In the course of his dispute with Conington on the comparative merits of Catullus and Horace, Munro taxed the Augustans with having made the lyric of the heart impossible in Latin by their virtual exclusion of diminutives from the language of poetry; and, whether that is the result or no, the general fact that diminutives are rare in the serious poetry of the Augustan age is well known. The details, however, are less easy to come by. Stolz and (...) Stolz-Schmalz devote a few unilluminating lines to the Stilistik of diminutives: otherwise the grammars and the treatises on diminutives known to me concern themselves only with forms and meanings. Except for a note by Professor Housman which, at 4. 927, sets out Manilius's diminutives, I know of no collections for any Augustan poet, and it is perhaps worth while therefore to state the facts. I have not indeed read through Augustan poetry for the purpose, but for some time past I have been in the habit of noting such diminutives as I have come across in the course of reading, and these lists I have now checked and amplified from the indexes to the authors concerned. My lists are probably not complete, but I hope they are sufficiently near it to present a true picture of the position. (shrink)

The process of chromatin diminution in Parascaris and Ascaris is a developmentally controlled genome rearrangement, which results in quantitative and qualitative differences in DNA content between germ line and somatic cells. Chromatin diminution involves chromosomal breakage, new telomere formation and DNA degradation. The programmed elimination of chromatin in presomatic cells might serve as an alternative way of gene regulation. We put forward a new hypothesis of how an ancient partial genome duplication and chromatin diminution may have served to maintain the (...) genetic balance in somatic cells and simultaneously endowed the germ line cells with a selective advantage. (shrink)

Great theoretical value has always been attached toBoveri's discovery as regards chromatin diminution inAscaris, for this discovery appeared to expose the mechanism causing the propagative cells, in which all chromatin remains, to originate an entirely new organism, whereas the soma cells of which the chromosomes have been diminished are only capable of specific differentiation.Boveri was further able to show that, not only do the soma and propagative nuclei differ from each other, but that rather the character of the cell-plasma decides (...) whether the nucleus diminishes or not. Considerations are brought forward to prove that the “diminisher” hypothesis as given byKing andBeams, is untenable. Diminution has always been supposed to result in the loss of the totipotence of the diminished nuclei. In the light of recent chromosome research this course of events does not seem probable. Therefore the following theory is brought forward: When the egg ofAscaris is split, blastomeres originate, which differ from each other as to the plasma. In proportion to the quality of the surrounding plasma, now these now other genes of the totipotent nucleus react in different cells, thus originating the specific differentiation of the cell in question. This cooperation between plasma and nucleus is, however, at first obstructed in the large collective chromosomes ofAscaris, by the presence of their thickened ends. In order to keep up this cooperation a certain quality of plasma is needed, situated in a certain horizontal zone of the egg. As soon as, in the course of the division, nuclei come to rest in different zones, a diminution occurs, and differentiation of the cells in question sets in. Towards the end of the embryonic development the ends of the chromosomes are lost in the propagative cells, and also in these cells differentiation occurs.On a toujours attribué une haute signification théorique à la découverte deBoveri, de la diminution des chromatines chez l'ascaris puisqu'elle semblait expliquer le mécanisme qui cause que les cellules propagatrices où séjourne, la totalité de l'effectif des chromatines, font de nouveau sortir d'elles-mêmes un organisme entier, pendant que les cellules somatiques, dont les chromosomes ont été diminués, ne sont plus capables qu'à produire une différenciation spécifique. De plus,Boveri a pu démontrer, que les noyaux somatiques et propagateurs ne sont pas, à peu de chose près, différents, mais que c'est bien plus la qualité du plasme des cellules qui décide si les noyaux qui leur ont été distribués, diminuent ou non. Des arguments sont apportés, qui démontrent que l'hypothèse du „diminisher” échafaudée parKing etBeams est insoutenable. En général on s'est représenté. l'action de la diminution de telle façon que la totipotentialité des noyaux diminués a été perdue. Cependant, le fait n'est pas acceptable quand on le considère à la lumière de la recherche moderne sur les chromosomes. Par conséquent, nous proposons l'opinion suivante: Dans l'œuf de l'ascaris, des blastomères différant plasmatiquement les uns des autres prennent naissance pendant le fendage. Selon l'état du plasme environnant, dans les cellules individuelles on voit réagir certain gène, dans les autres un autre gène du noyau totipotentiel, causant ainsi la différenciation des cellules visées. Cette collaboration entre le plasme et le noyau est cependant premièrement bloquée dans les grands chromosomes collectifs de l'ascaris par la présence des bouts de chromosomes épaissis. Pour leur conservation une certaine qualité de plasme est requise qui se trouve dans une zone horizontale déterminée de l'œuf. Dès que, dans le procès du fendage, des noyaux arrivent dans d'autres zones du plasme, la diminution a lieu, et la différenciation des cellules visées s'opère. Cependant, après la conclusion du développement embryonal, les bouts des chromosomes se perdent dans les cellules propagatrices et la différenciation a lieu aussi dans ces cellules. (shrink)

