Resenha do livro Agonia do Eros, de Byung-Chul Han.

O filósofo sul coreano Byung-Chul Han em seu ensaio Agonia do Eros, procura compreender como as relações advindas do mundo digital impedem o erotismo de se desenvolver e quais são as consequências nefastas nas relações afetivas em que o ego narcísico sobressai no lugar do amor.

Em Agonia do Eros, o filósofo sul coreano, Byung Chul-Han, autor dos ensaios: sociedade do cansaço, sociedade da transparência, topologia da violência, no enxame, busca analisar as relações afetivas na contemporaneidade. A erotização desfalece frente ao igual, sendo que Eros procura aquele que difere do que somos, porém na atualidade, afirma o autor, o diferente perde para o inferno do igual. Para explicar sua tese o autor faz sua análise no rastro de pensadores como: Michel Foucault, Jean (...) Baudrillard, Emmanuel Levinas, George Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, dentre outros. (shrink)

Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom “I” refers, we show that there are occasionswhen it is not always obvious. In demonstratingthis we challenge Kaplan's assumptionthat the utterer, agent and referent of “I” arealways the same person.We begin by presenting what weregard to be the received view about indexicalreference popularized by David Kaplan in hisinfluential 1972 “Demonstratives” before goingon, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle'sanswering machine paradox which may be thoughtto threaten this view, and his deferredutterance method of (...) resolving this puzzle. Insection 3 we introduce a novel version of theanswering machine paradox which suggests that,in certain cases, Kaplan's identification ofutterer, agent and referent of “I” breaks down.In the fourth section we go on to consider arecent revision of Kaplan's picture by Predelliwhich appeals to the intentions of the utterer,before arguing that this picture is committedto unacceptable consequences and, therefore,should be avoided if possible. Finally, insection 5, we present a new revision ofKaplan's account which retains much of thespirit of his original proposal whilst offeringa intuitively acceptable way to explain all ofthe apparently problematic data. In doing so,we also show how this picture is able toexplain the scenario which motivated Predelli'saccount without appealing to speakerintentions. (shrink)

A ideia de que a ciência — ou ao menos as atividades científicas que são consideradas as mais essenciais para a ciência — deve ser livre de valores é bastante difundida. Neste capítulo, vou discutir essa tese, normalmente entendida como um ideal de ciência. Na primeira seção, introduzo alguns conceitos e distinções que são importantes para entender essa tese, como a diferença entre valores cognitivos e não-cognitivos. Na segunda seção, discuto o papel dos valores na seleção de problemas e na (...) metodologia científica. Na terceira seção, apresento dois argumentos canônicos contra o ideal da ciência como livre de valores: o argumento da lacuna explicativa, de Helen Longino (1990), e o argumento do risco indutivo, de Heather Douglas (2009). Na quarta seção, discuto algumas respostas a esses argumentos. Por fim, na última seção, a partir da abordagem ecológica, exploro e sustendo a ideia de que a reconcepção da ciência como uma atividade social situada e adaptativa supera a dicotomia entre fato e valor que subjaz a discussão. Essa nova concepção de ciência nos permite acomodar melhor os resultados dos argumentos apresentados na terceira seção. (shrink)

It is argued that, in order to account for examples where the indexicals `now' and `here' do not refer to the time and location of the utterance, we do not have to assume (pace Quentin Smith) that they have different characters (reference-fixing rules), governed by a single metarule or metacharacter. The traditional, the fixed character view is defended: `now' and `here' always refer to the time and location of the utterance. It is shown that when their referent does not correspond (...) to the time and/or location of the utterance, `now' and `here' work in an anaphoric way, inheriting their reference from another noun phrase. The latter may be explicit or implicit in the discourse. It is also shown that `now' and `here' can inherit their reference from a presupposed or tacit reference. In that case, they are coreferential with what will be labeled a `tacit initiator'. This anaphoric interpretation has the merit of fitting within the Kaplanian distinction between pure indexicals (`now', `here', `today', etc.) and demonstratives (`this', `that', `she', etc.). (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that some mental states and cognitive processes extend onto the environment. Items external to the organism or exploratory actions may constitute in part mental states and cognitive processes. In Clark and Chalmers’ original paper, ‘The Extended Mind’, this thesis receives support from the parity principle and from the active externalism. In their paper, more emphasis is given to the parity principle, which is presented as neutral regarding the nature of cognition. It would be advantageous to (...) maintain that extended mental states and processes do not require a reform of our pre-theoretical view of cognition. In the present paper, I submit that we should give more emphasis on the active externalism, which, I argue, is not neutral regarding the nature of cognition. Cognition is viewed as successful adaptation to a specific task. Although this move may seem at first disadvantageous, it is necessary for the correct understanding and justification of Otto case as an example of extended mental state. Additionally, the parity principle cannot handle Weiskopf’s criticism that information registered in Otto’s notebook is not responsive to reasons. In order to address this criticism, we need to appeal to active externalism and its corresponding view of cognition. (shrink)

