The article begins with a discussion about what might constitute consciousness in entities other than oneself and the implications of the mind-brain debate for the possibility of a conscious machine. While referring to several other facets of the philosophy of mind, the author focuses on epiphenomenalism and interactionism and presents a critique of the former in terms of biological evolution. The interactionist argument supports the relevance of parapsychology to the problem of consciousness and the statistical technique of meta-analysis is cited (...) in support of this position. (shrink)

In the very first issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, dualist John Beloff discusses the problem of how interactions may occur between the supposedly different realms of mind and matter. It is indeed the case that meta-analyses covering many years of research give very strong support to the reality of psi phenomena . Historical analysis has shown, however, that the results of some of the stronger paradigms are subject to a decline effect after an initial successful period of ten (...) to twenty years. And even if the reality of the phenomena stand up against time, a proper use of the available data -- as opposed to Beloff's selective use of it -- would at least complicate the naive interactionist picture and in fact argue against the dualist perspective. (shrink)

Purpose: Josef Mitterer's essays are considered to be important philosophical advancements of radical constructivism. The main purposes of this paper are, on the one hand, to structure the RC landscape and, on the other hand, to investigate the relations of Mitterer's work to radical constructivism in particular and to philosophy in general. Findings: In this short essay focusing on Mitterer's Das Jenseits der Philosophie, I would like to stress two major points. First, Mitterer's book should be considered as (...) one of several contemporary variants of a radical critique of the semantic turn in the philosophy of science that has taken place since the mid-thirties with the works of Rudolf Carnap, Carl G. Hempel, Hilary Putnam, Alfred Tarski and others. Second, it is by no means clear how to determine the relevance of the new semantic critique for the present and future cognitive status of radical constructivism. The degree of relevance depends crucially on the use of the term "radical constructivism." If radical constructivism, as I will argue, is seen as an umbrella term for a group of empirical research programs, then, by sheer necessity, the relevance can be marginal only. If, however, radical constructivism is viewed as a special form of philosophy of language and/or as a new epistemology, then the importance of Josef Mitterer's approach must be judged within the context of available functional alternatives. Implications: An immediate consequence of this article lies in a renewed emphasis on advancing an empirical research agenda for radical constructivism and in an effective downsizing of radical constructivism as a philosophical perspective. (shrink)

This thesis develops a radical critique of utopian thinking by examining the dialectical and dualistic methodological elements in Hayekian, Rothbardian, and Marxian theory. Utopianism is defined as an abstract, dualistic, ahistorical form of social thought. Its central failure is its inability to resolve the polarity between its progressive intentions and the emergent, unintended consequences of human interaction. It grants to men an illusory degree of cognitive efficacy in its construction of a new society. Radicalism, however, recognizes socio-historical conditions in (...) any attempt to dialectically transform them. The Hayekian, Rothbardian and Marxian projects are appraised in their capacity to transcend the methodological pitfalls of utopianism. ;The comparison between Hayek, Rothbard and Marx is unusual precisely because each is a major figure in a distinctly different tradition of social analysis. Hayek exemplifies the "evolutionist" perspective which synthesizes insights from Burke, Popper, Polanyi and Scottish liberalism. Despite its inadequate analysis of the state and classes, and its dualistic distinction between "spontaneous" and "designed " order, Hayek's framework constitutes a highly dialectical critique of utopianism which has provocative parallels with the Marxian critique. ;Though Hayek and Rothbard share a belief in free market processes, Rothbard embraces a libertarian perspective which synthesizes the insights of Austrian economics, New Left historical revisionism, and the natural rights philosophies of John Locke and Ayn Rand. Rothbard shares many of the progressive goals of Marx, but his anarchist utopia is an outgrowth of an ahistorical, abstract, dualistic methodology. Rothbard's analysis is far more radical when it uncovers important dialectical relationships between the "coercive" state and the "voluntarist" market. ;Marx's dialectic offers a profoundly radical mode of inquiry. In contrast to both Hayek and Rothbard, Marx views the duality between state and market as historically specific to capitalism. Taking full cognizance of the evolutionist perspective, Marx proposes the immanent emergence of a communism that consists in the triumph of conscious human agency. Yet, Marx's project grants to man a cognitive efficacy which may be beyond his capacity. ;The thesis attempts to transcend the utopian limitations of Hayekian, Rothbardian, and Marxian theories through the development of a truly radical methodology. (shrink)

We approach the problem of the extended mind from a radically non-dualist perspective. The separation between mind and matter is an artefact of the outdated mechanistic worldview, which leaves no room for mental phenomena such as agency, intentionality, or feeling. We propose to replace it by an action ontology, which conceives mind and matter as aspects of the same network of processes. By adopting the intentional stance, we interpret the catalysts of elementary reactions as agents exhibiting desires, intentions, and sensations. (...) Autopoietic networks of reactions constitute more complex super-agents, which moreover exhibit memory, deliberation and sense-making. In the specific case of social networks, individual agents coordinate their actions via the propagation of challenges. The distributed cognition that emerges from this interaction cannot be situated in any individual brain. This non-dualist, holistic view extends and operationalises process metaphysics and Eastern philosophies. It is supported by both mindfulness experiences and mathematical models of action, self-organisation, and cognition. (shrink)

Was Descartes a Cartesian Dualist? In this controversial study, Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris argue that, despite the general consensus within philosophy, Descartes was neither a proponent of dualism nor guilty of the many crimes of which he has been accused by twentieth century philosophers. In lively and engaging prose, Baker and Morris present a radical revision of the ways in which Descartes' work has been interpreted. Descartes emerges with both his historical importance assured and his philosophical (...) importance redeemed. (shrink)

Problem: Mitterer's critique of the central argumentations of radical constructivists has been mostly neglected until today. The paper presents and evaluates his criticism and, in the second part, outlines a format of constructivism that tries to draw appropriate consequences. Solution: In his critique Mitterer explains why the radical constructivism represented above all by Maturana, Varela, von Glasersfeld or Roth still remains in a dualistic format. In his view Neurobiology is used in their writings as the indisputable basis for (...) deriving far-reaching epistemological consequences. Therefore constructivism evades self-application. To overcome this serious critique a different approach to constructivist thinking is sketched that operates without using any biological or psychological theories, tries to avoid dualism, and elaborates Mitterer's basic argument that the description of an object and the object under description are the same. Benefits: The paper shows what constructivism can learn from a serious critique and how it can be rewritten in a non-dualistic way. (shrink)