How persuasive are Rousseau’s and Diderot’s objections against Helvétius’s view that it is always interest that guides our esteem? Against Helvétius’s view that we always esteem ourselves in others, Rousseau objects that we can esteem the ideas that we recognize to be superior to our own ideas; against Helvétius’s idea that particu-lar societies and nations can only esteem ideas that are useful for them, Diderot objects that we can experience and esteem the feeling of universal benevolence. However, Rousseau and Diderot (...) overlook that Helvétius’s conception of moral luck explains why experiences of the kind that they describe can occur. At the same time, Helvétius’s conception of moral luck explains why these experiences occur so rarely. This is why he holds that what we esteem needs to be modified through republican constitution building—expresses itself a kind of opti-mism concerning the possibility of cultivating morally good qualities of individuals through political agency. (shrink)

In some cases our sensory organs are no longer capable of rendering processes in the external world perceptible to us. Their inadequacy expresses itself, for example, in phenomena that involve the kind of expansion of space and time in which the conditions for summary perception are no longer at all present. The resources that aid our immediate sense perception in these circumstances will thus be charged with the task of expanding or diminishing space and time to the extent that the (...) contiguity and succession of events is comprehensible to us. The microscope is thus essentially based upon the principle of spatial expansion, the map on that of spatial diminution. The pertinent contrivances for these purposes are largely derived from the graphic arts. How stereoscopy and instantaneous photography, which is based on temporal expansion, facilitate our perception! In spite of the multifarious applications of photography, one has yet to take the step of employing it in the opposite direction, namely as a means of temporal diminution. We demonstrate that phenomena that take place in too ephemeral and too rapid a succession for our eyes can, with the help of instantaneous photographs in series, be analyzed with our senses as the event passes in a comparatively longer time. Quite analogously, we could also compress into a small duration the moments of an event separated widely from one another in time and thereby give our perception an understanding of the nature thereof. (shrink)

Focusing on the broadly conceived principle of hospitality, the essay offers an analysis of Joshua Barnes's Gerania, a highly original but little-studied late seventeenth-century utopia set in India and featuring the Pygmies as utopians and Homer as their lawgiver. It is argued that Barnes's utopia offers a radical alternative to the policy of closure and isolation adopted in early modern utopian commonwealths. Its peculiar construction results in the unique openness of the narrator's discourse to an alien word and of the (...) ideal world to outsiders, their outlandish beliefs, rules and artifacts. (shrink)

Numerous studies show that language can influence both perceptual judgments, as well as the mental categorization of objects in memory. Previous research showed that using diminutive names of objects resulted in being less satisfied with owning said objects and lowering their perceived value. In the present studies, to explore this phenomenon, we decided to investigate whether the influence of a diminutive on the reduction in the subjective value of an object is determined by the perceived size of the object, in (...) accordance with the „bigger is better” heuristic. In Study 1 participants estimated a banknote to be smaller when it was presented with a diminutive label “banknocik” than “banknot”. However, this was not related to the perceived subjective value of the banknote. In Study 2 participants declared that they could buy less with a coin labeled as “pieniążek” than “pieniądz”, but the effect was not linked to the perceived size of the coins. In Study 3 a candy bar labeled as “batonik” was evaluated worse than the same product labeled “baton”, however, once again this was not related to the evaluation of its size. Thus, we show that the effect of diminutives on the reduction in the subjective value of an object is independent of the evaluation of the size of the object and we consider other explanations for the occurrence of this phenomenon. (shrink)

