The paper reviews proposals by Abell, Predelli, and others on the semantics of fiction, focusing on the discourse through which fictions are created. Predelli develops the radical fictionalism of former writers like Kripke and van Inwagen, on which that discourse is contentless and does not express propositions. This paper offers reasons to doubt these claims. It then explores realist proposals like Abell’s in which singular terms in fictions refer to fictional characters, understood as socially created representational artifacts, and irrealist alternatives (...) in which the discourse is fully meaningful even though those terms fail to refer. (shrink)

W. V. O. Quine's contention that translation is indeterminate has been among the most widely discussed and controversial theses in modern analytical philosophy. This chapter offers some initial reflections on the content and implications of the indeterminacy thesis, and of the presuppositions that Quine makes in treating it as a stepping‐stone to semantic irrealism. It distinguishes Quine's two principal arguments for the thesis: the famous 'gavagai' argument of Word and Object, and the argument from the underdetermination of empirical (...) theory by data emphasized in 'On the reasons for the indeterminacy of translation', and lays out the essentials of the former argument. The chapter assesses the cogency of Evans's objections, and lays‐out certain basic distinctions and implications of the second and more radical argument. The translation of theoretical terms in the native scientists' language can be no more indeterminate than is the selection of an empirically adequate theory of those data. (shrink)

Paul Boghossian (1997) has argued that there is much to be said on behalf of the notion of analyticity so long as we distinguish epistemic analyticity and metaphysical analyticity. In particular, (1) epistemic analyticity isn’t undermined by Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, (2) it can explain the a prioricity of logic, and (3) epistemic analyticity can’t be rejected short of embracing semantic irrealism. In this paper, we argue that all three of these claims are mistaken.

An irrealist conception of a given region of discourse is the view that no real properties answer to the central predicates of the region in question. Any such conception emerges, invariably, as the result of the interaction of two forces. An account of the meaning of the central predicates, along with a conception of the sorts of property the world may contain, conspire to show that, if the predicates of the region are taken to express properties, their extensions would have (...) to be deemed uniformly empty. The question then becomes whether the predicates are best understood as expressing properties, and hence as founded on error, or whether they ought to be understood along non-factualist lines.z Historically, irrealist models were developed primarily in connection with evaluative discourse, although as physicalism has flourished and as reductionist programs have failed, their application has been extended to many other domains. Indeed, it is one of the more influential suggestions in contemporary philosophy of mind that they apply even to ordinary belief/desire psychology. A correct understanding of the semantics and metaphysics of content-based psychology leaves us, so the proponents of the in-. (shrink)