Arguing against the prevailing view that Cartesian dualism is fundamental to understanding Descartes' philosophy, Gordon Baker and Katherine Morris present a controversial examination of Descartes' philosophy. As the first full-length study of Descartes' conception of the person, Baker and Morris depart radically from traditional representations of Descartes'argument about the persona, the cogito, and the alleged "mind/body" dualism. Contesting the nearly institutionalized view that Cartesian duality is central to understanding Descartes, Baker and Morris illuminate how this "reading" has been (...) ascribed mistakenly and erroneously to Descartes. Controversially, they show how this interpretation has led to abuse both within philosophy and beyond it. Refusing to draw a distinction between the mind and the body in traditional ways, Baker and Morris open up interesting ways of conceptualizing both ourselves and philosophy itself. (shrink)

This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with (...) monism, which is the theory that there is only one fundamental kind, category of thing or principle; and, rather less commonly, with pluralism, which is the view that there are many kinds or categories. In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical — or mind and body or mind and brain — are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing. Because common sense tells us that there are physical bodies, and because there is intellectual pressure towards producing a unified view of the world, one could say that materialist monism is the ‘default option’. Discussion about dualism, therefore, tends to start from the assumption of the reality of the physical world, and then to consider arguments for why the mind cannot be treated as simply part of that world. (shrink)

Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998) was a German sociologist and system theorist who wrote on law, economics, politics, art, religion, ecology, mass media, and love. Luhmann advocated a radical constructivism and antihumanism, or "grand theory," to explain society within a universal theoretical framework. Nevertheless, despite being an iconoclast, Luhmann is viewed as a political conservative. Hans-Georg Moeller challenges this legacy, repositioning Luhmann as an explosive thinker critical of Western humanism. Moeller focuses on Luhmann's shift from philosophy to theory, which introduced new (...) perspectives on the contemporary world. For centuries, the task of philosophy meant transforming contingency into necessity, in the sense that philosophy enabled an understanding of the necessity of everything that appeared contingent. Luhmann pursued the opposite--the transformation of necessity into contingency. Boldly breaking with the heritage of Western thought, Luhmann denied the central role of humans in social theory, particularly the possibility of autonomous agency. In this way, after Copernicus's cosmological, Darwin's biological, and Freud's psychological deconstructions of anthropocentrism, he added a sociological "fourth insult" to human vanity. A theoretical shift toward complex system-environment relations helped Luhmann "accidentally" solve one of Western philosophy's primary problems: mind-body dualism. By pulling communication into the mix, Luhmann rendered the Platonic dualist heritage obsolete. Moeller's clarity opens such formulations to general understanding and directly relates Luhmannian theory to contemporary social issues. He also captures for the first time a Luhmannian attitude toward society and life, defined through the cultivation of modesty, irony, and equanimity. (shrink)

This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with (...) monism, which is the theory that there is only one fundamental kind, category of thing or principle; and, rather less commonly, with pluralism, which is the view that there are many kinds or categories. In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical — or mind and body or mind and brain — are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing. Because common sense tells us that there are physical bodies, and because there is intellectual pressure towards producing a unified view of the world, one could say that materialist monism is the ‘default option’. Discussion about dualism, therefore, tends to start from the assumption of the reality of the physical world, and then to consider arguments for why the mind cannot be treated as simply part of that world. (shrink)

The problem of Cartesian dualism is viewed as falling under a more general problem: the problem of human unity. This problem is both ancient and modern: whether a human being is a substantial unity of soul and body or merely a contingent one. I compare Aristotle's and Descartes's response to this problem. My thesis is that an important factor in generating Cartesian dualism is the rejection implicit in Descartes's metaphysical codification of the new mathematical science of nature, namely, (...) the rejection of Aristotle's radical teleological concept of nature. It is argued that the modern intractable problem of the relation of mind to body turns historically and metaphysically on the Cartesian substitution of the mathematically refined concept of body--three-dimensional extension--for the once-influential Aristotelian teleological concept of corporeal substance. (shrink)

summaryThis paper argues that an epistemological duality between mind/brain and an external world is an uncritically held working assumption in recent computational models of cognition. In fact, epistemological dualism largely drives computational models of mentality and representation: An assumption regarding an external world of perceptual objects and distal stimuli requires the sort of mind/brain capable of representing and inferring true accounts of such objects. Hence we have two distinct ontologies, one denoting external world objects, the other cognitive events and (...) neural transformations. A basic question is then raised and explored: If the elements of these two different ontologies are so radically different, how can the one access the other?The last part of the paper sketches an alternative to ED and the associated two ontologies account. Instead of external world objects being construed as independent givens, initiating perceptual processes, they are rather interpreted as ‘computational constructs’. It is argued at length that this account is far more consistent with recent computational models of mind/brain than the two ontologies model associated with ED. It is further claimed that an ontology of cognitive and neural states, as well as an external world ontology, have no other epistemic status that as contingent working hypotheses. As such, both ontologies are in principle amenable to revision as evidence, explanatory models, and scientific practices mutually readjust and redefine one another over time. (shrink)

This chapter draws an analogy between substance dualism (SD) and one kind of creationism. Some substance dualists appear to believe that SD is preferable to physicalism because only the former can account for the existence of morality. Some dualists are attracted to emergence, although it is unclear that it is a form of SD; indeed, it is not clear that it is a form of dualism at all, and if it is it would seem to be a form (...) of property dualism. The chapter discusses SD's relationship to three key elements of religious doctrine and the idea of emergence. It describes most serious arguments for physicalism and consequently against SD. According to SD, mind and brain are radically different substances, the former nonphysical, the latter physical. Advocates of occasionalist SD claim that God appropriately correlates mental and physical events occasion by occasion. (shrink)

Dualism argues that the mind is more than just the brain. It holds that there exists two very different realms, one mental and the other physical. Both are fundamental and one cannot be reduced to the other - there are minds and there is a physical world. This book examines and defends the most famous dualist account of the mind, the cartesian, which attributes the immaterial contents of the mind to an immaterial self. John Foster's new book exposes the (...) inadequacies of the dominant materialist and reductionist accounts of the mind. In doing so he is in radical conflict with the current philosophical establishment. Ambitious and controversial, _The Immaterial Self_ is the most powerful and effective defence of Cartesian dualism since Descartes' own. (shrink)

