O objetivo do artigo é analisar a condução da política externa estadunidense com a China, entre 1890 e 1909, tomando como referencial a interpretação historiográfica dos autores revisionistas William Appleman Williams e Walter LaFeber. Propõe-se que o “anticolonialismo imperial” engendrado pelos Estados Unidos no processo de disputa pela abertura do mercado chinês está na origem dos conflitos com as tradicionais potências imperialistas. O trabalho explora, portanto, a tese historiográfica revisionista segundo a qual a política externa norte-americana radicada nos princípios da (...) “Open Door Policy” é fundamental para a compreensão de antagonismos que contribuíram para a Guerra Fria.The aim of the article is to analyze the conduct of US foreign policy with China between 1890 and 1909, taking as reference the historiographical interpretation of the revisionist authors William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber. It is proposed that the "imperial anticolonialism" engendered by the United States in the process of dispute over the opening of the Chinese market is at the origin of conflicts with the traditional imperialist powers. The paper thus explores the revisionist historiographical thesis that US foreign policy rooted in the principles of the Open Door Policy is fundamental to understanding the antagonisms that contributed to the Cold War. Resumen El objetivo del artículo es analizar la conducción de la política exterior estadounidense con China, entre 1890 y 1909, tomando como referencial la interpretación historiográfica de los autores revisionistas William Appleman Williams y Walter LaFeber. Se propone que el "anticolonialismo imperial" engendrado por Estados Unidos en el proceso de disputa por la apertura del mercado chino es el origen de los conflictos con las tradicionales potencias imperialistas. El trabajo explora, por lo tanto, la tesis historiográfica revisionista según la cual la política exterior norteamericana radicada en los principios de la "Open Door Policy" es fundamental para la comprensión de antagonismos que contribuyeron a la Guerra Fría. (shrink)

We are revolutionary offspring of indomitable spirit. We are born rebels. We came to this world to rebel against the bourgeoisie and carry the great proletarian revolutionary banner. Sons will justifiably succeed the power seized by their fathers' generation. This is called passing it on from generation to generation.

Contra Michael Walzer and Jeff McMahan, neither classical just war theory nor the contemporary rules of war require or support any notion of combatant moral equality. Nations rightly accept prohibitions against punishing enemy combatants without recognizing any legal or moral right of aggressors to kill. The notion of combatant moral equality has real import only in our interpersonal -- and intrapersonal -- attitudes, since the notion effectively preempts any ground for conscientious objection. Walzer is criticized for over-emphasizing our collective responses (...) to war conduct and slighting our personal, extra-political responses. (shrink)

Combating and overcoming corruption in business and in political affairs is one of the most important issues facing business and professional ethics in the 21st century. That corruption exists is a fact. That corruption is widespread and spreading is a commonperception. Many believe that corruption is culturally induced. Some believe corruption to be so much a part of the fabric of some societies as to be unquestioned and unassailable. Or, is it simply a myth that corruption is a matter of (...) culture? (shrink)

The principle of noncombatant immunity prohibits warring parties from intentionally targeting noncombatants. I explicate the moral version of this view and its criticisms by reductive individualists; they argue that certain civilians on the unjust side are morally liable to be lethally targeted to forestall substantial contributions to that war. I then argue that reductivists are mistaken in thinking that causally contributing to an unjust war is a necessary condition for moral liability. Certain noncontributing civilians—notably, war-profiteers—can be morally liable to be (...) lethally targeted. Thus, the principle of noncombatant immunity is mistaken as a moral (though not necessarily as a legal) doctrine, not just because some civilians contribute substantially, but because some unjustly enriched civilians culpably fail to discharge their restitutionary duties to those whose victimization made the unjust enrichment possible. Consequently, the moral criterion for lethal liability in war is even broader than reductive individualists have argued. (shrink)

Moral injury, the experience of having acted incommensurably with one's most deeply held moral conceptions, is increasingly recognized by the mental health disciplines to be associated with postcombat traumatic stress. In this essay I argue that moral injury is an important and useful clinical construct but that the phenomenon of moral injury beckons beyond the structural constraints of contemporary psychology toward something like moral theology. This something, embodied in specific communal practices, can rescue moral injury from the medical model and (...) the means—end logic of techne and can allow for truthful, contextualized narration of and healing from morally fragmenting combat experiences. (shrink)