It is argued that, contrary to appearances, description-names (e.g.: "The Roman Empire", "The Beatles", "The Holy Virgin",...) do conform to Millianism, i.e. the view that proper names are directly referential expressions, referring regardless of whether the relevant individual satisfies some associated description or not. However, description-names name and describe. Some arguments supporting this peculiarity and a logic to handle description-names are proposed. It will be shown that the best framework with which to accommodate description-names is a multiple-proposition theory, according to (...) which a given utterance may express several propositions. (shrink)

In combining a pluri‐propositionalist framework (Bach‐style) concerning alleged conventional implicatures, and a pluri‐propositionalist framework (Perry‐style) distinguishing various levels of content associated with a single utterance, I defend a Grice‐inspired model of communication. In so doing, I rely on the distinction between what is said, i.e. what is semantically encoded, and what is pragmatically implicated. I show how the notion of same‐saying plays a central role in dealing with problems pertaining to communication insofar as it permits us to posit a stability (...) of content among interlocutors. I also show how people can be classified as same‐sayers in different ways, viz. if they express the same (minimal) proposition/content or if they utter the same sentence. If A utters ‘I'm happy’ and B replies: ‘C said that too’, what B said can mean either that C said that A is happy—thus C and A expressed the same proposition—or that C utters the same words—they both utter ‘I'm happy’ and in so doing express different propositions, i.e. that A is happy and that C is happy respectively. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how perceptual experience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that perceptual experience justifies non-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discuss this question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. (...) But I will defend that there is no such need. The content can be non-conceptual and even so the experience can justify beliefs non-inferentially. I will try to explain how this is possible and at the end I will assess my approach in the face of Sellars' claim that empiricism assumes a triad of inconsistents thesis. I will recast these thesis in accordance with the approach defended and I will conclude that this present version of empiricism is free from Sellars's criticism. (shrink)

Since Wilfrid Sellars' attack on sense-date theories, it became hard to understand the role of perceptual experience in the justification of beliefs about the world. Many philosophers have started to sustain that experience only causes beliefs, never justifies them. In this thesis, I defend that experience justifies empirical beliefs non-inferentially. I work out three senses of 'justification': basement, reason and warrant. The idea is that experience can be a reason to believe. The subject can base upon his experience in order (...) to form or hold a belief about the world. The distinction between vehicle and content has a important role in this thesis. Perceptual experience and belief are representational vehicles. Both can hold the same content. By this step I can explain the relevance of experience content to the truth of the belief. It is also necessary to explain how an experience can be a reason to believe in the first-person perspective. The inference model shows how a belief can be a reason for another belief. Nevertheless, the inference model can not be used to explain the transition from a perceptual state to a doxastic state, because experience can be a non-conceptual vehicle. Following Evans, I submit that the conceptualization act involved in the formation of a belief about the world is the key for understanding how experience can be a reason to believe, that is, how the transition from a perceptual state to a doxastic state can be rational. The empiricism defended is minimal. Although experience works as an unconditioned justifier for beliefs about the world, beliefs thus justified are not incorrigible. (shrink)

The argument from illusion/hallucination have been proposed many times as supporting the strong conclusion that we are always perceiving directly sense-data. In Sense & Sensibilia, Austin argues that this argument is based on a “mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies”. In this paper, I argue that Austin's argumentative moves to deconstruct the argument from illusion is better understood if they are seen as due to his implicit commitment to some disjunctivist conception of perception. His considerations should be taken as a (...) depth discussion about how to conceive perception. If we conceive the perceptual capacity disjunctively, even the weaker conclusion that we sometimes perceive sense-data does not hold. In response to Austin, Ayer claimed that the strong conclusion of the argument from illusion could be sustained by the method of the possibility of error. I argue that this method alone does not sustain that conclusion and the controversy turns back to the conflict between different conceptions of perception. The argument from illusion is philosophically interesting by putting in evidence the problem of how the perceptual capacity should be articulated and conceived. Although matters of fact are relevant to this question, they alone do not decide it. (shrink)

Tomamos como certo que os nossos sentidos nos colocam em contato com o ambiente ao nosso redor. Enquanto caminhamos em uma rua, vemos obstáculos que temos de contornar ou remover. Mesmo de costas, podemos ouvir a bicicleta que se aproxima e dar passagem. Em suma, por meio de experiências perceptivas (visuais, auditivas, olfativas etc.), ficamos conscientes de objetos ou eventos que estejam ocorrendo ao nosso redor. Além disso, com base no que percebemos, podemos formar e manter crenças acerca do ambiente (...) e, assim, adquirir conhecimento perceptivo acerca do mundo. A importância desse conhecimento acerca do que está ao nosso alcance perceptivo é inestimável para a nossa sobrevivência e a condução de nossos projetos cotidianos. Contudo, podemos querer saber (1) se de fato temos acesso ao mundo físico circundante por meio das nossas experiências perceptivas, e (2) se e como essas experiências justificam as nossas crenças acerca do que percebemos. Esses problemas são centrais para a epistemologia da percepção, embora não sejam os únicos. Nessa entrada, abordaremos esses dois problemas. (shrink)