Context: Although Josef Mitterer’s non-dualism has received increasing attention in recent years, it is still underrated by philosophers. It is an ambitious and unusual treatment of epistemological problems concerning truth and reality. Problem: Is non-dualism tenable? Is conceptual relativism tenable? Method: On the basis of a pragmatic semantics, Mitterer’s arguments against conceptual relativism are shown to be unjustified. Results: Non-dualism lacks a clear conception of semantics. Given the similarities to Robert Brandom’s account of truth, as well as (...) Mitterer’s preoccupation with Wittgenstein, pragmatic semantics suggests itself for filling this gap. But then conceptual relativism seems to be the more attractive position. Implications: This paper is a critical survey of non-dualism and a defense of conceptual relativism, but it might also be a worthwhile reading for those interested in semantic issues such as the difference between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Robert Brandom’s approaches to “meaning as use.” Constructivist content: Non-dualism is sometimes regarded as an alternative to realistic and constructivist positions in epistemology. This paper, however, defends conceptual relativism, which is a kind of realism that can also be seen as a kind of (non-radical) constructivism. (shrink)

summaryThis paper argues that an epistemological duality between mind/brain and an external world is an uncritically held working assumption in recent computational models of cognition. In fact, epistemological dualism largely drives computational models of mentality and representation: An assumption regarding an external world of perceptual objects and distal stimuli requires the sort of mind/brain capable of representing and inferring true accounts of such objects. Hence we have two distinct ontologies, one denoting external world objects, the other cognitive events and (...) neural transformations. A basic question is then raised and explored: If the elements of these two different ontologies are so radically different, how can the one access the other?The last part of the paper sketches an alternative to ED and the associated two ontologies account. Instead of external world objects being construed as independent givens, initiating perceptual processes, they are rather interpreted as ‘computational constructs’. It is argued at length that this account is far more consistent with recent computational models of mind/brain than the two ontologies model associated with ED. It is further claimed that an ontology of cognitive and neural states, as well as an external world ontology, have no other epistemic status that as contingent working hypotheses. As such, both ontologies are in principle amenable to revision as evidence, explanatory models, and scientific practices mutually readjust and redefine one another over time. (shrink)

Non‐Cartesian substance dualism is a position in the philosophy of mind concerning the nature of the mind‐body relation or, more exactly, the person‐body relation. Whereas Cartesian substance dualism takes subjects of experience to be necessarily immaterial and indeed nonphysical substances, non‐Cartesian substance dualism does not insist on this. This distinctive feature of non‐Cartesian substance dualism gives it certain advantages over Cartesian dualism, without compelling it to forfeit any of the intuitive appeal that attaches to its (...) more traditional rival. In this chapter, the author's own view is that the self is indeed a simple substance. The simplicity of the self goes some way toward explaining its unity, including the unity of consciousness that characterizes its normal condition. A divided consciousness is in principle consistent with self‐identity: what is not consistent with this is a radical disunity of beliefs and values, manifested in a radical inconsistency of thought and action. (shrink)

The present era of biological annihilation lends significant urgency to the need to radically reconfigure human-animal-nature relations along more ethical lines and sustainable trajectories. This article engages with largely post-humanist scholarship to offer up an in-depth qualitative analysis of a set of semi-structured interviews, conducted in August 2017-2018 with 26 radical environmental activists (REAs) from a variety of movements. These activists are posited as contemporary manifestations of the 'post-anthropocentric paradigm shifts' that challenge traditional notions of human separateness from - (...) and superiority to - the nonhuman world. However, despite being broadly categorised as post-humanist or post-anthropocentric in their efforts to deconstruct hierarchical and dualistic constructions of the human-animal-nature relationship, considerable variations abound in terms of who and what REAs value and on what basis. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the nature of REAs' post-anthropocentric sensibilities and mobilisations, and considers implications for the development of more ethical modes of human-animal-nature relationality that value and respect the irreducible alterity of nonhuman others. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the view that Berkeley endorses a spirit-idea dualism, and I explain what this dualism amounts to. Central to the discussion is Berkeley's claim that spirits and ideas are "entirely distinct." Taken as a Cartesian real distinction, the "entirely distinct" claim seems to be at odds with Berkeley's view that spirits are substances that support ideas by perceiving them. This has led commentators to deflate Berkeley's notion of "entire distinction" by reading it as analogous (...) to the categorical distinction between substance and accident. I argue that rather than taking Berkeley's notion of "entire distinction" in either of these ways, it ought to be understood as insisting upon a radical dissimilitude between spirits and ideas. This dissimilitude requires that ideas cannot be viewed as analogous to modes or accidents which inhere in a substance. Moreover, spirits and ideas cannot be understood in terms of a single, gradated scale of reality. Instead, for Berkeley spirits and ideas occupy two entirely different scales of reality and consequently the very term 'thing' applies to them in different senses. In this way, Berkeley endorses a severe dualism that occurs at the highest level of his ontology. En este trabajo defiendo que Berkeley sostiene un dualismo espíritu-idea y explico qué significa tal dualismo. Es central en la discusión la afirmación de Berkeley que los espíritus y las ideas son "totalmente distintos". Considerada como una distinción real cartesiana, la tesis "totalmente distintos" parece estar en tensión con la concepción de Berkeley de que los espíritus son sustancias que "support ideas by perceiving them". Esto ha llevado a los comentadores a disminuir la noción de Berkeley de "distinción total" leyéndola como un análogo a la distinción categorial entre sustancia y accidente. Yo argumento que en lugar de considerar a la noción de Berkeley de "distinción total"en alguno de esos modos, debe ser comprendida como insistiendo en una radical diferencia entre espíritus e ideas. Esta diferencia requiere que las ideas no se vean como análogas a modos o accidentes de la sustancia. Además espíritus e ideas no pueden ser entendidos en términos de una única escala graduada de realidad. En cambio para Berkeley espíritus e ideas ocupan dos escalas totalmente distintas de realidad y en consecuencia, el término mismo "cosa" se aplica en sentidos distintos. De este modo, Berkeley sostiene un dualismo severo que acaece al más alto nivel de su ontología. (shrink)

Emergentism provides a remarkably appropriate fit with an evolutionary account of the history of life on earth. Emergentism presents us with a compelling picture of the co‐evolution of mind and brain. Among the emergentist options, emergent dualism is the one that best satisfies the requirements of both good philosophy and sound theology. The common versions of creationism are generally modeled on the dualism of Rene Descartes, according to which body and mind are two radically different kinds of substances. (...) The body is physical through andthrough; it has all the natural, physical properties we are familiar with through the physicalsciences, but in itself it has no trace of mental properties such as thought or even sensation. The mind is the “thinking thing”; its essential characteristic is consciousness and conscious thought, with everything that goes along with that. (shrink)

Profoundly important ethical and political controversies turn on the question of whether biological life is an essential aspect of a human person, or only an extrinsic instrument. Lee and George argue that human beings are physical, animal organisms - albeit essentially rational and free - and examine the implications of this understanding of human beings for some of the most controversial issues in contemporary ethics and politics. The authors argue that human beings are animal organisms and that their personal identity (...) across time consists in the persistence of the animal organisms they are; they also argue that human beings are essentially rational and free and that there is a radical difference between human beings and other animals; criticize hedonism and hedonistic drug-taking; present detailed defenses of the prolife positions on abortion and euthanasia; and defend the traditional moral position on marriage and sexual acts. (shrink)

This groundbreaking book proposes that the universe around us is literally alive and conscious. This worldview restores a sense of the sacred to modern lives that have too long insisted that mind, spirit, and consciousness must be divorced from body, nature, and matter. Going back to the earliest days of Western philosophy, this book illustrates how the notion of intrinsically sentient matter is thousands of years old and has only recently been challenged by the currently dominant paradigm of materialism. By (...) recognizing that matter feels, one can more closely relate to our bodies, planet, and cosmic environment as magnificent creations brimming with spirit and meaning. (shrink)

