In _Civility, Nonviolent Resistance, and the New Struggle for Social Justice_, contributors expose the roots of injustice and violence, and propose civil, nonviolent ways of challenging them.

Theorists of political obligation have long devoted special attention to civil disobedience, establishing its pride of place as an object of philosophical analysis, and as one of a short li...

ABSTRACTArendt’s work on civil disobedience sets out an optimistic portrayal of the possibilities of such forms of action in re-energising the spirit of American politics in the late twentieth century. Civil disobedience should not simply be tolerated, she argued, but incorporated into the legal structure of the American political system. Her work is usually seen to promote an idea of civil disobedience that is thus bound to existing constitutional principles and essentially nonviolent. However, by looking at Arendt’s discussion and critique (...) of various practices of civil disobedience in 1960s and 1970s America, specifically in relation to the nonviolence movement influenced by Martin Luther King, and on the other side, the more militant Black Power movement, a different idea of civil disobedience emerges. This paper argues that whilst, for Arendt, civil disobedience within America certainly possesses the constitutionally restorative potential she assigns to it, in a broader sense – theoretically, globally, and even in terms of alternative ideologies within America – her conception of civil disobedience is in itself neither necessarily constitutional, nor nonviolent. It is, instead, a form of revolutionary action, whose limits are set only by politics itself, and specifically, Arendt’s criterion of publicity. (shrink)

Three Quaker elders, all scholar activists, have just published two important works for anyone studying nonviolence, works that are framed very differently but which complement each other well. One is a new work by the estimable George Lakey, who has trained nonviolent resisters around the world in many countries for decades, and whose thinking has always been structural, strategic, and careful. The other work is by Alice and Staughton Lynd, two historians whose activism education stretches far back to teaching in (...) the Freedom Summer schools of Mississippi in 1964 and even earlier. The Lynds have just published the third edition of their Nonviolence in America: A Documentary History. (shrink)

The claim that guns can safeguard freedom is common in US political discourse. In light of a broadly republican understanding of freedom, I evaluate this claim and its implications. The idea is usually that firearms would enable citizens to engage in revolutionary violence against a tyrannical government. I argue that some of the most common objections to this argument fail, but that the argument is fairly weak in light of other objections. I then defend a different argument for the claim (...) that guns can safeguard freedom. I claim that firearm ownership among members of oppressed groups can hinder the use of systematic violence aimed at preventing them from exercising their basic liberties. I show how a commitment to armed self-defense is compatible with non-violent civil resistance as a tool of political change, and show how the former facilitated the latter during the Civil Rights Movement. Finally, I consider the policy implications of my argument. I don’t think it vindicates lax gun control policies. However, it may vindicate some individuals acquiring guns and learning how to use them, and some organizations aiding them in doing so. (shrink)

Civil disobedience is a conscientious, unlawful, and broadly nonviolent form of protest, which most political philosophers and many non-philosophers are inclined to treat as potentially defensible in democratic societies. In recent years, philosophers have become more receptive to long-standing complaints from activists that civil disobedience is an unduly restrictive framework for considering the ethics of dissent. Candice Delmas and Jason Brennan have written important books that illustrate and strengthen this trend, both defending forms of “uncivil” resistance that go beyond the (...) narrow confines of civil disobedience. Their books offer contrasting but complementary philosophical defences of incivility as a tactic of resistance, but it is nonetheless a mistake to conclude that the rich tradition associated with civil disobedience no longer has any relevance for resistance in national, transnational, and global contexts. (shrink)

The first part of this article presents an overview of civil resistance theory and practice, including key concepts and the historical record of nonviolent movements ending authoritarian and occupying regimes. It will also present a practical checklist for assessing why people power movements succeed or fail. The second part of this article will demonstrate how civil resistance applies to the global scourge of financial corruption. It will first illustrate two recent successful people power campaigns against financial corruption, then examine their (...) dynamics in terms of new research and analysis of organized, collective nonviolent action targeting graft and abuse. Finally, it will adapt the general civil resistance checklist to the anti-corruption arena, concluding with the specific elements that are most critical to curbing financial corruption. (shrink)