A tese da mente estendida alega que ao menos alguns processos cognitivos se estendem para além do cérebro do organismo no sentido de que eles são constituídos por ações realizadas por esse organismo no ambiente ao seu redor. Um movimento mais radical seria alegar que ações sociais realizadas pelo organismo poderiam pelo menos constituir alguns dos seus processos cognitivos. Isso pode ser chamando de tese da mente socialmente estendida. Baseando-me na noção de affordance tal como ela foi desenvolvida na tradição (...) da psicologia ecológica, eu defendo que a percepção se estende ao meio ambiente. Então, apoiado no fenômeno da atenção conjunta, eu estendo a noção de affordance para encorporar affordances sociais. Assim, a percepção pode, em algumas situações, ser também estendida socialmente. (shrink)

Descartes, one of the central figure of the rationalist school, brought to the philosophical forum questions such as “What am I?”, “Does one’s mind differ from one’s body?” and if so, “How does the mind interact with the body?”. The Cartesians observed that some phenomena of nature (e.g. the mastery of language) do not fall within the mechanical philosophy of their time: they thus posited a new entity, the res cogitans (the mind) to account for these phenomena. In rejecting the (...) mechanical philosophy, nowadays rationalists are in a position to deal with Descartes’ traditional questions in a new way. In this Chomsky’s foundational works on language (and the cognitive revolution he initiated) play a central role and welcome new solutions and dissolutions to some traditional philosophical puzzles. (shrink)

SummaryAgainst an externalist view popularized, among others, by Evans and McDowell I shall show fiat object‐dependent thoughts are psychologically spurious. This version of externalism is contrasted with the picture that thoughts are object‐independent. It is argued that object‐independent thoughts are perspectival and context‐sensitive and that these perspectival thoughts, unlike object‐dependent thoughts: deal with delusion in an intuitive and elegant way; support psychological generalizations in a straightforward way; do not need to be fully articulated and, as such, fit with an economical (...) rule governing our thinking activity. To state my point I shall mainly concentrate on perceptual thoughts and emphasize how they are contextually related to the external world. (shrink)

SummaryAgainst an externalist view popularized, among others, by Evans and McDowell I shall show fiat object‐dependent thoughts are psychologically spurious. This version of externalism is contrasted with the picture that thoughts are object‐independent. It is argued that object‐independent thoughts are perspectival and context‐sensitive and that these perspectival thoughts, unlike object‐dependent thoughts: deal with delusion in an intuitive and elegant way; support psychological generalizations in a straightforward way; do not need to be fully articulated and, as such, fit with an economical (...) rule governing our thinking activity. To state my point I shall mainly concentrate on perceptual thoughts and emphasize how they are contextually related to the external world. (shrink)

In this paper we present some benefits of semantic minimalism. In particular, we stress how minimalism allows us to avoid cognitive overloading, in that it does not posit hidden indexicals or variables at the LF or representational level and it does not posit the operation of free enrichment processes when we produce or hear a sentence. We nonetheless argue that a fully adequate semantic minimalism should embrace a form of relativism—that is, the view that semantic content must be evaluated, pace (...) Cappelen and Lepore, vis-à-vis a given situation, the latter being a fragment of a possible world or a partial world. In so doing we shall show how Cappelen and Lepore damage the insight of semantic minimalism insofar as they insist that the semantic content should be evaluated with respect to a whole possible world. This move fails to capture the powerful contextualist intuition that it does not make much sense to evaluate the content of, say, Naomi is rich, or Jon is tall, with respect to, for instance, the actual world. (shrink)

To determine whether ethical issues concerned with field research are addressed in the peer-review process, instructions to authors and reviewers of 141 (mainly natural science) journals were examined to ascertain how often ethical issues were mentioned. Only one-third (n=41) of responding journals addressed ethical issues in their instructions to authors or reviewers. When ethical issues were considered, most of the journals limited their concerns to ethical issues associated with animal and general human experimentation. No journal mentioned ethical practices in working (...) with indigenous peoples or on traditional lands. Only two journals addressed the ethics of research in sensitive areas in their instructions to authors, only one in its instructions to reviewers. We suggest that peer-reviewed journals respond to an emerging issue in ecological research by formally incorporating research ethics into their instructions to authors and reviewers. Furthermore, these instructions should address the ethical issues associated with field research and in working with indigenous peoples and on traditional lands. (shrink)

In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that (...) takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition for learning. We argue that qualia taken to be qualitons are part of our mechanism of sensory concept acquisition. (shrink)

According to proponents of the continuity hypothesis, metaphors represent one end of a spectrum of linguistic phenomena, which includes various forms of loosening/broadening, such as category extensions and approximations, as well as hyperbolic interpretations. The continuity hypothesis is used to establish that the inferences derived from the set of linguistic expressions mentioned above result from the same or nearly similar pragmatic processes. In this paper, we want to challenge that particular aspect of the continuity hypothesis. We do so based on (...) considerations and analysis of an understudied linguistic phenomenon that we call the metaphorical uses of proper names (MPNs). We first explain how MPNs represent a unique linguistic class distinguishable from, for example, nicknames. In addition, we offer some remarks on how MPNs can be understood against the background of current debates between referentialists and predicativists about names. Our discussion leads us to conclude that MPNs are categorically different from literal interpretations of proper names. We spell out the consequences that the results of our analysis have for the continuity hypothesis. (shrink)