Panexperientialists hold that experience is a fundamental feature of our universe, and that their view avoids radical emergence by providing an intelligible ground for our human experiences. This paper argues that they face a radical emergence problem of their own, and that they can avoid radical emergence only by adopting a strategy that can also be used by dualists (whose view they reject). It also argues that panexperientialists must either hold that all experiential properties they regard as (...) simple must have been actually instantiated since the earliest days of our universe, or accept radical emergence, or avoid radical emergence by a strategy that can also be adopted by dualists. (shrink)

318 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 36:2 APRIL 1998 stress should not be placed on Spinoza's excommunication . One among many who held radical views and during a period of unrest brought on by an influx of emigration, Spinoza was dealt the same punishment as those who failed to pay their communal dues. The apt conclusion drawn is that from the perspective of the commu- nity, this excommunication was of no great significance. Such history corrects earlier interpretations and (...) helps readers to approach primary texts through the introduction of the problems and issues of the specific period. Devoting almost six hundred pages to ancient and medieval philosophy, the last third of the history is given over to modern and contemporary thought. Seymour Feldman's clear account of Spinoza sets the tone for Michael L. Morgan's presentation of Mendelssohn and Mordecai Finley's account of German Reform philosophy. Both represent stages in the accommodation of Judaism to the Enlightenment. What is important to keep in mind here and what becomes clear in the text is that Jewish philosophers were not just appropriators of the Enlightenment, but played central roles in its formation. Harry Lesser and David Ellenson present the other side of the story through balanced accounts of the emergence of Jewish Orthodoxy as a response to Reform philosophy. Continuing where Julius Guttmann left off in his classic history translated as Philoso- phies of Judaism.. (shrink)

El transhumanismo es una moda intelectual que propone la transformación de los seres humanos mediante diversas tecnologías. Expondremos brevemente los rasgos más conspicuos del TH, así como las principales críticas que se le han hecho. Pero la intención de este artículo no es entrar en esta polémica; aportaremos tan solo las claves imprescindibles para poder seguir adelante. Y una de las claves más intrigantes del TH es que, por debajo de su pátina tecno-futurista, remite a ciertas ideas filosóficas tan viejas (...) como, en apariencia, incompatibles entre sí. El TH remite al naturalismo radical, tanto como al nihilismo existencialista. La tesis que aquí se defiende es que tanto el naturalismo radical como el nihilismo existencialista son producto de las diversas oleadas del dualismo: del dualismo platónico antiguo, del dualismo cartesiano moderno. Una vez que separamos, a la manera dualista, la libertad por un lado y la naturaleza por el otro, podemos contar hasta dos, como hacen los dualistas, o quedarnos solo en uno, como hacen los existencialistas, que se paran en la libertad, y los naturalistas, que solo cuentan con la naturaleza. En cualquier caso, la imagen del ser humano, que es libertad y naturaleza, sale dañada. Asoma entonces el animal aporético y enfermizo al cual hay que salvar… de sí mismo. ¿Cómo? Siguiendo el método de Procusto, pero ahora con los prefijos bio e info en lugar de sierra y martillo. Hasta que el pobre ser humano encaje en el lecho de la utopía que algunos visionarios han urdido. ¿Y no hay otra vía, otra forma de mejorar la vida humana que sea más respetuosa para con la humana envergadura? Quizá sí, mas para trazar esa tercera vía, entre el naturalismo radical que mutila y el nihilismo existencialista que descoyunta y estira, habría que negar de antemano el dualismo que a los dos engendra, y atenerse a la sensatez común, en línea con la tradición aristotélica, antes que a las ensoñaciones utópicas. En nuestra opinión, el concepto aristotélico de naturaleza humana nos habilita para juzgar las antropotecnias mejor que la normatividad extraída de las visiones futuristas propias del TH. (shrink)

Context: Traditional research on the fiction/non-fiction distinction is the fruit of an essentialist methodology in which the procedures of ontologizing and textualizing are assumed as obligatory. Ontologizing and textualizing form the basic discursive technique, in which analyses are focused on the object as the semantic centre. Theory of literary fiction – deeply rooted in Alexius Meinong’s theory of non-existent objects – is object-orientated and, as a result, is always ontologically involved/engaged. Problem: The re-description of the fundamental literary problems as a (...) kind of epistemological experiment for which non-dualizing philosophy is a foundation. Considerations are aimed at providing answers/solutions to the three following issues: 1. Is it possible to connect non-dualism with a literary discourse about literary fiction? 2. What difference does the non-dualizing perspective make in comparison to a philologically-orientated discourse? 3. What difference does the non-dualizing perspective make in comparison to the constructivist approach to the problem of fiction? Approach: Mitterer’s non-dualism is considered from both the context of ontologically-orientated discourse about fiction and literary research and the context of constructivist discourse about fiction. Results: Mitterer’s non-dualizing conception may be considered a foundation of a radical non-essentialist way of thinking about literary fiction. As a result, the philologically-orientated research on literary text, focused on the explanation of its semantics, would rather move towards a culturally-, pragmatically-, and/or sociologically- orientated type of discourse. The notion of (literary) fiction should be reformulated as follows: fiction is not the reason for interpretation; fiction is the result of interpretation because the description comes from the object of speech (from-object-cognition). Implications: This is only an introduction to the project of a potential non-ontologizing discourse about literary fiction. Therefore it should be developed and discussed as the option for the dualizing type of the discourse as it still stirs up a lot of controversies. (shrink)

Radical phenomenology is nonintentional phenomenology, and it opposes what Michel Henry has designated since The Essence of Manifestation "onto-phenomenological monism,"1 according to which appearing is always ecstatic, that is, transcendent. Contrary to monism, radical phenomenology maintains a dualism of appearing: underlying the intentionally given, life reveals itself in pure immanence. Nonetheless, this living self-affection can never appear to intentionality, although the second is grounded in the first: they are two modes of appearing that are essentially different. While (...) the very essence of appearing or manifestation lies in immanent self-affection, intentional appearing is derived from and second to .. (shrink)

