Bridging the gap between the world of science and the realm of the spiritual, B. Alan Wallace introduces a natural theory of human consciousness that has its roots in contemporary physics and Buddhism. Wallace's "special theory of ontological relativity" suggests that mental phenomena are _conditioned_ by the brain, but do not _emerge_ from it. Rather, the entire natural world of mind and matter, subjects and objects, arises from a unitary dimension of reality that is more fundamental than these dualities, as (...) proposed by Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Jung. To test his hypothesis, Wallace employs the Buddhist meditative practice of _samatha_, refining one's attention and metacognition, to create a kind of telescope to examine the space of the mind. Drawing on the work of the physicist John Wheeler, he then proposes a more general theory in which the participatory nature of reality is envisioned as a self-excited circuit. In comparing these ideas to the Buddhist theory known as the Middle Way philosophy, Wallace explores further aspects of his "general theory of ontological relativity," which can be investigated by means of _vipasyana_, or insight, meditation. Wallace then focuses on the theme of symmetry in reference to quantum cosmology and the "problem of frozen time," relating these issues to the theory and practices of the Great Perfection school of Tibetan Buddhism. He concludes with a discussion of the general theme of complementarity as it relates to science and religion. The theories of relativity and quantum mechanics were major achievements in the physical sciences, and the theory of evolution has had an equally deep impact on the life sciences. However, rigorous scientific methods do not yet exist to observe mental phenomena, and naturalism has its limits for shedding light on the workings of the mind. A pioneer of modern consciousness research, Wallace offers a practical and revolutionary method for exploring the mind that combines the keenest insights of contemporary physicists and philosophers with the time-honored meditative traditions of Buddhism. (shrink)

Using as a starting point recent and apparently incompatible conclusions by Saunders and Knox, I revisit the question of the correct spacetime setting for Newtonian physics. I argue that understood correctly, these two versions of Newtonian physics make the same claims both about the background geometry required to define the theory, and about the inertial structure of the theory. In doing so I illustrate and explore in detail the view—espoused by Knox, and also by Brown —that inertial structure is defined (...) by the dynamics governing subsystems of a larger system. This clarifies some interesting features of Newtonian physics, notably the distinction between using the theory to model subsystems of a larger whole and using it to model complete universes, and the scale-relativity of spacetime structure. _1_ Introduction _2_ Newtonian Mechanics and Galilean Spacetime _3_ Vector Relationism and Maxwellian Spacetime _4_ Recovering the Galilei Group: Dynamics of Subsystems _5_ Knox on Inertial Structure _6_ Connections on Maxwellian Spacetime _7_ Knox on Newtonian Gravity _8_ Vector Relationism and Newton–Cartan Theory _9_ Inertial Structure in Newton–Cartan Gravity _10_ Reconciling Knox and Saunders _11_ Conclusions. (shrink)

I respond to the frequent objection that structural realism fails to sharply state an alternative to the standard predicate-logic, object / property / relation, way of doing metaphysics. The approach I propose is based on what I call a ‘math-first’ approach to physical theories (close to the so-called ‘semantic view of theories') where the content of a physical theory is to be understood primarily in terms of its mathematical structure and the representational relations it bears to physical systems, rather than (...) as a collection of sentences that attempt to make true claims about those systems (a ‘language-first’ approach). I argue that adopting the math-first approach already amounts to a form of structural realism, and that the choice between epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism is then a choice between a language-first and math-first view of metaphysics; I then explore the status of objects (and properties and relations) in fundamental and non-fundamental physics for both versions of math-first structural realism. (shrink)

Many important explanations in physics are based on ideas and assumptions about symmetries, but little has been said about the nature of such explanations. This chapter aims to fill this lacuna, arguing that various symmetry explanations can be naturally captured in the spirit of the counterfactual-dependence account of Woodward, liberalized from its causal trappings. From the perspective of this account symmetries explain by providing modal information about an explanatory dependence, by showing how the explanandum would have been different, had the (...) facts about an explanatory symmetry been different. Furthermore, the authors argue that such explanatory dependencies need not be causal. (shrink)