Evaluative markers of diminution and augmentation typically express quantity or intensity. Prior evidence suggests that they also convey emotions, although it remains unexplored as to whether this function is mediated by their role in expressing quantification/intensification. Here we investigated the effects of evaluative suffixes on the assessment of word affective properties by asking participants (N = 300) to score valence and arousal features for augmentatives, diminutives and base words with negative, positive or neutral valence. Diminutives and, to a (...) lesser extent, augmentatives were assessed more positively than base forms in negative words and more negatively than bases in positive words. The capacity of diminution to express attenuated emotions is in line with its function in conveying quantity. By contrast, valence effects for augmentatives suggests a role in expressing pejoration and amelioration that is not mediated by quantification. With regard to arousal, negative, neutral and positive augmentatives showed higher scores than base words, which, in addition, were also rated higher than diminutives. These incremental effects suggest that suffixes which convey larger quantity are also associated with increased arousal. Thus, with the exception of valence effects in augmentatives, it seems that evaluative suffixes encode both valence and arousal through quantification. (shrink)

Across languages, lexical items specific to infant‐directed speech (i.e., ‘baby‐talk words’) are characterized by a preponderance of onomatopoeia (or highly iconic words), diminutives, and reduplication. These lexical characteristics may help infants discover the referential nature of words, identify word referents, and segment fluent speech into words. If so, the amount of lexical input containing these properties should predict infants’ rate of vocabulary growth. To test this prediction, we tracked the vocabulary size in 47 English‐learning infants from 9 to 21 (...) months and examined whether the patterns of growth can be related to measures of iconicity, diminutives, and reduplication in the lexical input at 9 months. Our analyses showed that both diminutives and reduplication in the input were associated with vocabulary growth, although measures of iconicity were not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that phonological properties typical of lexical input in infant‐directed speech play a role in early vocabulary growth. (shrink)

The diminution of emphasis on the arts and the humanities and the corresponding increased emphasis on business and STEM disciplines has resulted in a normative conception of national progress that excludes aesthetic education. Scholars in the arts and the humanities have responded to this marginalization either by calling for more esotericism or by underscoring the importance of aesthetic education to the future of democracy and humanity. These arguments have failed to capture the public’s attention. In this essay, I argue that (...) there is a third way: aesthetic educators should challenge the normative understanding of national progress. To this end, I return to the dawn of the split between scientific inquiry and humanist understanding to highlight French Enlightenment debates around the understanding of progress. Specifically, I call attention to the writings of the French philosopher Germaine de Staël because in the adaptation of her notion of progress lies possible hope for the future of the humanities and the arts. (shrink)

La diminution du poids institutionnel des religions dans notre société ne signifie pas pour autant que les hommes se détournent d'interrogations fondamentales touchant à leur identité profonde, à leur origine et à leur destination, au sens de leur vie ici-bas, à l'éventualité d'une vie après la mort. Que ces questions continuent d'occuper la pensée humaine, chacun est à même d'en faire le constat, et la science elle-même les a investies avec des moyens renouvelés. Ce qui a changé dans les dernières (...) décennies, c'est peut-être la manière d'appréhender ces interrogations fondamentales : on recueillait autrefois les réponses en se référant à sa religion d'appartenance ou en puisant dans un ensemble de discours et de pratiques proprement ésotériques ; aujourd'hui, la recherche de principes directeurs qui soient à même de donner un sens à l'existence n'échappe pas au mouvement général de sécularisation et de globalisation qui a radicalement transformé nos cultures. Anticipant cette tendance, Ostad Elahi s'était interrogé, il y a plus de cinquante ans, sur les conditions d'une sagesse contemporaine partagée, capable d'intégrer la dimension spirituelle, et fondée sur les principes fondamentaux communs aux différentes religions. Sous le titre Quelle sagesse pour notre temps?, cet ouvrage entend ouvrir une réflexion sur les modalités que peut prendre la recherche d'une telle sagesse adaptée à notre époque, à la fois conforme à l'idéal d'autonomie de l'individu moderne et ouverte à ses aspirations les plus profondes. Quels en seraient les principes? Parviendra-t-on à les dégager en s'accordant sur des valeurs éthiques et spirituelles universelles? Et si oui, comment est-il possible de les mettre en oeuvre? Une recherche de ce genre relève-t-elle d'une démarche strictement individuelle, ou peut-elle être également conduite de manière collective, à un niveau académique et plus généralement institutionnel? (shrink)

La diminution rapide du nombre des prêtres en nos régions pose avec urgence la question du gouvernement des communautés chrétiennes, et en particulier celle de la présidence de l’eucharistie qui en fait normalement partie. Le retour aux sources effectué en ecclésiologie et en théologie des sacrements depuis Vatican II invite à reprendre à nouveaux frais la question d’un élargissement des conditions d’accès au ministère de présidence : ordination d’hommes mariés, délégations à durée déterminée, voire cas-limite d’une présidence «charismatique» dans les (...) cas de nécessité. L’article recense les positions d’une série de théologiens qui ont envisagé positivement ce problème et plaide pour qu’on ne limite pas trop vite l’éventail des solutions théologiquement acceptables. (shrink)

No, that diminutive but independent vocable, begins its great role early in human life and never loses it. For not only can it head a negative sentence, announcing its judgement, or answer a question, implying its negated content, it can, and mostly does, in the beginning of speech, express an assertion of the resistant will—sometimes just that and nothing more. Eva Brann explores nothingness in the third book of her trilogy, which has treated imagination, time and now naysaying.

