What is it to regard the occupation of teaching as a profession -- as distinct from a trade or vocation? The conventional modern conception of a profession is that of a normative enterprise in which standards of good practice are not just technically or contractually but also morally grounded: indeed, arguably the key difference between trades like plumbing or building and professions like medicine or law is that although the former are doubtless often subject to ethical regulation, ethical principles (...) are actually constitutive of professions. It is also plausible to regard universal professional obligations as grounded in rights indexed to considerations of human need: insofar as humans cannot in general flourish without health, medical practitioners are bound to respond to any medical need without favour or prejudice. This paper argues, however, that powerful and persuasive contemporary critiques of notions of objective or value-neutral development and flourishing raise quite serious theoretical problems (expressed here as antinomies) for any analogous view of teaching as a profession. (shrink)

R S Downie; Professions and Professionalism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 147–159, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2020, Page 44-46.

R S Downie; Professions and Professionalism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 147–159, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

Though this paper is mostly about a sense of “profession” common in much of the West, it explains how the term might apply in any country (especially how the profession of engineering differs from the function, discipline, and occupation of engineering). To do that, I have to explain the connection between “profession” (in my preferred sense) and another hard-to-translate term, “code of ethics” (in the sense it has in the expression “code of engineering ethics”). To understand engineering (or any other (...) occupation) as a profession is to adopt a certain conception of it, one neither old nor (yet) universal. With that conception in hand, it should be possible for social science to answer the question posed in the title. (shrink)

Every year in this country, some 10,000 college and university courses are taught in applied ethics. And many professional organizations now have their own codes of ethics. Yet social science has had little impact upon applied ethics. This book promises to change that trend by illustrating how social science can make a contribution to applied ethics. The text reports psychological studies relevant to applied ethics for many professionals, including accountants, college students and teachers, counselors, dentists, doctors, journalists, nurses, school teachers, (...) athletes, and veterinarians. Each chapter begins with the research base of the cognitive-developmental approach--especially linked to Kohlberg and Rest's Defining Issues Test. Finally, the book summarizes recent research on the following issues: * moral judgment scores within and between professions, * pre- and post-test evaluations of ethics education programs, * moral judgment and moral behavior, * models of professional ethicseducation, and * models for developing new assessment tools. Researchers in different professional fields investigate different questions, develop different research strategies, and report different findings. Typically researchers of one professional field are not aware of research in other fields. An important aim of the present book is to bring this diverse research together so that cross-fertilization can occur and ideas from one field can transfer to another. (shrink)

In her paper ‘Why Not Common Morality?’, Rosamond Rhodes argues that medical ethics cannot and should not be derived from common morality and that medical ethics should instead be conceptualised as professional ethics and the content left to the medical profession to develop and decide.1 I have considerable sympathy with the first claim and have myself argued along somewhat similar lines.2 I am, however, very sceptical about elements of the second claim and will briefly explain why. The first part of (...) Rhodes’s constructive argument is to show that practising medicine is not only a role, it is something more. Medicine is a profession and as such its members have to internalise and personally endorse a specific ethics. Rhodes is careful to state that more work is needed to complete the justification for this claim, but the arguments she does provide are strangely ahistorical. First, it is not that long ago that what we now conceive of as one profession was actually two very strictly separated professions, that is, university educated physicians and apprenticed surgeons. Can we really be certain that medicine is now one, unified profession1? Second the way butchers, bakers and candlestick makers are traduced is also oddly ahistorical. It is only fairly recently in many countries that anyone can butcher meat, bake bread or make candlesticks and legally sell the product to the public. Historically these trades have in Europe not been mere roles, but …. (shrink)

What are the conceptual connections between torture and profession? Exploring this question requires exploring at least two others. Before we can work out the conceptual connections between profession and torture, we must have a suitable conception of both profession and torture. We seem to have several conceptions of each. So, I first identify several alternative conceptions of profession, explaining why one should be preferred over the others. Next, I do the same for torture; and then, I argue that, given the (...) preferred conception of torture and the preferred conception of profession, there can be no profession of torturers. In the final section, I argue that deliberately torturing or aiding in torture is always unprofessional. The fact that some conceptions of profession do not yield this conclusion tells us more about the inadequacy of those conceptions than about professions. (shrink)

