In this article I introduce the notion of crucial evidence and I use it to shed light on an ongoing scholarly controversy in Hobbes studies, namely whether Hobbes holds a prudential or a deontological theory of contractual obligation. Even though there is important evidence for both readings, I argue that there is crucial evidence for interpreting Hobbes’s account in a deontological fashion.

According to the evidence-relative view of liability to defensive harm, a person is so liable if and only if she acts in a way that provides sufficient evidence to justify a (putative) victim’s belief that the person poses a threat of unjust harm, which may or may not be the case. Bas van der Vossen defends this position by analyzing, in relation to a version of Frank Jackson’s famous drug example, a case in which a putative murderer is killed by (...) a putative victim. Van der Vossen submits that the putative murderer is liable to be killed, which is a verdict that can be accommodated only by the evidence-relative view. We argue that Van der Vossen’s attempt to ground the evidence-relative view of liability to defensive harm fails. We also argue that this notion should be construed in fact-relative terms. This, however, does not mean that the notion of permissibility should necessarily also be understood in such a way in all possible cases. So, we explore whether the evidence-relative view of permissibility may be used in some contexts. (shrink)

David Estlund and Massimo Renzo argue that, given the right background conditions, combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars, a thesis they put forward even as they recognize that this involves committing serious moral wrongs. Their views, then, fall between traditionalism and revisionism in the theory of just war. We argue that both Estlund and Renzo fail to adequately distinguish between binding and nonbinding serious morally wrong orders, that their views are incompatible with their assumed fact‐relative (...) understanding of morality, and that they fail to establish that combatants are obligated to obey orders to fight in unjust wars. We conclude that just as untenable as these two middle‐ground positions is the traditionalist view. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes’s political theory contains conceptual theses on law, including an analysis of the way legal requirements affect practical reasoning. However, Hobbes’ account of law and the structure of reasons for political obedience is extremely ambiguous. In this paper, I show that Hobbes develops not one but two different accounts. Also, I argue that the two theories are in tension, something that Hobbes himself seems to recognize to some extent.

The author introduces the notions of crucial argument and crucial evidence in the philosophy of intellectual history (broadly construed, including the history of political thought). He will use these concepts and take sides in an important controversy in Hobbes studies, namely whether Hobbes holds a prudential or a deontological theory of contractual obligation. Though there is textual evidence for both readings, he will argue that there is especially relevant evidence - crucial evidence - for interpreting Hobbes's account in a deontological (...) fashion. (shrink)

John Locke says that a victim is permitted to kill a Conditional Threat in self-defense. Yet, David Rodin argues that killing is disproportionate to the harm averted and is therefore impermissible. But Rodin mischaracterizes the situation faced by a Conditional Threat victim as analyzed by Locke. In this article, I aim to provide a more satisfactory reading of Locke on self-defense against Conditional Threats, particularly of the thesis that killing involves a proportionate response to the harm averted. In addition to (...) this, I also aim to further elaborate and defend Locke's view. First, I show that a Conditional Threat deprives his victim of her freedom to act as she thinks fit, without having to depend on the Conditional Threat's arbitrary will. Second, I argue that an interest in not being deprived of one's freedom to act as one thinks fit, without having to depend on another person's arbitrary will, by a conditional threat of deadly harm, is of sufficient value to make killing a proportionate act, especially if the person is highly morally culpable. If killing also meets the necessity condition of justified self-defense (admittedly, a big “if”), it follows that Locke, not Rodin, holds the correct view. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo sostengo que los argumentos específicos desarrollados por John Rawls para justificar la adopción de un estándar de bienes sociales primarios no logran su cometido. En primer lugar, presento y critico los argumentos rawlsianos relacionados con intuiciones antidiscriminatorias y con el hecho del pluralismo razonable. Asimismo, caracterizo y critico las ideas rawlsianas concernientes al alcance del concepto de equidad, así como el argumento de los gustos caros y de la responsabilidad por los fines. Estimo que ellos no (...) logran justificar el distribuendum recursivista de bienes sociales primarios. En cambio, entiendo que tales consideraciones brindan apoyo a un estándar bienestarista. Ello se debe a que un estándar welfarista enfrenta exitosamente las dificultades que Rawls menciona para favorecer el estándar recursivista de bienes sociales primarios. In the present paper I argue that the specific arguments developed by John Rawls to justify the standard of social primary goods do not succeed. In the first place I develop and criticize the Rawlsian arguments grounded in antidiscriminatory intuitions and the fact of reasonable pluralism. I also characterize and criticize Rawls's ideas concerning the scope of the concept of fairness as well as his argument concerning extensive tastes and responsibility for ends. I believe that they do not justify a resourcist distribuendum. On the contrary, I argue that such considerations support a welfarist standard. The reason is that a welfarist standard successfully deals with the difficulties Rawls mentions in favoring the resourcist standard of social primary goods. (shrink)