Today, when it comes to soul-body dualism, the view that comes to mind is the substance dualism that Descartes systematized. As the name suggests, this dualism implies that there are two different types of substances. Similarly, although Ibn Sīnā also adopted a kind of substance dualism by stating that the soul is a different type of substance than matter, his dualism differs from Descartes’ in important aspects. It can be said that the most important reason (...) for this difference is that both ideas belong to different traditions. While Ibn Sīnā’s dualism carries the traces of Aristotelian hylomorphism, Cartesian thought is built on the post-Newtonian understanding of the mechanical universe. This significant difference has deeply affected soul-body conception of both philosophers. The aim of this study is to reveal the fundamental differences between the dualistic understandings of these philosophers in the context of soul-body. Thus, it will become clearer where the Avicennian dualism stands in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind. In this context, the first question to be addressed here is whether, according to both philosophers, the immaterial part of man means the same thing. The answer to this question is negative. The functions that Ibn Sīnā and Descartes attribute to the immaterial substance are quite different from each other. According to Descartes, it can be said that the soul is actually identical with the mind. Because, he describes the soul as the substance whose essence is to think. Here, Descartes is not only referring to theoretical calculations by thinking. It also includes phenomenal consciousness, that is, conscious phenomena, which is also called qualia in contemporary philosophy of mind. Thus, according to the Cartesian tradition, the fundamental distinction between soul/mind (the immaterial substance) and body is phenomenal consciousness: A thing is a soul only if it can have phenomenal consciousness. Whereas, Ibn Sīnā does not see phenomenal consciousness, which is the most basic function that the present Cartesian dualist tradition attributes to the soul, as the basic function of the immaterial substance. In fact, he does not even see it as a function of the human nafs. In other words, according to him, the main function of the human nafs is not to feel/experience or to have phenomenal consciousness. Such functions can also be performed by animals that do not have an immaterial substance. According to Ibn Sīnā, the main functions of the human soul are theoretical or universal thinking and being self-conscious. One of the places where this distinction can be seen most clearly is their thoughts about animal souls. Both philosophers argue that animals do not have an immaterial substance in addition to their material bodies. However, while this means that animals are unconscious automatons for one philosopher (Descartes), it does not mean anything like that for the other. Because, according to Avicenna, an immaterial substance is not necessary to have consciousness or feeling. However, according to Descartes, for a being to be conscious or sentient requires it to have an immaterial substance. Since animals do not have such (substantial) souls, Descartes saw them as unconscious robots. Another point where the same difference can be observed is an argument put forward by Avicenna to prove this immaterial substance, which he addresses as the human soul. According to Avicenna’s argument, the existence of an immaterial substance is necessary for man’s access to universal knowledge, not for having consciousness. However, according to the argument used in the Cartesian tradition and known as the unity of consciousness argument, the existence of immaterial substance is necessary for the unity of consciousness (not knowledge). The aim of this study is to reveal the basic differences between the dualistic understandings of these philosophers in the context of soul and body. In order to reveal these differences, the following points will be discussed: The question of whether animals are conscious and Avicenna’s argument mentioned above. Because the differences in the handling of these two issues by both philosophers will guide us to reveal the fundamental differences in their dualistic understanding. In this study, it will be argued that the dualistic understanding of Avicenna and Descartes in the context of soul-body are radically different from each other, especially over these two issues. (shrink)

