O artigo se propõe a refletir sobre a relação entre Estado, desenvolvimento no continente africano e pandemia da Covid-19. De caráter ensaístico, espera-se demonstrar que, além de simbolizarem o avanço da solidariedade africana vide integração como meio para a solução dos desafios africanos, as ações para mitigar o avanço da Covid-19 no continente africano, em verdade, refletem, em maior ou menor intensidade, o distanciamento do Estado africano com relação ao neoliberalismo. Para tal feito, a metodologia adotada será de abordagem qualitativa (...) e de caráter interpretativo, baseada na revisão da literatura e no uso de documentos oficiais, sendo o artigo estruturado, juntamente a essa introdução e as considerações finais, em mais três seções. Na primeira, buscaremos discorrer sobre as principais características da relação entre Estado e desenvolvimento econômico no continente africano durante a Guerra Fria. Em seguida, analisaremos o avanço do neoliberalismo e seus impactos na relação entre Estado e desenvolvimento nos países africanos. Por fim, na terceira seção o principal objetivo será destacar o modo de atuação dos países africanos na luta contra a pandemia da Covid-19. (shrink)

We examine, from the partial structures perspective, two forms of applicability of mathematics: at the “bottom” level, the applicability of theoretical structures to the “appearances”, and at the “top” level, the applicability of mathematical to physical theories. We argue that, to accommodate these two forms of applicability, the partial structures approach needs to be extended to include a notion of “partial homomorphism”. As a case study, we present London's analysis of the superfluid behavior of liquid helium in terms of Bose‐Einstein (...) statistics. This involved both the introduction of group theory at the top level, and some modeling at the “phenomenological” level, and thus provides a nice example of the relationships we are interested in. We conclude with a discussion of the “autonomy” of London's model. (shrink)

In this paper a constructive empiricist account of scientific change is put forward. Based on da Costa's and French's partial structures approach, two notions of empirical adequacy are initially advanced (with particular emphasis on the introduction of degrees of empirical adequacy). Using these notions, it is shown how both the informativeness and the empirical adequacy requirements of an empiricist theory of scientific change can then be met. Finally, some philosophical consequences with regard to the role of structures in this context (...) are drawn.Now, we daily see what science is doing for us. This could not be unless it taught us something about reality; the aim of science is not things themselves, as the dogmatists in their simplicity imagine, but the relations between things; outside those relations there is no reality knowable. (shrink)

A common response to those who question the Law of Non-Contradiction is that it is impossible to debate such a fundamental law of logic. The reasons for this response vary, but what seems to underlie them is the thought that there is a minimal set of logical resources without which rational debate is impossible. This chapter argues that this response is misguided. First, it defends non-apriorism in logic: the view that logic is in the same epistemic boat as other scientific (...) theories. It then offers an account of logical theory change in terms of this epistemology. The LNC is discussed in terms of this account of logical theory change, and it is shown that rational debate over this law can, and does, proceed. Finally, arguments for and against the LNC are discussed, and how and where non-a priori considerations arise in these arguments are illustrated. (shrink)

Preschoolers naturally form mental representations that capture generic knowledge about object kinds. These have been considered to pose a special explanatory and learning challenge. We here argue for a new deductive model of them, where (i) the representations in question have a linguistic format from the start; (ii) they are inherently structurally simpler compared to reference to individuals or quantifications; and (iii) formed in communicative contexts because communication in humans is linked to language. In this model, specific language‐related resources explain (...) the scope and limits of the forms of knowledge obtained, illustrating how language and cognition develop in tandem. (shrink)

A first step is taken towards articulating a constructive empiricist philosophy of mathematics, thus extending van Fraassen's account to this domain. In order to do so, I adapt Field's nominalization program, making it compatible with an empiricist stance. Two changes are introduced: (a) Instead of taking conservativeness as the norm of mathematics, the empiricist countenances the weaker notion of quasi-truth (as formulated by da Costa and French), from which the formal properties of conservativeness are derived; (b) Instead of quantifying over (...) spacetime regions, the empiricist only admits quantification over occupied regions, since this is enough for his or her needs. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Logical Consequence Logical Pluralism Applications of Logic Conclusion References.