The introduction of the concept of the field of rationality and its correlates (the field of potentiality and the formal field) by Józef Życiński and Michał (Michael) Heller opened up space for the philosophical explanation of the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in capturing regularities built into the physical reality. The presented study is a response to the clear incentive of these authors towards the development of the understanding and applicability of these concepts. It is argued that identifying symmetries within the (...) field of rationality not only helps to articulate the fundamental role of symmetries in physics but also provides a better grasp on the issue of potentialities for the emergence of complexity in the Universe. Additionally, some global properties of this field can be more deeply comprehended. By indicating the drawbacks and limitations of this approach, perspectives for further inquiry into the meaning and usefulness are suggested. (shrink)

This is the first part of a two-tier overview article on fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. It provides an introduction to the notion of fundamentality in metaphysics, as well as to several related concepts. The key issues in the contemporary debate on the topic are summarised, making systematic reference to the most relevant literature. In particular, various ways in which the fundamental entities and the fundamental structure of reality may be conceived are illustrated and discussed. A final (...) brief section looks at the methodological issue of naturalism, paving the way for the survey of fundamentality in the philosophy of physics, which is carried out in the second part. (shrink)

Although computation and the science of physical systems would appear to be unrelated, there are a number of ways in which computational and physical concepts can be brought together in ways that illuminate both. This volume examines fundamental questions which connect scholars from both disciplines: is the universe a computer? Can a universal computing machine simulate every physical process? What is the source of the computational power of quantum computers? Are computational approaches to solving physical problems and paradoxes always fruitful? (...) Contributors from multiple perspectives reflecting the diversity of thought regarding these interconnections address many of the most important developments and debates within this exciting area of research. Both a reference to the state of the art and a valuable and accessible entry to interdisciplinary work, the volume will interest researchers and students working in physics, computer science, and philosophy of science and mathematics. (shrink)

The ‘cosmological constant problem’ has historically been understood as describing a conflict between cosmological observations in the framework of general relativity and theoretical predictions from quantum field theory, which a future theory of quantum gravity ought to resolve. I argue that this view of the CCP is best understood in terms of a bet about future physics made on the basis of particular interpretational choices in GR and QFT, respectively. Crucially, each of these choices must be taken as itself grounded (...) in the sucesses of the respective theory for this bet to be justified. 1 Introduction 2 The Cosmological Constant Problem 2.1 The physics that anticipates ‘vacuum energy’ 2.2 Getting to zero-point energies 2.3 Getting to the cosmological constant 3 The Epistemology of Physical Interpretation 4 The View from High-Energy Physics 5 Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

Based on author's thesis (Ph. D., University of Victoria, 2010).

Because of the complex interdependence of physics and mathematics their relation is not free of tensions. The paper looks at how the tension has been perceived and articulated by some physicists, mathematicians and mathematical physicists. Some sources of the tension are identified and it is claimed that the tension is both natural and fruitful for both physics and mathematics. An attempt is made to explain why mathematical precision is typically not welcome in physics.

This thesis inquires what it means to interpret non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM), and the philosophical limits of this interpretation. In pursuit of a scientific-realist stance, a metametaphysical method is expanded and applied to evaluate rival interpretations of QM, based on the conceptual distinction between ontology and metaphysics, for objective theory choice in metaphysical discussions relating to QM. Three cases are examined, in which this metametaphysical method succeeds in indicating what are the wrong alternatives to interpret QM in metaphysical terms. The (...) first two cases failed in doing so due to different kinds of underdetermination. In the third case, unlike underdetermination, where there are many choices to be made, a “null-determination” is proposed where there may be no metaphysical choices in the available metaphysical literature. Considering what has been discussed, an agnostic philosophic position is adopted concerning the possibility of interpreting QM from a scientific-realistic point of view. (shrink)

The contributions gathered here demonstrate how categorical ontology can provide a basis for linking three important basic sciences: mathematics, physics, and philosophy. Category theory is a new formal ontology that shifts the main focus from objects to processes. The book approaches formal ontology in the original sense put forward by the philosopher Edmund Husserl, namely as a science that deals with entities that can be exemplified in all spheres and domains of reality. It is a dynamic, processual, and non-substantial ontology (...) in which all entities can be treated as transformations, and in which objects are merely the sources and aims of these transformations. Thus, in a rather surprising way, when employed as a formal ontology, category theory can unite seemingly disparate disciplines in contemporary science and the humanities, such as physics, mathematics and philosophy, but also computer and complex systems science. (shrink)

