In a reply to Howard Sankey I have maintained that the epistemic relativist cannot use the strategy of the sceptic since the relativist is at pains not to draw the sceptical solution. Sankey has objected to my argument by distinguishing between weak and strong justification: according to Sankey, the relativist using the sceptic’s strategy aims to provide an argument against the latter form of justification but still maintains that we can have the former.In this counter-response I argue that if this (...) is really the relativist’s strategy then she cannot provide any argument against the absolutist at all. The reason is that she simply fails to address the key question in the debate about relative/absolute justification: are there any absolutely correct epistemic standards? The epistemic relativist using the sceptic’s strategy is thus trapped between the Scylla of undermining her right to maintain that there is relative justification and the Charybdis of providing no argument against absolutism at all. (shrink)

This paper explores the view that, on Mumford’s account of the purist, to the degree that the purist adopts an aesthetic perspective, he or she doesn’t watch the sport in question, and to the degree that he or she does watch the sport, there is a loss of aesthetic appreciation. The idea that spectators oscillate between partisanship and purism means that the purist is unable to avoid either the Scylla of not actually watching the sport, or the Charybdis of (...) loss of aesthetic appreciation at any given point. Ultimately there seems to be both a sport-shaped hole and an aesthetic-shaped hole in Mumford’s account of the purist. It is argued that oscillation is incapable of dealing with the problem precisely because it is disjunctive in nature and entails the spectator either watching sport from an aesthetic perspective or from a partisan perspective at any given time. An alternative conception of the aesthetic is considered that offers one way of dissolving the purist’s dilemma. (shrink)

'de se' attitudes and pragmatic intrusion. A critique of Higginbotham (2003).

Reinhard Bendix made a major contribution to the early reception and interpretation of Max Weber's work. His classic study, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (1960), developed a remarkably consistent interpretation of Weber as a comparative historical sociologist. Bendix also emulated and subtly reinterpreted in his own work key aspects of Weber's comparative method and research strategies. By searching for a middle course between `Scylla and Charybdis', between the abstractions of theoretical concepts and the richness of empirical evidence, Bendix sought (...) to reinterpret and renew the vital centre of Weber's comparative enterprise as a study of western uniqueness. In so doing, he decisively challenged Talcott Parsons's alternative methodological reading of Weber's work. Yet, curiously Bendix's status as a Weber interpreter and comparative historian profoundly influenced by Weber's legacy has often been neglected or misinterpreted. This article re-examines Bendix's classic reading of Weber's corpus, and the way in which he sought to keep alive in his substantive work the promise and spirit of Weber's comparative historical sociology. (shrink)

In comparing it with the mechanistic and vitalistic views, the author seeks to make clear the nature of holistic causality, referring toDonnan's equations as an example.Holistic causality is essentially dimensional simplification. A complex system which forms a whole must be described in the first instance autonomo-phenomenologically, and if possible mathematically. Thereafter it is simplified into other wholes of less dimensionality, through progressive elimination of its higher dimensions, and so on until there remain over constituents no longer showing „wholeness”. These are (...) called „atoms” in the general sense. In holistic thought we do not begin with the atom; it is found at the end of the process of simplification.All unitary systems which lie between the atoms — the ultimate terms of holistic simplification, no longer showing wholeness — and the highest world-whole which we call the universe, are relative wholes. Each of these unitary systems is a complete whole only with respect to those systems of lower dimension into which it can itself be simplified. On the other hand it is itself a partial whole in relation to the wholes of higher dimension to which it is subordinated. Accordingly all these systems are at the same time complete wholes and partial wholes.It follows from this principle, as indeed theDonnan equations show, that theoretical biology can be simplified into the complementary domain of theoretical physics, but that it is quite impossible to „deduce„ the principles and theorems of theoretical biology from those of theoretical physics, as all mechanistic doctrines maintain.L'auteur, en discutant les points de vue mécanistes et vitalistes, cherche à définir la causalité holistique tout en se référant aux équations deDonnan, qu'il prend comme exemple.La causalité holistique est essentiellement une simplification dimensionnale. Un système complexe, constituant une totalité, doit être décrit avant tout de façon autonomo-phénoménologique et — si possible — de façon mathématique. Ensuite il est simplifié de manière à former d'autres totalités de dimensionalité inférieure par suite de l'élimination progressive de ses dimensions supérieures et ainsi de suite jusqu'à ce qu'il n'en reste plus que les parties ne formant plus totalité. Celles-ci s'appellent „atomes” dans le sens propre du mot. Dans le holisme on ne commence pas par l'atome, qu'on trouve au contraire à la fin de la simplification.Tous les systèmes constituant une totalité et se trouvant entre les atomes en tant que restes de la simplification holistique, qui ne possèdent plus un caractère de totalité, et d'autre part la totalité mondiale la plus élevée, appelée Univers, sont des totalités relatives. Tout système constituant de cette façon une totalité, ne forme une totalité complète que pour ceux-là des systèmes de dimensions inférieures dans lesquels il peut être simplifié lui-même; par contre il constitue lui-même un membre-totalité pour les totalités de dimensions supérieures auxquelles il est luimême subordonné. Ainsi tous ces systèmes sont en même temps membres-totalités et totalités complètes.Il s'ensuit de ce principe, que, comme le démontrent aussi les équations deDonnan, la biologie théorique peut bien être simplifiée dans les domaines qui lui sont complémentaires de la physique théorique, mais qu'il est complètement impossible de dériver les principes et les théorèmes de la biologie théorique de ceux de la physique théorique, comme le prétendent toutes les doctrines mécanistes. (shrink)