Attitudes towards active voluntary euthanasia (AVE) and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) among 1,238 doctors on the medical register of New South Wales varied significantly with self-identified religious affiliation. More doctors without formal religious affiliation ('non-theists') were sympathetic to AVE, and acknowledged that they had practised AVE, than were doctors who gave any religious affiliation ('theists'). Of those identifying with a religion, those who reported a Protestant affiliation were intermediate in their attitudes and practices between the agnostic/atheist and the Catholic groups. Catholics (...) recorded attitudes most opposed to AVE, but even so, 18 per cent of Catholic medical respondents who had been so requested, recorded that they had taken active steps to bring about the death of patients. (shrink)

Although this paper is a written version of an inaugural lecture given at the University of Sheffield in December 1995, its central thesis is that, in a postmodern age, the practice of professors of education giving inaugural lectures is incoherent. To advance this thesis in an inaugural lecture entails an obvious contradiction which, it is proposed, can only be resolved by examining the historical origins of the inaugural lecture in the early medieval university. What emerges from this examination is not (...) only that there is a pre-modern version of the inaugural lecture but that the virtue-based understanding of education which it presupposed can be revised and advanced in the postmodern world. (shrink)

Ethics is no less of a science than any other. It has its roots in conflicts of interest between human beings, and in their conflicting urges to behave either selfishly or altruistically. Resolving such conflicts leads to the specification of rules of conduct, often expressed in terms of rights and duties. In the special case of professional ethics, the paramount rule of conduct is altruism in the service of a 'noble' cause, and this distinguishes true professions from other trades (...) or occupations. If professional ethics come into conflict with national laws, the professional today can test the legitimacy of such laws by reference to internationally agreed legal standards in the field of human rights, and so help to perform the role of 'professions as the conscience of society'. (shrink)

For generations following the first American Medical Association Code of Ethics in 1847, the relationship between doctors and advertising remained unambiguous—advertising was forbidden. In 1975, however, the Federal Trade Commission accused the profession of “restraint of trade” and legally persuaded doctors to permit advertising amongst their clan. As the 1970s witnessed the relentless burgeoning of healthcare expenditure, physicians accepted the blame for immuring themselves from the natural forces of economics. American physicians were bullied to embrace advertising under the delusion that (...) doctoring—like any trade—would become better and cheaper if incited by competition. Today most American physicians engage in some form of paid advertising, yet it is doubtful that physician advertising has either augmented the quality or diminished the cost of health care. Advertisement has eroded medical professionalism by denying doctors the right to enforce ethical boundaries between themselves and the “let the buyer beware” world of business. And more is at stake than professional status, for the doctor/patient relationship, the cornerstone of medicine, is endangered as physicians continue to cast forth the self interested lure of advertisement.To assume that for over 130 years physicians anathematised advertising for purely ethical reasons would be naive. Sociologist Paul Starr explains that in the early 19th century, no group “embraced the ways of the market as actively as did popularisers, alternative healers, and quacks”.1 Advertisement was perhaps the most successful implement of empirical medicine. So it is no surprise that professional licensed doctors in America grew up with a “distaste and discomfort for advertising”.2 Medical advertisements were especially potent in the self reliant Jacksonian era, which touted health as a do it yourself venture commodified into tonics and one time procedures. To distinguish themselves from the circus of healthcare providers, physicians not only instituted higher educational standards and licensure …. (shrink)

As part of a survey of the biological history of Alpine populations, the lineages of all the families of the Vallouise valley (a French of the Hautes Alpes) have been reconstructed over several centuries. The genealogies have been included in a computerized population record, known as 20th centuries)Canadian programme Analypop. Most of the professions of the family heads were included in the files. In this study, various profession groups were identified and their descents determined over successive generations. In this (...) mountain area, where over 92% of marriages took place among relatives during the 19th century, the profession groups modulated their descents according to chosen strategies, sometimes with considerable differences among groups but with a remarkable consistency of behaviour. Moreover, there was weak interpenetration in the descents of each profession at both the 2nd and 3rd generations. (shrink)