In this article I introduce the notion of crucial evidence and I use it to shed light on an ongoing scholarly controversy in Hobbes studies, namely whether Hobbes holds a prudential or a deontological theory of contractual obligation. Even though there is important evidence for both readings, I argue that there is crucial evidence for interpreting Hobbes’s account in a deontological fashion.

In this paper I outline three kinds of analysis of classical texts in the history of political philosophy, which I call “Reconstruction”, “Illustration” and “Use”. I briefly develop each of these methodologies, relying especially on my own work on John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. Finally, I put forward some thoughts about the value of the different kinds of approach.

Introduction -- Coercion, rational self-interest, and obligation -- The authority of law -- Political obligation -- Contractarianism -- The Hobbesian analysis of contracts under coercion : a critique -- Final remarks.

En este trabajo caracterizo y evalúo un argumento que David Miller formula contra la concepción cosmopolita de la justicia internacional. Miller afirma que la justicia cosmopolita es excesivamente demandante y consiguientemente sólo puede ser cumplida por «héroes» pero no por personas regulares. Sobre la base de estas consideraciones, Miller asegura que los principios de justicia distributiva sólo pueden tener un ámbito de aplicación nacional y que no pueden extenderse a uno global. Por mi parte, entiendo que las consideraciones psicológico-morales desarrolladas (...) por Miller son insuficientes para abandonar al cosmopolitismo y justificar la adopción de la posición nacionalista liberal. (shrink)

Massimo Renzo argues that, as long as it is acting in good faith, an authority can issue orders that require subjects to act in ways that are morally wrong and still be acting within the scope of its jurisdiction, so that the orders are binding. This, however, is incorrect. If the authority is permitted to issue an order, it is acting within the scope of its jurisdiction and so the order creates an obligation. But if the authority is not permitted (...) to issue the order, it is not acting within the scope of its jurisdiction and so the order does not create any obligation whatsoever. I develop my position and provide a model of mistaken authority through engagement with Renzo's view. (shrink)

Yitzhak Benbaji argues that those combatants who have agreed to blindly obey their superiors and who are ordered to fight in unjust wars are released from their duty to deliberate about the merits of the acts that they are ordered to perform. This is because their agreements result in the combatants’ permissible lack of a necessary capacity for moral responsibility. Thus, the combatants are not morally responsible for their wrongful acts—their moral responsibility is “transferred” to their superiors. We argue, first, (...) that Benbaji’s own reasoning suggests that the agreements entered into between the combatants and their superiors are not binding and, second, that even if such agreements are binding, those combatants who obey their orders to fight are nevertheless morally responsible for their wrongful acts. Thus, Benbaji has failed to show that the combatants are permitted to act as ordered. By critically examining Benbaji’s view, then, we defend the revisionist position that just and unjust combatants are morally unequal. (shrink)

En los últimos años, la relación entre la filosofía de la Ilustración y el cinismo ha logrado atraer la atención de los especialistas. En ese marco, los críticos suelen identificar las filosofías de Diógenes y Diderot. El objetivo del presente trabajo es revisar el vínculo que existe entre ambos con el fin de demostrar que el mismo es problemático y que, por esa razón, desborda las interpretaciones que se han presentado hasta el momento. Esto, por otra parte, arrojará luces sobre (...) la relación entre el materialismo de Diderot y su teoría ético-política. In recent years the relationship between the philosophy of the Enlightenment and cynicism has managed to attract the attention of scholars. In this framework, critics often identify Diogenes and Diderot's philosophy. The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between Diderot and Diogenes in order to demonstrate that it is a problematic relationship that goes beyond the interpretations that have been presented so far. This, on the other hand, will shed light on the relationship between Diderot's materialism and his ethical and political theory. (shrink)