The basic question I want to ask is: can the exercise of private property rights abridge fundamental norms of democratic decision-making? And, under what conditions can it do so? To the extent that we view democratic decision making as required by justice, the issue is whether there is a deep tension between certain ways of exercising the rights of private property and that part of social justice that is characterized by democracy. To the extent that this tension holds, I will (...) argue that commitment to democratic norms implies that private capitalist firms must cooperate with a democratic assembly and government in the pursuit of the aims of a democratic assembly even when this implies some diminution of the profits of the firms. The cooperation I have in mind goes beyond the norm of faithful compliance with the law. To be sure, there are limits to this requirement as we will see in the later part of the paper. To the extent that private capitalist firms fail to do this and partially undermine the pursuit of the aims of a democratic assembly, they act in a way that is incompatible with fundamental norms of democratic governance. (shrink)

In the “diminution argument,” which Hume adduces in the Treatise section “Scepticism with Regard to Reason,” he infers from our universal fallibility that “all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.” My aim in this paper is, first, to show that on all extant interpretations of the argument, it turns out to be very weak, and, second, that there is in the vicinity a significant sceptical argument in support of (...) the conclusion that all our beliefs are totally unjustified, an argument that cannot be easily dismissed. (shrink)

The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, (...) I argue there are rationally self‐consuming attitudes: affective attitudes that become less fitting the longer they endure while the facts that give reason for them persist. A widely held synchronic view of fitting affective attitudes denies that fittingness at a time depends on the agent's attitudes at different times and therefore denies that the fittingness of an affective attitude can depend on its duration. Once we reject the synchronic view, we may see that affective attitudes are often fitting due to the fitting processes of which they are part. These fitting processes explain the fitting diminution of backward‐looking emotions as well as other diachronic aspects of the fittingness of emotions. -/- . (shrink)

Suppose we suffer a loss, such as the death of a loved one. In light of her death, we will typically feel grief, as it seems we should. After all, our loved one’s death is a reason for grief. Yet with the passage of time, our grief will typically diminish, and this seems somehow all right. However, our reason for grief ostensibly remains the same, since the passage of time does not undo our loss. How, then, could it not be (...) wrong for grief to diminish? Or how are we to make sense of the diminution of grief? Do reasons expire? —The paper clarifies the puzzle and then considers four responses. It argues that all of them are inadequate and that there are principled reasons why this should be so: In experiencing grief we are apprehending a loss. Yet in our effort to understand the diminution of grief, we must apprehend ourselves. But because grief is not about ourselves, our apprehension of the diminution of grief is at odds with our apprehension of the object of grief. This gives rise to a kind of double-vision, which is why the puzzle eludes a solution. (shrink)

This article contains reflections on the further structural transformation of the public sphere, building on the author’s widely-discussed social-historical study, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, which originally appeared in German in 1962 (English translation 1989). The first three sections contain preliminary theoretical reflections on the relationship between normative and empirical theory, the deliberative understanding of democracy, and the demanding preconditions of the stability of democratic societies under conditions of capitalism. The fourth section turns to the implications of digitalisation (...) for the account of the role of the media in the public sphere developed in the original work, specifically to how it is leading to the expansion and fragmentation of the public sphere and is turning all participants into potential authors. The following section presents empirical data from German studies which shows that the rapid expansion of digital media is leading to a marked diminution of the role of the classical print media. The article concludes with observations on the threats that these developments pose for the traditional role of the public sphere in discursive opinion and will formation in democracies. (shrink)

Recognising a diminution in his emotional response to patients’ deaths, the author analyses in detail his internal reactions in an attempt to understand what he believes is a common phenomenon among doctors. He identifies factors that may erode the connection between patient and physician: an instinct to separate oneself from another’s suffering, professional unease in the case of therapeutic failure, the atrophying effect of perceived hopelessness, insincerities in the establishment of the initial relationship, and an inability to imbue the sedated (...) or unconscious patient with human qualities. He concludes that recognition of these negative influences, without necessarily changing behaviours that are natural, may be a first step towards protecting doctors against what might be an otherwise insidious process of dehumanisation. (shrink)