RESUMO O artigo examina a função da noção de obrigação política no pensamento do filósofo italiano da política e do direito Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves (1902-1985), especialmente em sua relação com o regime democrático e as formas de resistência por parte dos cidadãos. Pela análise dos principais argumentos do autor a esse respeito, o artigo procura demonstrar a flexibilidade do conceito de Estado do autor e a importância da filosofia enquanto ponto de intersecção entre a moral e o direito, constituindo-se como (...) instrumento de abordagem fenomenológica das formas de associação humana. (shrink)

This article examines the theoretical implications of the changing relationships between NGOs and businesses that have emerged as a response to the evolving agenda around CSR and sustainable development. In particular, it focuses upon examining whether greater engagement from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in this area reflects a process of appropriation and co-optation of protest by the business community. To examine this process, the article considers two forms of appropriation—appropriation of language and appropriation via participation—as a basis for discussion. While co-optation (...) pressures are identified within both areas, the article argues that co-optation is identified almost as an inevitable outcome of engagement without significant consideration of the ability of movements to identify and respond to these processes. In identifying an alternative approach, the article utilises Mouffe’s framework of agonistic pluralism. Mouffe’s framework, it is argued, provides an understanding of the way in which agonistic relationships are emerging between NGOs and businesses while highlighting the continuance of conflict between parties struggling to influence the contested interpretations of responsible business. (shrink)

The words "violence" and "nonviolence" are increasingly misleading translations for the Sanskrit words hiṃsā and ahiṃsā -- which were used by Gandhi as the basis for his philosophy of satyāgraha. I argue for re-reading hiṃsā as “maleficence” and ahiṃsā as “beneficence.” These two more mind-referring English words – associated with religiously contextualized discourse of the past -- capture the primacy of intention implied by Gandhi’s core principles, better than “violence” and “nonviolence” do. Reflecting a political turn in moral accountability detectable (...) through linguistic data, both the scope and the usage of the word “violence” have expanded dramatically. The expanded scope of “violence” reflects greater consciousness of the various forms that serious harm can take, but also makes it harder to convincingly characterize people and actions as “nonviolent.” New translations could clarify the distinction between hiṃsā and ahiṃsā, and thereby prevent some misunderstandings of Gandhi. Training in beneficence would reflect Gandhi’s psychological path to reducing avoidable harm: detachment from the ego, learning to love universally, and seeking truth by experiment. (shrink)

While philosophers usually agree that there is room for civil disobedience in democratic societies, they disagree as to the proper justification and role of civil disobedience. The field has so far been divided into two camps—the liberal approach on the one hand, which associates the justification and role of civil disobedience with the good of justice, and the democratic approach on the other, which connects them with the value and good of democracy. William Smith’s Civil Disobedience and Deliberative Democracy offers (...) a ‘deliberative’ theory, which constitutes an attractive synthesis of the two camps as it conceives of civil disobedience as a guardian of both justice and deliberative democracy. In this review essay, I first revisit the ‘problem’ of civil disobedience, examining in particular the two pillars of the case against civil disobedience as Smith depicts it, namely, the prohibition on legal disobedience established by the moral duty to comply, and the notion that civil disobedience strains the bonds of civic friendship. I suggest, contra, that the duty to comply as Smith defends it fails to be comprehensive because it is tightly bound to deliberative democratic procedures, which are involved in the making of only a portion of authoritative decisions; and, contra, that civil disobedience does not strain, but instead invigorates, civic friendship. Second, I entertain the possibility that citizens have a moral duty, not a mere right, to resist injustice. I show that Smith’s theory, in particular his account of the moral duty to comply, provides the resources to defend a general duty to resist injustice which, depending on the circumstances, can demand protesting the law or frustrating injustice. Third, I contend that Smith’s conception of the different contexts of injustice—he identifies three main ones—should be expanded to include what I call ‘official disrespect’ and ‘deliberative ignorance’. I argue that each context offers reasons to disobey the law but not necessarily in the civil manner determined by Smith. (shrink)

In this article I will introduce and outline the concept of resistance as it relates to health and healthcare. Starting with a number of examples of action, I will then turn to the broader literature to discuss some conventional definitions and related concepts, outlining debates, controversies and limitations related to conceptualizing resistance. I conceptualize resistance broadly, as any act, performed by any individual (or collective) acting as or explicitly identifying as a healthcare professional, that is a response to power, most (...) often in opposition to contentious, harmful or unjust rules, practices, policies or structures. Practically this could account for any public action, marches, sit‐ins and civil disobedience, but also forms of ‘everyday resistance’, such as working slowly, feigning sickness, or even providing care for marginalized groups that would otherwise not have access. Such action could go unrecognized by those in power and perhaps more contentiously, those resisting needn’t even recognize their actions as resistance. I will then apply this conceptualization to explain action that has been undertaken by healthcare professionals, identifying its key features. I will briefly discuss future directions for inquiry that appear particularly pressing. These including ongoing conceptual development, identifying the functions of resistance in health and healthcare along with what makes it distinct from healthcare as usual and other forms of resistance and finally, the range of normative questions resistance raises. (shrink)

