This book is intended as a comprehensive defense of psycho-physical dualism. It gives answers to the question of what dualism may consist in, and inquires into the broadly cultural motivation behind accepting dualism or its opponent physicalism. Arguments for dualism, among them strengthened versions of the famous classical arguments, are presented and defended against objections. Moreover, the various general objections to dualism are criticized in detail, for example, the allegation that dualism is of an anti-scientific nature. The book issues into (...) developing the outlines of a dualistic theory of consciousness and agency. The theory outlined is not only compatible with science but actually connects with it. It offers a unified perspective on the phenomenon of conscious life and may serve as a basis for a general ethics regarding all conscious living beings. (shrink)

The phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind, as worked out by Husserl, has been severely criticized by philosophers within the Wittgensteinian tradition and, implicitly, by Wittgenstein himself. This book examines this criticism in detail, looking at the writings of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hacker, Dennett, and others. In defending Husserl against his critics, it offers a comprehensive fresh view of phenomenology as a philosophy of mind.

In a time which it is not amiss to term “the Dark Ages of logic”, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause stayed not only true to logic but actually did something for its advancement. Besides making systematic use of Venn-diagrams long before Venn, Krause — once more taking his inspiration from Leibniz — propounded what appears to be the first completely symbolic systematic representation of logical forms, strongly suggestive of the powerful symbolic languages that have become the mainstay of logic since the (...) beginning of the 20th century. However, Krause’s limits in logic are also clearly visible: Krause’s method in logic is, in the main, not axiomatic; it is combinatorial. More importantly, Krause remained entirely within the confines of traditional syllogistics, neglecting propositional logic and, of course, first-order relational terms. (shrink)

The paper provides new perspectives for a dualistic conception of mental causation by putting causation that originates in a nonphysical self into an evolutionary perspective. Nonphysical causation of this type - free agency -, together with nonphysical consciousness, is regarded as being not only compatible with physics, but also as having a natural place in nature. It is described how free agency can work, on the basis of the brain, and how it can be compatible with the result of the (...) Libet-experiment. The necessary condition for the existence of free agency is that the physical macro-world is indeterministic to a degree that is relevant for living beings, that is, for their survival and well-being. From an evolutionary point of view, and on the basis of the facts of consciousness, it is more likely than not that this condition is in fact fulfilled. (shrink)

In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it is argued (...) that the classical conception is more satisfactory than the two modern ones, not only regarding phenomenal adequacy, but also on the grounds of epistemological considerations. In the second part, the paper argues that classical intentionality is not naturalizable, that is, physicalizable. Since classical intentionality exists (in the experiences that display it), the non-naturalizability of classical intentionality implies psychophysical dualism. (shrink)

This chapter offers a version of Cartesian dualism that draws on the resources of a Husserlian account of intentionality. For example, it argues that 'I can locate myself at the point in space from which I am looking at the world (my 'center of perspective')'. It relies on empirical phenomenology to show that this location that does not correspond to my body or any part of it. Phantom sensations provide confirming evidence. Next, the chapter uses the example of blurred (versus (...) sharp) vision to provide evidence of qualitative properties that cannot be instantiated within the physical world. Finally, it argues that the self's endurance through calls for explanation in terms of patterns of psychophysical causation or interaction. (shrink)

Until quite recently, mind-body dualism has been regarded with deep suspicion by both philosophers and scientists. This has largely been due to the widespread identification of dualism in general with one particular version of it: the interactionist substance dualism of Réné Descartes. This traditional form of dualism has, ever since its first formulation in the seventeenth century, attracted numerous philosophical objections and is now almost universally rejected in scientific circles as empirically inadequate. During the last few years, however, renewed attention (...) has begun to be paid to the dualistic point of view, as a result of increasing discontent with the prevailing materialism and reductionism of contemporary scientific and philosophical thought. Awareness has grown that dualism need not be restricted to its traditional form and that other varieties of dualism are not subject to the difficulties commonly raised against Descartes' own version of it. -/- Interest in these alternative versions of dualism is growing fast today, because it seems that they are capable of capturing deep-seated philosophical intuitions, while also being fully consistent with the methodological assumptions and empirical findings of modern scientific work on the human mind and brain. The object of this book is to provide philosophers, scientists, their students, and the wider general public with an up-to-date overview of current developments in dualistic conceptions of the mind in contemporary philosophy and science. (shrink)

I argue (1) that it is not philosophically significant whether causation is linguistically represented by a predicate or by a sentence connective; (2) that there is no philosophically significant distinction between event- and states-of-affairs-causation; (3) that there is indeed a philosophically significant distinction between agent- and event-causation, and that event-causation must be regarded as an analog of agent-causation. Developing this point, I argue that event-causation's being in the image of agent-causation requires, mainly, (a) that the cause is temporally prior to (...) the effect, (b) that the cause necessitates (is sufficient with necessity) for the effect. Causal necessity is explained as a derivative of nomological necessity, and finally, via a definition of the causal sentence connective, the logic of event-causation is shown to be a part of temporal modal logic. (shrink)

