizational division of the internal structure of the Catholic churches in Ukraine is presented, and it is also clarified which structural units are responsible for coordination with the Ukrainian power structures and organization of pastoral work. Attention is drawn to the review of the cooperation of the Catholic churches in Ukraine with the military formations of Ukraine in the aspect of pastoral activity. Special attention is paid to the coverage of the various areas of pastoral work directly by the military chaplains of the Catholic churches and the coordination of this work by the relevant structural units of the Catholic churches. In particular, conferences, meetings, trainings, pilgrimages on the organization and implementation of pastoral work in the field of military chaplaincy. Also, consideration is given to the activities of the advisory body on military chaplaincy at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and its contribution to the establishment of the Institute of Military Chaplaincy in Ukraine. The inter-denominational cooperation of the churches in Ukraine, including the Catholic ones, was considered in establishing a military chaplaincy institution in independent Ukraine through the activities of interfaith associations. It has been found that the issue of legislative securing of the Institute of Military Chaplaincy in the Armed Forces of Ukraine remains urgent. In this regard, the legislative work in this area and the involvement of Catholic churches in Ukraine are highlighted. (shrink)

Anthony E. Hartle brings a unique perspective to the work at hand as a philosopher and as a military officer who has seen combat. His task is aptly summarized in the quotation from Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars with which he introduces his topic: "For war is the hardest place; if comprehensive and consistent moral judgments are possible there, they are possible everywhere." In this work Hartle, who is a professor of philosophy and a member of the permanent (...) faculty at the United States Military Academy at West Point, labors valiantly to construct a coherent military ethic for the hardest place. As a result of his position this work has more than academic interest. Presumably, the future elite leaders of the United States Army and, through them, many others are being trained according to its principles. (shrink)

This paper explores the question of whether the United Nations should engage in preventive military actions. Correlatively, it asks whether UN preventive military actions could satisfy just war principles. Rather than from the standpoint of the individual nation state, the ethics of preventive war is discussed from the standpoint of the UN. For the sake of brevity, only the legitimate authority, just cause, last resort, and proportionality principles are considered. Since there has been disagreement about the specific content (...) of these principles, a third question also is explored: How should they be formulated? Moreover, these questions are addressed in the context of a particular issue: the goals of the non-proliferation and the abolition of weapons of mass destruction. (shrink)

Military and defense-related procurement has been an important source of technology development across a broad spectrum of industries that account for an important share of United States industrial production. In this book, the author focuses on six general-purpose technologies: interchangeable parts and mass production; military and commercial aircraft; nuclear energy and electric power; computers and semiconductors; the INTERNET; and the space industries. In each of these industries, technology development would have occurred more slowly, and in some case much (...) more slowly or not at all, in the absence of military and defense-related procurement. The book addresses three questions that have significant implications for the future growth of the United States economy. One is whether changes in the structure of the United States economy and of the defense-industrial base preclude military and defense-related procurement from playing the role in the development of advanced technology in the future, comparable to the role it has played in the past. A second question is whether public support for commercially oriented research and development will become an important source of new general-purpose technologies. A third and more disturbing question is whether a major war, or the threat of major war, will be necessary to mobilize the scientific, technical, and financial resources necessary to induce the development of new general-purpose technologies. When the history of United States technology development in the next half century is written, it will focus on incremental rather than revolutionary changes in both military and commercial technology. It will also be written within the context of slower productivity growth than of the relatively high rates that prevailed in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s or during the information technology bubble that began in the early 1990s. These will impose severe constraints on the capacity of the United States to sustain a global-class military posture and a position of leadership in the global economy. (shrink)

Following the recent decisions by Western militaries to pursue greater integration of women into combat roles, this paper examines the principles that motivate integration and organizes them into a theoretically coherent scheme that could serve as a roadmap for policymakers as they rebuild military institutions and their combat units in an integrated fashion. The strategy of the paper is Rawlsian: the right relationship between the principles that motivate integration can be derived through an application of Rawls's methodology as (...) described in A Theory of Justice. The result is a lexically ordered set of principles that begin with gender-blind equal opportunity but permit adjustments that take gender into account when these adjustments serve the interests of military institutions. The paper concludes with a discussion of two concerns, one practical and one theoretical, that one might have about the account. (shrink)

Fostering a culture and climate of respect is a point of emphasis for the United States military. Yet, despite its clear commitment to the value of respect—and, more specifically, respect for human...

This article uses Public Use Microsample data drawn from the 1990 census to explore the relationship between military presence, defined as the percentage of the local labor force in the active-duty armed forces, and women's employment and earnings across local labor market areas in the United States. Comparisons of local rates of unemployment and mean women's earnings are made between those LMAs in which the military plays a disproportionate role in the local labor market and those in which (...) military presence is low. Results suggest that women who live in labor market areas with a substantial military presence have, on average, lower annual earnings and higher rates of unemployment than their counterparts who live in nonmilitary LMAs. The argument is made that through the interaction of several socially situated conditions—including gender, family, labor markets, human capital, and place—the military emerges as a source of inequality in labor market outcomes for women working on or around military installations. (shrink)

In so far as long-range tele-operated weapons, such as the United States’ Predator and Reaper drones, allow their operators to fight wars in what appears to be complete safety, thousands of kilometres removed from those whom they target and kill, it is unclear whether drone operators either require courage or have the opportunity to develop or exercise it. This chapter investigates the implications of the development of tele-operated warfare for the extent to which courage will remain central to the role (...) of the warrior and for the future culture of the armed services in the age of drone warfare. (shrink)