What are our responsibilities in the face of injustice? How far should we go to fight it? Many would argue that as long as a state is nearly just, citizens have a moral duty to obey the law. Proponents of civil disobedience generally hold that, given this moral duty, a person needs a solid justification to break the law. But activists from Henry David Thoreau and Mohandas Gandhi to the Movement for Black Lives have long recognized that there are times (...) when, rather than having a duty to obey the law, we have a duty to disobey it. -/- Taking seriously the history of this activism, A Duty to Resist wrestles with the problem of political obligation in real world societies that harbor injustice. Candice Delmas argues that the duty of justice, the principle of fairness, the Samaritan duty, and political association impose responsibility to resist under conditions of injustice. We must expand political obligation to include a duty to resist unjust laws and social conditions even in legitimate states. -/- For Delmas, this duty to resist demands principled disobedience, and such disobedience need not always be civil. At times, covert, violent, evasive, or offensive acts of lawbreaking can be justified, even required. Delmas defends the viability and necessity of illegal assistance to undocumented migrants, leaks of classified information, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, sabotage, armed self-defense, guerrilla art, and other modes of resistance. There are limits: principle alone does not justify law breaking. But uncivil disobedience can sometimes be not only permissible but required in the effort to resist injustice. (shrink)

What do we mean by nonviolence? What can nonviolence achieve? Are there limits to nonviolence? These are the questions that Ramin Jahanbegloo tackles in his journey through the major political advocates of nonviolence during the 20th century. Focusing on examples of their way of thinking in different cultural, geographic and political contexts, from the Indian Independence Movement and US Civil rights and Anti-Apartheid movements to the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia and nonviolent protests in Tunisia, Iran, Serbia and Hong-Kong, Jahanbegloo explores (...) why nonviolence remains relevant as a form of resistance against injustice and oppression around the world. (shrink)

Each year, millions of people die from poverty-related causes. In this groundbreaking and thought-provoking book, Gwilym David Blunt argues that the only people who will end this injustice are its victims, and that the global poor have the right to resist the causes of poverty. He explores how the right of resistance is used to reframe urgent political questions: is illegal immigration a form of resistance? Can transnational social movements, such as the indigenous rights movement, provide the foundations for civil (...) resistance to global poverty? If peaceful resistance fails, is armed struggle justified? Do people living in affluent states have a responsibility to help even if it requires them to break the law? Giving clear historical examples and engaging with fields including philosophy, international law, history, and international political studies, this volume addresses real-world issues from terrorism to activism. It will be important for anyone interested in applied philosophy and global injustice. (shrink)

In this article, we will discuss Civil Disobedience as a tool for non-violent protests. We will analyze the ideas from Thoreau to Kant, including the thoughts of Gandhi and Dworkin, verifying the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of their arguments in the political world. With regard to Dworkin and Gandhi, both inspired by Thoreau's thought, civil disobedience to norms provided a change in the political scenario, capable of effecting a mediation of conflicts through non-violence. Kant's perspective, in turn, presents the hypothesis (...) of peaceful resistance when the norms do not correspond to the proposed expectations, the general rule being the idea of respect and obedience to the law. Finally, to conclude this article, we will highlight the writings of Thoreau, Gandhi, Dworkin, and Kant, to postulate that civil disobedience must be linked to the criteria of non-violence, peace, justice, and legitimacy. (shrink)

What is the difference between civil and uncivil disobedience? How can illegal protest be compatible with a democratic regime based on the rule of law? Is Edward Snowden a civil disobedient? This book follows the philosophical debate around these and other issues, showing how the notion of civil disobedience has evolved from a form of passive resistance against injustice, to an active way to engage with the political life of the community. The author presents the major contributions in political and (...) legal philosophy, ranging from John Rawls' seminal account in 1971, to the recent views advanced by Kimberley Brownlee, David Lefkowitz and William Smith. In the last chapter, the author proposes a novel account of civil disobedience, able to meet some of the unresolved challenges. The author argues that, to make sense of civil disobedience, we should expand our conception of political obligation, so to include acts that, despite being illegal, may reveal the agent's civility. (shrink)

In this essay, the resistant potential of curiosity will be first framed by theories of political curiosity writ large (drawn from Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida) and then explicated through three case studies: the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960’s, prison resistance networks in the 1970’s, and a more recent initiative for accessible restrooms. From these archives, an anatomy of politically resistant curiosity will be drawn.