For at least the past several decades, medicine has been embroiled in a crisis concerning the nature of its professionalism. The fundamental questions that drive this ongoing crisis are primarily three. First, what is the nature of medical professionalism? Second, who are medical professionals? Third, what does medicine or these professionals profess or promise? In this paper, the professionalism crisis vis-à-vis these questions is examined and analyzed chiefly in terms of both Francis Peabody’s and Edmund Pellegrino’s writings. Based on their (...) writings, I introduce a conceptual framework for professionalism to address the crisis. In addition, I contend that to address the professionalism crisis adequately, medicine’s position within an evolving health care network must also be considered. To that end, I first discuss the genesis of the crisis in terms of the Flexner Report and especially Peabody’s response to it. Next, I explore how the crisis intensified during the twentieth century, particularly in terms of medicine’s ultimate scientification and eventual commercialization, and how Pellegrino reacted to this. I then propose a health care professionalism cycle and a care-competence cycle to provide a conceptual framework for addressing the crisis. I conclude that medicine’s position is no longer as the center of health care but rather as another node within a wider evolving health care network. And the resolution of medicine’s professionalism crisis depends on medicine’s positioning and defining itself in terms of the professionalism for each of the other professions within the health care network. (shrink)

This article examines three common arguments for the claim that engineering is not a profession: 1) that engineering lacks an ideal internal to its practice; 2) that engineering’s ideal, whether internal or not, is merely technical; and 3) that engineering lacks the social arrangements characteristic of a true profession. All three arguments are shown to rely on one or another definition of profession, each of which is inadequate. An alternative to these definition is offered. It has at least two advantages. (...) On the one hand, it emphasizes the importance of professional community, the role of occupation in defining profession, the centrality of a moral ideal, and the necessity for morally binding standards (beyond ordinary morality). On the other hand, the alternative definition is in part independent both of moral theory and sociology. This article concludes by considering what light the alternative definition can throw on the professional status of engineers serving the Nazis. (shrink)

This second edition of _Professions in Ethical Focus_ comprises over seventy-five readings complemented by twenty case studies with corresponding discussion questions. These resources are organized into several thematic units, including “conflicts of interest,” “honesty, deception, and trust,” “privacy and confidentiality,” and “professionalism, diversity, and pluralism.” An alternative table of contents is also provided, identifying readings that bear on particular professions such as engineering, journalism, medicine, law, and policing. The book’s introductory unit offers short selections from classic and contemporary ethical (...) theory, including non-Western traditions. All of the readings have been introduced by the editors and carefully excerpted for relevance, always with the needs of student readers in mind. (shrink)

The mental health professions operate largely so as to objectify a language of mental deficit. In spite of their humane intentions, by constructing a reality of mental deficit the professions contribute to hierarchies of privilege, reduce natural interdependencies within the culture, and lend themselves to self-enfeeblement. This infirming of the culture is progressive, such that when common actions are translated into a professionalized language of mental deficit, and this language is disseminated, the culture comes to construct itself in (...) these terms. This leads to an enhanced dependency on the professions and these are forced, in turn, to invent additional terms of mental deficit. Thus, concepts of infirmity have spiraled across the century, and virtually all remaining patterns of action stand vulnerable to deficit translation. Required within the professions are new linguistic formulations that create a reality of relationships without evaluative fulcrum. (shrink)

This book explores the controversial relationship between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry, identifies the ethical tensions and controversies, and proposes numerous reforms both for medicine's own professional integrity and for effective public regulation of the industry.

In terms of output in the form of published work and attraction of resources, bioethics seems to be a more vibrant field than environmental ethics. In this commentary it is argued that bioethics is, in some respect, less humanistic than environmental ethics and that two factors––bioethics’ strong connection to a profession, and its access to an intellectual ‘killer app’––offer ways in which environmental ethicists might learn from the ‘success story’ of bioethics.