This is the second part of an overview article on fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. Here, the notion of fundamentality is looked at from the viewpoint of the philosophical analysis of physics and physical theories. The questions are considered (1) whether physics can be regarded as fundamental with respect to other sciences, and in what sense; (2) what the label ‘fundamental physics’ should exactly be taken to mean; (3) on what grounds a particular physical theory should be (...) considered fundamental; (4) what should be regarded as fundamental according to particular theories of physics; and (5) what indications come from contemporary physics concerning the fundamental structure of reality. (shrink)

The idea at the core of the New Mechanical account of explanation can be summarized in the claim that explaining means showing ‘how things work’. This simple motto hints at three basic features of Mechanistic Explanation (ME): ME is an explanation-how, that implies the description of the processes underlying the phenomenon to be explained and of the entities that engage in such processes. These three elements trace a fundamental contrast with the view inherited from Hume and later from strict logical (...) empiricism (see Creath 2017), focused on epistemic and formal features of science and according to which issues concerning the kind of entities and processes that lie within a theory’s domain are extraneous to science and belong instead to ontology or metaphysics. Philosophers belonging to the new mechanical philosophy believe that the received view of scientific explanation (Hempel 2001), pivoting on the notion of law of nature, overshadows this insight. Since its origin in the 17th century, mechanical philosophy aimed to explain natural phenomena by reducing them to mechanisms. Traditional attempts to define the concept of mechanism involved the identification of a limited set of fundamental elements as, for instance, contact action, action at a distance, inertial motion (see e.g. Hesse 2005), and, more recently, transmission of a mark, or of a conserved quantity (see Frisch, this volume). The new mechanical philosophy rejects this austere characterization of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation and aim at providing a novel, philosophically rigorous explication of the concept of mechanism and of its role in scientific explanation and practice. ME has been adopted with profit in philosophy of special sciences (for instance in biomedical sciences, e.g. in the explanation of chemical transmission at synapses ((Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000), MDC henceforth); but also in social sciences, e.g. the three kinds of social mechanisms in Coleman’s analysis of Max Weber’s account of the role of the Protestant ethic in the growth of capitalism (Hedström and Swedberg 1998)), where exceptionless regularities are rarely ever found. In physics, it is generally possible to formulate explanations in law-based form, with the result that the plurality of explanatory forms might be overlooked. This should not come as a surprise, given that physics was the main inspiration for logical empiricists, and, in particular, Newtonian physics was a template for Hempel’s formulation of the covering law model. However, this situation is unfortunate, since, we will argue, knowing how things work is often part of the explanation of physical phenomena. In this chapter, we provide an introduction to the basic features of ME, with specific focus on its application to physics (section 1). The main part of the chapter is devoted to the defence of two theses: on the one hand, some domains of physics are not compatible with mechanistic reasoning and explanation (section 2); on the other hand, a comprehensive account of explanation in physics can’t dispense with ME (section 3). (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness is the question how subjective experience arises from brain matter. I suggest that quantum physics may be part of the answer. The simultaneous unity and complexity of subjective experience is very difficult to understand from a classical physics perspective. In contrast, quantum entanglement is naturally both complex and holistic. Building on recent remarkable progress in quantum technology and neuroscience, I propose a concrete hypothesis as a basis for further investigation, namely that subjective experience is related (...) to the dynamics of a complex entangled state of spins, which is continuously generated and updated through the exchange of photons. The proposed hypothesis raises many interesting experimental and theoretical questions in neuroscience, quantum physics, evolutionary biology, psychophysics, and philosophy. (shrink)

We offer to extend structural realism into the field of mind and brain studies. The naturalised metaphysics of structural realism has been defined in terms of unification of sciences. The unification program has been carried out nicely in fields of Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity. But for the structural realist metaphysics to receive a recommendation, the unification program needs to be extended to the fields of especial sciences. Our aim in the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we present (...) a structural realist theory of the brain that is well-supported by the best theories of computational neurosciences. On the other hand, and at the same time, we provide further reason for being optimistic about the structural realism metaphysical claim which is based on the idea of unification in sciences. (shrink)

We propose a distinction between two different concepts of time that play a role in physics: geometric time and creative time. The former is the time of deterministic physics and merely parametrizes a given evolution. The latter is instead characterized by real change, i.e. novel information that gets created when a non-necessary event becomes determined in a fundamentally indeterministic physics. This allows us to give a naturalistic characterization of the present as the moment that separates the potential future from the (...) determined past. We discuss how these two concepts find natural applications in classical and intuitionistic mathematics, respectively, and in classical and multivalued tensed logic, as well as how they relate to the well-known A- and B-theories in the philosophy of time. (shrink)

Quantum Physics suggests that life in the world is about engaging with and entangling in its waves. Its concept of complementarity also makes possible the affirmation of God's consistent actions in the universe without violating Scientific findings, an affirmation that offers resources for dealing with life's waves.