In this paper, I defend the existence of a moral duty to disobey the law and engage in civil disobedience on the basis of one of the grounds of political obligation—the Samaritan duty. Christopher H. Wellman has recently offered a ‘Samaritan account’ of state legitimacy and political obligation, according to which the state is justified in coercing each citizen in order to rescue all from the perilous circumstances of the state of nature; and each of us is bound to obey (...) the law, as the state demands, because we each have a responsibility to help rescue others when this assistance is not unreasonably costly. Though Wellman recognizes that there can be reasons for disobeying the law and resisting injustice in otherwise legitimate states, he overlooks the possibility that at least some of these reasons could be Samaritan in nature, grounded in the duty to rescue people from peril. As I shall argue, the Samaritan duty supports obligations to disobey the law, when the law prohibits Samaritan rescues, and to engage in civil disobedience, when unjust laws and practices contribute to endangering people. The discussion proceeds as follows. After a brief overview of the Samaritan duty, I articulate my case for Samaritan duties to disobey the law, and duties to engage in civil disobedience when unjust laws, institutions, or practices enable what I call ‘persistent Samaritan perils’. I then examine and respond to several objections to my account: first, that the costs of law-breaking are unreasonable, and thus cannot be morally required; second, that individuals’ particular acts of protest and civil disobedience do not appear to make any difference to the rescue, and thus cannot be required; third, that I stretch the Samaritan duty beyond recognition; and fourth, that the Samaritan duty binds us to help people in need or peril anywhere, not particularly at home. I consider in conclusion the advantages and limits of my account of citizens’ Samaritan duties in the face of injustice. (shrink)

Until very recently, civil disobedience, being a deliberate infraction of the law which is politically or morally motivated, was logically interpreted by theorists as a practice rooted in the state, since the source of positive law was primarily the State. But in the context of today’s globalization, the diversification of sources of power, the emergence of international laws or rules, or simply the obsoleteness of viewing the government as a juridical model, lead one to question the relevance of resorting to (...) civil disobedience. Indeed, its strategic minimalism, which consists of non-cooperation, passive resistance or non-violence, in addition to its relative acceptance of the State and the legal framework of its discourse, seem to make civil disobedience unable to face the “global challenge” that any emancipatory movement has to confront if it wants to be efficient. This paper thus proposes a new conception of civil disobedience inspired by Nancy Fraser’s theory of “abnormal justice”, so as to take into account the transversal nature of social contestation. (shrink)

An argument that anyone can pursue political agency and resistance through photography, even those with flawed or nonexistent citizenship.

Foucauldian analyses of civil society depart from classical approaches in that they don´t consider civil society to be a site of societal change or resistance as classical analyses do, but rather one of society’s multiple locations where so-called governmentality hits the ground. Although Foucauldian investigations have provided the prevailing discussion with a necessary departure from excessively idealistic images of civil society organizations as sites of resistance and societal transformation, what may have resulted in turn are overly pessimistic analyses that have (...) overlooked the emancipatory aspects of civil society organizations as sites where Foucauldian “care of the self” becomes possible. This article provides the reader with an analysis of these kind of aspects in civil society organizations’ work and, more importantly, of the conditions of their existence. The study contributes to the prevailing discussion by offering examples of the possibilities that civil society organizations have to act as a counterbalance and addition to states institutions. The context is Finnish drug treatment policies that took a client-centered and user-friendly approach at the turn of 21st century. Since then new kinds of methods to work with drug users have been initiated, which have helped the users to recast their identities and find new ways of living as a drug user. (shrink)

