This book offers solutions to two persistent and I believe closely related problems in epistemology. The first problem is that of drawing a principled distinction between perception and inference: what is the difference between seeing that something is the case and merely believing it on the basis of what we do see? The second problem is that of specifying which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., directly, or noninferentially, justified) and which are not. I argue that what makes a belief a (...) perceptual belief, or a basic belief, is not any introspectible feature of the belief but rather the nature of the cognitive system, or "module", that is causally responsible for the belief. Thus, even zombies, who in the philosophical literature lack conscious experiences altogether, can have basic, justified, perceptual beliefs. -/- The theories of perceptual and basic beliefs developed in the monograph are embedded in a larger reliabilist epistemology. I use this theory of basic beliefs to develop a detailed reliabilist theory: Inferentialist Reliabilism, which offers a reliabilist theory of inferential justification and which solves some longstanding problems for other reliabilist views by demanding inferential support for some—but not all—beliefs. The book is an instance of a thoroughgoingly naturalistic approach to epistemology. Many of my arguments have an empirical basis, and the view that I endorse reserves a central role for the cognitive sciences—in particular, cognitive neuroscience—in filling in the details of an applied epistemological theory. (shrink)

Our seamless perception of the world depends very much on the slow time scales used by conscious perception. Time scales longer than one second are needed to assemble conscious experience. At time scales shorter than one second, this seamlessness quickly deteriorates. Numerous experiments reveal the fragmentary nature of the visual information used to construct visual experience. Models of how the brain manages these fragments use the construct of a routine, which is a task-specific fragment of a sensory-motor program. This (...) paper provides an overview of some of the experiments that test these models. Its aim is to show how the structures that they elucidate constrain the understanding of conscious perception. (shrink)

A paper about cross-cultural and cross-racial loving that emphasizes the need to understand and affirm the plurality in and among women as central to feminist ontology and epistemology. Love is seen not as fusion and erasure of difference but as incompatible with them. Love reveals plurality. Unity–not to be confused with solidarity–is understood as conceptually tied to domination.

It is a standard feature of modern philosophy, at least from Locke, to tie together the questions of how we perceive the world and what we have reason to think the world is like in itself. This is a natural connection, because the questions of how we perceive it, and what kind of conception of it we can best form on the basis of that mode of perception, are obviously intimately linked. Part I of this volume defends the (...) sense-datum theory of perception against its opponents, and argues that the sense-datum theory is much closer to a form of direct realism than is normally thought: we directly perceive the world in the form that it naturally manifests itself to creatures like us. This leaves open the question of what it is like in itself, and Part II tries to show that a Berkeleian interpretation—that the world is a nomological structure in the mind of God—is the most plausible option. Arguments with roots in Berkeley, in modern philosophers such as John Foster, and in modern science, are drawn on to support this conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that perception justifies belief about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character together with its relations to the external world. But I argue that perceptual relations to the external world impact on the justifying role of perception only by virtue of their impact on its representational content. Epistemic level-bridging principles provide a principled rationale for avoiding more radically externalist theories of perceptual justification.

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Relativistic Content The Argument from Primitive Colors The Argument from the Inverted Spectrum The Argument from Dual Looks The Argument from Duplication Conclusion References.

0. Relativistic Content In standard semantics, propositional content, whether it be the content of utterances or mental states, has a truth-value relative only to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is sitting now’ is true just in case Jim is sitting at the time of utterance in the actual world, and the content of my belief that Alice will give a talk tomorrow is true just in case Alice will give a talk (...) on the day following the occurrence of my belief state in the actual world. Let us call propositional content which has a truth-value relative only to a possible world ‘non-relativistic content’. Non-relativistic content can be treated as either structured or unstructured. On the unstructured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set of possible worlds and bears the truth-value true just in case the actual world is a member of that set. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is working now’ at time t is the set of worlds in which Jim is working at t, and this content is true just in case the actual world is among those worlds. On the structured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set or conglomeration of properties and/or objects, where properties are features which objects possess regardless of who considers or observes them and regardless of when they are being considered or observed. Such properties are said to be (or represent) functions from possible worlds to extensions. Relative to a possible world they determine a set of objects instantiating the property. For example, relative to the actual world the property of being human determines the set of actual humans. Not all content is non-relativistic. Let us say that propositional content is relativistic just in case it possesses a truth-value only relative to a centered world. A centered world is a possible world in which an individual and a time are marked, where the marked individual.. (shrink)