Over that last several decades the ethics of war has grown into a major subfield in philosophy at the same time as large literatures have developed on the relation between gender and war as well as feminist approaches to the ethics of war. This article aims to contribute to these literatures and to bring them into closer contact. It argues that canonical just war theorists such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and Walzer rely on appeals to masculinity to help ground the (...) obligations of soldiers to participate in war upon command. This appeal helps them overcome their otherwise weak arguments for the political subordination of soldiers, or what I call the Internal Problem of the soldier. It also helps explain a problem that has vexed contemporary ethics of war scholars, namely, the supposed equal right to kill combatants in war, or what I call the External Problem of the soldier. If this is true, then just war theorists should be much more concerned with the gender and war literature and find common ground with feminists who have treated the problem of the political standing of soldiers as a philosophical priority. (shrink)

It is argued in this paper that the contemporary issue of modern slavery is one of meaningful relevance to today’s business, particularly multinational corporations. For a number of theoretical and pragmatic reasons, including corporate social responsibility, global corporate citizenship, corporate power and innovative capability, the issue should resonate with, and draw response from, modern business. Further, several suggestions are made as to how business organizations and their leaders can effectively aid in combating modern slavery.

To date, 1.7 million US military service personnel have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those, one in five are suffering from diagnosable combat-stress related psychological injuries including Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). All indications are that the mental health toll of the current conflicts on US troops and the medical systems that care for them will only increase. Against this backdrop, research suggesting that the common class of drugs known as beta-blockers might prevent the onset of PTSD is (...) drawing much interest. I urge caution against accepting too quickly the use of beta-blockers for dealing with the psychological injuries that combat experiences can wreak. Beta-blockers are thought to work by disrupting the formation of emotionally disturbing memories that typically occur in the wake of traumatic events and that in some people manifest as PTSD. Focusing on a single dimension of soldiers' experience in combat, namely, their perpetration of other-directed violence, I argue that some of the emotional memories blunted by beta-blockers play important roles in the recovery of moral aspects of soldiers' selves damaged by experiences of combat violence — specifically, in the achievement of a state of grace— and, therefore, that the use of beta-blockers may come with distinct moral costs. (shrink)

This book explores the thesis that legal roles force people to engage in moral combat, an idea which is implicit in the assumption that citizens may be morally required to disobey unjust laws, while judges may be morally required to punish citizens for civil disobedience. Heidi Hurd advances the surprising argument that the law cannot require us to do what morality forbids. The 'role-relative' understanding of morality is shown to be incompatible with both consequentialist and deontological moral philosophies. In (...) the end, Hurd shows that our best moral theory is one which never makes one actor's moral success turn on another's moral failure. Moral Combat is a sophisticated, well-conceived and carefully argued book on a very important and controversial topic at the junction between legal and political philosophy. It will be of interest to moral, legal, and political philosophers, as well as teachers and students of professional ethics in law. (shrink)

In his discussion of Roman military institutions Polybius described how the desire for fame might inspire Roman soldiers to heroic feats of bravery, including single combat: τ δ μέγιστον, ο νέοι παρορμνται πρς τ πν πομένειν πρ τν κοινν πραγμάτων χάριν το τυχεν τς συνακολουθούσης τος γαθος τν νδρν εκλείας. πίστιν δ' χει τ λεγόμενον κ τούτων. πολλο μν γρ μονο-μάχησαν κουσίως ωμαίων πρ τς τν λων κρίσεως κτλ. Modern scholars, however, have taken little notice of this remark and (...) some have tried to belittle the importance of single combat at Rome. Thus G. Dumézil alleged that the Romans fought few single combats and that this was significant for their outlook upon war, while R. Bloch described the duels in the seventh book of Livy as ‘un mode de combat absolument étranger à la tradition romaine, mail auquel les Romains ont été contraints par les habitudes et par les défis des Celtes’. W. V. Harris is the only scholar to have understood the importance of monomachy in the Roman Republic, but even he has not assembled all the evidence necessary for an accurate assessment of the phenomenon. This essay is intended to provide a full treatment and thus to make some contribution in a limited but interesting area to our understanding of Roman attitudes to warfare. I have included a list and discussion of all instances of single combat from the Roman Republic which I have discovered and have argued that the custom continued from prehistoric times at least to 45 b.c. (shrink)