Der Kausalbegriff gehört zu den, gerade in der Gegenwart, am häufigsten in Anspruch genommenen philosophischen Begriffen. In Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftstheorie, der Philosophie des Geistes, in der Handlungstheorie und der Sprachphilosophie taucht er immer wieder in zentraler Funktion auf. Für die Philosophie ist die Deutung des Kausalbegriffs daher von größter Bedeutung. Das vorliegende Buch ist ein Leitfaden zum Kausalbegriff. In seinem ersten Teil wird eine detaillierte Explikation dieses Begriffs geboten, die auf eine neuartige Fassung der nomologischen Regularitätstheorie und die Formulierung einer Logik (...) der Kausalität hinausläuft. Im zweiten Teil wird diese Explikation in einer umfassenden kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der Literatur zu den verschiedenen Themen, die sich mit dem Kausalbegriff verbinden, weiter begründet und verteidigt. Dabei ergibt sich ein umfassendes Panorama des gegenwärtigen Standes der kausalitätstheoretischen philosophischen Diskussion - mit teilweise weit zurückreichenden Perspektiven in die Vergangenheit. Zur Sprache kommen u. a. die folgenden Themen: probabilistische und Sine-qua-non-Kausalität, kausale Überdeterminierung und Präemption, die Probleme der kausalen Notwendigkeit und des kausalen Vorrangs, Physikalisierung der Kausalität, Retrokausalität, die Deutungen des Ereignisbegriffs und Agens- versus Ereigniskausalität. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive, non-model-theoretic theory of ontic necessity and possibility within a formal (and formalised) ontology consisting of states of affairs, properties, and individuals.

Axiomatic Formal Ontology is a fairly comprehensive systematic treatise on general metaphysics. The axiomatic method is applied throughout the book. Its main theme is the construction of a general non-set-theoretical theory of intensional entities. Other important matters discussed are the metaphysics of modality, the nature of actual existence, mereology and the taxonomy of entities.

The paper presents a new version of the "Cosmological Argument" – considered to be an ontological argument, since it exclusively uses ontological concepts and principles. It employs famous results of modern physics, and distinguishes between event-causation and agent-causation. Due to these features, the argument manages to avoid the objection of infinite regress. It remains true, however, that the conclusion of the argument is too unspecific to be unambiguously considered an argument for the existence of God.

This book models and simulates metaphysics by presenting the metaphysics of a model.

The paper analyzes the concept of a first cause, both for event causation and for agent causation. It turns out that one is rather ready to believe in the existence of first causes that are events, but not in the existence of first causes that are agents. The paper, however, develops and defends a complex argument to the conclusion that there is a first agent-cause. one version of that argument proves -- not necessarily the existence of God -- but still (...) the existence of a godlike agent. Finally, the notion of a first agent-cause is employed for an analysis of freely willed human action. (shrink)

With the emergence of modern physics a conflict became apparent between the Principle of Sufficient Cause and the Principle of Physical Causal Closure. Though these principles are not logically incompatible, they could no longer be considered to be both true; one of them had to be false. The present paper makes use of this seldom noticed conflict to argue on the basis of considerations of comparative rationality for the truth of causal statements that have at least some degree of philosophico-theological (...) relevance and can be taken to indicate ( not prove) the existence of God. The paper’s comparatively modest aim is to establish belief in the existence of God as a rational metaphysical option, not as a rational obligation. In its final section, enriched causal considerations lead to an indication ( not proof) of God as that which guarantees the unified continuance of the physical world. (shrink)

In fact, Godel gave an important model of pure predication, where he showed that restricted comprehension without parameters is valid, but where restricted comprehension with parameters is not (although this invalidity was not established until Cohen). This is the model based on ordinal definability in set theory.

This paper states and examines a modal argument for universal necessity, that is: for the necessary truth of every true proposition. Deep issues in the metaphysics of modality are bound up with the argument, as is revealed in the attempt to defend, or refute, it.

This treatise delves into the construction and formalization of a precise theory to encapsulate a pivotal facet of Thomas Aquinas’s ontology. In particular, it focuses on the development of a formal language that is adequate for formulating Aquinas’s understanding of the simultaneous nature of divinity as both an object of subsistence and a universal, individual, and actuating form—a concept evocative of the original Platonic sense of form. The presented axiomatized theory as a medium for expounding the ontological principles enunciated by (...) Thomas Aquinas. A comprehensive set of axioms is systematically justified, exhibiting their congruence with Aquinas’s ontological doctrines. To elucidate this harmony, an extensive series of theorems is deduced, closely aligned with the verbal tenets of Aquinas’s teachings. The inherent consistency of the axiom system is proven by the provision of a geometrico-topological model tailored to support it. (shrink)

Welchen ontologischen Status hat das Ich? Verfugen wir uber Selbstwissen und wenn ja, in welchem Sinne?