Dos desdobramentos freudianos acerca da civilização, questionaremos como, diante da eminencia de um futuro trágico, a indagação de formas alternativas de gozo pode originar uma sociedade menos hostil. Partindo de noções como pulsão de morte, agressividade e Super-Eu, veremos que a racionalização dos afetos não reclama nossa destrutividade. Da antinomia entre Eros e Thanatos, Freud conclama a independência das pulsões agressivas, alegando que a civilização é vivenciada como mal-estar. Assinalando como os desejos do outro estão implicados nos nossos, acentuaremos (...) que a agressividade instaura o Super-Eu, cuja função é impor sobre o Eu a mesma hostilidade que este satisfaria nos outros. Exercendo autoridade interna, o Super-Eu atravessa a subjetividade, indicando que não há nada que não garanta nossa própria catástrofe. Mas se a civilização está edificada sobre o resto da liberdade individual, então talvez a responsabilização pelo desejo permita pensar novas formas de subjetivação e, quiçá, numa sociedade menos hostil. (shrink)

A pesar de matices y variaciones de significado, la intencionalidad husserliana sigue al servicio de la verdad como adaequatio, adaptada al orden monádico de la conciencia trascendental. Sin embargo, en la conciencia interna del tiempo se ve la dificultad de interpretar intencionalmente la esfera pasiva de la conciencia, con lo cual peligra la vocación por la verdad de la intencionalidad. A partir de la constitución eidética, se busca una génesis pasiva del sentido ideal intencional, sin perder su referencia egológica. Despite (...) the nuances and variations in meaning, Husserlian intentionality continues to be at the service of truth as adaequatio, adapted to the monadic order of transcendental consciousness. However, the internal consciousness of time reveals the difficulty of interpreting the passive sphere of consciousness intentionally, which jeopardizes intentionality's vocation for truth. On the basis of eidetic constitution, a passive genesis of ideal intentional meaning is sought, which does not lose its reference to the ego. (shrink)

Considerando-se que a oposição entre Eu-não Eu, Sujeito-Objeto, Prazer-Desprazer são os pares de opostos que lançam o indivíduo nos mais significativos vínculos para a estruturação de sua vida anímica, deseja-se aqui pensar em uma “organização psicofisiológica” que vai desde os estímulos pulsionais aos destinos das pulsões. É nesse “circuito de investimentos” que a natureza biológica desse pulsional transbordará — eis o que se procurará defender — para um universo simbólico instanciado pela presença de outros seres humanos. Por fim, defender-se-á que (...) é no cerne da dinâmica das moções pulsionais que o individual encontrar-se-á vinculado aos enigmas das “psiques de massa”: trata-se da relação entre necessidade e satisfação e as exigências da comunidade. (shrink)

One of the ways in which Plato has captured the popular imagination is with the claim that the philosopher can feel erôs, passionate love, for the objects of knowledge. Why should Plato make this claim? In this chapter, I explore Plato’s treatment of philosophical erôs along three dimensions. First, I consider the source of philosophical erôs. I argue that it is grounded in our mortality and imperfection, which give rise to a desire for immortality and the immortal. Second, I turn (...) to the object of philosophical erôs. I suggest that it is an arresting response to beauty, through which we come to value the ideal properties of the forms. Finally, I address the nature of erôs. I claim that it is a focusing desire, that overrides other concerns and causes us to overwhelmingly focus on its object. I conclude the chapter by considering the problem Vlastos famously raises for Plato’s account of erôs: can it do justice to disinterested, interpersonal love? In agreement with Vlastos, I claim that one who comes to grasp the forms will cease to feel interpersonal love; however, I also suggest that erôs can give rise to philia, beneficent concern with the wellbeing of others. (shrink)

The philosophy of loveFor centuries, popular writers and respected scholars have written about and analyzed the phenomenon of love without exhausting its potential for contemporary debate. By representing the three major traditions in the philosophy of love--Platonic eros, Christian agape, and Aristotelian philia--editor Alan Soble has not only examined the intellectual problem of what "love" is, but has designed a dialogue among the three traditions in genuine philosophical style. "Eros is acquisitive, egocentric or even selfish; agape is a (...) giving love. Eros is an unconstant, unfaithful love, while agape is unwavering and continues to give despite ingratitude. Eros is a love that responds to the merit or value of its object; while agape creates value in its object as a result of loving it... Finally, eros is an ascending love, the human's route to God; agape is a descending love, GodÆs route to humans... Philia is caught between eros and agape."--From the Introduction to Eros, Agape and Philia ISSUES EXPLORED: --What is the state of love today as seen through the eyes of Plato, Aristotle, and Paul? --How do relations between the sexes illustrate the difficulties of love? --What are the nature and effects of exclusivity, reciprocity, and constancy? --What are the conceptual and psychological ties between sex and love? --Does it make any sense to think of love in moral terms? (shrink)

