Dissertation, University of Michigan (
1995)
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Abstract
In this dissertation I attempt to develop a framework for appreciating the significance of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations for various issues in metaphysics. ;In chapter one I develop the notion of a conceptually structured property. I argue that the proper target of the rule-following arguments is not the idea that we can have cognitive access to semantic facts tout court, but rather the idea that we can have cognitive access to them in a sense of cognitive access defined by what I call the Sublimated Conception of cognitive access: the view that we can only cognitively access the facts about the instantiation of conceptually unstructured properties. The conclusion of chapter one is that there cannot be semantic facts that we are capable of cognitively accessing in the sense of access defined by the Sublimated Conception. ;In chapters two and three I look at the irrealist and anti-realist positions that can be viewed as reactions to the predicament we are left in by the conclusion of chapter one. I suggest that neither of these sorts of view provides us with a stable response to the rule-following arguments. ;In chapter four, I try to show that there is an alternative to the Sublimated Conception of cognitive access, which, following, John McDowell, I call Humanized Platonism. According to Humanized Platonism we are perfectly entitled to think of ourselves as cognitively accessing facts about the instantiation of conceptually structured properties. I claim that Humanized Platonism provides us with a way of meeting the challenge of chapter one, whilst avoiding the difficulties associated with irrealism and anti-realism. ;In chapter five I try to show how various aspects of John McDowell's work can be explicated using our framework, and I also spend some time discussing the contemporary literature on response-dependence and related matters