Since 1970 the United Kingdom, like the United States, has developed a “winner-take-all” political economy characterized by widening inequality and spectacular income growth at the top of the distribution. However, Britain’s centralized executive branch and relatively insulated policymaking process are less amenable to the kind of “organized combat” that Hacker and Pierson describe for the United States. Britain’s winner-take-all politics is better explained by the rise of political ideas favoring unfettered markets that, over time, produce a self-perpetuating structural advantage (...) for the richest. That advantage is, in turn, justified and sustained by reference to the same ideas. Inequality growth in the United Kingdom has been primarily driven by the financialization of the economy that began under the Thatcher government and continued under New Labour. The survival of pro-finance policies through the financial crisis provides further evidence that lobbying by a weakened City of London was less decisive in shaping policy than the financial sector’s continuing structural advantage and the tenacity of its supporting political consensus. (shrink)

Building on Seumas Miller’s concept of corruption leads me to conclude that the question of disposition is central to the concept of corruption, which prompts me to consider punishment theories with regard to deterring dispositions to corruption. However, problems with punishment as a stand-alone approach lead me to consider institutional reform recommendations. Although institutional reforms have the weakness of merely engaging corrupt disposition in a hide-and-seek game, I seek to reconcile institutional approaches and moral individualism by suggesting that the former (...) is intended to aid the latter, in the sense that resisting corruption is a question of cost, and the onus is to determine how to reduce this cost. In this regard, prevailing proposals are inept without an enabling environment: public deliberation (comprising publicity and deliberation) is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for combating corruption, because it (1) compels reason to function at its best, (2) demands rational accountability, and therefore account-giving, (3) increases ‘common-good’ thinking, (4) facilitates the recruitment of responsible institutional role-occupants, and (5) is a self-correcting instrument. (shrink)

This article formulates a new approach to combating corruption in Uganda. In pursuit of this research, the author highlights the chronicity of corruption in Uganda, which is uniformly political and bureaucratic. Bureaucratic corruption takes place in service delivery and rule enforcement. It has two sides: demand-induced and supply-induced. Political corruption occurs at high levels of politics. There are 'political untouchables' and businessmen who are above the law and above institutional control mechanisms. The established institutions of checks and balances in Uganda (...) have assiduously continued to have a limited bearing on corruption. Neither coherent anti-corruption norms nor severe formal sanctions are able to dishearten certain politicians and civil servants in Uganda from the deviant behaviour of structural corruption. Corruption is a spiritual departure from the law and standard of God. It is an action conceived in the human mind and carried out by the corrupt. Therefore, corruption deterrence not only lies in sound public financial management systems but depends to a large extent on having people with positive human character in all aspects of national life. This article thus provides the framework of corruption and discusses the manifestation of political and bureaucratic corruption in Uganda. It also exegetes the biblical stance regarding corruption. Finally, it proposes a panacea for combating political and bureaucratic corruption. (shrink)

Vaccines, when available, will prove to be crucial in the fight against Covid-19. All societies will face acute dilemmas in allocating scarce lifesaving resources in the form of vaccines for Covid-19. The author proposes The Value of Lives Principle as a just and workable plan for equitable and efficient access. After describing what the principle entails, the author contrasts the advantage of this approach with other current proposals such as the Fair Priority Model.