SUMMARYJeremy Bentham has two very strong commitments in his thought: one is to the principle of utility, or the greatest happiness principle, as the fundamental principle of morality; the other is to truth, as indicated, for instance, in his opposition to falsehood and fiction in the law. How, then, did Bentham view the relationship between utility and truth? Did he think that utility and truth simply coincided, and hence that falsehood necessarily led to a diminution in happiness, and conversely truth (...) led to an increase in happiness? This article addresses this issue through two bodies of material: the first consists of Bentham's writings on religion under the heading of ‘Juggernaut’ and dating from 1811 to 1821; the second consists of the writings on judicial evidence dating from 1803 to 1812 and which appeared in Rationale of Judicial Evidence. (shrink)

For some time now a number of critics have argued that Juergen Habermas has misinterpreted Freud. The gist of this criticism is that Habermas' interpretation of psychoanalysis as `depth hermeneutics' must violate the intent of Freud's work, which is so deeply grounded in drive theory. In other words, Habermas confuses philosophical reflection with psychoanalysis. This paper takes a somewhat different focus. It examines the consequences of Habermas' interpretation of Freud for Habermas' view of the individual. It is shown that Habermas' (...) interpretation eventuates in an abstract and shadowy view of the individual. It is argued that an alternative view of psychoanalysis, object relations theory, can help locate the source of Habermas' pale view of the individual, and help correct it, without succumbing to `neo-Freudian revisionism'. Object relations theory also suggests that in order to overcome the diminution of the individual in real life it is necessary for political theory to examine seriously the role of the family. Finally, object relations theory generates an interesting criticism of so-called postmodern psychoanalysis—for example, the work of Jacques Lacan. This criticism can help us better understand the relationship between Habermas and modernism. (shrink)

How can we explain the rational diminution of backward-looking emotions without resorting to pragmatic or wrong kind of reason explanations? That is to say, how can the diminution of these emotions not only be rational but fitting? In this paper, I offer an answer to this question by considering the case of anger. In Sect. 1, I examine Pamela Hieronymi’s account of forgiveness as the rational resolution of resentment. I argue that Hieronymi’s account rests on an assumption about the rationality (...) of emotions —namely, that a rational change in emotion entails a change in the fact that constitutes the reason for the emotion. Then, in Sect. 2, I consider Agnes Callard’s recent criticism of accounts like Hieronymi’s as well as Callard’s alternative account of the rational resolution of anger. I argue that Callard offers a promising account but fails to explain how it avoids the criticism she levels against Hieronymi and others. Finally, in Sect. 3, I reject Hieronymi’s assumption and argue that an emotion can cease to be fitting without any change in the fact that constitutes the reason for it. I also explain how my proposal can complement Callard’s account of the rational dissipation of anger. My discussion of anger leads to a solution to the general problem about backward-looking emotions: a fitting backward-looking emotion can fittingly diminish when it is part of a process that is itself a fitting response to the past occurrence. (shrink)