Christian Non-Resistance (1846) is the major philosophical statement by the nineteenth-century theorist of nonviolence, Adin Ballou. Ballou argued that the Biblical injunction "resist not evil" should be understood as "resist not personal injury with personal injury." While prohibiting the injury of any person under any provocation whatsoever, Ballou taught that Christians have a duty to resist, oppose, or prevent evil by all uninjurious means, including the use of "uninjurious benevolent force." He believed that this would allow a community to adopt (...) non-resistant principles while still maintaining public safety and order. Once dismissed as a relic of the naive and sentimental optimism of pre-Civil War America, Christian Non-Resistance is now recognized as an important contribution to the theory of nonviolent resistance. Ballou's combination of the utmost moral resistance to evil with the uninjurious physical restraint of evildoers provides a conceptually simple, flexible approach to the problem of resisting evil without becoming evil oneself. This edition contains the essay "Christian Non-Resistance in Extreme Cases" (1860), in which Ballou takes up a type of challenge often put to pacifists: "Suppose a robber attacks you in some lonely place on the highway? Suppose you and your family are attacked by a gang who design to commit rape, robbery and murder? How can the downtrodden peoples of the earth ever gain their liberty without fighting to the death against their tyrants?"". (shrink)

In 1992, the Frankfurt scholar Ingeborg Maus launched a polemical attack against then current narratives of democratic protest, objecting to the languages of ‘resistance’ or ‘civil disobedience’ as defensive, servile and insufficiently transformative. This article explores in how far the language of constituent power can be adopted as an alternative justificatory strategy for civil disobedience in transnational protests. In contrast to current approaches that look at states as agents of international civil disobedience-as-constituent power, I suggest we look at political movements. (...) I focus on the example of the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 which understands itself as a pan-European movement of civil disobedience, at the same time working towards an articulation and exercise of constituent power among the people of Europe. In the final section, I sharpen the criteria for the invocation of constituent power in transnational protest in distinguishing between its articulation, activation and... (shrink)

Despite its long history of refugee crises, Asia lacks effective refugee protection mechanisms. Most Asian states resist ratification of the international refugee laws, and many international organizations are ineffective and lack concrete legal and political approaches to protecting refugees. Asian civil society, particularly Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, collaborates to protect refugees by employing alternative frameworks. This paper argues that Asian civil society aims to challenge the nature of refugee protection in Asia. Instead of encouraging states to ratify the 1951 (...) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, APRRN stimulates national-level implementation of refugee protection principles and practices from below. It engages its members in global decision-making by mobilizing and sharing resources with them. APRRN frames refugee protection as international human rights issue instead of as a national security concern. (shrink)

ABSTRACTRecent years have seen an increase in the influx of asylum-seekers in Scandinavia, and in Denmark this has led to ever-tighter immigration control. This article discusses emerging practices of refugee solidarity and resistance to migration policy in Danish civil society in the wake of what has been referred to as the European refugee crisis. To accomplish this purpose, I analyse how participants in Facebook discussions construe topoi and attitudes when facing the ethical dilemma of respecting the law versus showing concern (...) for humans in need, in line with what Foucault, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) has referred to as ‘ethical self-formation’. This is illustrated through a case study of an incident from September 2015, when a member of a Danish City Council offered private shelter to immigrants on their way to Norway. The incident led to legal proceedings in August 2016 for what the defendant referred to as ‘the offense of helping fellow human beings in need’. The study is informed by Critical Discourse Analysis. Analysing Discourse. Textual analysis for social research. London and New York: Routledge; Wodak, R.. The politics of fear. London and New York: Sage) and governmentality theory. The subject and Power. In H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; Foucault, M.. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–78.. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; McIlvenny, P., Klausen, J. Z., & Lindegaard, L. B.. Studies of Discourse and Governmentality. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins). Data include media representations and facebook comments published during 2016. The analytical approach combines topos analysis.. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage; Wodak, R.. The politics of fear. London and New York: Sage) and appraisal analysis to tease out evaluative meaning. (shrink)

Is hactivism the new civil disobedience? I argue that most recent hacktivism isn't, and shouldn't be shoehorned into the category of civil disobedience. I sketch instead a broad matrix of electronic resistance, attentive to the many shapes and goals of hacktivism and I locate five clusters on it, briefly sketching possible dimensions of normative assessment for each: vigilantism, whistleblowing, guerrilla communication, electronic humanitarianism, and electronic civil disobedience.