Não é fácil demarcar a diferença entre as concepções platônicas de Eros e Philia. Nos diálogos mais voltados para o assunto, como Lísis, Banquete e Fedro , identificamos uma sobreposição dos dois temas, tal que o exame de um acaba por remeter ao exame do outro. No Lísis , enquanto a Philia constitui-se como o foco da discussão de Sócrates com Menexeno, o diálogo traz como pano de fundo e com forte apelo dramático o amor de Hipótales por Lísis. (...) No Banquete , apesar de ser Eros o tema central do diálogo, tem-se a partir do discurso de Pausânias a diferenciação entre dois tipos de Eros , de modo que o mais belo deles em muito se assemelha ao que se entende por Philia . No Fedro , por sua vez, esta aparece como um Eros mitigado. Pretendo mostrar que, nos diálogos supracitados, Platão se vale da aproximação entre Eros e Philia para fundamentar sua própria concepção de Philos sophía , na qual Eros desempenha um papel decisivo. Mais precisamente, uma concepção de filosofia na qual o que é Belo ( Eros ) deve assimilar o que é Bom ( Philia ). Para tanto, lança mão das seguintes teses: 1. O desejo é causa tanto de Eros quanto de Philia e, enquanto tal, pressupõe uma relação entre amantes/amigos; 2. O desejo é marcado por uma falta (presente ou futura); 3. O que falta é na verdade algo que foi perdido; 4. O desejo é o movimento da alma para recuperar algo perdido, a saber, a contemplação do Belo. 5. A filosofia é o percurso, guiado por Eros, para o reencontro do Belo. (shrink)

For among most contemporaries, the concept of Eros seems to have nothing to do with Christianity. Sifting through the psychoanalysis of sexual fantasy, theologically it says nothing. Our study gives reasons showing that for theologians since the dawn of the Christian era, Eros-love plays a fundamental role.. The connotations of this concept, however, are different from those of today, when its sensory meaning is more restricted to sexuality. Greek theologians of the first centuries after Christ, taught the concept (...) of Plato enshrined as a unifying enthusiasm, the attraction of inferior to superior states, as “hungry and thirsty” for something continuously higher, developing, and enriching the connotation. The work of Dionysius Areopagite, the Idea of Good, leads us step by step up the ascent of the erotically chaste, and is identified with the One-God, who is the very source of love. Consequently, Eros-love originates from God, Eros- love being not only an ascending but firstly a descending love, which calls for a reciprocal communion. (shrink)

For the ancient Greeks, the world was both Eros, the god of chaos and creativity, and Logos, the regularity of the heavens as law. From chaos the world came forth. The world was home to ultimate creativity. Two thousand years later Kepler, Galileo, and then mighty Newton created deterministic classical physics in which all that happens in the universe is determined by the laws of motion, initial and boundary conditions. The Theistic God who worked miracles became the Deistic God (...) who set up the universe and let Newton’s laws take over. Eros, raw creativity, is dead, all is Logos.Quantum mechanics replaced the determinism of classical physics with fundamental indeterminism. This was a major crisis in physics, but remained entirely within the Newtonian paradigm of laws, here the Schrödinger equation, initial and boundary conditions. The Schrödinger equation entails the deterministic propagation of a probability distribution. The probabilities concern the indeterminate outcomes of quantum measurement events.The central issue of this article is to show that no laws at all determine or entail the becoming of our biosphere or any other among the 1022 solar systems in the universe. This claim is radical. If no laws determine or entail the becoming of biospheres, and biospheres are part of the universe, the Pythagorean dream that All is Number, All is Logos, is dead. There is no Final Theory that entails all that become in the universe. Eros is again, and always was, rambunctiously alive in the raw creativity of the becoming of life anywhere in the universe. The becoming of life is based on physics, on Logos, but beyond it, emerging from Eros.The reasons Eros is at play in the evolution of biospheres are fourfold.First, the universe will not make all possible complex things. That is, the universe is vastly non-ergodic. Yet complex things such as the human heart exist.Second, the reason human hearts exist is that organisms are Kantian Wholes in which the parts exist for and by means of the whole. Hearts exist because they fulfill the function of pumping the blood that keeps the whole organism alive. Such organisms propagate progeny that carry with them the hearts that keep them alive.Third, adaptations like hearts, the flagellar motor, the loop of Henle in kidneys that concentrates urine, and flight feathers, are tinkered-together contraptions stumbled upon in evolution. Parts and processes that arise in evolution are jury-rigged for unprestatable new functions that help keep the entire Kantian Whole organism alive and propagating in the evolving biosphere. There is no deductive theory of jury rigging. We cannot deduce the emergence of such novel functions.Fourth, the functions of parts of organisms emerge in unprestatable ways and form the unprestatable and ever-changing phase space of evolution. Since we cannot prestate the ever-changing phase space of evolution, we can write no laws of motion in differential equation form, so cannot integrate the equations we do not have. Thus, no laws entail the becoming of any biosphere.Evolving biospheres are everywhere creative. This is Eros, the chaos from which the world emerges. This profound creative emergence is the stuff of story, of narrative. Evolving biospheres always were and always will be both Eros and Logos, the stuff of story and the stuff of law. We always live in a world of Art and Science. (shrink)

