Plato articulates a deep perplexity about inquiry in ?Meno's Paradox??the claim that one can inquire neither into what one knows, nor into what one does not know. Although some commentators have wrestled with the paradox itself, many suppose that the paradox of inquiry is special to Plato, arising from peculiarities of the Socratic elenchus or of Platonic epistemology. But there is nothing peculiarly Platonic in this puzzle. For it arises, too, in classical Indian philosophical discussions, where it is formulated with (...) great clarity, and analysed in a way that casts it in a new light. We present three treatments of the puzzle in Indian philosophy, as a way of refining and sharpening our understanding of the paradox, before turning to the most radical of the Indian philosophers to tackle it. The Indian philosophers who are optimistic that the paradox can be resolved appeal to the existence of prior beliefs, and to the resources embedded in language to explain how we can investigate, and so move from ignorance to knowledge. Highlighting this structural feature of inquiry, however, allows the pessimist philosopher to demonstrate that the paradox stands. The incoherence of inquiry is rooted in the very idea of aiming our desires at the unknown. Asking questions and giving answers rests on referential intentions targeting objects in a region of epistemic darkness, and so our ?inquiry sceptic? also finds structurally similar forms of incoherence in the pragmatics of interrogative discourse. (shrink)
Organised in broadly chronological terms, this book presents the philosophical arguments of the great Indian Buddhist philosophers of the fifth century BCE to the eighth century CE. Each chapter examines their core ethical, metaphysical and epistemological views as well as the distinctive area of Buddhist ethics that we call today moral psychology. Throughout, the book follows three key themes that both tie the tradition together and are the focus for most critical dialogue: the idea of an?tman or no-self, the appearance/reality (...) distinction and the moral aim, or ideal. Indian Buddhist philosophy is shown to be a remarkably rich tradition that deserves much wider engagement from European philosophy. Carpenter shows that while we should recognise the differences and distances between Indian and European philosophy, its driving questions and key conceptions, we must resist the temptation to find in Indian Buddhist philosophy, some Other, something foreign, self-contained and quite detached from anything familiar. Indian Buddhism is shown to be a way of looking at the world that shares many of the features of European philosophy and considers themes central to philosophy understood in the European tradition. (shrink)
This chapter aims to reconstruct the philosophical motivation for the pudgalavāda or “Personalist” Buddhist view that the person is ultimately real. It argues that the ultraminimalism of the Abhidharma is too minimal to account for crucial features of personhood—especially its capacity to construct unities out of pluralities. The Buddhist Personalist insists that the individuation of person-constituting continua must be an ultimately real fact, not something we project onto or construct out of ultimate reality. That certain ultimate particulars really do belong (...) together, in a way they do not belong to other dharmas with which they may stand in causal-conditional relations, is a position not readily articulated within the Abhidharma metaphysical framework—yet the Pudgalavādin will not reject this framework, for it is only the person, and not other complex wholes, that must be ultimately real. (shrink)
Development of Buddhist thought in India; 1. The Buddha’s suffering; 2. Practice and theory of no-self; 3. Kleśas and compassion; 4. The second Buddha’s greater vehicle; 5. Karmic questions; 6. Irresponsible selves, responsible non-selves; 7. The third turning: Yogācāra; 8. The long sixth to seventh century: epistemology as ethics; I. Perception and conception: the changing face ofultimate reality; II. Evaluating reasons: Naiyāyikas and Diṅnāga. III. Madhyamaka response to Yogācāra IV. Percepts and concepts: Apoha 1 ; V. Efficacy: Apoha 2 ; (...) VI. The path of the Bodhisattva; Epilogue; Background information; Appendix 1: The languages of Buddhism; Appendix 2: Intellectual context; Appendix 3: The Abhidharma. (shrink)
Aristotle bequeathed to us a powerful metaphysical picture, of substances in which properties inhere. The picture has turned out to be highly problematic in many ways; but it is nevertheless a picture not easy to dislodge. Less obvious are the normative tones implicit in the picture and the way these permeate our system of values, especially when thinking of ourselves and our ambitions, hopes and fears. These have proved, if anything, even harder to dislodge than the metaphysical picture which supports (...) them. This paper first draws out the ethics suggested by a conception of being as individual substances, and finds both inner tensions among these values—expressed in divergent characteristics in the history of philosophy—and a neglect of a significant set of values. Substance metaphysics prefers freedom, independence and autonomy over relational and reciprocal values, which can even be regarded as existentially threatening. A prominent attempt to accommodate both sorts of values without eschewing substantialist metaphysics is briefly considered, before turning to examine an alternative metaphysics and the values it implies. A metaphysics which takes being as becoming, it is argued, supports an ethics centred on relational values, and their associated virtues of care. (shrink)
Socrates’ claim that pleasure is a γένεσις unifies the Philebus’ conception of pleasure. Close examination of the passage reveals an emphasis on metaphysical-normative dependency in γένεσις. Seeds for such an emphasis were sown in the dialogue’s earlier discussion of μεικτά, thus linking the γένεσις claim to Philebus’ description of pleasure as ἄπειρον. False pleasures illustrate the radical dependency of pleasure on outside determinants. I end tying together the Philebus’ three descriptions of pleasure: restoration, indefinite, and γένεσις.