This is a new major and systematic monograph on the realism debate, written by a very skillful and sophisticated defender of anti-realism. The realism debate is conceived here as a primarily semantic controversy concerning the possibility of forming propositions or sentences about the world whose truth or falsity might be unknowable to us. Realists of various persuasions take it to be perfectly possible, while nonrealists of all sorts deny this. Tennant distinguishes two basic forms of nonrealism in his book: (...) irrealism and antirealism. According to semantic irrealism, there are no such entities as propositions, or objective and determinate meanings for sentences to possess. Semantic antirealists generally do not agree with such a radical conclusion. They argue for the objectivity and determinacy of meaning, although at the same time they insist that both meaning and truth attributable to propositions or sentences has to be epistemically constrained, that is, grasping a meaning has to be manifestable and truth has to be in principle knowable. While developing in greater detail his own version of antirealism that respects those two constraints, Tennant combines the knowability requirement with the claim that truth need not be bivalent, which in turn leads him to replace classical logic based on bivalence by a nonclassical constructive logic, namely, intuitionistic relevant logic. Tennant attempts to show that this logic has much wider application than one might suppose. It suffices not only for mathematics but also adequately captures the basic inferential practices of empirical sciences. It would be hard to overestimate the significance of that attempt, since if successful it undermines the charge that anti-realism is a doctrine that cannot really be extended beyond the domain of mathematical discourse. The general strategy taken in this respect by Tennant is not, as has been common so far, to strengthen the notion of empirical verification or confirmation of a sentence in such a way as to make it a close analogue of the notion of mathematical proof. “Rather, one should attend to the main feature of natural scientific theorizing to which Popper drew our attention: our scientific theories can at best be falsified, not verified”. In other words, in the case of empirical discourse the perfect analogue of the antirealist notion of constructive provability is the notion of constructive falsifiability. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay offers a reconfiguration of the possibility‐space of positions regarding the metaphysics and epistemology associated with historical knowledge. A tradition within analytic philosophy from Danto to Dummett attempts to answer questions about the reality of the past on the basis of two shared assumptions. The first takes individual statements as the relevant unit of semantic and philosophical analysis. The second presumes that variants of realism and antirealism about the past exhaust the metaphysical options . This essay argues that (...) both of these assumptions should be rejected. It develops as an alternative an irrealist account of history, a view based in part on work by Leon Goldstein and Ian Hacking. On an irrealist view, historical claims ought to be treated as subject to the same conditions and caveats that apply to any theory of empirical or scientific knowledge. Irrealism argues for pasts as made and not found. The argument emphasizes the priority of classification over perception in the order of understanding and so verification. Because nothing a priori anchors practices of classification, no sense can be attached to claims that some single structure must or does determine what events take place in human history. Irrealism denies to realism the very intelligibility of any imagined view from nowhere, that is, a determinately configured past subsisting sub specie aeternitatis. A plurality of pasts exists because constituting a past always depends to some degree on socially mediated negotiations of a fit between descriptions and experience. (shrink)

As with all other moral realists, so-called relaxed moral realists believe that there are moral truths. Unlike metaphysical moral realists, they do not take themselves to be defending a substantively metaphysical position when espousing this view, but to be putting forward a moral thesis from within moral discourse. In this paper, I employ minimalism about truth to examine whether or not there is a semantic analysis of the claim ‘There are moral truths’ which can support this moral interpretation of (...) one of moral realism’s key theses. My results are both discouraging and encouraging: Whilst I will argue that the claim ‘There are moral truths’ cannot be shown to be both moral and capable of demarcating relaxed realism from irrealism on the basis of a convincing semantic analysis that would be compatible with relaxed commitments, the moral interpretation of moral realism can be secured by modifying our understanding of what distinguishes relaxed realism from error-theoretic irrealism. Yet, we will see that this moral interpretation of moral realism does not ‘tumble out’ of the semantics provided for its central claims. Rather, hard work needs to be done before we can fully relax. (shrink)

The words “content” and “character” in my title refer to the representational content and phenomenal character of color experiences. So my topic concerns the nature of our experience of color. But I will, of course, be talking about colors as well as color experience. Let me set the stage by mentioning some things, some more controversial than others, that I will be taking for granted. I assume, to begin with, that objects in the world have colors, and have them independently (...) of being perceived to have them, and independently even of there being creatures capable of perceiving them. I think, and this of course sets me apart from the many color irrealists among philosophers and color scientists, that any reasonable semantics for color terms, and any reasonable account of the reference of color concepts, should yield the result that colors are properties of external things that are realized in certain of their physical properties, namely those responsible for their reflecting or emitting the light whose impact on our retinas is involved in causing our color perceptions. This brings me to a further assumption that I shall be making, namely the truth of physicalism. I take physicalism to be the thesis that all properties of things either are or are realized in basic physical properties, where basic physical properties are the properties that underlie the behavior and causal powers of inanimate things. There are two ways in which the commitment to physicalism will figure in my discussion. First, I assume that colors are physically realized properties. Second, I assume that color experiences are physically realized. These two commitments frame the problem I am discussing – how can colors be properties realized in the microphysical properties of things, and how can color experience be so realized? I don’t think there is any generally accepted account of what it is for a property to be “realized in” other properties. For those who think, as I do, that properties are individuated by their causal features, it should seem plausible to say that property P realizes property Q just in case the forward looking causal features of Q are a subset of the forward looking causal features of P, and the backward looking.... (shrink)