Eros and Illness explores the place of desire in illness. We urgently need such an exploration because illness is no longer simply a natural feature of the human condition. Most people fall ill, but illness now falls under the supervision of biomedicine, a science-based, state-regulated system dominated by the new molecular gaze. The use of a person's distinctive genetic data to guide treatment and to forestall disease--called "personalized medicine"-- reflects how the molecular gaze can produce valuable advances in biomedical (...) healthcare. What does this indispensable super-vision, however, tend to overlook? Eros and Illness proposes that biomedicine ignores, in clinical practice and in bench science, the powerful role of desire in illness. Desire, always double-edged, requires attention because it can do both great harm and great good. Patients, caregivers, family members, and physicians, as they recognize the role of desire, gain access to a power that can make the passage through illness much less onerous and far more healing: truly "personalized. (shrink)

Em sua obra magna, O mundo como vontade e representação, Arthur Schopenhauer entende a sua filosofia como um sistema orgânico e afirma que o mundo é vontade e aparece como representação, ou seja, tudo é vontade e, por conseguinte, manifestação da vontade. De modo especial, o autor define uma das formas mais penetrantes da vontade, assim chamada de Vontade de vida, entendida como uma força obscura e cega; um impulso terrível e dramático, que move os indivíduos de forma dolorosa e (...) brutal. Este desejo extremamente rude e irrefletido é condicionado pelo instinto de conservação. Um dos problemas a ser ressaltado é de que existe uma condição existencial relacionada a vida humana que é o sofrimento humano e a espécie humana seria a mais suscetível ao sofrimento. A vida é um perpétuo combate e cada indivíduo é apenas um instrumento da vontade que luta para impor o que parece necessário, já que todo o querer nasce de uma necessidade. Em todos os graus de objetivação da vontade, existe necessariamente uma luta contínua entre os indivíduos de todas as espécies. O ponto de partida de toda luta está no egoísmo, representado na figura de Éris. Em virtude de a essência íntima da natureza, a Vontade de vida, ter como expressão máxima o impulso sexual. Os poetas e filósofos antigos, dentre eles Hesíodo, Parmênides, Péricles, Aristóteles, afirmaram que Eros seria o primeiro, o criador, o princípio do qual provêm todas as coisas. A natureza, cuja essência íntima é a Vontade de vida, compele com todas as forças o homem e o animal para a propagação da espécie. Tal vontade de vida, preocupa-se exclusivamente com a conservação da espécie e, neste caso, o indivíduo pode ser considerado em vão. (shrink)

O artigo visa discutir a análise que Foucault faz d a erótica plat ônica no quinto capitulo de O uso dos prazeres. Para responder às dificuldades de inserção deste texto no livro e no conjunto da obra do autor, não seria lícito afirmar que tudo aquilo que Foucault diz a respeito da relação eró tica não valeria também para a relação discursiva? Não se trata, em ambos os casos, da “busca verdade"?

The release of Emmanuel Levinas’s Prison Notebooks (Carnets de captivité) as a part of the first tome of his collected works has further illuminated the extent of the philosopher’s preoccupation with art, especially literature. Levinas’s own literary efforts have been well documented, but less attention has been paid to the relationship between the Prison Notebooks and Levinas’s early philosophy of art. In this article, I suggest that much of what Levinas has to say apropos art in his early philosophy can (...) be traced back to meditations undertaken in captivity. I will unearth the influence of the Prison Notebooks in three articles from the 1940ʹs “L’autre dans Proust,” “La réalité et son ombre,” and “La transcendance des mots.” I argue that in Levinas’s early philosophy of art follows two distinct “paths”: the path of eros and the path of sensation. On one hand, Levinas questions how and if literature can do justice to the question of alterity, whereas on the other he seeks to make sense of the relationship between art and sensibility. I argue that in his notebooks Levinas offers an account of the meaning of sensations that forms the basis of his early aesthetics. Thus, the study of the Prison Notebooks is important as it allows us to see how Levinas’s early philosophy of art, including his seminal “La réalité et son ombre,” functions as a continuation of a philosophical project already begun during his time in captivity. (shrink)

On ground shared by environmental hermeneutics, critical social theory, and environmentally minded feminism, this article attempts to conciliate between the nearly antithetical ethical viewpoints of environmental philosophers David Abram and Steven Vogel. It will demonstrate first that Abram’s linguistic arguments for extending ethical considerability to nonhuman nature succumb to two of Vogel’s debilitating critiques, which it labels the social constructivist critique and the discourse ethics critique, and secondly that Abram fails to guard against the problem of human-human oppression. The article (...) also points out, on the other hand, that while Vogel evades the problem of human-human oppression, his view fails to protect against the problem of dangerous anthropocentrism. Operating within the boundaries that Vogel establishes, it will seek to avoid the pitfalls of Abram’s view, to address the underlying ideology that leads to both types of oppression, and to eliminate the problem of dangerous anthropocentrism. To do so it draws upon the arguments of Trish Glazebrook, contending that Abram’s appeals to the “speech” of nature can be more effectively conceptualized as erotic appeals, and that engaging in this call-and-response eros promotes the development of virtues that undermine our current ideology and extend to both the human and the nonhuman. (shrink)

They do not understand that being brought apart is carried back together with itself; it is a back-stretching harmony as of the bow and the lyre. Herakleitus, Frag. 51 “Tell me, you, the heir of the argument,” I said, “what was it Simonides said about justice that you assert he said correctly?”“That it is just to give to each what is owed,” he said. “In saying this he said a fine thing, at least in my opinion.” Plato, Republic 331e.