In the Timaeus , plants are granted soul, and specifically the sort of soul capable of perception and desire. Also in the Timaeus , perception requires the involvement of to phronimon . It seems it must follow that plants are intelligent. I argue that we can neither avoid granting plants sensation in just this sense, nor can we suppose that ` to phronimon ' is something devoid of intelligence. Indeed, plants must be related to intelligence, if they are to be (...) both orderly and good. Plants must have individual souls if they are to be distinguished from each other, each with an orderly life; but the intelligence their perceptions require is not similarly individuated, for their ultimate good is only derivative: it is only as completing the body of the cosmos that plants are good things. Plants have their own perceptions and desires in virtue of the intelligence ordering the cosmos as a whole. (shrink)
In the Timaeus, plants are granted soul, and specifically the sort of soul capable of perception and desire. Also in the Timaeus, perception requires the involvement of to phronimon. It seems it must follow that plants are intelligent. I argue that we can neither avoid granting plants sensation in just this sense, nor can we suppose that `to phronimon' is something devoid of intelligence. Indeed, plants must be related to intelligence, if they are to be both orderly and good. Plants (...) must have individual souls if they are to be distinguished from each other, each with an orderly life; but the intelligence their perceptions require is not similarly individuated, for their ultimate good is only derivative: it is only as completing the body of the cosmos that plants are good things. Plants have their own perceptions and desires in virtue of the intelligence ordering the cosmos as a whole. (shrink)
For those of us who work in Indian philosophy, these are encouraging times, with reasons for guarded optimism that the broader philosophical community will slowly continue to realize the quality and depth of Indian responses to perennial philosophical problems. Across the profession, there is increased awareness of the sheer historical contingency behind the political, social, and distinctively academic structures which perpetuate the myopic idea that Philosophy proper is a cultural practice tied to a fairly narrow tradition that began with Thales (...) and terminates in the work of (largely) English-speaking thinkers in American and European universities. The last few decades have also witnessed the emergence of a group of scholars who are both expert in contemporary philosophy and historical research into Indian thought, and capable of bringing the latter into conversation with the former in fruitful ways. Against this background, one chief requirement of the times is work that provides philosophically sophisticated introductions to Indian philosophical thought. We need something, after all, to give to people who wish to learn about Indian thought without having to develop the competence to understand technical material or who would like to include something from India within an undergraduate course on Philosophy. AmberCarpenter’s Indian Buddhist Philosophy, published within Acumen’s Ancient Philosophies series is indeed this very sort of work, and succeeds admirably at achieving the right tone, neither setting the bar too high, nor ignoring the work of accurate philosophical and historical reconstruction. It also tackles an ambitious range of material without sacrificing serious philosophical engagement and appropriate contextualization. (shrink)
We explored the relationship between qualities of victims in hypothetical scenarios and the appearance of framing effects. In past studies, participantsâ feelings about the victims have been demonstrated to affect whether framing effects appear, but this relationship has not been directly examined. In the present study, we examined the relationship between caring about the people at risk, the perceived interdependence of the people at risk, and frame. Scenarios were presented that differed in the degree to which participants could be expected (...) to care about the group and the extent to which the group could be construed as interdependent. A framing effect was found only for the scenario describing the victims as the participantsâ friends who did not know each other (high caring/low interdependence), and this went in the opposite direction from typical framing effects. Finally, perceived interdependence and caring affected choice both within and across scenarios, with more risky choices made by participants with high interdependence ratings and high caring ratings. (shrink)
In the Timaeus, plants are granted soul, and specifically the sort of soul capable of perception and desire. But perception, according to the Timaeus, requires the involvement of to phronimon. It seems to follow that plants must be intelligent. I argue that we can neither avoid granting plants sensation in just this sense, nor can we suppose that the phronimon is something devoid of intelligence. Indeed, plants must be related to intelligence, if they are to be both orderly and good (...) – for intelligence is the cause of normativity and teleology. And yet, plants are not intelligent creatures. While plants must have individual souls if they are to be distinct from each other, each having its own orderly life, the intelligence they require for their individual sensations is not similarly individuated, but is rather that of the cosmos itself. Plants’ peculiar partial individuation arises from the fact that their ultimate good is only derivative: unlike animals, it is only by completing the body of the cosmos that a plant’s good a Good Thing. (shrink)