Practical philosophy and ethics -- Practical tortise raising -- Truth, beauty, and goodness -- Dilemmas: dithering, plumping, and grief -- Group minds and expressive harm -- Trust, cooperation, and human psychology -- Must we weep for sentimentalism? -- Through thick and thin -- Perspectives, fictions, errors, play -- The steps from doing to saying -- Success semantics -- Wittgenstein's irrealism -- Circles, finks, smells, and biconditionals -- The absolute conception: Putnam vs. Williams -- Julius Caesar and George Berkeley play (...) leapfrog -- The majesty of reason -- Fiction and conviction. (shrink)

I argue for three principle claims. First, philosophers who seek to integrate the semantic and the intentional into a naturalistic metaphysical worldview need to address a task that they have thus far largely failed even to notice: explaining into- level connections between the physical and the intentional in a naturalistically acceptable way. Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there is much to (...) be said for an irrealist, non-eliminativist, naturalistic approach to intentionality that I call "preservative irrealism". (shrink)

In the philosophy of fiction, a majority view is continuism, i.e., the thesis that ordinary names, or genuine singular terms in general, directly refer to ordinary real individuals in fiction-involving sentences – e.g. “Napoleon” in the sentences that constitute the text of Tolstoy’s War and Peace. But there is also a minority view, exceptionalism, which is the thesis that such terms change their semantic value in such sentences, either by directly referring to fictional surrogates of those individuals – what (...) we may call exceptional hyperrealism about fictional characters – or by acquiring a semantic value that turns them into nonreferential terms, involving no ontological commitment to such characters – exceptional irrealism about fictional characters. In this paper, first of all, I want to support hybrid exceptionalism, according to which both parties are partly right and partly wrong. In the fictional use of fiction-involving sentences, those terms directly refer to ordinary real individuals, as continuists claim, while both in the internal and the external metafictional use of fiction-involving sentences, such terms change their semantic value, as exceptionalists claim. (By contrast, for pure exceptionalists such terms either always refer to fictional surrogates or are nonreferring on all such uses.) Moreover, I will argue that hybrid exceptional hyperrealism must be preferred to hybrid exceptional irrealism: in the latter uses, I claim, such terms directly refer to fictional surrogates. (shrink)

In this work I defend moral realism, the thesis that there are objective moral truths, by defending “epistemic realism.” Epistemic realism is the thesis that epistemic judgments, e.g., judgments that some belief is epistemically reasonable, or justified, or known or should be held, are sometimes true and made true by stance-independent epistemic facts and properties. -/- One might think that epistemic realism needs no defense because it is obviously true and nearly universally accepted. But there are influential arguments against moral (...) realism, which is analogous to epistemic realism: moral realists think that moral judgments, e.g., that something is morally good, or ought to be done, are sometimes true because there are stance-independent moral facts and properties. Moral irrealists deny this for a variety of semantic, metaphysical, psychological and epistemological reasons. They argue that moral judgments are neither true nor false since they are non-cognitive expressions of emotion or commands, or are never true since they fail to refer, or that their truth is “relative.” -/- Drawing on the moral irrealisms of Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Mackie, Harman, and more recent thinkers, I construct parallel arguments for epistemic irrealisms. On these views, epistemic judgments are also merely expressive, a kind of command, always false, or relativistic in truth conditions: even “epistemic platitudes” like “justified beliefs are better than unjustified beliefs” and “ideally, one’s beliefs ought to be consistent” are understood not as epistemic propositions that might be believed (much less believed truly), or as attempts to accurately represent epistemic facts, or as attributions of epistemic properties. -/- The implications of these claims are highly at odds with common epistemological assumptions, even those that moral irrealists tend to accept. I argue that these implications are rationally unacceptable and that, therefore, the premises that support them should be rejected. Since these premises are those given in defense of moral irrealisms, I thereby defend both moral and epistemic realism. Thus, I argue that “oughts,” “shoulds” and other evaluative judgments are equally legitimate in both ethics and epistemology. (shrink)