One thing nearly all epistemologists agree upon is that Gettier cases are decisive counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge; whatever else is true of knowledge, it is not merely belief that is both justified and true. They now agree that knowledge is not justified true belief because this is consistent with there being too much luck present in the cases, and that knowledge excludes such luck. This is to endorse what has become known as the 'anti-luck platitude'. <br /><br (...) />But what if generations of philosophers have been mistaken about this, blinded at least partially by a deeply entrenched professional bias? There has been another, albeit minority, response to Gettier: to deny that the cases are counterexamples at all. <br /><br />Stephen Hetherington, a principal and vocal proponent of this view, advances what he calls the 'Knowing Luckily Proposal'. If Hetherington is correct, this would call for a major re-evaluation and re-orientation of post-Gettier analytic epistemology, since much of it assumes the anti-luck platitude both in elucidating the concept of knowledge, and in the application of such accounts to central philosophical problems. It is therefore imperative that the Knowing Luckily Proposal be considered and evaluated in detail. <br /><br />In this paper I critically assess the Knowing Luckily Proposal. I argue that while it draws our attention to certain important features of knowledge, ultimately it fails, and the anti-luck platitude emerges unscathed. Whatever else is true of knowledge, therefore, it is non-lucky true belief. For a proposition to count as knowledge, we cannot arrive at its truth accidentally or for the wrong reason. (shrink)

I first discuss reasons for feminists to attend to the role of women in the military, despite past emphasis on antimilitarism. I then focus on the exclusion of women from combat duty, reviewing its sanction by the U.S. Supreme Court and the history of its adoption. I present arguments favoring the exclusion, defending strong replies to each, and demonstrate that reasoning from related cases and feminist analyses of equality explain why exclusion remains entrenched.

Academic institutions aim at achieving the highest standards of education and learning. Consequently, they prohibit academic corruption such as cheating or plagiarism. This article examines how international accreditation and quality assurance standards embody academic integrity as a main factor in deciding whether an academic institution should be accredited, and what ranking should an academic institution acquire in a competitive contest for educational excellence. Academic integrity is broadly defined to include, in addition to cheating and plagiarism, compliance with standards of human (...) rights, labor rights, corporate social responsibility, ant-corruption measures, environmental protection, social media usage, protection of underage students, anti-radicalization and extremism, avoidance of conflict of interest, faculty professionalism, students codes of conduct and human experimentation. Academic institutions should adopt policies that are designed to address these diverse standards and accommodate diversity and enhance access to education for all without discrimination. Academic institutions should also strictly require the highest standards in teaching and research. This article will discuss the different policies, laws, rules and regulations adopted by Qatar University as a model for incorporating academic integrity, which may be of interest to the international higher education community. This article will ask two main questions; are accrediting institutions asking the right questions to find out whether an academic institution strictly adheres to a policy of academic integrity, and whether policies adopted by academic institutions, Qatar University as a model, are adequate to address various violations of academic integrity. (shrink)

Procurou-se, e esse foi o objetivo essencial, que este volume fosse marcado pelo discurso questionador e crítico de historiadores, de filósofos, de especialistas da ciência política, das ideias, do direito, da economia, da educação, da comunicação, da informação, das ciências, das artes. Surgiram assim interpretações, quadros, configurações e reconfigurações, ângulos de análise diversificados que fomentarão, por certo, uma reflexão viva dos leitores. É fundamental — continua a sê-lo — repensar e questionar campos temáticos à luz das análises teóricas e concetuais, (...) mas também dos processos, das dinâmicas, das relações, das potencialidades explicativas da nossa contemporaneidade. É assim que se entende este livro, com muitas contribuições, que vêm propiciar e enriquecer a reflexão sobre Outros Combates pela História. Combates pela História é, como se sabe, o título de um livro famoso de Lucien Febvre dos anos cinquenta. Através de uma recomposição, de novo se deu importância a todas as modalidades da História, mantendo, todavia, o sentido do rigor que era algo perseguido nos «combates pela História». Quer-se, pois, analisar o sentido da História, nas suas várias áreas. Contudo, ao propor-se este tema, não se desejou que os autores apresentassem tanto as suas investigações nas suas áreas próprias — embora elas estivessem subentendidas e devessem ser expressas —, mas que refletissem sobre o seu sentido no âmbito da História entendida como Ciência Social e Humana. Para tal, desejou-se que discutissem o objeto e o método da História das diversas áreas, equacionando os seus vários problemas. Foi isso que também sucedeu — estamos disso convencidos. Mas será o leitor, melhor do que ninguém, a ajuizá-lo. (shrink)