Portraits of Integrity depicts more than 20 historical, fictional and contemporary figures whose character or life raises questions about what integrity is and how it is perceived. Integrity might be culturally bound, but this diverse set of portraits demonstrates that it is not the special preserve of any one culture. Portraits of Socrates, Mencius, Rama and Job, alongside the aspirational 16th-century couple John and Dorothy Kaye, civil rights activist Ella Baker and an anonymous banker, highlight the persisting – sometimes conflicting (...) – features of a life lived with integrity. An introduction identifies and discusses the key questions and themes raised by the case studies, encouraging the reader to determine for themselves the weight and significance of the recurring topics integrity brings up - truth, awkwardness, goodness, and charisma. For anyone looking to learn more about this elusive virtue, Portraits of Integrity is an essential collection. It uncovers the manifold aspects of integrity, illustrates the various possibilities for its expression in a life and asks whether living a life of integrity means living a life of isolation and hardship, or if it is possible to live with integrity without jeopardising all else. (shrink)
In the Philebus, Plato reinterprets the traditional Olympian pantheon in terms of a nationalistic account of the cosmos which grounds the alternative to hedonism which Socrates defends. From the metaphysics of the Philebus, we can grasp 'Zeus' as a formal characteristic of the cosmos, required by any teleological account, and internal to the intelligible order of the universe, rather than standing outside of it. The universe is at once rationally ordered and good in virtue of the relation of reason to (...) goodness itself. Notwithstanding the rationalistic bias of Plato's theology, the 'good' is prior to and responsible for the divine. (shrink)
Recent research on the human genome challenges the basic assumption that human races have no biological basis. In this article, we provide a theoretical synthesis that accepts the existence of genetic clusters consistent with certain racial classifications as well as the validity of the genomic research that has identified the clusters, without diminishing the social character of their context, meaning, production, or consequences. The first part of this article describes the social constructionist account of race as lacking biological reality, its (...) main shortcomings, and our proposed solution: the concept of clinal classes. The second part discusses the character of the group differences that would be consistent with clinal classes and introduces the concept of genomic individualism, which extends an emerging model for understanding biosocial causation to include the genetic effects of ancestry. The third part develops the argument for a "bounded nature" reformulation of racial constructionism that reconceptualizes racial and ethnic categorization as the social perception of ancestry. The final part summarizes the article's contributions and outlines implications for future research. (shrink)
ABSTRACT In the pages of this journal, Samuel DeCanio and colleagues have advanced the proposition that public ignorance (PI) can lead to state autonomy (SA), inasmuch as the public cannot constrain state actions of which it is unaware. The pisa framework, while original and deserving of further research, needs to take account of complicating factors on both the public ignorance and the state autonomy sides of the equation. ?Knowledge,? and thus ?ignorance,? is a matter of diverse interpretations, so what seems (...) like ignorance may actually be a form of fragmented knowledge that buttresses state autonomy. Conversely, public ignorance of state actions that would be popular if they were widely known might diminish state autonomy, by undermining the legitimacy of the state bureaucracy in question. (shrink)
Transparency requires more than disclosure of data. It requires a mechanism and policy for conveying information to the public. In order for the aims of the excellent report of the FDA Transparency Working Group to be realized, a publicity initiative will need to accompany the plan of action. The FDA will need to actively convey information about the evidence concerning benefit-risk profiles of drugs, sometimes pointing out misleading claims by manufacturers or sponsors. In other cases, the FDA will need to (...) make available its procedures, including possible conflicts of interest, not only in drug approval, but also in guidance documents and in rulemaking. Transparency as a process of letting the public see into the agency should be accompanied by a proactive strategy of distributing information about the products regulated by the agency. (shrink)