Mental states differ from most other entities in the world in having semantic or intentional properties: they have meanings, they are about other things, they have satisfaction- or truth-conditions, they have representational content. Mental states are not the only entities that have intentional properties - so do linguistic expressions, some paintings, and so on; but many follow Grice, 1957 ] in supposing that we could understand the intentional properties of these other entities as derived from the intentional properties of (...) mental states. Of course, accepting this supposition leaves us with a puzzle about how the non-derivative bearers of intentional properties could have these properties. In particular, intentional properties seem to some to be especially difficult to reconcile with a robust commitment to ontological naturalism - the view that the natural properties, events, and individuals are the only properties, events, and individuals that exist. Fodor puts this intuition nicely in this oft-quoted passage: " I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they've been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of _spin_, _charm_, and _charge_ will perhaps appear upon their list. But _aboutness_ surely won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep.... If aboutness is real, it must be really something else. " Some philosophers have reacted to this clash by giving up one of the two views generating the tension. For example, Churchland, 1981 ] opts for intentional irrealism in order to save ontological naturalism, while. (shrink)

In everyday usage, ‘realism’ is often used as a name for a practically or epistemically low-ambition attitude, while ‘idealism’ is often taken to denote a highambition—if not utopian—attitude. In philosophcal usage, mostly, it is the other way around: those who are called realists tend to claim more than their opponents—they are the philosophical optimists. Within philosophy itself, ‘realism’ adopts a variety of interrelated and contested meanings. It is used as the name for doctrines about issues such as perceptual access to (...) reality, the existence of universals, the goals and achievements of science, the nature of truth, the objectivity of morality, and many other things. Given this variety, no single shorthand definition of the term ‘realism’ can be provided. One manifestation of this variety is that the opponents of realism about these issues are not called uniformly by a single label (other than the rather uninformative ‘antirealism’): the labels used include idealism, phenomenalism, instrumentalism, conventionalism, fictionalism, noncognitivism, constructivism, relativism, irrealism, and others. Sometimes such labels vary from one dispute or domain to another even when similar ideas are being expressed. Sometimes they are used to make claims that are specific to the domain at hand and distinct from other antirealist theses. In what follows a brief tour will be taken along some of the representative philosophical highways and lanes, from ontology through semantics to epistemology. Along the way, realism will be confronted with some of its various opponents and internal conflicts. The philosophical landscape in the neighborhood of realism is nowadays much broader than it used to be: in a typical older encyclopedia, ‘realism’ was taken to name doctrines about universals or about perception, or both, to the exclusion of much of its present coverage, and many of the current opponents were missing from view altogether. (shrink)

Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates (...) them, it needs development. I then argue that the ?phenomenal concept strategy? (PCS) of a purely cognitive account of the distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts combines physicalism with phenomenal concepts only by misrepresenting physical properties. This is because phenomenal concepts carry ontological commitment, and I present an argument to show the tension between this commitment and granting ontological authority to physical concepts only. In the final section, I show why phenomenal concepts are more ontologically committed than PCS theorists can allow, revive U.T. Place's notion of a ?phenomenological fallacy? to explain their enduring appeal, and then suggest some advantages of functional analyses of concepts of conscious states over the phenomenal alternative. (shrink)