This paper aims at the construction of a structural coupling between object-oriented philosophy and Whitehead’s philosophy of organism by making a case for the primacy of the ontological principle through the proposal of a social object hypothesis. The social object here differs from traditional renderings of sociology, which are centered on humans’ activity and personalities, by way of recuperating Tarde’s social theory of associations. This theory provides us with a non-anthropocentric reading of sociality. This hypothesis will be furthered by the (...) introduction of the systemic category of internal/external, or system/environment, as a self-enclosure feature of social objects. Equipped with these two notions, we will discuss Graham Harman’s paper “Whitehead and Schools X, Y, and Z,” while rerouting his assessments to our own social object hypothesis. The final idea is to propose an alliance through the conception of a macro-ontological approach to philosophy of organism. We intend to show that this is not only coherently feasible regarding Whitehead’s own categoreal scheme, but also meets the requirements of being a real object in object-oriented ontology’s directives. (shrink)

Styles of reasoning are important devices to understand scientific practice. As I use the concept, a style of reasoning is a pattern of inferential relations that are used to select, interpret, and support evidence for scientific results. In this paper, I defend the view that there is a plurality of styles of reasoning: different domains of science often invoke different styles. I argue that this plurality is an important source of disunity in scientific practice, and it provides additional arguments in (...) support of the disunity claim. I also contrast Ian Hacking’s broad characterization of styles of reasoning with a narrow understanding that I favor. Drawing on examples from molecular biology, chemistry and mathematics, I argue that differences in style of reasoning lead to differences in the way the relevant results are obtained and interpreted. The result is a pluralist view about styles of reasoning that is sensitive to nuances of inferential relations in scientific activity. (shrink)

As part of the development of an epistemology for mathematics, some Platonists have defended the view that we have (i) intuition that certain mathematical principles hold, and (ii) intuition of the properties of some mathematical objects. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties that this view faces to accommodate some salient features of mathematical practice. I then offer an alternative, agnostic nominalist proposal in which, despite the role played by mathematical intuition, these difficulties do not emerge.

How is that when scientists need some piece of mathematics through which to frame their theory, it is there to hand? What has been called 'the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics' sets a challenge for philosophers. Some have responded to that challenge by arguing that mathematics is essentially anthropocentric in character, whereas others have pointed to the range of structures that mathematics offers. Otavio Bueno and Steven French offer a middle way, which focuses on the moves that have to be made (...) in both the mathematics and the relevant physics in order to bring the two into appropriate relation. This relation can be captured via the inferential conception of the applicability of mathematics, which is formulated in terms of immersion, inference, and interpretation. In particular, the roles of idealisations and of surplus structure in science and mathematics respectively are brought to the fore and captured via an approach to models and theories that emphasize the partiality of the available information: the partial structures approach. The discussion as a whole is grounded in a number of case studies drawn from the history of quantum physics, and extended to contest recent claims that the explanatory role of certain mathematical structures in scientific practice supports a realist attitude towards them. The overall conclusion is that the effectiveness of mathematics does not seem unreasonable at all once close attention is paid to how it is actually applied in practice. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Mathematical Relativism: Does Everything Go In Mathematics? Conceptual, Structural and Logical Relativity in Mathematics Mathematical Relativism and Mathematical Objectivity Mathematical Relativism and the Ontology of Mathematics: Platonism Mathematical Relativism and the Ontology of Mathematics: Nominalism Conclusion: The Significance of Mathematical Relativism References.

Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hrsg. von Georg Mohr und Marcus Willaschek. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1998, 680 Seiten . María Jesús Vázquez Lobeiras: Die Logik und ihr Spiegelbild. Das Verhältnis von formaler und transzendentaler Logik in Kants philosophischer Entwicklung. Frankfurt on the Main, Berlin, Berne, New York, Paris, Vienna: Peter Lang 1998, xiv + 254 pp. Rae Langton: Kantian Humility. Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998, xiv + 232 Seiten.

Conrad-Martius’ philosophy can be defined as a non-orthodox position in phenomenological ontology. This position can be considered such in a different sense from Heidegger’s ontology and may be treated as an extension of Husserl’s phenomenology in view of the following three elements. (1) Seiendes (entity) is considered anything that has consistence in the larger sense of the word, including all entities, such as fantastical entities (spirits, fairy-tale beings), soul, ideas and others, that can be used to obtain the phenomenological description. (...) (2) The phenomenological description that occurs through a new definition of “phenomenological reduction” and epoché, in such a way that a realistic solution is emphasized in the analysis of being; being is not considered as the residuum of a system of noema, but, following medieval philosophy, as having the eminent character of reality, through which any of the others can be derived. (3) The analysis of being gives a stratification of various entities, through which each finds definition by means of its relative allocation in an “ontological space”. (shrink)