In the last two decades there have been many critics of western biomedicine's poor integration of social and psychological factors in questions of human health. Such critiques frequently begin with a rejection of Descartes' mind-body dualism, viewing this as the decisive philosophical moment, radically separating the two realms in both theory and practice. It is argued here, however, that many such readings of Descartes have been selective and misleading. Contrary to the assumptions of many recent authors, Descartes' dualism (...) does attempt to explain the union of psyche and soma - with more depth than is often appreciated. Pain plays a key role in Cartesian as well as contemporary thinking about the problem of dualism. Theories of the psychological origins of pain symptoms persisted throughout the history of modern medicine and were not necessarily discouraged by Cartesian mental philosophy. Moreover, the recently developed biopsychosocial model of pain may have more in common with Cartesian dualism than it purports to have. This article presents a rereading of Descartes' mental philosophy and his views on pain. The intention is not to defend his theories, but to re-evaluate them and to ask in what respect contemporary theories represent any significant advance in philosophical terms. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, the author wishes to defend a naturalistic version of phenomenology rooted in and expropriated from William James’s radical empiricism against Max Scheler’s non-naturalistic phenomenology. By drawing from Jack Reynolds’s arguments for a minimal phenomenology, the author posits that radical empiricism is a middle way between the misguided self-sufficiency of transcendental phenomenology and the misguided self-sufficiency of ontological naturalism. The orthodox reading of Scheler as a dualist is found problematic, and in outlining four propositions characteristic (...) of Scheler’s positions, the author motivates resources from Jamesian thought to argue for the superiority of a naturalistic phenomenology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’s Dualism by Marleen RozemondSteven J. WagnerMarleen Rozemond. Descartes’s Dualism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. Pp. xx + 279. Cloth, $24.00.Rozemond gives particular attention to questions of mind-body distinctness vs. union and to the status of sensory ideas. Her historical emphasis, backed by impressive scholarship, is Descartes’s relation to the late scholastics. Rozemond is clear, alert to detail, and fair-minded. While the text is too long (...) (esp. in chapters 4–5), this study is indeed rich, its scope and architecture justified.Any good reading of a philosopher is defined—both enhanced and limited—by certain decisions. I have mentioned one of Rozemond’s: her account of Descartes’s dialogue with such predecessors as Suárez and Fonseca sheds important light. It makes one ask, further, whether standard histories are not just as wrong to ignore scholastic concerns in, say, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke. Yet Rozemond is less helpful with issues that make more sense when we read forward from the 1640s, not back. An historian also sets a level of philosophical engagement. One chooses between presenting a meaningful narrative, and struggling with the endless problems of detail that can both doom [End Page 678] a philosophical position and give it life. Rozemond inclines toward narrative, often stopping just short of hard questions. Yet she shows curiosity and intelligence throughout. As in the first case, another decision would not have been better or worse but simply yielded a different kind of history.Fundamental is a third choice. A philosopher’s thought may appear as an orderly structure; or as a mix of fixed points and shifting, inconsistent tendencies. Most of us are trained to the former style of representation (although we let philosophers “develop” over time). Rozemond’s Descartes, too, turns out this way. He occupies definite positions. Within each position he knows whether Ρ is a premise for Q, vice versa, or neither. This way of presenting a body of thought, i.e., as a determinate structure admitting logical assessment, is an indispensable tool for historians. Its value in any particular case is, however, a matter of judgment. Rozemond attacks textual problems with skill, often improving decisively on the competition, but the going looks smoother than it is. Sometimes she carries the privilege of selective reading too far. At other times, she overlooks the poor mutual fit of separately smooth solutions, or rests with an outcome that could not have satisfied Descartes. Some examples:1. There is an old question how far Descartes goes towards proving dualism in the Second Meditation, how much is left for the Sixth. Rozemond basically champions the Second Meditation. Although some texts favor this, she ignores important contrary passages. Her reconstruction of the “argument from separability” also fails completely to carry over to Descartes’s alternate proof (AT VII, 85–6) from the indivisibility of mind.2. Rozemond identifies (“pure”) intellection with thought or mind (56). This leaves a problem how sensation could be a mode of thought, given that for her sensations differ from pure thoughts in being ‘modes of the mind as united to the body’ (201, emphasis mine). She remarks that sensations are not ‘straightforward modes of the mind’; yet her earlier chapters have no place for obscure modal hybrids and indeed require the tidy metaphysical scheme that is now denied.3. Although Rozemond handles Descartes’s anti-empiricism well, the discussion of empty space (95–7) no sooner suggests than it drops a crucial question. Descartes traces belief in the void to a childhood prejudice according to which all bodies are perceptible; rejecting the prejudice is supposed to remove support for the hypothesis of the void. But can Descartes really pick up the doctrine of childhood prejudice, an anti-Aristotelian weapon, and turn it against the radically different atomist framework? Rozemond passes on the attendant philosophical and textual problems (cf. 133–7).4. Rozemond’s extensive treatment of sensory perceptions and qualities rewards study (particularly on the importance, for dualism, of problems about body). But she misses the chance for more. Her Descartes firmly “places sensory qualities in the mind.” The real one struggled repeatedly over whether sensory ideas can or must... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction:Beyond Nature/Culture Dualism: Let's Try Co-Evolution Instead of "Control"Ronnie Hawkins (bio)In the original call for papers for this special issue, nature/culture dualism was characterized as a way of thinking that holds human culture and nonhuman nature to be radically different ontological spheres, hyperseparated and oppositional, or, as Val Plumwood maintains in her essay, an orientation that assumes "separate casts of characters in separate dramas." In the human (...) sphere, individuals are unique and their lives are precious (at least theoretically), with concerns understood "from the inside," in terms of experience, intention and agency. In the sphere of nature, on the other hand, nonhuman beings are seen "from the outside," at best as replaceable members of species or populations needed for ecosystem functioning and, at worst, as unagentive, thinglike objects open for unbridled human exploitation. With our vast information and communication systems now largely in place, however, our human "noösphere" is rapidly enlarging to place us firmly within the biosphere (which, of course, in the imagery of Venn diagrams, must make up the larger circle on the screen), illuminating "both casts in both dramas," or perhaps joining all actors on the stage in a many-act, multidimensional play, the denoument of which, whether or not the extant lifeforms on this [End Page 1] planet will continue to evolve, remains as yet unwritten. The five essays in this collection speak to these points, and together they develop an alternative vision to our present dualistic impasse, seeing multiple natural agencies engaged with humanity in ongoing co-evolution and, as Freya Mathews suggests, raising the hope for a synergistic restructuring of lifeways that may yet save us from anthropogenic catastrophe.In "The Culture of Nature As Seen Through Mississippian Geographies," Jeff Baldwin shows us the broad scope of interacting agents, human and nonhuman, biological and geological, in what he terms "the nature-culture of the Mississippi River," as highlighted by the recent devastation of human habitation along the Gulf Coast of the United States wrought by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. By enacting a role in which we "believe [our]selves to rule over a mechanistic world," we humans have, over the last century or so, stemmed the natural flooding of the Mississippi, rerouting the sediments that maintained and extended the delta, funneling them into the sea and thereby bringing about the subsidence and erosion of hundreds of square miles of coastal land. Concomitantly, we have let agricultural runoff from the huge Mississippi drainage basin eject excess nutrients into the Gulf of Mexico, stimulating algal blooms and die-offs, depleting the water of oxygen so as to create a hypoxic "dead zone" that is now the size of Massachusetts, and (though Baldwin does not discuss this aspect of the problem) we have released enough petrochemical pollution in the area to have earned the lower reaches of the River the name "Cancer Alley" decades ago. A failure to grasp the import of these large anthropogenic effects is, sadly, evident in calls for rebuilding the New Orleans area according to the same mechanistic model that has already proven so inadequate. Baldwin observes that the earth changes wrought through human cultural innovation often occur so rapidly, or have their negative feedbacks technologically so displaced through time and space, that their eventual impacts on the larger system may initially go unappreciated. His vision of "the culture of nature," however, is ultimately an optimistic one, since his functional understanding of culture is that it ultimately works toward mutualism, promoting increasingly appropriate relationships among all interacting components, and he finds evidence of a growing effort to establish an "intentional co-evolution," a conscious alignment of human projects with the ongoing projects of a living nature that encompasses them. [End Page 2]If Baldwin's essay helps us see our human activities "from the outside"—not just "from within" prevailing human culture, where they seem taken-for-granted necessities given a certain form of social construction, but as they alternatively appear inside biospherical space, often as inappropriate, exploitative interferences and intrusions—Stacey Sowards' essay, "Identification Through Orangutans: Destabilizing the Nature/Culture Dualism," explores the potential for our connecting with nonhuman life "from the inside," relating... (shrink)

A dramatic problem facing the concept of the self is whether there is anything to make sense of. Despite the speculative view that there is an essential role for the perceiver in measurement, a physicalist view of reality currently seems to be ruling out the conditions of subjectivity required to keep the concept of the self. Eliminative materialism states this position explicitly. The doctrine holds that we have no objective grounds for attributing personhood to anyone, and can therefore dispense with (...) the concept. That implication would require us to dispense with many of the most basic commitments of our manifest or common sense image of the world. And it would require us to abandon, to maintain as an act of bad faith, or radically to adjust, virtually every significant basic commitment underlying the variety of traditions that have evolved historically from the (natural) platform of common sense. Daniel Dennett’s sympathies seem to be divided over this issue. He is reluctant to eliminate the most fundamental linguistic-conceptual-institutional commitments that have evolved from common sense. Yet, I will argue, the basis of his support for these, beneath the surface of his rhetoric, is a mirage. His view of persons and related (intentional) concepts is a case in point. In place of the eliminative materialist position, Dennett recommends that we regard the self as a highly useful “theorist’s fiction.” He adopts a similar epistemic stance toward intention, belief, mind, and so on. In this paper I aim to show that Dennett’s recommendation is based on a subtle version of the dualism of subject and object (or scheme and content), which he seems to agree that we should transcend. Against Dennett’s view of the self as a “theorist’s fiction,” I argue in favour of a version of Donald Davidson’s realist thesis that, once we properly appreciate the significance of abandoning this pervasive dualism, we can maintain the self and associated intentional items – belief, mind, and so on – within a thoroughly realist ontology. (shrink)

Since the seventeenth century, mind-body dualism has undergone an evolution, both in its metaphysics and its supporting arguments. In particular, debates in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England prepared the way for the fall of substance dualism—the view that the human mind is an immaterial substance capable of independent existence—and the rise of a much less radical property dualism. The evolution from the faltering plausibility of substance dualism to the growing appeal of property dualism depended on (...) at least two factors. On the one hand, there was an increasing recognition of the causal and ontological interdependence of mind and body. Important here was a growing appreciation of the dependence of thought and perception on complex activities in the brain. On the other hand, there was a reconceptualization of the nature of matter; no longer inert and passive, matter came to be viewed as active in its own right. The old arguments lost much of their force, opening the door to a new sort of argument. Rather than appealing to the supposed immaterial nature of mental substance and volition, arguments for dualism began to appeal to the subjective nature of conscious experience—and its inexplicable emergence from the brain—as proof of the ontological distinctiveness of conscious properties. Consequently, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the ascent of a more plausible, but still very problematic, property dualism, a position that to this day enjoys significant support. (shrink)

The dualistic structures permeating western culture emphasize radical discontinuity between humans and nonhumans, but receptive attention to nonhuman others discloses both continuity and difference prevailing between other forms of life and our own. Recognizing that agency and subjectivity abound within nature alerts us to our potential for dominating and oppressing nonhuman others, as individuals and as groups. Reciprocally, seeing ourselves as biological beings may facilitate reconstructing our social reality to undo such destructive relationships.