The metaphysical conception of the generation of the macroworld from fundamental physics that Hawthorne considers is criticized in this Commentary, and compared with the scientific account offered by Halliwell and Hartle. It is argued that Hawthorn's critique of Everettian quantum mechanics fails.

The modern philosophy of science has not succeeded in defining conclusively what the scientific method consists in. On the contrary, scientific practice seems to consist in a methodological pluralism, a definition that connects with essential fragments of John Dewey's Logic, the Theory of Inquiry. For Dewey, even the forms of logic emerge from the problems defined in indeterminate situations. A historical example was the introduction of the notion of complementarity in physics, which allowed the interpretation of two confusingly paradoxical experiments (...) in a coherent way. Dewey's thought demonstrates its relevance by helping us to define the pattern of inquiry. Methodological pluralism and the dependence of logic on research problems is not something that will happen, it is something that has happened and does happen in scientific practices. (shrink)

This “fun, brain-twisting book... will make you think” as it explores more than 75 paradoxes in mathematics, philosophy, physics, and the social sciences (Sean Carroll, New York Times–bestselling author of Something Deeply Hidden) Paradox is a sophisticated kind of magic trick. A magician’s purpose is to create the appearance of impossibility, to pull a rabbit from an empty hat. Yet paradox doesn’t require tangibles, like rabbits or hats. Paradox works in the abstract, with words and concepts and symbols, to create (...) the illusion of contradiction. There are no contradictions in reality, but there can appear to be. In Sleight of Mind, Matt Cook and a few collaborators dive deeply into more than 75 paradoxes in mathematics, physics, philosophy, and the social sciences. As each paradox is discussed and resolved, Cook helps readers discover the meaning of knowledge and the proper formation of concepts—and how reason can dispel the illusion of contradiction. The journey begins with “a most ingenious paradox” from Gilbert and Sullivan’s Pirates of Penzance. Readers will then travel from Ancient Greece to cutting-edge laboratories, encounter infinity and its different sizes, and discover mathematical impossibilities inherent in elections. They will tackle conundrums in probability, induction, geometry, and game theory; perform “supertasks”; build apparent perpetual motion machines; meet twins living in different millennia; explore the strange quantum world—and much more. (shrink)

In this book Philip Clayton defends the rationality of religious explanations by exploring the parallels between explanatory effects in the sciences and the explanations offered by religious believers, students of religion, and theologians. Clayton begins by surveying the types of religious explanation, offering a synopsis of the most significant competing positions. He then critically examines recent important developments in the philosophy of science regarding the nature of scientific explanations—including the work of Popper, Hempel, Kuhn, and Lakatos in the natural sciences (...) and Habermas, Weber, and Schütz in the social sciences. Clayton outlines the process of rational evaluation in these disciplines, defining the explanatory quest as the attempt to make sense of or bring coherence into subjective and intersubjective worlds. He briefly discusses explanations in philosophy and then turns to the explanatory role of individual religious experience, drawing on a coherence theory of meaning and on the conclusions from his discussion of science. Based on his defense of the doubting or “secular” believer, he concludes by advocating a model of theology in which questions about the truth of a religious tradition are intrinsic to its theology. “A valuable exposition of the thesis that the explanatory work of theology possesses formal similarities with that of the physical sciences, the social sciences, and philosophy. Clayton exhibits an impressive command of a broad area of scholarship, and his reflections are balanced and carefully argued.” –Michael J. Buckley, S.J., professor of religion at the Jesuit Theological Seminary and author of _At the Origins of Modern Atheism_ “I know of no philosopher writing today who has dealt in as informed and thoughtful a way with the broad subject of this book. Clayton guides the reader through important discussions with ease, illuminating the path all along the way.” –Josiah B. Gould, professor of philosophy at the State University of New York, Albany. (shrink)

Plato's Tim. 90b1-c6 describes a pathway to the soul's salvation via the study of the heavens. This paper poses three questions about this theme in Platonism: 1. The epistemological question: How is the paradigmatic function of the visible heavenly bodies to be reconciled with various Platonic misgivings about the faculty of perception? 2. The metaphysical question: How can »assimilation« to the motions of bodies in the realm of Becoming provide for the salvation of souls when souls are »higher«- a mid-point (...) between Being and Becoming? 3. The psychological question: What can it mean for an incorporeal soul to utilise the motions of a body for an ethical and cognitive paradigm? And provides an account of how Proclus and some of his fellow Neoplatonists answered these questions. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 2, Page 462-465, September 2021.