In his discussion of Roman military institutions Polybius described how the desire for fame might inspire Roman soldiers to heroic feats of bravery, including single combat: (6.54.3–4)τ⋯ δ⋯ μέγιστον, οἱ νέοι παρορμ⋯νται πρ⋯ς τ⋯ π⋯ν ὑπομένειν ὑπ⋯ρ τ⋯ν κοιν⋯ν πραγμάτων χάριν το⋯ τυχεῖν τ⋯ς συνακολουθούσης τοῖς ⋯γαθοῖς τ⋯ν ⋯νδρ⋯ν εὐκλείας. πίστιν δ' ἔχει τ⋯ λεγόμενον ⋯κ τούτων. πολλο⋯ μ⋯ν γ⋯ρ ⋯μονο-μάχησαν ⋯κουσίως Ῥωμαίων ὑπ⋯ρ τ⋯ς τ⋯ν ὅλων κρίσεως κτλ. Modern scholars, however, have taken little notice of this remark and (...) some have tried to belittle the importance of single combat at Rome. Thus G. Dumézil alleged that the Romans fought few single combats and that this was significant for their outlook upon war, while R. Bloch described the duels in the seventh book of Livy as ‘un mode de combat absolument étranger à la tradition romaine, mail auquel les Romains ont été contraints par les habitudes et par les défis des Celtes’. W. V. Harris is the only scholar to have understood the importance of monomachy in the Roman Republic, but even he has not assembled all the evidence necessary for an accurate assessment of the phenomenon. This essay is intended to provide a full treatment and thus to make some contribution in a limited but interesting area to our understanding of Roman attitudes to warfare. I have included a list and discussion of all instances of single combat from the Roman Republic which I have discovered and have argued that the custom continued from prehistoric times at least to 45 b.c. (shrink)

The past three years saw more suicide attacks than the last quarter century. Most of these were religiously motivated. While most Westerners have imagined a tightly coordinated transnational terrorist organization headed by Al Qaeda, it seems more likely that nations under attack face a set of largely autonomous groups and cells pursuing their own regional aims. Repeated suicide actions show that massive counterforce alone does not diminish the frequency or intensity of suicide attack. Like pounding mercury with a hammer, this (...) sort of top-heavy counterstrategy only seems to generate more dispersed and insidious forms of suicide terrorism. Even with many top Qaeda leaders now dead or in custody, the transnational Jihadist fraternity is transforming into a hydra-headed network more difficult to fight than before. Poverty and lack of education per se are not root causes of suicide terrorism. And Muslims who have expressed support for martyr actions and trust in Osama Bin Laden or the late Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin do not as a rule hate democratic freedoms or Western culture, although many despise American foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. Rising aspirations followed by dwindling expectations – especially regarding civil liberties – are critical factors in generating support for suicide terrorism. The United States, Israel, Russia and other nations on the frontline in the war on terror need to realize that military and counterinsurgency actions are tactical, not strategic responses to suicide terrorism, the most politically destabilizing and psychologically devastating form of terrorism. When these nations back oppressive and unpopular governments this only generates popular resentment and support for terrorism against those governments and their backers. To attract potential recruits away from Jihadist martyrdom – suicide terrorism's most virulent strain - and to dry up its popular support, requires addressing these grievances before a downward spiral sets in where core meaning in life is sought, and found, in religious networks that sanctify vengeance at any cost against stronger powers, even if it kills the avenger. (shrink)