This article presents a critical phenomenology of embodiment in radical democratic struggles, focusing on racialized citizens inhabiting and navigating public spaces and on anti-racist protests. It contrasts the notion of the precarious body, central to critical theorists like Judith Butler, with an alternative phenomenological understanding, locating the political significance of the body in spontaneous movement (Arendt) and competence (Merleau-Ponty). Attending to either precariousness or mobile-capable bodies reveals distinct dimensions of radical democratic struggles. While precariousness addresses the unequal distribution of social-material (...) conditions, it tends to overshadow the shared lived experience of freedom among citizens countering inhibitions of free movement, often motivated by their disproportionate exposure to precarious conditions in the first place. From a phenomenological perspective, public action is permitted by capable and mobile bodies. It is argued that public space opens the power of “we-can” bodies by soliciting citizens' movement among others and their engagement in shared projects, according to their bodily capacities. Pluralistic interaction, aiming to maintain or create free spaces of movement, is presented as the political practice of freedom par excellence, exemplified by radical democratic walking practices in the Black civil rights movement. (shrink)

Quelles sont nos responsabilités face à l’injustice ? Les philosophes considèrent généralement que les citoyens d’un État globalement juste doivent obéir à la loi, même lorsqu’elle est injuste, quitte à employer exceptionnellement la désobéissance civile pour protester. Les militants quant à eux, qu’ils luttent pour les droits civiques, contre les violences faites aux femmes ou pour le climat, jugent souvent que l’obligation première est résister à l’injustice.

The degree to which Hobbes's citizenry retains its right to resist sovereign power has been the source of a significant debate. It has been argued by a number of scholars that there is a clear avenue for legitimate rebellion in Hobbes's state, as described in the Leviathan - in this work, Hobbes asserts that subjects can retain their natural right to self-preservation in civil society, and that this represents an inalienable right that cannot, under any circumstances, be transferred to the (...) sovereign. The conclusion frequently drawn from this feature of Hobbes's account is that it places a considerable limit on sovereign authority. The right to self-preservation has been taken as proof that Hobbes sought to ensure that the sovereign's power relies upon the continual consent of the individuals that make up his or her constituency. I want to examine Hobbes's account of this civil right in Leviathan in order to show that this line of interpretation is ultimately unfounded. While self-preservation results from the individual's own judgment of threats to her personal safety, it is justified in only the most strictly delineated contexts. Judgments regarding the overall peace and security of the state do not, and cannot, fall to individual experiences and judgments. Hobbes is quite adamant that individuals are not appropriate judges of right and wrong action in matters the sovereign legislates. (shrink)

Analizando el caso colombiano se procura dilucidar las características de la guerra irregular y las razones de su duración a lo largo de más de cinco décadas, mediante una breve recapitulación. En seguida se examinan algunos de los trabajos más representativos de los investigadores sociales colombianos al respecto, así como sus referentes teóricos más universales y el tipo de interpretación que se ha ido construyendo. El acento está puesto en la singularidad de una guerra irregular, de baja intensidad pero de (...) larga duración, y en sus efectos sobre la población civil en las zonas en donde la guerrilla ha logrado un grado de implantación y de manera correlativa el ejército desarrolla labores de contrainsurgencia. El ensayo termina con el análisis de distintas modalidades de resistencia civil hacia la guerra, el modo y secuencia en que se han ido manifestando y algunos ejercicios predictivos acerca de los desarrollos previsibles de la resistencia civil. (shrink)

The four essays by Ashworth, Blackburn, Nimtz and Post all make important contributions to our understanding of the causes and consequences of the American Civil War, and to modern analysis of these questions within a Marxist tradition. Although they differ among themselves on key issues, they direct attention to problems too often neglected by other historians: the rôle of class-conflict within North and South in the coming of the War; the part played by slave-resistance in the sectional conflict; the nature (...) of the economic relationship between slave and free economies; and a shift in control of the national state as an enduring result of the conflict. (shrink)

According to a prominent argument, citizens in unjust societies have a duty to resist injustice. The moral and political principles that ground the duty to obey the law in just or nearly just conditions, also ground the duty to resist in unjust conditions. This argument is often applied to a variety of unjust conditions. In this essay, I critically examine this argument, focusing on conditions involving institutionally entrenched and socially normalised injustice. In such conditions, the issue of citizens’ duties to (...) resist is complicated. I conclude by considering how my discussions may clarify a contemporary problem about engaging in resistance to aid potential migrants who have been turned away by states in accordance with widely accepted rules. (shrink)