Colour has long been a source of fascination to both scientists and philosophers. In one sense, colours are in the mind of the beholder, in another sense they belong to the external world. Colours appear to lie on the boundary where we have divided the world into 'objective' and 'subjective' events. They represent, more than any other attribute of our visual experience, a place where both physical and mental properties are interwoven in an intimate and enigmatic way. -/- (...) The last few decades have brought fascinating changes in the way that we think about 'colour' and the role 'colour' plays in our perceptual architecture. In Colour Perception: Mind and the physical world, leading scholars from cognitive psychology, philosophy, neurophysiology, and computational vision provide an overview of the contemporary developments in our understanding of colours and of the relationship between the 'mental' and the 'physical'. With each chapter followed by critical commentaries, the volume presents a lively and accessible picture of the intellectual traditions which have shaped research into colour perception. -/- Written in a non-technical style and accessible to an interdisciplinary audience, the book will provide an invaluable resource for researchers in colour perception and the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

Studies on age-related differences in risk perception in a real-world situation, such as the recent COVID-19 outbreak, showed that the risk perception of getting COVID-19 tends to decrease as age increases. This finding raised the question on what factors could explain risk perception in older adults. The present study examined age-related differences in risk perception in the early stages of COVID-19 lockdown, analyzing variables that can explain the differences in perception of risk at different ages. A total of 1,765 (...) adults aged between 18 and 87 years old completed an online survey assessing perceived risk severity and risk vulnerability of getting COVID-19, sociodemographic status, emotional state, experience relating to COVID-19, and physical health status. Results showed that the older the participants, the lower the perceived vulnerability to getting COVID-19, but the higher the perceived severity. Different predictors explain the perception of risk severity and vulnerability at different ages. Overall, self-reported anxiety over the pandemic is a crucial predictor in explaining risk perceptions in all age groups. Theoretical and practical implications of the empirical findings are discussed. (shrink)

I recently discovered that work I was doing in the laboratory and in theoretical writings was implicitly taking a position on a set of questions that philosophers had been worrying about for much of the past 30 or more years. My clandestine involvement in philosophical issues began when a computer science colleague and I were trying to build a model of geometrical reasoning that would draw a diagram and notice things in the diagram as it drew it (Pylyshyn, Elcock, Marmor, (...) & Sander, 1978). One problem we found we had to face was that if the system discovered a right angle it had no way to tell whether this was the intersection of certain lines it had drawn earlier while constructing a certain figure, and if so which particular lines they were. Moreover, the model had no way of telling whether this particular right angle was identical to some bit of drawing it had earlier encountered and represented as, say, the base of a particular triangle. There was, in other words, no way to determined the identity of an element (I use the term “element” when referring to a graphical unit such as used in experiments. Otherwise when speaking informally I use the term “thing” on the grounds that nobody would mistake that term for a technical theoretical construct. Eventually I end up calling them “Visual Objects” to conform to usage in psychology) at two different times if it was represented differently at those times. This led to some speculation about the need for what we called a “finger” that could be placed at a particular element of interest and that could be used to identify it as particular token thing (the way you might identify a particular feature on paper by labeling it). In general we needed something like a finger that would stay attached to a particular element and could be used to maintain a correspondence between the individual element that was just noticed now and one that had been represented in some fashion at an earlier time. The idea of such fingers (which.... (shrink)

The phenomena of perception have been used by philosophers to kindle and fuel doubts about the reality of ‘the external world’, a phrase which points roughly in the direction of our natural environment. After grappling with problems, which trade under this title, one often discovers that the issues have less to do with the reality of anything which might be called ‘the external world’ and more to do with the reality of the problems themselves. In this paper I (...) propose to examine three approaches to what might deserve to be labelled, ‘problems about theexternal world’. (shrink)

Privacy is a sociocultural perception, depending on the dominant values of a society, sociocultural heritage, and contemporary technological developments. This article focuses on privacy perception among adolescents based on a European school survey (PRACTIS), and presents comparative results of an exploratory study conducted among over 1,428 adolescents in six countries. The results reveal that adolescents attribute high value to privacy and are prepared to actively oppose if an online corporation is challenging their personal interests. However, they tend to trade off (...) privacy for other perceived benefits. Adolescents’ privacy perception and data protection are affected by cultural diversity, age, gender, and most of all their various social network sites activities and their attitudes toward importance of sharing and controlling personal information. (shrink)