Un - combat amoureux - (Heidegger) ou une - lutte entre les penseurs - (Husserl) determine le destin de l'histoire de la philosophie. Au coeur du debat avec la phenomenologie francaise, cet ouvrage engage une veritable disputatio philosophique ancree sur ledit -tournant theologique de la phenomenologie francaise-. Assure que l'heure n'est plus au simple choc frontal, mais a un veritable dialogue et confrontation entre les disciplines, ce livre tente de montrer en quoi une -phenomenologie de la limite- peut aussi (...) servir de contrepoint a la -phenomenologie de la revelation-, et la tourner davantage vers une pensee de l'-i ncarnation- ou de l'-e xperience-. Jacques Derrida, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, Jean-Louis Chretien, Jean-Yves Lacoste, Claude Romano et Jean Greisch, marquent les differents etapes de cette -traversee- point par point articulee, et en quete d'un respondeo a meme d'autrement decider.". (shrink)

The principle of non-combatant immunity holds that it is impermissible to intentionally target non-combatants in war, even if they belong to the ‘unjust side’ of a war. This principle is traditionally defended by the claim that non-combatants are materially innocent: that, unlike combatants, non-combatants do not threaten. But this view is prima facie implausible. Non-combatants often contribute to their country’s war effort. More recent defences of the PNI therefore seek to show that a non-combatant is not liable to be killed (...) even if she contributes to her country’s war effort. This... (shrink)

Combating Hatred provides several practical case studies of teachers, administrators, and school board members who have successfully combated intolerance, prejudice, and hatred in their schools. Furin details innovative ways used in the case studies to create communities that sought the highest social justice values of respect and equality for everyone.

AI-supported methods for identifying and combating disinformation are progressing in their development and application. However, these methods face a litany of epistemic and ethical challenges. These include (1) robustly defining disinformation, (2) reliably classifying data according to this definition, and (3) navigating ethical risks in the deployment of countermeasures, which involve a mixture of harms and benefits. This paper seeks to expose and offer preliminary analysis of these challenges.

This article examines two spheres of global governance in which the World Health Organization (WHO) has sought to exercise international leadership — combating “counterfeit” medicines and illicit trade in tobacco products. Medicines and tobacco products lie at polar opposite ends of the health spectrum, and are regulated for vastly different reasons and through different tools and approaches. Nevertheless, attempts to govern counterfeit trade in each of these products raise a host of somewhat similar challenges, involving normative and operational conflicts that (...) cut across the crowded intersection of health protection and promotion, intellectual property protection, and activity to combat transnational organized crime. As negotiations of an illicit trade protocol to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control enter their final stages, lessons learned from counterfeit medicines governance need to be applied to ensure that the most appropriate governance arrangements are adopted. (shrink)

Just war theory has traditionally presupposed what Michael Walzer calls the moral equality of soldiers: that combatants on all sides have an equal right to kill, such that the soldier is not blameworthy for fighting for an unjust cause. The theory of moral equality has come under increasing attack by Jeff McMahan and others who argue that soldiers are responsible for killing for an unjust cause. I agree with McMahan that soldiers cannot be justified in serving injustice, such that there (...) is no full moral equality. Moreover, the common excuses of ignorance and duress cannot exculpate many soldiers. However, I argue that when one considers the force of legal authority and the bonds of patriotism, combined with ignorance and duress, most soldiers are excused. Because of the rarity of exceptions and the consequences of holding soldiers accountable, I conclude that we should presuppose the equal blamelessness of combatants. (shrink)

Just war theory has traditionally presupposed what Michael Walzer calls the moral equality of soldiers: that combatants on all sides have an equal right to kill, such that the soldier is not blameworthy for fighting for an unjust cause. The theory of moral equality has come under increasing attack by Jeff McMahan and others who argue that soldiers are responsible for killing for an unjust cause. I agree with McMahan that soldiers cannot be justified in serving injustice, such that there (...) is no full moral equality. Moreover, the common excuses of ignorance and duress cannot exculpate many soldiers. However, I argue that when one considers the force of legal authority and the bonds of patriotism, combined with ignorance and duress, most soldiers are excused. Because of the rarity of exceptions and the consequences of holding soldiers accountable, I conclude that we should presuppose the equal blamelessness of combatants. (shrink)