O pensamento de E. M. Cioran (1911-1995) sempre se pautou pela omnipresença de um pessimismo existencial, em que a noção de queda informa indelevelmente o seu quadro mental. Sendo o exílio ontológico uma das pedras angulares do seu catálogo reflexivo, a tragédia capital, para Cioran, seria uma queda no ser e no tempo, a inescapabilidade da existência que encontra uma particular ressonância num título como Do Inconveniente de Ter Nascido (1973). Não negando a validade destas premissas filosóficas, o presente artigo (...) visa, no entanto, colmatar aquilo que julgamos ser uma lacuna no âmbito dos estudos cioranianos, nomeadamente uma incursão sobre a pertinência, para um correcto entendimento da obra deste autor, da presença do humor e da ironia na sua forma mentis, aludindo ao conceito de profanação explanado por Giorgio Agamben, ao conceito de humor explorado por Julio Cortázar e ao conceito de desastre de Maurice Blanchot. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar a semântica da palavra Eros dentro da tradição cristã. Limita-se a algumas dessas significações. A reflexão mostra a limitação dessa expressão na língua portuguesa. Seu significado é muito mais rico na língua grega. Se a tradição cristã carregou esta palavra de forma negativa, outros Padres leram-na em sintonia com Ágape e com outros significados. A relação mística a interpreta como uma relação “erótica” entre homem e Deus. Esta intimidade procura explicar o aspecto do (...) desejo de Deus e da relação mútua entre aquele que ama e o amado, que tem sua raiz na busca mais íntima da humanidade. Negar por preconceitos palavras carregadas de desejos não divinos e nem dignos da humanidade, como na Antigüidade, é reduzir demais seu campo semântico na história. Esta palavra reflete o amor da alma para com Deus numa perspectiva mística, assume variações significativas, dentre tantas, como o amor de Jesus Cristo, como sinônimas de Ágape, do amor de Deus para com os homens, como amor individual ligado a Deus, o Eros como virtude e como castidade. A compreensão das dimensões do amor se realiza na capacidade de ver que todas elas são positivas e importantes para obtermos o equilíbrio da vida humana, numa harmonia destas dimensões constitutivas e importantes para a vida. Palavras-chave: Eros; Patrística; Amor; Alma; Mística; Virtude; Castidade e Ágape. ABSTRACT This article aims at demonstrating the semantics of the term Eros in Christian tradition, pointing out the limitations of the term in Portuguese. The scope of its meaning is much wider in Greek. If Christian tradition has charged the word with a negative feature, other priests have read it in tune with Agape and other meanings. The mystical perspective interprets it as an ‘erotic’ relationship between man and God. Such intimacy attempts to explain God’s desire and the mutual relation between the one who loves and the beloved, rooted in mankind’s most intimate longing. To deny, on account of prejudice, words charged with non-divine desires unworthy of humanity, as happened in antiquity, is to reduce their semantic field in history. That word reflects the soul’s love for God in a mystical perspective and assumes meaningful variations, among which Christ’s love, ‘Agape’ or God’s love for men, and individual love connected with God: ‘Eros’ as virtue and chastity. The comprehension of the dimensions of love takes place in the capacity to realize that they are all positive and relevant to human life’s balance, in the harmony of those dimensions that constitute life. Key words: Eros; Patristics; Love; Soul; The mystical; Virtue; Chastity; Agape. (shrink)

I consider Agnes Callard's _Aspiration_, primarily with regard to its characterization of aspirants as having a partial grasp of a value and being oriented toward their own self-improvement, and to its descriptions of individual case studies, primarily those of Alcibiades and the "good music student" who wishes to learn more about music for its own sake. While she surely has a real phenomenon in view, her theorization of it is more baffling than enlightening, hemmed in by bizarre side conditions on (...) what could count as a reason for pursuing something and by curiously anhedonic exemplars. Her agents have no actual desire to engage in their pursuits, only intellectual respect for them, and no reason to do so: Callard substitutes for "partial grasp of a reason" the idea of two-faced "proleptic reason", whose two faces are a non-aspirational reason the agent has and an aspirational reason the agent doesn't have. Despite the book's subtitle and occasional obiter dicta, she has no concept of becoming, or agents who understand themselves as deepening their engagement with something out of interest in it. (shrink)

En este ensayo se propone una lectura de la narración de Eros y Psique de Apuleyo, extrayendo de ella, principalmente, dos temas de reflexión. El primero es una crítica al modo de entender el pensamiento, es decir, la filosofía, que es generalmente desvinculado del amor, del cuerpo y de la belleza. El segundo tema es la propuesta de cómo se puede co-instituir un sano pensamiento filosófico. Este ensayo pretende continuar la propuesta de Apuleyo y, por lo mismo, repensar desde (...) su herencia las ideas que generalmente se sostienen en Occidente en torno al amor y el pensamiento. (shrink)