Times of heightened risk to the physical safety of their citizens inevitably cause democracies to recalibrate their institutions and processes and to reinterpret existing legal norms, with greater emphasis on security, and less on individual liberty, than in "normal" times. This article explores the ways in which the American courts have responded to the tension between civil liberties and national security in times of crises. This history illustrates that courts have rejected both of the two polar positions that characterize public (...) discourse on these issues. Civil libertarians argue that political bodies are too easily gripped by passions, hysteria, and self-interest in these times and that courts therefore ought to play a central role in protecting liberty. Executive unilateralists argue that the qualities that uniquely characterize the executive branch, such as decisiveness, access to information, and efficiency, must become so dominant in these moments that few checks, if any, should constrain executive prerogatives. Oddly, civil libertarians and executive unilateralists find implicit consensus in the view that, in times of war, courts have tended not to play a significant role in overseeing executive power. We argue to the contrary: historically, a significant constitutional tradition of judicial scrutiny in the United States during times of war does exist. But this scrutiny does not take the form of courts making first-order substantive judgments about the content of liberty or other claimed constitutional rights. Nor does it take the form of judicial assessment of how significant or credible the national security claims of the executive branch might be. Instead, judicial oversight has been focused on preserving the institutional structures and processes through which decisionmaking on these issues takes place. The judicial role has centered on the second-order question of whether the right institutional processes have been used to make the decisions at issue, rather than on what the content of the underlying rights ought to be. This approach has historically rejected or resisted most claims of executive unilateralism. When courts have upheld the government's actions, they have done so only after a judgment that Congress, as well as the executive, has endorsed the action. This approach has also rejected the civil libertarian framework. When courts find bilateral institutional endorsement, they have typically accepted the joint political judgment of how liberty and security tradeoffs ought to be made. By focusing on congressional endorsement of emergency measures, the courts have created a broad-based political accountability for the actions taken in the name of national security. We suggest that even if congressional endorsement is more apparent than real in some of these contexts, the judicial maintenance of this structure of rhetorical justifications sustains desirable understandings of political structure. Because the President and Congress draw from different political constituencies in a presidential rather than a parliamentary system, we also raise questions about whether the American judicial approach to these questions should be limited to political systems with separated executive and legislative powers. (shrink)

The emergence of global governance in several key areas calls into question conventional understandings of world politics in terms of conflicts of interests between sovereign states under conditions of anarchy. At the same time the new phenomena of anti-globalisation demonstrations, transnational social movements and an emergent global civil society point to developments in international relations that are both of profound importance and analytically complex. This volume's starting point is the hypothesis that one way of thinking about these processes is in (...) terms of a dichotomy between the politics of governance and the politics of resistance. Leading scholars from several perspectives reflect on the usefulness of this dichotomy and consider its application to several crucial areas of international relations. (shrink)

Tony Milligan argues that some forms of covert non-human animal rescue, wherein activists anonymously and illegally free non-human animals from confinement, should be understood as acts of civil disobedience. However, most traditional understandings of civil disobedience require that the civil disobedient act publicly rather than covertly. Thus Milligan’s proposal is that we revise our understanding of civil disobedience to allow for covert in addition to public disobedience. I argue we should not. Milligan cannot justify using paradigm cases to expand the (...) scope of civil disobedience without justifying similar reasons to limit the scope, and he does nto give convincing reasons for discarding the communication requirement, according to which an action cannot count as civil disobedience unless it is communicative. The immediate conclusion is that animal rescue is not civil disobedience, while the broader conclusion is one about civil disobedience more broadly: an act must be public to count as civil disobedience. (shrink)

Comparing the Gandhian idea of civil disobedience to those of Rawls and other modern thinkers, Haksar here demonstrates the relevance of Gandhi's thought to contemporary society and politics.