Logical pluralism is the view according to which there is more than one relation of logical consequence, even within a given language. A recent articulation of this view has been developed in terms of quantification over different cases: classical logic emerges from consistent and complete cases; constructive logic from consistent and incomplete cases, and paraconsistent logic from inconsistent and complete cases. We argue that this formulation causes pluralism to collapse into either logical nihilism or logical universalism. In its place, we (...) propose a modalist account of logical pluralism that is independently well motivated and that avoids these collapses. (shrink)

Batterman raises a number of concerns for the inferential conception of the applicability of mathematics advocated by Bueno and Colyvan. Here, we distinguish the various concerns, and indicate how they can be assuaged by paying attention to the nature of the mappings involved and emphasizing the significance of interpretation in this context. We also indicate how this conception can accommodate the examples that Batterman draws upon in his critique. Our conclusion is that ‘asymptotic reasoning’ can be straightforwardly accommodated within the (...) inferential conception. 1 Introduction2 Immersion, Inference and Partial Structures3 Idealization and Surplus Structure4 Renormalization and the Stability of Mathematical Representations5 Explanation and Eliminability6 Requirements for Explanation7 Interpretation and Idealization8 Explanation, Empirical Regularities and the Inferential Conception9 Conclusion. (shrink)

An account of scientific representation in terms of partial structures and partial morphisms is further developed. It is argued that the account addresses a variety of difficulties and challenges that have recently been raised against such formal accounts of representation. This allows some useful parallels between representation in science and art to be drawn, particularly with regard to apparently inconsistent representations. These parallels suggest that a unitary account of scientific and artistic representation is possible, and our article can be viewed (...) as laying the groundwork for such an account—although, as we shall acknowledge, significant differences exist between these two forms of representation. (shrink)

Identity is arguably one of the most fundamental concepts in metaphysics. There are several reasons why this is the case: Identity is presupposed in every conceptual system: without identity, it is unclear that any conceptual system can be formulated. Identity is required to characterize an individual: nothing can be an individual unless it has well-specified identity conditions. Identity cannot be defined: even in systems that allegedly have the resources to define identity. Identity is required for quantification: the intelligibility of quantification (...) presupposes the identity of the objects that are quantified over. These are only four considerations in support of identity's fundamental role. In this paper, I examine and defend them. I then examine a challenge that has been raised against identity's fundamentality: one from the metaphysics of physics—based on a significant interpretation of non-relativist quantum mechanics—according to which certain quantum particles lack identity conditions. After responding to this challenge, I consider the nature of the commitment to identity, and argue that it turns out to be very minimal. In fact, a very deflationary form of metaphysics can accommodate it. In arguing that identity is fundamental, one need not overstep the boundaries of even a very minimal empiricist metaphysics. Or so I argue. (shrink)

Both the spirituality in organizations and managerial issues have been addressed through different religion-based beliefs. In this article, one intends to enlarge it through the perspective of the Spiritist Doctrine (SD). Thus, it reviews the SD literature, as well as spirituality in organizations theory to find common views. In addition, it (1) argued that SD tenets, codified by Allan Kardec, also bring helpful contributions to work settings that differ from the traditional religion approaches and (2) discussed its implications to managers' (...) spiritual development. It is posited that the SD tenets, while building on and expanding Jesus Christ's teachings, disclose us some severe implications related to our future. In a broader view, SD tenets provide important warnings that encompass people work lives as well. Finally, we depict a framework that embraces corporate life coupled with some factors that may likely build and enhances one's spiritual progress, the potential spiritual rewards derived from these factors, and the loci where the rewards are enjoyed. (shrink)

We argue that standard definitions of ‘vagueness’ prejudice the question of how best to deal with the phenomenon of vagueness. In particular, the usual understanding of ‘vagueness’ in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth-value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach. According to this latter approach, borderline cases are inconsistent (i.e., glutty not gappy). We suggest that a definition of ‘vagueness’ should be general enough to accommodate any genuine contender in the debate over (...) how to best deal with the sorites paradox. Moreover, a definition of ‘vagueness’ must be able to accommodate the variety of forms sorites arguments can take. These include numerical, total-ordered sorites arguments, discrete versions, continuous versions, as well as others without any obvious metric structure at all. After considering the shortcomings of various definitions of ‘vagueness’, we propose a very general non-question-begging definition. (shrink)