This dissertation explores three areas of philosophical interest: expressivist or non-cognitivist construals of normative discourse, normative construals of semantic discourse, and the plausibility of semantic non-factualism or irrealism. These three areas are not as unrelated as they may at first glance appear to be. In particular the work presented here demonstrates that the notions of disagreement and inconsistency play a crucial role in all three areas. ;Regarding the first area, it is argued that reflection on the nature (...) of disagreement and inconsistency yields some deep problems for expressivist construals of normative discourse. The best current attempts to provide an expressivist construal of normative discourse---due to Blackburn and Gibbard---model what disagreement and inconsistency amount to on the expressivist account on the way in which forbidding p conflicts with permitting p. However, closer examination of what exactly constitutes disagreement and inconsistency raises doubts about whether such a move is legitimate. Regarding the second area, it is argued that the normativity of meaning is required to explain how disagreement itself is possible. Finally, regarding the last area, it is argued that the attempts of Boghossian and Wright to establish that semantic non factualism inflates into global non-factualism are not successful. The notion of disagreement is once more crucial here. In particular it is argued that getting clear on what exactly it is to disagree is the key to seeing where Wright's line of reasoning goes astray. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with the semantics and metaphysics of events and facts, particularly when they are claimed to be causal relata. I relate these issues to various well-known analyses of causation. The approach to the analysis of events is the property exemplification theory. I defend Kim's fine-grained individuation of events against most of Bennett's objections to it, but agree with Bennett that it is too fine-grained to provide a description of our ordinary thought and talk about events, including causal (...) statements. In the final part of the paper, I attempt to show that we need to distinguish between two different senses of 'fact': the term can mean both a true proposition and a situation (truthmaker). I try to show that Bennett seems to hold that facts in the first sense are causal relata. I argue that this view either amounts to a causal irrealism or to a conflation of epistemology with ontology. (shrink)

In this dissertation I attempt to develop a framework for appreciating the significance of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations for various issues in metaphysics. ;In chapter one I develop the notion of a conceptually structured property. I argue that the proper target of the rule-following arguments is not the idea that we can have cognitive access to semantic facts tout court, but rather the idea that we can have cognitive access to them in a sense of cognitive access defined by what (...) I call the Sublimated Conception of cognitive access: the view that we can only cognitively access the facts about the instantiation of conceptually unstructured properties. The conclusion of chapter one is that there cannot be semantic facts that we are capable of cognitively accessing in the sense of access defined by the Sublimated Conception. ;In chapters two and three I look at the irrealist and anti-realist positions that can be viewed as reactions to the predicament we are left in by the conclusion of chapter one. I suggest that neither of these sorts of view provides us with a stable response to the rule-following arguments. ;In chapter four, I try to show that there is an alternative to the Sublimated Conception of cognitive access, which, following, John McDowell, I call Humanized Platonism. According to Humanized Platonism we are perfectly entitled to think of ourselves as cognitively accessing facts about the instantiation of conceptually structured properties. I claim that Humanized Platonism provides us with a way of meeting the challenge of chapter one, whilst avoiding the difficulties associated with irrealism and anti-realism. ;In chapter five I try to show how various aspects of John McDowell's work can be explicated using our framework, and I also spend some time discussing the contemporary literature on response-dependence and related matters. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman’s disparate writings are often discussed and written about only within their own particular discipline, such that the epistemology is discussed in contrast to others’ epistemology, the aesthetics is contrasted with more traditional aesthetics, and the ontology and logic is viewed in opposition to both other contemporary philosophers and to his historical predecessors. This book argues that that is not an adequate way to view Goodman. The book is divided into three sections: The Metaphysics, The Epistemology, The Aesthetics. I (...) demonstrate, firstly, the dependency of his epistemology and aesthetics on his early metaphysical and ontological writings, and secondly, that it is the very application of those metaphysical and ontological positions to the rest of his philosophical writings that is the source of much of which fails to be completely satisfactory in his aesthetics. They are sequential sections within each providing the ground rules for the next section and, furthermore, providing the reasons for limitations on the terms available to the subsequent section(s). Thus the Metaphysics is an explication of Gooodman’s basic nominalist ontology and logic, and it is upon those principles that he builds his epistemology. It is the sum of both the metaphysics and the epistemology, with the nominalist principle as the guiding force, which constructs the aesthetics. At the end of each section, the consequent limitations imposed on his terms and concepts available to him are explicated, such that, by the end of the book, I am able to delineate the constraints imposed upon the aesthetics by both the metaphysics and the epistemology. (shrink)