In this dissertation I examine how the English philosopher-theologian Samuel Clarke (1675--1729) attempted to reasonableness of Christianity and its compatibility with the new natural philosophy. In reaction to what he perceived as the problematic excesses of mechanical philosophy, with its looming threat of atheism, Clarke developed a series of arguments against atheism which aimed to show the shortcomings of a purely material or mechanical explanation of the universe, and demonstrate the overall `reasonability' of the Christian religion. Clarke aimed to demonstrate (...) the `reasonableness' of Christianity by turning the `mathematical' style of reasoning of the mechanical philosophy against his atheist adversaries. Clarke's writings offer us a valuable case-study for the complex interplay of philosophy, science and religion in England at the start of the eighteenth century, and the impact of mechanical philosophy on natural theology. This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of Clarke's philosophy through careful examination of its principal components: The active role of God in the world, the perfection of God's plan, the existence of immaterial substances and powers, and the subsequent reasonability of the Christian religion. Taken together, the four chapters show Clarke's solutions to the atheist threats, and provide a coherent picture of Clarke's ideas about the nature of God and God's role in the world. (shrink)

In the controversy on the philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics Whitehead's philosophy of organism has an essential place. But its realistic position invalidates any attempt to relate it to the School of Copenhagen's “orthodox interpretation”. Unlike, the Eurhythmic Physics developed by the Lisbon School has notable theoretical tunings with Whitehead's philosophy. In both, the notion of passive matter disappears; entities are understood as ecstatic process of becoming arising from a continuum of potentialities; and they achieve physical persistence grace to a (...) set of synergistic interactions among their own regimes of rhythmical activity. The principle of Eurhythmy proposed by Prof. Croca then appears as the hypothesis, in contemporary theoretical physics, corresponding to the organicist vision of a universe in a developmental process of realization of the abstract potentiality of all possible worlds: a universe that, as a living organism, should be described as guided by an immanent teleological principle. (shrink)

Modern (theoretical) physics seems to be in deep crisis today as many of its core aspects are not empirically well-confirmed. Heated exchanges among physicists on the scientific status of physical theories with little or, at best, a tenuous connection to possible experimental tests is highly visible in the popular scientific literature. Some physicists (e.g., Carroll 2014, 2019; Ijjas et al., 2017) argue that science must discard empirical testability as one of its defining properties and the highly explanatory theories of present-day (...) physics should be exempted from experimental testing, while others (e.g., Ellis & Silk 2014) spot in these arguments (for softening the testability or falsifiability requirement for modern physics) a dangerous tendency to undermine science. The philosopher of science who naturally draws most attention in these current debates is Karl Popper (1902-1994). His views, however, are often misrepresented in these debates. The prime objective of this paper is to explain how a more enlightened perspective on the ongoing debates can be obtained by a careful scrutiny of the Popperian criterion of falsifiability. As a first step in achieving this objective we will analyze the two major (conceptual) failures on which the current controversies rest. Our next step will be examining the controversial string theory to see whether the criteria of falsifiability is a ‘blunt instrument’ for determining its scientific status. (shrink)

I argue against the claim -- advocated by Albert Einstein, Bernard Williams, and Ted Sider, among others -- that a description is objective only if it says how the world is in itself. Instead, I argue for the claim -- inspired by comments of Niels Bohr -- that a family of descriptions is objective only if they co-vary with their respective descriptive contexts. Moreover, I claim that "there is a shared objective reality" simply means that it is possible to satisfy (...) this kind of covariance requirement. (shrink)