Just war theory has traditionally presupposed what Michael Walzer calls the moral equality of soldiers: that combatants on all sides have an equal right to kill, such that the soldier is not blameworthy for fighting for an unjust cause. The theory of moral equality has come under increasing attack by Jeff McMahan and others who argue that soldiers are responsible for killing for an unjust cause. I agree with McMahan that soldiers cannot be justified in serving injustice, such that there (...) is no full moral equality. Moreover, the common excuses of ignorance and duress cannot exculpate many soldiers. However, I argue that when one considers the force of legal authority and the bonds of patriotism, combined with ignorance and duress, most soldiers are excused. Because of the rarity of exceptions and the consequences of holding soldiers accountable, I conclude that we should presuppose the equal blamelessness of combatants. (shrink)

Yitzhak Benbaji argues that those combatants who have agreed to blindly obey their superiors and who are ordered to fight in unjust wars are released from their duty to deliberate about the merits of the acts that they are ordered to perform. This is because their agreements result in the combatants’ permissible lack of a necessary capacity for moral responsibility. Thus, the combatants are not morally responsible for their wrongful acts—their moral responsibility is “transferred” to their superiors. We argue, first, (...) that Benbaji’s own reasoning suggests that the agreements entered into between the combatants and their superiors are not binding and, second, that even if such agreements are binding, those combatants who obey their orders to fight are nevertheless morally responsible for their wrongful acts. Thus, Benbaji has failed to show that the combatants are permitted to act as ordered. By critically examining Benbaji’s view, then, we defend the revisionist position that just and unjust combatants are morally unequal. (shrink)

L’auteur, qui se propose de publier, pour le bicentenaire de la naissance d’Édouard Reuss , sa correspondance avec Michel Nicolas , présente l’état de ces lettres inédites et les circonstances de leur rédaction. Il montre qu’elles éclairent l’élaboration de la production littéraire des deux protagonistes et l’évolution de la théologie protestante au XIX e siècle en France. Pour illustrer le combat commun des deux correspondants pour le progrès des sciences théologiques en France, il présente enfin les passages qui concernent (...) le projet de création d’une revue scientifique. Il suggère au passage l’influence insoupçonnée de M. Nicolas sur la théologie protestante française, en particulier sur l’évolution des sciences bibliques. The author, who proposes to publish, for the bicentennial of Edouard Reuss’ birth , his correspondence with Michel Nicolas , presents the state of these yet unpublished letters and the circumstances in which they were written. He shows that they enlighten the literary production of both protagonists and the evolution of French Protestant theology in the 19th century. To illustrate their common struggle for the advance of theological sciences in France, he presents at last passages which concern the project to create a scientific periodical. He also suggests the unsuspected influence of M. Nicolas on French Protestant theology, in particular on the evolution of biblical sciences. (shrink)

The doctrine of the moral equality of combatants holds that combatants on either side of a war have equal moral status, even if one side is fighting a just war while the other is not. This chapter examines arguments that have been offered for and against this doctrine, including the collectivist position famously articulated by Walzer and McMahan’s influential individualist critique. We also explore collectivist positions that have rejected the moral equality doctrine and arguments that some individualists have offered in (...) its favor. We defend a non-categorical version of the moral equality doctrine, according to which combatants on either side of a just war sometimes (but not always) have equal moral status. On our view, some degree of culpability is necessary for liability, and non-culpable combatants may therefore sometimes remain non-liable even when they fight for an unjust cause. (shrink)

Arguably, STEM undergraduate education has narrowed student engagement with the social, ethical, and global. Our paper argues that disengagement is caused by a failure of moral imagination. We propose socio-technical analysis as the cornerstone to a more inclusive approach to STEM education. It promotes four activities: (1) zooming in on technologies by describing their structure, function, and embedded values; (2) zooming out to the surrounding socio-technical system which constrains and enables the technology’s functioning; (3) moving back-and-forth through Appropriate Technology to (...) assess the fit of the technology to its socio-technical surroundings; and (4) using the capability approach to finish the (re)engagement process. We then look at graduate and undergraduate student work that has successfully used our framework to combat disengagement and conclude by discussing materials we have used to assess student engagement. (shrink)

