Crenças justificadas não-inferencialmente e o mito do dado

Princípios 16 (25):231-263 (2009)
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The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how perceptual experience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that perceptual experience justifies non-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discuss this question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. But I will defend that there is no such need. The content can be non-conceptual and even so the experience can justify beliefs non-inferentially. I will try to explain how this is possible and at the end I will assess my approach in the face of Sellars' claim that empiricism assumes a triad of inconsistents thesis. I will recast these thesis in accordance with the approach defended and I will conclude that this present version of empiricism is free from Sellars's criticism.



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Eros Carvalho
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul

Citations of this work

Epistemologia da Percepção.Eros Carvalho - 2022 - In Rogel Esteves de Oliveira, Kátia Martins Etcheverry, Thiege Vieira Rodrigues & Carlos Augusto Sartori (eds.), Compêndio de Epistemologia. Porto Alegre: Editora Fi. pp. 268-286.

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