How much does stimulus input shape perception? The common-sense view is that our perceptions are representations of objects and their features and that the stimulus structures the perceptual object. The problem for this view concerns perceptual biases as responsible for distortions and the subjectivity of perceptual experience. These biases are increasingly studied as constitutive factors of brain processes in recent neuroscience. In neural network models the brain is said to cope with the plethora of sensory information by predicting stimulus regularities (...) on the basis of previous experiences. Drawing on this development, this chapter analyses perceptions as processes. Looking at olfaction as a model system, it argues for the need to abandon a stimulus-centred perspective, where smells are thought of as stable percepts, computationally linked to external objects such as odorous molecules. Perception here is presented as a measure of changing signal ratios in an environment informed by expectancy effects from top-down processes. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The focus of this book is on conceptual and philosophical issues of perception including the classic notion of unconscious inferences in perception. The book consists of contributions from a group of internationally renowned researchers who spent a year together as distinguised fellows at the German Centre for Advanced Study.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Introduction. The author analyzes the informa- tional discourse of the World Cup in Qatar through the prism of collective historical memory. It is assumed that the Qatari Championship turned out to be both a sporting and political event. The article highlights the main problems that formed the information agenda, as well as the vectors and trajectories of the interpretation and perception of the Championship by liberal analysts and experts. Goal. The purpose of the article is to analyze the main (...) directions of the liberal perception of the World Cup in Qatar in the information discourse of “Al-Araby Al-Jadeed” through the prism of the historical politics of memory. Methods. The author uses the methods proposed within the memorial turn in modern interdiscipli- nary historiography, which make it possible to iden- tify and systematize the features of the transfor- mation of the collective historical memory of Arab societies through the prism of sports, actualised by the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. Scientific novelty. The article is one of the few at- tempts to interpret the historical politics of memory in modern society in the context of the perception of sports as an element of the memorial culture and historical experience of the Arab societies of the Middle East. Results. The article analyzes the main vectors and trajectories of the use of sports for the politiciza- tion and ideologization of historical memory. It is assumed that the Championship stimulated political and ideological contradictions between Arab experts on the issues of collective historical and political experience, as well as its reflection in memorial cultures. The author believes that Arab analysts formally used sports events to update the political, social and economic problems and contradictions of the Middle East through the prism of historical memory, visualizing the trauma of the colonial and orientalist heritage. Conclusions. It is shown that the Championship ac- tualized political contradictions in the perception of current historical experience, visualizing the lines of ideological demarcation between Arab intellectuals who actively used sports as an information occa- sion for discussing the problems of historical poli- tics and the politics of collective memory, including the perception of the place and role of authoritari- anism, democracy and human rights in contempo- rary memorial cultures. The author believes that the reaction of the elites to the attempts of the liberal media to turn sport into a space for memo- rial conflicts and wars of memory was minimal, as the elites were focused on maintaining control and receiving economic dividends from the World Cup. It is shown that the politicization of sports has become the contribution of modern liberal media to the aggravation of wars of memory as a form of memorial conflicts in the Arab world. (shrink)

Using a unique dataset provided by the international rating agency GES®, we investigate the effects of corporate sustainability and industry-related exposure to environmental and social risks on the market value of MSCI World firms. The results show a negative relationship in the earlier years of our sample period. However, the analysis reveals that the capital market perception of sustainability has changed owing to the financial crisis. Looking at the height of the crisis in September 2008, the month in which (...) Lehman Brothers shocked the world’s capital markets by filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, we find that the previously negative perception of corporate sustainability across its various dimensions was positively affected and offset. In addition, as a moderated regression analysis shows, the crisis led to a positive perception of corporate sustainability in industries that are exposed to higher environmental and social risks. Our study has the practical implication that executives, in particular in industries with high environmental and social risks, should increase their commitment to corporate sustainability due to the changes in the institutional setting triggered by the financial crisis. (shrink)

The phenomena of perception have been used by philosophers to kindle and fuel doubts about the reality of ‘the external world’, a phrase which points roughly in the direction of our natural environment. After grappling with problems, which trade under this title, one often discovers that the issues have less to do with the reality of anything which might be called ‘the external world’ and more to do with the reality of the problems themselves. In this paper I (...) propose to examine three approaches to what might deserve to be labelled, ‘problems about theexternal world’. (shrink)

The phenomena of perception have been used by philosophers to kindle and fuel doubts about the reality of ‘the external world’, a phrase which points roughly in the direction of our natural environment. After grappling with problems, which trade under this title, one often discovers that the issues have less to do with the reality of anything which might be called ‘the external world’ and more to do with the reality of the problems themselves. In this paper I (...) propose to examine three approaches to what might deserve to be labelled, ‘problems about theexternal world’. (shrink)

Perceptual phenomena reviewed by O'Regan & Noë (O&N) cannot be explained by bottom-up activity alone, but conventional interpretations suffice if perceptions are seen as activations of memory models of the outside world and its events. Motor involvement is necessary only during the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of perceptual mechanisms.

THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES: A REALISTIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION by David Kelley Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986. 286 pp., $24.95.