La question des services publics, dans son idée de mise en commun des biens sociaux, suscite aujourd’hui une réflexion sur les mutations du politique. Les transformations des services publics, leur diminution voire leur abolition correspondent, selon l’auteur, au recul d’un certain projet politique de mise en commun. Le partage des biens sociaux découle, de plus en plus, du jeu des rapports de force au détriment d’un projet de mise en commun conforme à un projet politique plus vaste qui définirait les (...) paramètres d’un « vivre ensemble de solidarité ». (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Status of the Person in the Humanism of Giovanni Gentile" A. ROBERT CAPONIGRI THE HUMANISMOf Giovanni Gentile has gradually come to be recognized as one of the major speculative achievements of our time. The great strength and appeal of this position lie chiefly in the manner in which it meets the exigencies of the modem analysis of man and human existence while retaining the basic classical insights of (...) western thought. It achieves a synthesis which possesses at once historical, speculative, and cultural value and which rectifies many of the unilateral analyses so much in evidence. At the same time, serious limitations have been alleged to mar the Gentilean view of man. The most important of these allegations concerns the notion most intimately associated with the humanism of the west: the person. Strangely, it has been charged that the humanism of Gentile not only fails to develop an adequate concept of the person but directly involves the diminution and constriction of this concept as it has developed historically and influenced the western view of man. His, it is asserted, is a humanism without the person, which is but a small remove from the paradoxical assertion that it is a humanism without man? In many ways this charge is most perplexing. Were it correct, it would certainly have the limiting and constrictive effects his critics have pointed out. The real perplexity resides, however, not in spelling out the probable consequences of the allegation, but in determining how it might ever have arisen and gained such credence and championship. The fact is that nothing could be further from Gentile's intention and (what is more important) more alien to the burden of his text than the least diminution of the person. On the contrary, the person constitutes the central and pivotal notion of the entire structure of Gentilean humanism. The constructive effort of his thought is directed principally to the elaboration and validation of this * This paper was read before the Thirteenth International Congress of Philosophy, Mexico City (September, 1963), but has not been included in the Proceedings of the Congress. 1 M. F. Sclacca, II XX Secolo (1947), Vol. I, pp. 400 ft.; R. Holmes, The Idealism of Giovanni Gentile (1957), passim; H. S. Harris, The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (1960), passim. [6q 62 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY concept of the person. Once established, this concept becomes the cardinal principle upon which all his subsequent explorations and assertions in the areas of art, ethics, social and political theory, and education hinge. Consequently, it seems of utmost importance, for the comprehension of his thought and of its place in the total prospect of contemporary philosophy, to place in clear relief the basic lineaments of the concept of the person as it emerges from the critical stages of Gentile's thought as well as the role it plays in all subsequent constructive efforts. Formation of the Concept of the Person in Gentile's Thought To understand the emergence of the concept of the person in actualism, it is necessary to determine clearly Gentile's basic point of departure. This is established firmly in the history of philosophy: a fact which corroborates Harris's perception that Gentile's thought is essentially an historical enterprise? One of Gentile's chief and most sustained fields of effort is the history of philosophy and his work in this area served a double purpose. The first was the properly historical and critical work of establishing an interpretation of the course of the history of western philosophy; s the second was to locate his own thought in the context of the history of philosophy as thus established and thus to endow it with a firm scientific and "public" character, to assign it a "public" basis. This public basis was the achievement of western philosophy which his analysis had recognized as solid and beyond cavil. This achievement, he reasoned, must constitute the point of departure of any further relevant speculation. Gentile took the philosophical position of Hegel as representing this indubitable achievement of western thought in its most salient features. This statement must be correctly understood to be of any help and importance in approaching his thought. Gentile did not... (shrink)

This is the first critical edition and study of a unique and important Muslim polemic against Christians and Jews. The Book of Disputation was written in Arabic by a Mudejar (subject Muslim living under Christian rule in late medieval Iberia) and offers new insight into the cultural and intellectual life of this Muslim minority. The text advances arguments drawn from natural philosophy-largely from Aristotle and Averroes-along with more traditional revealed sources such as the Qur'an and the Bible. Mudejar communities suffered (...) a diminution of religious and political intelligentsia over time. This text, however, highlights the author's particular conception of the world as the creation of God in his defense of Islam, demonstrates the vitality of intellectual life among Muslims in medieval Christian Iberia, and documents the continued cultivation of natural philosophy within these Muslim communities. (shrink)

Modern American nursing has an extensive ethical heritage literature that extends from the 1870s to 1965 when the American Nurses Association issued a policy paper that called for moving nursing education out of hospital diploma programs and into colleges and universities. One consequence of this move was the dispersion of nursing libraries and the loss of nursing ethics textbooks, as they were largely not brought over into the college libraries. In addition to approximately 100 nursing ethics textbooks, the nursing ethics (...) heritage literature also includes hundreds of journal articles that are often made less accessible in modern databases that concentrate on the past 20 or 30 years. A second consequence of nursing’s movement into colleges and universities is that ethics was no longer taught by nursing faculty, but becomes separated and placed as a discrete ethics course in departments of philosophy or theology. These courses were medically identified and rarely incorporated authentic nursing content. This shift in nursing education occurs contemporaneously with the rise of the field of bioethics. Bioethics is rapidly embraced by nursing, and as it develops within nursing, it fails to incorporate the rich ethical heritage, history, and literature of nursing prior to the development of the field of bioethics. This creates a radical disjunction in nursing’s ethics; a failure to more adequately explore the moral identity of nursing; the development of an ethics with a lack of fit with nursing’s ethical history, literature, and theory; a neglect of nursing’s ideal of service; a diminution of the scope and richness of nursing ethics as social ethics; and a loss of nursing ethical heritage of social justice activism and education. We must reclaim nursing’s rich and capacious ethics heritage literature; the history of nursing ethics matters profoundly. (shrink)