The semantical framework is fundamentally intensional: neither possible worlds nor sets as basic entities, but rather, besides individuals, propositions, properties and relations (in intension). Logical truth is defined in terms of logical form (without mentioning this notion) without employing sets of models and the concept of truth in a model. Truth itself is explicitly defined (without recursion); the truth-conditions for the logical constants of the object-language become theorems derivable from the axioms for "to intend"--the basic semantical relation.

This paper presents a set-theoretical conceptual framework for theorizing about (possible) events , and states some analytical and synthetical principles which describe the way in which the concept of reality (or actuality ) applies to them. The conceptual framework has few primitives, but is nevertheless of great definitional power; the demonstration of this will fill the first part of the paper.

In diesem Aufsatz wird eine axiomatisierte logische Rekonstmktion der Platonischen Prädikationstheorie vorgeschlagen, aufbauend auf der Ähnlichkeitsrelation. Die Theorie ist konsistent und trivial. Selbst-Prädikation bereitet darin keine Schwierigkeiten und das Dritte-Mann-Argument wird als harmlos aufgezeigt. Es werden Kriterien dafür, daß etwas ein Standardgegenstand (eine Form oder Idee) ist, aufgestellt und ausgeführt, daß diese die Platonische Ideentheorie implizieren. Die Grenzen von Piatons Prädikationstheorie werden klar gemacht; sie ist von der adjektivischen (linguistischen) Prädikation abgeleitet und kann ontologisch nur diesen Typ der Prädikation abdecken, (...) nicht aber substantivische Prädikation. Schließlich wird gezeigt, daß die Existenz Gottes in der Platonischen Prädikationstheorie bewiesen werden kann. (shrink)

In Plato's Parmenides we find on the one hand that the One is denied every property , and on the other hand that the One is attributed every property . In the course of the history of Platonism , these assertions - probably meant by Plato as ontological statements of an entirely formal nature - were repeatedly made the starting points of metaphysical speculations. In the Mystical Theology of the Pseudo-Dionysius they became principles of Christian mysticism and negative theology. I (...) shall show that the two assertions can each be interpreted within the ontological framework of ancient and medieval logic in such a manner that it becomes true, and I shall make plausible that they were understood, with regard to their logical core, by pagan and Christian Platonic metaphysicians just as is indicated by that interpretation. The mentioned ontological framework is basically the Boolean algebra of first-order properties. The main points of the interpretation are on the one hand the identification of the One with the maximal element of the algebra of properties, and on the other hand two alternative intuitively prominent mereological definitions of ontic predication. (shrink)

In this paper, a paradox is shown to arise in the context of classical logic from prima facie highly plausible assumptions for the existence predicate as applied to definite descriptions. There are several possibilities to evade the paradox; all involve modifications in the principles of first-order logic with identity, existence, and definite descriptions; some stay within classical logic, others leave it. The merits of the various "ways out" are compared. The most attractive "way out," it is argued, stays within classical (...) logic, except for the fact that it involves a new logical truth: "There is at least one non-existent object." But this "exit" will certainly not be to everyone's taste and liking. Thus, the paradox defies complete resolution. (shrink)

This paper has two parts. The first part is historical, presenting a brief history of the concept of necessity from the time of antiquity to the present. It is shown that the conceptions of necessity in antiquity had four main sources: matter-necessity, form-necessity, efficiencynecessity, and purpose-necessity. Special attention is accorded to the syncretistic concept of the necessity of fate, and its transformations from the beginning of antiquity to its end. Moreover, it is pointed out that already in antiquity we find (...) the conception of proofnecessity, and the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic necessity. At present, of the original four main sources of conceptions of necessity, three have dried up, leaving only form-necessity still active. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the development of a rigorous theory of form-necessity, at the end of which a skeptical note is struck regarding laws of nature. (shrink)

Quantum physics, unlike classical physics, suggests a non-physicalistic metaphysics. Whereas physicalism implies a reductive position in the philosophy of mind, quantum physics is compatible with non-reductionism, and actually seems to support it. The essays in this book explore, from various points of view, the possibilities of basing a non-reductive philosophy of mind on quantum physics."--Back cover.

The paper first distinguishes ontological priority from epistemological priority and unilateral ontic dependence. Then explications of ontological priority are offered in terms of the reducibility of the actual existence or identity of entities in one ontological category to the actual existence or identity of entities in another. These explications lead to incompatible orders of ontological priority for individuals, properties of individuals and states of affairs. Common to those orders is, however, that the primacy of the category of individuals is abandoned. (...) This primacy is challenged in the paper also by epistemological arguments, and an onto-anthropological explanation is offered for the very common but false idea that individuals are ontological prior to all other kinds of entities. Finally ontological priority is discussed with respect to a fully specified system of ontological categories. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to the formulation of a restricted theory of ontic modality (for example, I do not address questions that arise when modal operators interact with quantifiers, although some of the theoretical developments presented here certainly suggest such questions). As will be seen, notwithstanding its restrictions, the theory has a pleasing richness to it, as well as formal rigor and intuitive satisfactoriness. It also offers an unusual perspective on modality.