ABSTRACT For a long time, the question of the existence of free will has fueled philosophical debate with no definitive solution. Libet’s paradigm (1983) seemed to demonstrate that simple and apparently voluntary movements could be triggered not by consciousness, but by preconscious or random brain processes. Such findings had wide repercussions in the academic and scientific circles, triggering an extensive discussion among neuroscientists, philosophers and jurists. Exploring the interfaces between neuroscience and free will, the present work aims to formulate an (...) updated synthesis of the diverse problematizations about the Libetian findings. It appears that Libet’s essay, although repeatedly analyzed and replicated in recent decades, still lacks a definitive interpretation, in part due to methodological controversies and specific conceptual shortcomings. The deepening of these investigations, combined with the new discoveries offered by neuroscience, can enrich research on free will in the coming years. (shrink)

Amie Thomasson has articulated a novel conception of ontological debates, defending an easy approach to ontological questions as part of the articulation of a deflationary metaphysical view (Thomasson, 2015). After raising some concerns to the approach, we sketch a neutralist alternative to her ontological framework, offering an even easier way of conducting ontological debates.

The authors provide an object-theoretic analysis of two paradoxes in the theory of possible worlds and propositions stemming from Russell and Kaplan. After laying out the paradoxes, the authors provide a brief overview of object theory and point out how syntactic restrictions that prevent object-theoretic versions of the classical paradoxes are justified philosophically. The authors then trace the origins of the Russell paradox to a problematic application of set theory in the definition of worlds. Next the authors show that an (...) object-theoretic analysis of the Kaplan paradox reveals that there is no genuine paradox at all, as the central premise of the paradox is simply a logical falsehood and hence can be rejected on the strongest possible grounds—not only in object theory but for the very framework of propositional modal logic in which Kaplan frames his argument. The authors close by fending off a possible objection that object theory avoids the Russell paradox only by refusing to incorporate set theory and, hence, that the object-theoretic solution is only a consequence of the theory’s weakness. (shrink)

We have three goals in this paper. First, we outline an ontology of stance, and explain the role that modes of engagement and styles of reasoning play in the characterization of a stance. Second, we argue that we do enjoy a degree of control over the modes of engagement and styles of reasoning we adopt. Third, we contend that maximizing one’s prospects for change also maximizes one’s rationality.

Na primeira parte, argumento que o descritivismo proposto por Moritz Schlick não compreende adequadamente a função dos juízos morais. Na segunda parte, argumen-to que o emotivismo não apresenta uma explicação adequada para o papel da razão na ética. Na terceira parte, argumento que o prescritivismo universal proposto por R. M. Hare avança na solução dos problemas do emotivismo, porque amplia o papel da razão na ética, e na solução dos problemas do descritivismo, porque compreende a função dos juízos morais na (...) linguagem ordinária. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende explicar como Meinecke e Cassirer entendem o maquiavelismo de Hegel enquanto a ‘legitimação de um bastardo’, estabelecendo um forte ponto de concordância no plano histórico-interpretativo ao reconhecerem um mesmo processo histórico, que se inicia com Maquiavel, passa pela teoria do Direito Natural dos séculos XVII e XVIII, e finaliza com Hegel. Para tanto, recorre-se a uma reconstrução e comparação de momentos relevantes de _O mito do Estado _, de Cassirer, e de _A ideia de Razão de (...) Estado na história moderna _, de Meinecke. Por fim, busca-se explicitar que, apesar de haver concordância quanto ao plano histórico-interpretativo do maquiavelismo de Hegel entre Meinecke e Cassirer, a valoração ético-política dada por estes intérpretes a este processo histórico é distinta em se considerando a crítica de Cassirer à _Lebensphilosophie _quanto ao seu potencial de resistência ao fascismo_. _. (shrink)