La crisis económica de Argentina en años recientes derivó en la pérdida de legitimidad de las instituciones polí­ticas del paí­s. La medida de suspensión de las libertades y garantí­as de derechos individuales provocó una desobediencia civil generalizada que llevó a miles de personas a manifestar pací­ficamente su repudio al gobierno de Fernando de la Rúa. Este gesto ciudadano espontáneo, desorganizado y voluntario sirvió, entre otras cosas, para formar una autodeterminación primaria directa de la voluntad popular y una autocomprensión del carácter (...) democrático de la sociedad civil. La justificación de la desobediencia se basaba en una cuestión de derechos. Todos los manifestantes afirmaban que tení­an derecho a desobedecer porque la desobediencia, en ciertas circunstancias, era un derecho humano. ¿Pero puede ser la desobediencia civil, en un Estado de derecho, un auténtico derecho? ¿En qué circunstancias, en el contexto legal y fuera de los derechos habituales de resistencia como huelga, manifestación, etcétera, se puede desobedecer una norma legal?"œCivil disobedience in Argentina"The recent economic crisis in Argentina led to the loss of identity of the country"™s political institutions. The measure of the suspension of freedom and of the guarantee of individual rights provoked a generalized civil disobedience which led thousands of people to peacefully demonstrate their repudiation of Fernando de la Rua"™s government. This spontaneous, unorganized and voluntary action by the citizens served, among other things, to form a direct primary self-determination of the will of the people and a self-understanding of the democratic character of civil society. The justification of the disobedience was based on a question of rights. All the demonstrators asserted that they had the right to disobey because disobedience, in certain circumstances, was a human right. However, can civil disobedience, in a constitutional state, be an authentic right? In what circumstances, in the legal context and outside the normal rights of resistance such as strike action, demonstations etc., can a legal norm be disobeyed? (shrink)

In Section One the automatic ratification of existing law as immediately self-validating is shown to undermine the very purpose of law - the surpassing of arbitrariness and of Czar-like ukases. In Sections Two and Three there is an attempt to explore the justification or grounding that can be given for the existing laws and civil disobedience, respectively. In both cases, the justification has been given in terms of fundamental human dignity which should never be violated by empirical laws. Only when (...) such a violation does occur can civil disobedience be justified. Therefore, the rationale for, and motivation of, both a legal system and civil disobedience are the same.However, one does not so easily resolve the opposition between the two. For the law itself is proclaimed apodictically, without the reservation that one may with impunity break the law and commit an act of civil disobedience whenever the law violates one's conscience. Otherwise, we do not have a rule of law but instead anarchy. For, as Jesus has said and Abraham Lincoln paraphrased it: “A kingdom divided against itself will not stand.” The law cannot declare that it is legal to break the law without incapacitating itself. The law must punish its violators to be a valid law; without powers of enforcing sanctions against violators the law is no law.However, we must not consider for this reason that those who are responsible for making, interpreting, and enforcing the law and those who are civilly disobedient are working at cross purposes. Both are concerned with justice. The civilly disobedient individual is concerned with improving the existing legal system. He envisions his role as therapeutic rather than destructive. He believes that the ideal of justice is being violated in some way in the existing laws. He therefore makes of himself a martyr, bearing witness to the truth, and hoping thereby to educate and enlighten and to move men of good will - in short, to effect a change in the law.Before an individual who respects the rule of law should be willing to be civilly disobedient he must be convinced of the violation of basic human rights in the law. He also must consider whether civil disobedience is the most effective means of producing the desired change. But beyond the pragmatic consideration of the most effective means to produce the desired end, there is also the question of what is most meaningful and suitable for him personally in living in conformity with the categorical imperative. Discussions of civil disobedience which limit themselves to questions of practical consequences do a great disservice to such actions. For, must we not admire those who resisted Hitler, even though they realized that their actions were futile in terms of changing the law and might even mean their deaths?In a free society, dedicated to the rule of law, all citizens are concerned with justice. Those entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing the law obviously must do just that, so that violators of the law have to be punished. However, when legislators and judges notice that some of the most perspicacious and conscientious individuals are openly violating existing laws in the name of a higher law, they should also make a serious reappraisal of their positions, looking to see whether they may not have become morally insensitive or careless. Indeed, the real value of a free society is its flexibility and tolerance of dissent, even that of civil disobedience, which can serve to dramatize forcefully, deep-seated convictions concerning the injustice of certain laws on the books. It is true that fanatics from time immemorial have been willing to sacrifice much in the name of their cause. But whenever one finds that there is an individual who is willing to sacrifice much without the hope of personal advantage and who is also willing to provide arguments in defense of his position, society would do well to listen to his words and actions.Without the constant delving scrutiny and criticism of existing laws, there cannot be true legal responsibility. Therefore, the civilly disobedient individual, who is willing to put his head on the block in order to abrogate unjust laws, is in fact the legally responsible individual par excellence. (shrink)