Public disclosure of industry payments to physicians is one way to address financial conflicts of interest in medicine. As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the Physician Payment Sunshine Act requires pharmaceutical, medical device, and biologics manufacturers who have at least one product reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid to disclose payments to physicians and teaching hospitals on a public website starting in 2014. The physician payment data will contain individual physician names, monetary values, and specific products connected (...) to payments.According to the Final Regulations issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in February 2013, the law will make transparent the extent and nature of relationships between physicians, teaching hospitals, and manufacturers. (shrink)
The volume contains a collection of papers presented at the International Symposium, which took place in Hvar, Croatia, in 2006. In recent years there has been an upsurge of interest in the study of Plato, Platonism and Neoplatonism. Taking the position that it is of vital importance to establish an ongoing dialogue among scientists, artists, academics, theologians and philosophers concerning pressing issues of common interest to humankind, this collection of papers endeavours to bridge the gap between contemporary research in Platonist (...) philosophy and other fields where insights gained from the study of Plato and Platonist philosophy can be of consequence and benefit. Authors: Werner Beierwaltes, Luc Brisson, AmberCarpenter, John Dillon, Jonathan Doner, Franco Ferrari, Francesco Fronterotta, F.A.J. de Haas, Aaron Hughes, Byron Kaldis, Daniel Kolak, Thomas Leinkauf, Dionysis Mentzeniotis, Jean-Marc Narbonne, Giannis Stamatellos, Vladimir Stoupel, Patrick Quinn, Jure Zovko and Marie-Élize Zovko. (shrink)
The "old chestnuts" of this engaging volume are, to quote its cover, "well-known passages in the works of ancient philosophers about which one might have thought everything there is to say has already been said"; its "sacred cows" are "views about what ancient philosophers thought, on issues of philosophical importance, that have attained the status of near-unquestioned orthodoxy." The degree of success in the targeting of such bovine targets among the thirteen papers is variable: thus Shaul Tor makes short work (...) of the ancient view, newly revived by Daniel Graham, that pre-Platonic natural philosophers operated with purely mechanical systems ; AmberCarpenter takes aim, via... (shrink)
Sydney Shoemaker notes that my "avoidance of the standard philosophical terminology for discussing such matters" often creates problems for me; philosophers have a hard time figuring out what I am saying and what I am denying. My refusal to play ball with my colleagues is deliberate, of course, since I view the standard philosophical terminology as worse than useless--a major obstacle to progress since it consists of so many errors trapped in the seductively lucid amber of tradition: "obvious truths" (...) that are simply false, broken-backed distinctions, and other cognitive illusions. I want to shift the perspective of philosophy of mind, and for that task using the standard terminology would be counterproductive. Fortunately, the inevitable communication-difficulties my policy provokes are forced into the open by occasions such as this constructive confrontation, permitting me to clarify my shocking message. I am grateful to Shoemaker, and to Michael Tye, Frank Jackson and David Rosenthal, for their vigorous and sympathetic reactions to my book. (shrink)
In June 2012, Sociological Theory published “The Genomic Challenge to the Social Construction of Race” by Jiannbin Lee Shiao, Thomas Bode, Amber Beyer, and Daniel Selvig. The article argues that “recent research on the human genome challenges the basic assumption that human races have no biological basis” (p. 68). The authors advance a “bounded nature” account of race to suggest that “biological ancestry” might lead to “different frequencies of personality and cognitive characteristics” by race (p. 83). In this response (...) I investigate three propositions central to Shiao et al.’s argument: (1) the contention that contemporary genetics research has documented a biological basis to race, (2) the assertion that such research warrants inquiries into the way “biological ancestry” might “contribute to average group differences” by race (p. 83), and (3) the claim that there is no “essential characteristic” of their findings that might be complicit with biological racism. (shrink)
Once upon a time, there were two large black boxes, A and B, connected by a long insulated copper wire. On box A there were two buttons, marked *a* and *b*, and on box B there were three lights, red, green, and amber. Scientists studying the behavior of the boxes had observed that whenever you pushed the *a* button on box A, the red light flashed briefly on box B, and whenever you pushed the *b* button on box A, (...) the green light flashed briefly. The amber light never seemed to flash. They performed a few billion trials, under a very wide variety of conditions, and found no exceptions. There seemed to them to be a causal regularity, which they conveniently summarized thus. (shrink)