Economic organization of the imaginary worlds depicted in popular literary works may be viewed as a mirror to public opinion on the economic organization of life. If a book becomes a best-seller, it is because the book conveys messages, feelings, and events the readers can relate to. In other words, the book's readers identify with the set of norms and rules that govern the development of the plot and the actions of its heroes. Therefore, a best seller, as a book (...) that successfully relates to readers of its time, can teach us about the norms and beliefs of its audience. Following this line of thought, we use the method of deconstruction to analyze the highly successful J.K. Rowlings' Harry Potter series. Studying the books within their social context allows us to learn about people's norms and attitudes, and their perceptions of issues such as the role of government, the structure of financial markets, poverty and inequality, etc. Thus, by looking at the Potterian economy through magnifying glasses, we obtain a perspective on what people might view as a normal or perhaps as an ideal economic structure. In other words, we argue, that the economic and organizational structure of the imaginary Potterian economy can be viewed as an economic model. By studying the social and the economic structure of the Potterian model and its assumptions, we hope to obtain some insights on people's attitudes towards various social and economic issues. The Potterian economic model, we conclude, is not a coherent model that fits neatly one of the standard economic models. Instead, it appears to combine ingredients from various economic models. (shrink)

The article covers such issues as the relevance of the theory of perception as a multi-level information processing, the methodological role of the concept of representation and the relation of neurodynamic structures to subjective experience. The author critically reviews the philosophical presumptions underlying the various concepts of “local rationality,” the core of which is constituted by the belief that large ethnic cultures generate or are based on their own rationality and their own logic. Three statements are successively considered: thinking is (...) based on the inherent rules of rationality, logic is an extract of rationality, and types of rationality are geographically consistent with large ethnocultural communities. Empirical arguments are presented that demonstrate equivocality of the first two theses. In particular, firstly, it is shown that the genuine rationality of thinking lies not in following the rules that are immanent to it, but in the development of thinking and, more broadly, cognitive operations towards optimization of certain indicators of the cognitive or motor system that are important for survival and adaptation. In addition, this rationality is multivariate, and the choice between variants is often weakly determined or even random. Thus, the first statement turns out to be refuted. Secondly, by reference to the well-known experiments, it is shown that most people do not explicitly follow some declared logical rules in solving even logical or mathematical problems, and yet there is reason to consider their behavior rational. The third thesis, as shown with some limited empirical material, appears to be partially confirmed. Nevertheless, the demonstration of the doubtfulness of the first two theses makes the conclusion that different nations have different logics insufficiently substantiated. (shrink)

Perceptions are often merely regarded as the basic elements of knowledge. They have, however, a complex structure of their own and are far from being elementary. My paper will analyze two basic patterns of perception and some of the resulting medical implications. Most basically, all object perception is characterized by a mixture of knowledge and ignorance (Husserl). Perception essentially perceives with inner and outer horizons, brought about by the kinesthetic activity of the perceiving subject (Sartre). This first layer of perceptual (...) reality, the world of open perceptions, is the inescapable background for every rationality, every value, every existence (Merleau-Ponty). On an epistemological level a characteristic change of perceptual patterns in medicine was introduced by pathological anatomy (Foucault). The reference of medical perception to the dead body created the new possibility of absolute perception, allowing for more precise medical interventions, but at the same time coming into conflict with the open structures of ordinary, non-scientific perception patterns in everyday life. On the basis of these distinctions, an analysis of the different perceptual patterns in medicine becomes possible. Such an analysis would be the task of a sub-field in medical philosophy that could be called medical aesthetics having as its goal an art of perception understood as a technique of adequately applying different perceptual patterns in medical practice. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive study of the dynamics that underlie information processing in foreign policy decision-making, the resultant biases and errors, and the implications for the quality of decisions. The World in Their Minds is a compendium of the manifold ways that misperception and, hence, miscalculation can enter into seemingly rational policy choice. The cases of Vietnam for the Americans and the Yom Kippur War for the Israelis constitute the primary database for the number of illustrations cited.

Can what we know change what we see? Does language affect cognition and perception? The last few years have seen increased attention to these seemingly disparate questions, but with little theoretical advance. We argue that substantial clarity can be gained by considering these questions through the lens of predictive processing, a framework in which mental representations—from the perceptual to the cognitive—reflect an interplay between downward-flowing predictions and upward-flowing sensory signals. This framework provides a parsimonious account of how what we know (...) ought to change what we see and helps us understand how a putatively high-level trait such as language can impact putatively low-level processes such as perception. Within this framework, language begins to take on a surprisingly central role in cognition by providing a uniquely focused and flexible means of constructing predictions against which sensory signals can be evaluated. Predictive processing thus provides a plausible mechanism for many of the reported effects of language on perception, thought, and action, and new insights on how and when speakers of different languages construct the same “reality” in alternate ways. (shrink)