This article re-examines the profession of the late antique mechanikos, who is identified as a practising architect with a sound liberal arts education as well as practical training. Despite the practical orientation of his profession, the mechanikos was of high social standing. This was possible because the practical utility of a vocation was increasingly acknowledged favourably in late antiquity and is reflected in early Byzantine portrayals of patrons, who allegedly invested hard labour in prestigious building campaigns and posed as the (...) supreme architects. (shrink)

The term value may be defined as a principle or ideal of intrinsic worth or desirability. Values and attitudes relate a property of an external object (intrinsic worth) with an internal process (feeling). People impute worth or value onto objects, principles or ideals. The values are preferences, criteria or choices of personal or group conduct. They are general principles that guide an individual's decisions. These principles have an inherent organization and a rational basis to impart worth to objects and other (...) individuals. As society and culture are not static, there can be many changes in a society in the course of a decade. Changes in societal values are usually gradual when viewed from a distance, and are at both individual and group levels. Individuals have values which they express both in terms of stated beliefs and actions. The present article is an attempt to understand the impact of profession, represented by teachers of higher education and medical doctors, and dietary habits, categorized as vegetarians and non–vegetarians, on the perception of existing values and expectation of ought to be values in the society. (shrink)

ABSTRACT As academics, we do not only produce and reproduce knowledge; we also produce our citizenship as a social and agonistic space. There are nuances embedded within academic citizenship – unqualifiable, but compelling in their production and reproduction of power dynamics, bringing into disrepute notions of academic citizenship as a homogenous or inclusive space. There are ways of being and becoming within citizenship that might be less readily conceivable, and hence, slip beneath the radar of scholarly scrutiny and debates.We have (...) yet to delve into how we come into the presence of one another. In offering an expanded understanding of academic citizenship as alterity, I argue that academic citizenship has to involve wading into a curious uncertainty about the other so that the immensity of diversity, its unknown-ness, is brought to bear on the university, not as fear and estrangement, but as a rupture with a continuity of Othering. (shrink)

In this article, the author speaks about how a profession can constitute a road to God and can lead one to a deeper understanding of spirituality as the heart of theology, by investigating the spiritual autobiographies of Teilhard de Chardin and Dag Hammarskjöld. While the former was a Jesuit with important contributions to the historical field, the latter was an important personality in the field of international diplomacy, whose contribution came to light towards the end of the important crises that (...) took place in the 1960s. Both of them left us rich spiritual autobiographies in the form of a last published book and a manuscript discovered after the author’s death and published posthumously.Contribution: This article brings into attention two important authors of the 20th century with different confessional backgrounds by investigating their spiritual autobiographies and showing how the profession they exercised led them to God and helped them deepen their spirituality and theology. (shrink)

It might seem at this point that I am courting a contradiction: If antiprofessionalism is a form of professional behavior and if professional behavior covers the field , then how can I fault Bate for using antiprofessionalism to further a professional project? By collapsing the distinction between activity that is professionally motivated and activity motivated by a commitment to abstract and general values, have I not deprived myself of a basis for making judgments, since one form of activity would seem (...) to be no different from or better than any other? The answer is no, because the consequence of turning everything into professionalism is not to deny value but to redistribute it. One deconstructs an opposition not by reversing the hierarchy of its poles but by denying to either pole the independence that makes the opposition possible in the first place. If my argument that there can be no literary criticism or pedagogy that is not a form of professionalism, it is also that there can be no form of professionalism that is not an extension of some value or set of values. Whereas before one was asked to choose between professionalism and some category of pure value , the choice can now be seen as a choice between different versions of professionalism, each with its attendant values. To say that antiprofessionalism is a form of professional behavior is not to have closed the discussion but to have identified the basis on which it can continue by identifying the questions that should now be asked: What kind of professional behavior is antiprofessionalism? and What are its consequences? The answer is that, at least in its literary form, it urges impossible goals and therefore has the consequence of making people ashamed of what they are doing. The psychological distress that marks this profession, the fact that so many of its members exist in a shamefaced relationship with the machinery that enables their labors, is in part attributable, I think, to literary antiprofessionalism, which is, as a form of professional behavior, almost always damaging. Stanley Fish’s most recent work is “Wrong Again: A Reply to Ronald Dworking,” Texas Law Review . His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry include “With the Compliments of the Author: Reflections on Austin and Derrida”. (shrink)