이 글은 초기 셸링의 자연철학이 동력학적 자연학임을 근원적 힘들에 관한 논의를 중심으로 해명하는 데 있다. 동력학적 자연학으로서 셸링의 자연철학은 다음과 같은 특성을 지닌다. 1) 운동은 정지로부터 나올 수 있다. 2) 모든 기계론적 운동은 근원적 운동으로부터 파생된 2차적 운동이다. 3) 근원적 운동은 근원적 힘들에서 유래한다. 셸링은 근원적 힘들인 인력과 척력을 통해 물질의 다양성을 양적 운동, 질적 운동, 상대적 운동으로 구성한다. 특히, 질적 운동은 화학적 운동을 통한 동력학의 자유로운 운동이다. 셸링은 자연을 주체로서 간주한다. 다시 말해, 자연은 생산물이 아닌 생산성으로 간주된다. 그러나 자연의 (...) 근원적 개념을 통해서 전체 자연은 생산물과 생산성의 동일성을 통해 규정된다. 동력학적 단계들은 생산물의 이중성과 동일성을 통해 자연의 보편적 범주들인 자기성, 전기성, 화학적 과정으로 전개된다. 이것은 무기적 생산물과 유기적 생산물의 차이를 나타낸다. 무기적 생산물에서 유기적 생산물로의 이행은 생산물에 의한 생산성의 제한으로부터 생긴다. 따라서 생산물의 유기적 형성은 팽창과 수축의 교체에 기인한다. 특히, 개체로서의 유기체는 유기적 생산물로서 감수성, 자극성, 형성충동을 거쳐 형성된다. 동력학적 관점에 의하면, 유기체는 감수성과 자극성의 상호작용, 감수성과 생산력의 상호작용, 자극성과 생산력의 상호작용을 통해 전개된다. 따라서 무기적 자연에서 유기적 자연으로의 이행은 잠세력을 통해 증명된다. 결론적으로 동력학적 자연학으로서의 셸링의 자연철학은 자연전체를 근원적 힘들로부터 설명하기 때문에, 결국 유기체에 연관되면서, 경험과 사변의 경계에서 근원적 힘들에 의한 이중성과 동일성으로 해명된다. (shrink)

The current technoscientific progress has led to a sectorization in the philosophy of science. Today the philosophy of science isn't is informal interested in studying old problems about the general characteristics of scientific practice. The interest of the philosopher of science is the study of concepts, problems and riddles of particular disciplines. Then, within this progress of philosophy of science, neuroscientific research stands out, because it invades issues traditionally addressed by the humanities, such as the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, (...) normativity, etc. As a result, the new area of interdisciplinary study of neuroscience and philosophy arises: neurophilosophy. This emerging area applies neuroscientific concepts to traditional philosophical questions, limiting their responses to neuroscientific revelations about nervous systems. Neurophilosophy research focuses on problems related to the indirect nature of mind and brain, computational or representative analysis of brain process, relationships between psychological and neuroscientific research, adequate adaptations of physical and philosophical concepts in neuroscience and the place of cognitive functions. Now, the temporal representation of conscious experience and the types of the neural architecture to represent objects in time have aroused scientific interest. Under these interests, we focus on the studies on the temporary triadic structure of phenomenological consciousness in Dan Lloyd and Rick Grush. From Grush’s studies, the importance of Kantian ideas for cognitive neuroscience emerges, due to the active way in which Kant conceived space and time as forms of intuition, within which the mind interprets its experience. Under this perspective, the theoretical arguments of Dennett-Kinsbourne and Eagleman-Sejnowski represent winks in the direction of Kant-Husserl within the neuroscientific goal while considering that the contents provided by the mind included space, objects and perception of causal relationships. Then, theories of cognitive neuroscience are beginning to suggest that these elements are also, as Kant argued, interpretative elaborations provided by mind / brain, and not only content received from outside. In other words, current cognitive neuroscientific theories try to pass from its Humean phase to a Kantian phase. So, the challenge has been to explain that these elements are provided by the mind and the world itself, and how they have the content they have come from. These are lacking in current studies. Filling this gap helps to involve the analysis of the scientist’s experience in his theoretical attitude. In this sense, an investigation under the Kantian-Husserlian approach that involves pure intuitions a priori with the experience of the scientific and neuroscientific concepts represents a ground-breaking. At present, a neurophilosophical study about this does not exist. In this sense, one feasible proposal for research would be based on the application of neuroscientific results of Moser-Britt to philosophical problems of foundational notions in relativistic physics: space, time, space-time, field, etc., under the Kantian-Husserlian approach, which allows to demonstrate the multidisciplinary link between neurophilosophy and physics. This represents a ground-breaking area in current interests in scientific research, with a positive impact in the field of neuroscience, and contributing to the study of abstraction emphasizing the importance of Kant’s Copernican turn and Husserl’s phenomenological ideas in the construction of physical theories. -/- . (shrink)