This book explores the thesis that legal roles force people to engage in moral combat, an idea which is implicit in the assumption that citizens may be morally required to disobey unjust laws, while judges may be morally required to punish citizens for civil disobedience. Heidi Hurd advances the surprising argument that the law cannot require us to do what morality forbids. The 'role-relative' understanding of morality is shown to be incompatible with both consequentialist and deontological moral philosophies. In (...) the end, Hurd shows that our best moral theory is one which never makes one actor's moral success turn on another's moral failure. Moral Combat is a sophisticated, well-conceived and carefully argued book on a very important and controversial topic at the junction between legal and political philosophy. It will be of interest to moral, legal, and political philosophers, as well as teachers and students of professional ethics in law. (shrink)

But if reason has no original influence, it is impossible it can withstand any principle which has such an efficacy, or ever keep the mind in suspense a moment. Thus, it appears, that the principle which opposes our passions cannot be the same with reason, and is only called so in an improper sense. We speak not strictly and philosophically, when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason.

International law grants to legitimate combatants the right to kill enemy soldiers both in wars of aggression and defensive wars. A main argument in support of this “combatant’s privilege” is Michael Walzer’s doctrine of the “moral equality of soldiers.” The doctrine argues that soldiers fighting in wars of aggression and defensive wars have the same moral status because they both typically believe that justice is on their side, and their moral choices are equally severely restricted by the overwhelming coercive powers (...) of the state, including propaganda, conscription, and harsh penalties for the refusal to fight. Recently, this doctrine has been convincingly refuted, at least with regard to aggressor soldiers who are part of professional volunteer armies in democratic societies. However, Walzer’s critics have not challenged combatant’s privilege, primarily for a variety of pragmatic reasons. This paper examines these reasons, finds them not decisive, and articulates a modest proposal for denying, under some conditions, combatant’s privilege to aggressor soldiers, making their very participation in a war of aggression a war crime. It is concluded that unrestricted combatant’s privilege is in tension with the aim of the United Nations “to save succeeding generationsfrom the scourge of war.”. (shrink)

Following international humanitarian law, soldiers who are authorized by their states to fight wars of aggression have a legal right to kill enemy soldiers, and even enemy civilians, as long as they respect such jus in bello norms as discrimination and proportionality. I criticize a variety of arguments in support of this “combatant’s privilege” of aggressor soldiers that maintain that these soldiers have a moral right to kill or are not culpable for their wrongful killing. I also contest some arguments (...) in support of the view that even though soldiers executing wars of aggression may be morally liable for their wrongful killing, it is impractical or dangerous to seek to change international law so that they would also be held legally liable. In conclusion, I cautiously articulate some conditions under which combatant’s privilege should not be legally granted and those who fight unjust wars should be prosecuted. (shrink)

A decent education is a basic human right. The provision of free, compulsory education in the US attests to a national commitment to this right. However, thecurrent school system is plagued by inequities, including spending less money on schools serving predominantly poor and non-White populations, subjectingstudents of color to harsher punishments, putting non-White students in special education tracks at higher rates, and neglecting students who are not fluent inEnglish. These inequities are taken for granted within the school system, making the (...) inevitable outcome, achievement gaps between White and non-Whitestudents, seem natural and inevitable. Bourdieu calls this process of making arbitrary differences seem natural “symbolic violence.” Two recent federalinterventions, No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top, have the potential to provide tools for combating this symbolic violence. However, each is designedaround flawed premises which inhibit that potential, which we explore in the context of teacher education. (shrink)

This article investigates what motivates combatants to fight in non-conventional armed organizations. Drawing on interviews with ex-combatants from the Army of the Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the article compares the role of nationalist ideology, coercive organizational structures, and small group solidarity in these two organizations. Our analysis indicates that coercion played a limited role in both armed forces: in the VRS coercion was relevant mostly in the recruitment phase, while in the IRA (...) its direct impact was only discernible during armed operations. We also find that although both organizations are seen as being highly motivated by nationalist ideas, the picture is much more complex and nationalism is less present than expected. The study demonstrates that nationalism played a relatively marginal role in combatants’ motivation to fight. Instead our research indicates that individualist motivations, small group solidarity, and local networks dominate. (shrink)