In the 1970s, deep ecologists developed a radical normative argument for ‘ecological consciousness’ to challenge environmental and human exploita- tion. Such consciousness would replace the Enlightenment dualist ‘illusion’ with a post-Enlightenment holism that ‘fully integrated’ humanity within the ecosphere. By the 2000s, deep ecology had fallen out of favour with many green scholars. And, in 2014, it was described as a ‘spent force’. However, this decline has coincided with calls by influential advocates of ‘corporate social and environmental responsibility’ (CSER) (...) and ‘green growth’ (GG) that urge market actors to ensure voluntarily that social and environmental ‘problems are addressed holistically’. Given that CSER and GG have also been associ- ated with rent seeking, privatisation and reducing incomes of the poor, could it be that some of deep ecology’s once radical ideas today serve to legitimate forms of exploitation that they once decried? A critical realist perspective can problematise deep ecology’s highly normative response to exploitation and alienation. By settling ontological questions in favour of holism and promoting moral voluntarism, deep ecology failed to address how actors with different interests might adopt green ideas. This blind spot can be cured by focusing instead on the active deployment of ethics, morality, values, beliefs, ideas and knowledges by political actors in historically specific contexts. Both critical normative and critical realist modes of engaging with environmental values are important; however, at a time when holism and voluntarism are gaining influence, critical realism offers helpful insight into the uses and abuses of such values. (shrink)

The problem of the nature of mind has lingered for a long time. Generated by the question of whether the mind is an independently existing entity or merely an aspect of bodily events and processes, the problem of the nature of mind has divided Western philosophers into two opposing camps, namely dualism and physicalism. Contemporary discourse of the nature of minds, within the Western philosophical tradition, continues to privilege physicalism over dualism, because it avoids the theoretical impasse engendered (...) by the dualist inability to account for how two radically different entities manage to interact with each other. Although physicalism avoids the dualist pitfalls, it, however, encounters the problem of plausibly accounting for the possibility of conscious experience without commitment to the dualist ontology of a realm different from the body. In this article, we provide an African (Yoruba) perspective to the question of the nature of mind as an alternative to the Western perspective represented by dualist and physicalist theories. We develop a variant of dualism called “contextual dualism,” which accepts the dualist basic tenet of the duality of body and mind but diverges from it by permitting that some physical organs of the body also function in the capacity of the mind. Using ethnological analysis and the Yoruba linguistic hermeneutics as theoretical frameworks, the paper argues that the difference between when a physical organ functions as body and when it functions as mind is revealed in Yoruba language through their contexts of use. The paper concludes that contextual dualism drives a reconciliatory wedge between mainstream dualism and physicalism. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Towards a PL-Metaphysics of Perception: In Search of the Metaphysical Roots of Constructivism” by Konrad Werner. Upshot: In his target article, Werner proposes a metaphysical foundation for a radical constructivist epistemology that is nonetheless claimed to reconcile constructivism with some sort of realism. While acknowledging his success in demonstrating that constructivism without an external/internal dualism is suitable for his purposes, I shall argue that rejecting a distinction between epistemological and ontological issues makes (...) it questionable whether PL-metaphysics can make constructivism compatible with realism. (shrink)

The article argues in favour of a pragmatist enactive interpretation of the emergence of the symbolic and contentful mind from a basic form of social communicative interaction in which basic cognitive capacities are involved. Through a critical overview of Radical Enactivists (RECers)’ view about language, the article focuses on Mead’s pragmatist behavioural theory of meaning that refers to the gestural conversation as the origin of the evolution of linguistic conversation. The article develops as follows. After exposing the main elements (...) of REC’s theory of cognition and language that involve the construction of a theory of natural signs (teleosemiotics) and basic directionality (Ur-intentionality), some critical points of Hutto and Myin’s proposal will be highlighted. To foster a continuist perspective of language, the behavioural theory of meaning and language that Mead develops from the notion of gesture will be analysed. His theory is akin to REC and could augment the bare bones of REC’s sketched perspective, helping to include Ur-intentionality in a broader non-dualistic phylogenetic and ontogenetic theory of symbolic language from gestural communication, thus helping to overcome the distinction between a content-less intentionality and a content-involving intentionality, i.e., a semantic propositional intentionality. Furthermore, a recent revival of Mead’s theory testifies to its up-to-date relevance to explain the innate social dimension of human and non-human animals, and the human communicative capacity through the conditioning of bio-social canons and structures. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle on the Etruscan Robbers:A Core Text of "Aristotelian Dualism"Abraham P. Bos (bio)1. A Non-Platonic Dualism in Aristotle's Lost WorksThe Soul of a Mortal on Earth is not "At Home," says Aristotle in his dialogue Eudemus. The story about the mantic dream of the expatriate Eudemus and his expectation that he "will return home"1 is well known. It makes clear that, in Aristotle's view, the death of (...) the human individual should be interpreted as the soul's "return to its homeland."2 This is strongly suggested by "the revelation of Silenus" which Plutarch (first century CE) passes down in a literal quotation from the Eudemus.3 It contains the theme of human life on earth as a punishment (timôria). The motif of human life as a punishment is central to two texts by Iamblichus (250-325 CE) and Augustine (354-430 CE), which are usually connected with Aristotle's Protrepticus.4 I want to examine these texts in more detail here. My intention in the following exposition is to propose a non-Platonistic explanation of these texts. In my opinion they have wrongly been read as testimonies of a "Platonistic" phase in Aristotle. The existence of such a phase in Aristotle's development has never been proved. Besides, the interpretation of these texts suffered from the fact that [End Page 289] Aristotle's De anima had also been explained in an unhistorical way since Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century CE.2. Revising the Modern View of AristotleWe have to make a different assessment of Aristotle's contribution to the discussion on the soul compared with what was current until recently. For after W. Jaeger5 and F. Nuyens6, modern scholars became inclined to leave Aristotle's dialogues out of consideration, because they regarded them as "Platonizing." But a fundamental correction is necessary on this point.7 Jaeger led modern Aristotle studies in a wrong direction by assuming a sharp distinction between Aristotle's lost dialogue Eudemus and his surviving treatise De anima. Although nowadays Jaeger's theory for many scholars is something of a dead horse, nevertheless a real alternative has not been proposed. We still have to get rid of the consequences of the Jaegerian paradigm and develop a unitary interpretation of Aristotle's entire oeuvre. Even more consistently than O. Gigon has already done,8 we should assume that Aristotle's lost works and his surviving biological writings and De anima did not propose two (or more) different psychological theories but one and the same. Because this one Aristotelian psychology was a non-Platonistic but nevertheless dualistic psychology, we have much more reason than could be recognized in the past to assume Aristotelian influence on this discussion.On one essential issue Aristotle disagreed with his teacher Plato: the soul,9 more particularly the indissoluble bond of the soul with a body. Aristotle radically and [End Page 290] consistently argued for the distinction between nous and psychè.10 For Aristotle the nous-in-act is always wholly incorporeal. But he considered it characteristic of the soul that it cannot carry out its functions "without body."11However, the crucial question is: what body does Aristotle mean when he says that the soul cannot perform its specific activities "without body"? Jaeger and Nuyens were wholly convinced that Aristotle was referring to the visible, external body of a human being, animal, or plant. Hence they saw a yawning gap between Aristotle's views in De anima and his position in the dialogue the Eudemus. In the Eudemus Aristotle had clearly argued that the soul can perform its own functions very well, indeed better, without the galling and oppressive visible body.12 But in De anima II 1, in his famous definition of "the soul," Aristotle says that the soul is inextricably bound up with a "sôma physikon organikon."13 Jaeger and Nuyens, following an almost unanimous tradition since Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century CE, interpreted this sentence in the sense that the soul is the formal principle or entelechy of an "organic body" or a "natural body equipped with organs," i.e., the visible body... (shrink)