"Philosophy and Civilization" is one of Dewey's most important—and most neglected—essays. It is unsettling to anyone who wants to think of Dewey primarily as a "pragmatist." Dewey says the aim of philosophy should be to deal with the meaning of culture and not "inquiry" or "truth": "Meaning is wider in scope as well as more precious in value than is truth and philosophy is occupied with meaning rather than with truth" (LW 3:4).1 Truths are one kind of meaning, but they (...) are only an "island" lying in "the ocean of meanings to which truth and falsity are irrelevant. We do not inquire whether Greek civilization was true or false, but we are immensely concerned to penetrate its meaning," he adds, and continues, "In .. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the figure and the role of Aspasia in Aeschines’ eponymous dialogue, with special regard to the Milesian’s ‘paideutic’ activity and the double bond connecting it to Socrates’ teaching, namely the elenctic method and a particular application of Σωκρατικὸς ἔρως. The study aims to highlight some crucial traits of Aeschines’ Aspasia by examining three key texts, all numbered among the testimonies on the Aspasia: Cicero’s account in De inventione 1.31.51-53 and two fundamental passages from Xenophon’s Memorabilia and (...) Oeconomicus. After analysing a set of ancient sources which repeatedly mention the close and personal association between Socrates and Aspasia, I will try to reconstruct the dialogical context of Xenophon’s testimonies and to combine them with Cicero’s account. My final aim is to clarify the role of Aspasia in Aeschines’ presentation of the Socratic theory of ἔρως. In pursuing this main objective, in the concluding section I will address two further issues: Aspasia’s connection with the figure of Diotima, as depicted in the same ancient sources and the relationship between Aspasias’ pedagogical use of ἔρως and that made by Socrates in the Alcibiades. (shrink)

O propósito deste ensaio é o de investigar as razões pelas quais a educação de Alcibíades por Sócrates não é tão exitosa quanto a educação de Sócrates por Diotima. Em outras palavras: qual é o motivo da derrota de Sócrates enquanto educador? Segundo a minha interpretação, enquanto Sócrates aprende de Diotima a scala amoris com a separação ontológica entre entidades materiais e imateriais, isto é, ideais, Alcibíades não recebe esta mesma teoria de Sócrates. A falta deste conhecimento (isto é, dos (...) princípios metafísicos do platonismo) é a razão pela qual Alcibíades pode propor a Sócrates a troca da verdade (isto é, da verdadeira virtude) pela opinião (a beleza corporal). (shrink)

In questa relazione suggerisco di considerare almeno la possibilità che nel Simposio Platone ci offre non una mera spiegazione della natura dell’amore, ma una spiegazione filosofica della natura del linguaggio (sull’amore). Nel Simposio Eros è una maschera di Socrate e Socrate una maschera del linguaggio. La storia di Diotima sulla nascita di Eros, figlio di Poros e Penia conferma questo punto: il linguaggio, come l’amore, non può possedere il suo oggetto come qualcosa di presente ma solo sempre in (...) una fragile bilancia tra presenza e assenza, tra oblio e memoria, tra conoscenza e ignoranza. Il linguaggio, come l’amore, è il demone della comunicazione. In questa relazione presento qualche prova, tratta dal dialogo, atta a supportare tale interpretazione. (shrink)

Resumen: Mientras que en Banquete Platón presenta a Éros como un daímon metaxý, i.e. como una divinidad intermedia e intermediaria entre dioses y hombres, en Fedro lo caracteriza, en cambio, como un theós -un dios. Procuraremos mostrar aquí que esto no implica, sin embargo, un cambio doctrinal substancial sino que se trata de dos aproximaciones distintas pero complementarias respecto a la verdadera naturaleza de Éros. Según el Fedro, si bien éros puede permanecer en una expresión puramente física, sin desarrollar su (...) aspecto divino, es posible también que, debido al intenso deseo sexual por el bello muchachito, el amante recuerde la Forma de la belleza y crezcan en él las alas del Éros divino. Pero únicamente los dioses nunca pierden las alas de sus almas y están regularmente en pleno contacto con las Formas. Las almas humanas deben adquirirlas, y aun así, con riesgo a perderlas, quedando entonces en un lugar “intermedio” -metaxý- como el Éros de Banquete.: Although in the Symposium Plato describes Erôs as a daimôn-metaxy, i.e. as an intermediate and intermediary divinity between gods and men, in the Phaedrus it is said that Erôs is a theos -a god. I will try to show that these different descriptions do not imply a substantial change of mind but work as two complementary views about the true nature of Erôs. According to the Phaedrus, although erôs can remain just at a physical level and not develop its divine power, it is also possible that, thanks to the same intense, sexual desire for the beautiful boy, the lover recollects the Form of beauty and so grows divine Erôs`s wings. However, only the gods never lose their wings and so are in regular, full contact with the Forms. The human souls need to acquire the wings and even so take the risk of losing them; they are then in an intermediate state -metaxy- like Erôs in the Symposium. (shrink)

El presente trabajo pretende analizar el problema de la agonía y la muerte en el pensamiento de Miguel de Unamuno, como estos dos aspectos innegables en la vida del hombre se constituyen en el fundamento del filosofar y del existir. La lucha encarnizada por no morir generará en el autor una duda muy grande a la que no se la puede negar pero que estará presente en todo el proceso vital del ser humano, para después dar paso a unas alternativas (...) de pervivencia que el mismo autor presenta pero que no logran convencerlo como una solución final. (shrink)