ResumoO artigo aponta o reducionismo da determinação exclusivamente socioeconômica do povo e dos grandes na interpretação de McCormick sobre Maquiavel. Este reducionismo resulta em uma leitura limitada de O Príncipe, não examinando satisfatoriamente os capítulos I ao III e o problema da inovação neles expresso. Defende-se que estes capítulos e este problema podem ser examinados pela tematização do conflito, quando se considera a questão da desunião entre grandes e povo para além do seu caráter socioeconômico.Uma comparação entre as leituras de (...) Pocock e Lefort é mobilizada para tanto, pois elas examinam os capítulos iniciais de O Príncipe e reconhecem neles o problema da inovação. O que as diferencia é Lefort reconhecer o tema do conflito enquanto implícito nos capítulos em questão. Com esta comparação, deixa-se indicado que Lefort permite ampliar o horizonte interpretativo visado por McCormick, permitindo uma compreensão mais complexa e dinâmica do conflito entre classes em Maquiavel.AbstractThis article indicates a reductionism on the exclusively socioeconomic determination of the popolo and the grandi in McCormick’s interpretation of Machiavelli. This reductionism results in a limited reading of The Prince, one that does not satisfactorily examine chapters I to III and the problem of innovation therein expressed. I defend that these chapters and this problem can be examined through the thematization of conflict, if one considers the question of the disunion between grandi and popolo beyond its socioeconomical character. A comparison between Pocock’s and Lefort’s interpretations is mobilized for it, for they examine the initial chapters of The Prince and recognize the problem of innovation therein. What differentiates them is that Lefort recognizes the theme of conflict as implicit in the initial chapters of The Prince. Through this comparison I indicate that Lefort allows us to broaden McCormick’s interpretative horizon, allowing a more complex and dynamic comprehension of conflict. (shrink)

A prominent figure in the social sciences in Brazil and Latin America, Renato Ortiz is invited in this interview to reflect on his intellectual and academic trajectory, whose (re) beginning goes back to France in the 1970s. Professor at the Campinas State University since 1988, he addresses here the main concepts and references that make up his vast work, situated at the intersections between sociology and anthropology. The conversation begins by addressing the issue of his university education and insertion in (...) the Brazilian academic field and develops through the following topics: religion and popular culture, national identity and modernity, mundialization and globalization, the market of symbolic goods and the luxury universe. Finally, he focuses on the dilemma of intellectual work in the social sciences amidst the adversities of the present. (shrink)

A number of people have recently argued for a structural approach to accounting for the applications of mathematics. Such an approach has been called "the mapping account". According to this view, the applicability of mathematics is fully accounted for by appreciating the relevant structural similarities between the empirical system under study and the mathematics used in the investigation ofthat system. This account of applications requires the truth of applied mathematical assertions, but it does not require the existence of mathematical objects. (...) In this paper, we discuss the shortcomings of this account, and show how these shortcomings can be overcome by a broader view of the application of mathematics: the inferential conception. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Suárez and Cartwright return to the example of London and London's construction of a model for superconductivity and raise a number of concerns against the account of this construction presented in French and Ladyman and elsewhere. In this discussion note, we examine the challenge they raised and offer our responses.

'Deus no Século XXI e o Futuro do Cristianismo' é uma colectânea de textos organizada por Anselmo Borges de grande interesse e qualidade. Reúne comunicações ao Congresso Internacional com o mesmo título realizado no Seminário da Boa Nova, Valadares, de 8 a 11 de Setembro de 2005, no âmbito das comemorações do 75o Aniversário da Sociedade Missionária Portuguesa.

This paper provides a rationale for advocating pancritical rationalism. First, it argues that the advocate of critical rationalism may accept (but not be internally justified in accepting) that there is ‘justification’ in an externalist sense, specifically that certain procedures can track truth, and suggest that this recognition should inform practice; that one should try to determine which sources and methods are appropriate for various aspects of inquiry, and to what extent they are. Second, it argues that if there is external (...) justification, then a critical rationalist is better off than a dogmatist from an evolutionary perspective. (shrink)

In a recent debate, Eric Drexler and Richard Smalley have discussed the chemical and physical possibility of constructing molecular assemblers - devices that guide chemical reactions by placing, with atomic precision, reactive molecules. Drexler insisted on the mechanical feasibility of such assemblers, whereas Smalley resisted the idea that such devices could be chemically constructed, because we do not have the required control. Underlying the debate, there are differences regarding the appropriate goals, methods, and theories of nanotechnology, and the appropriate way (...) of conceptualizing molecular assemblers. Not surprisingly, incommensurability emerges. In this paper, I assess the main features of the debate, the levels of the emerging incommensurability, and indicate one way in which the debate could be decided. (shrink)

We offer an overview of some ways of examining the connections between stance and rationality, by surveying recent work on four central topics: the very idea of a stance, the relations between stances and voluntarism, the metaphysics and epistemology that emerge once stances are brought to center stage, and the role that emotions and phenomenology play in the empirical stance.