Cartesian habits of the imagination, thought to be abandoned when Michael Polanyi’s theory of knowledge is embraced, may persist unrecognised and distort interpretation of this theory. These habits are challenged by a ‘radical’ reading of Polanyi which consistently finds a paradigm for knowledge in lively research. It is argued that this is rooted in an intention which is at once and irreducibly receptive and critical, and which gives rise to the ’radical line’ of inquiry. In this setting, Cartesian (...) dualism arises when quieter knowledge, falsely represented to itself, becomes instead a paradigm for knowledge. (shrink)

The paper gives a reconstruction of Donald Davidson’s theory of primary reasons in the context of the unified theory of meaning and action and its ontology of individual events. This is a necessary task to understand this philosophy of language and action because since his article “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” he has developed and modified his proposal on describing and explaining actions. He has expanded the “unified theory” to a composite theory of beliefs and desires as a total theory of (...) behavior. At first, the anomalous monism was a byproduct. Yet, the step to this philosophy of the mental is not contingent. It will be shown that the anomalous monism as the primary feature of the mental does not lead us to a materialic monism in our ontology. If the evidence of radical interpretation has no echo in natural science, we have to give up materialism.Following this, I will argue for a pure anomalism. Or, in other words, for the ascription of propositional attitudes given by the semantical analysis of sentences of such attitudes does not commit us to a materialistc framework in our ontological thinking. Yet, to understand Davidson’s unified theory, we have to grasp the role of individual events in this framework since the ontological reduction of individual events explains par example the relation between the mind and the body, and the possibility of autonomous action in the world of causality. I do not argue for a dualism of properties between the physical of the mental in the manner of other philosophers, since from the radical interpreters point the empirical restrictions of the speaker’s attitudes and behavior cannot be fixed for all cases. (shrink)

It is hard not to sympathise with Professor Honderich's starting point. It is easy to feel pessimistic about philosophy's ability to throw light on the nature of consciousness. What, then, to do? One option is to persist with the various current approaches. It is clear that Honderich thinks this would be akin to putting more effort into trying to work out the temporal priority of the chicken and the egg. The thought of the orthodox is that an account of consciousness (...) is going to be either fundamentally materialist or fundamentally dualist. The first of these is untenable as consciousness has other or more than neural properties. The second is untenable for various reasons, Honderich's favoured one being that it renders consciousness as out of space and of a mysterious nature. A second option would be to follow Colin McGinn's lead, and think that the problem is of such a nature that it is necessarily unsolvable (McGinn, 1989). Alternatively, we should be more radical and think creatively, not necessarily respecting our current conceptual boundaries between the mental and the physical, the inside and the outside. The solution, Honderich says, lies in the thought that `my consciousness now consists in the existence of a world' (Honderich, 2004, p. 130). I shall say a little about what I understand by this claim, by raising what I take to be three obvious questions, looking at Honderich's answers them, and inviting some further clarification. Throughout I will address only the question of perceptual consciousness. (shrink)

In this article I offer possibilities for conversations between a feminist, post-realist thealogy and an exploration of the posthuman as presented by Rosi Braidotti. Braidotti draws on the influence of Baruch Spinoza to argue for an awareness of the ‘radical immanence’ which allows a challenge to the hierarchically dualistic assumptions of an anthropocentric paradigm. I maintain that the role of ‘Goddess-talk’ can contribute to this exploration with its figurations of a transgressive sacrality which can embrace ambiguity and plurality and (...) which is immanent in a connection and interdependence with all forms of life. Such a thealogy can have points of contact with Braidotti’s call for an interrogation of what is meant by ‘being human’, a consideration of the implications of a ‘post-anthropocentric’ world and a challenge to the ways in which a global capitalist economy is undertaking the commodification of life itself. (shrink)

This paper re-evaluates Derek Parfit’s attack on the commonly held view that personal identity is necessarily determinate and that it is what matters. In the first part we first argue against the Humean view of personal identity; secondly, we classify the remaining alternatives into three kinds: the body theory and the brain theory, the quasi-Humean theory, and the soul theory, and thirdly we deploy Parfit’s arguments and related considerations to the point that none of the materialistic alternatives is consistent with (...) the commonly held view. This leaves us with the alternative: either we accept the radical and highly implausible materialistic view Parfit calls ‘Reductionism’, or we accept the view that we are nonphysical indivisible entities—Cartesian egos, or souls. The second part of the paper discusses Parfit’s objections against the Cartesian view: that there is no reason to believe in the existence of such nonphysical entities; that if such entities exist, there is no evidence that they are enduring ; that even if they exist and are enduring, they are irrelevant for the psychological profile and temporal continuity of a person; that experiments with ‘brain-splitted’ patients provide strong evidence against the Cartesian view. We argue that these objections are in part mistaken, and that the remaining part is not strong enough to make the Cartesian view less plausible than Reductionism. (shrink)