The Profession of Ignorance provides a readable discussion in dialogue form of the philosophy of "ignorance" as practiced by Socrates, who claimed a kind of knowledge of ignorance as human wisdom. Martin McAvoy shows that understanding this profession of ignorance is essential to understanding the character of Plato's Socrates. He begins by explaining that to comprehend this concept, Socrates' repeated claim that he is ignorant must be believed. In claiming this ignorance, Socrates claims a kind of knowledge. This knowledge of (...) ignorance is the central paradox of Socrates' wisdom, generating his mission and elenchus. McAvoy presents the concept of thinking as a dialogue between knowledge and ignorance. In this dialogue, one asks as if ignorant, and one answers as if knowing. This very form questions the reality of knowledge. McAvoy questions the nature of knowledge, since it appears that one can not be sure exactly what is knowledge, but can recognize that it exists, though always ignorant of precisely what it is. He acknowledges and utilizes the presence of a double irony, that in an important sense, makes the profession of ignorance sincere. The use of the dialogue form reflects this double irony, and exhibits McAvoy's profession of ignorance as a claim to knowledge, just as in the case of Plato's. (shrink)

Paul Griseri’s generous response to my ‘Against Professional Ethics’1 offers an interesting point of view and there is much on which we agree. But we continue to differ about the nature of the primacy of morality, the possibility of a ‘general idea of professionalism’ and — perhaps — about Kant’s Categorical Imperative.

L’avocat allemand semble jouir d’un statut plus valorisant au sein du système judiciaire allemand que son homologue français dans le sien. La formation commune avec les futurs magistrats, en l’absence d’une formation spécifique de type école de la magistrature ou école des avocats, contribue à une certaine affinité entre les deux professions et davantage de respect entre elles. L’Allemagne a intégré les avocats en entreprise dans la profession, notamment afin de les faire bénéficier de la caisse de retraite des (...) avocats, bien plus intéressante que le régime général. Les règles déontologiques qui leur sont applicables sont censées garantir leur indépendance et la confidentialité (moins absolue, il est vrai, qu’en France). Le système de rémunération par barème en fonction de la valeur de litige pourrait être un modèle pour une réforme de l’article 700 du code de procédure civile français bien plus ambitieuse et efficace que les idées du comité des États généraux de la justice à cet égard. (shrink)

On the face of things, the concept of 'profession' does not appear philosophically problematic: just survey the dozen or so occupations everyone calls professions and list their common attributes. Typically, it is said that law, medicine, teaching and other..

This book contends that the crises of well-being, distress, and dysfunction currently afflicting the legal profession, other professions, and our politics can best be addressed by encouraging people to pursue a flourishing life of meaning and purpose in communities of excellence and virtue. It draws centrally upon the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, arguably the most famous living moral philosopher and notorious for his critique of liberal democracy, its capitalist, large-scale market economy, and hyper-individualism in late Modernity. Constructing a fishing (...) village called Piscopolis as a central image and theoretical ideal, the book integrates relevant aspects of MacIntyre's Thomistic-Aristotelianism into a clear, comprehensible, and original synthesis that also significantly expands and supplements MacIntyre's theoretical approach, including insights drawn from Heideggerian phenomenology. It examines the legal polis, the "fishing village of the law" called Juropolis, to illustrate how the Piscopolis ideal challenges members of the professions and suggests how the ideal might be deployed more broadly to organically transform the liberal democratic state into a "republic of virtue." With the Covid-19 pandemic starkly revealing the need for such transformation, the book will interest both the MacIntyrean expert and novice alike and appeal broadly to moral and political philosophers, ethicists, theologians, legal professionals, and scholarly lay readers. (shrink)