BackgroundThe widespread sharing of biological and biomedical data is recognised as a key element in facilitating translation of scientific discoveries into novel clinical applications and services. At the same time, twenty-first century states are increasingly concerned that this data could also be used for purposes of bioterrorism. There is thus a tension between the desire to promote the sharing of data, as encapsulated by the Open Data movement, and the desire to prevent this data from ‘falling into the wrong hands’ (...) as represented by ‘dual use’ policies. Both frameworks posit a moral duty for life sciences researchers with respect to how they should make their data available. However, Open data and dual use concerns are rarely discussed in concert and their implementation can present scientists with potentially conflicting ethical requirements.DiscussionBoth dual use and Open data policies frame scientific data and data dissemination in particular, though different, ways. As such they contain implicit models for how data is translated. Both approaches are limited by a focus on abstract conceptions of data and data sharing. This works to impede consensus-building between the two ethical frameworks. As an alternative, this paper proposes that an ethics of responsible management of scientific data should be based on a more nuanced understanding of the everyday data practices of life scientists. Responsibility for these ‘micromovements’ of data must consider the needs and duties of scientists as individuals and as collectively-organised groups.SummaryResearchers in the life sciences are faced with conflicting ethical responsibilities to share data as widely as possible, but prevent it being used for bioterrorist purposes. In order to reconcile the responsibilities posed by the Open Data and dual use frameworks, approaches should focus more on the everyday practices of laboratory scientists and less on abstract conceptions of data. (shrink)

The present article discusses the “peace versus justice” dilemma in international criminal justice through the lenses of the respective legal theories of Judith Shklar and Hannah Arendt—two thinkers who have recently been described as theorists of international criminal law. The article claims that in interventions carried out by the International Criminal Court, there is an ever-present potentiality for the “peace versus justice” dilemma to occur. Unfortunately, there is no abstract solution to this problem, insofar as ICC interventions will in some (...) cases be conducive while in others, they will be deleterious to peace. If a tension between peace and justice arises in a particular case, the article asserts, the former must be prioritised over the latter. Such a prioritisation, however, requires a vision of the ICC as a flexible actor of world politics which is situated at the intersection of law, ethics and politics, rather than a strictly legalistic view of the court. Ultimately, then, the present article seeks to probe whether the legal and political theories of Shklar and Arendt—in isolation, but ultimately also in combination—support such a flexible vision of the ICC. (shrink)

Seemingly, metaphysics is trapped between the Scylla of being superfluous, on the one hand, and the Charybdis of being esoteric, on the other. Is there a wayout? In discussing two large-scale metaphysical projects that are very different in character, the article analyses one of the roots of this impasse – the ontological paradigm. The author tries, further, to argue for another stance towards the theoretical task metaphysics has to submit itself to: the paradigm of transcendentals. The structural-systematic philosophy will (...) be a point in case. (shrink)

The moral dilemma at the heart of the theory of just war stems from the contradiction between two opposing duties: on the one hand, the duty to provide aid, as far as possible, to those whose lives are endangered; and, on the other hand, the duty not to endanger the lives of the innocent. The theory of just war resolves this dilemma, firstly by privileging one of these two duties over the other; and secondly, by imposing conditions on justification concerning (...) the principle of discrimination against civilian populations and the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality thus acts as a moral constraint on justification. Nevertheless, the notion of proportion still remains vague. The present paper examines the sense and function of this notion, and analyses the underpinnings of its ethical foundation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTRespect in morally and culturally critical situations during military missions is complex and loaded with ambiguity. Respect seems a desirable and positive cross-cultural competence. It is assumed and expected that respectful action serves the objectives of the mission and contributes to the perceived legitimacy of the military. However, by respecting ‘the others’ culture’ too much, one can neglect one's own values and sideline one's own ethical point of view. We conducted a qualitative study in which we extracted 121 morally and (...) culturally critical situations from 29 in-depth interviews with Dutch soldiers who have been deployed to, for them, unfamiliar cultural settings. The findings of this study reveal, firstly, that soldiers who refer to ‘culture’ as a reason for their own behaviour in morally and culturally critical situations encountered during deployments are less likely to intervene even though these situations conflict with their own values. This could be considered to be a sort of ethic.. (shrink)

In his opening address at a discussion of the book: V. V. Bychkov, N. B. Mankovskaya, and V. V. Ivanov, Trialogue: Living Aesthetics and the Contemporary Philosophy of Art , held on 27 February 2012 at the S. Gerasimov All-Russia State University of Cinematography , the author shows that Trialogue came into existence as a result of interpretation, polemical debate, and further development of ideas formulated in his early fundamental work. The Artistic Apocalypse of Culture . The key idea of (...) both books is V. Bychkov's hypothesis of Culture -post- culture drawn from radical processes that take place in art, aesthetics, and the culture of the last century. (shrink)

The target article shows that the application of the evolutionary theory to psychopathology should not necessarily consist in finding hidden adaptive benefits for each psychiatric syndrome. However, in rejecting lax adaptationism, Darwinian psychiatrists should not forget that the search for adaptive behavioral polymorphisms can be a powerful antidote against the normative attitude of mainstream psychiatry and its growing tendency to medicalize human diversity. (Published Online November 9 2006).

Organizational life and social culture compel individuals toward more radical manifestations of individualism as bureaucracy and society increasingly define personal relationships by rules, regulations and rights. Otherwise incompatible with individualism, this actually contributes to individual and group differentiation when individuals function simply as technicians without the opportunity to gain fulfillment, and they experience existential isolation, becoming detached from their moral and spiritual side. For identity in and control over their own lives, people engage in even more individualistic behavior; working, planning, (...) attaining, or rebelling. The true meaning of freedom and individual rights are perverted and trivialized by this radical individualism as a way of fighting back, but it too has corrosive effects that diminish individual autonomy. ;Through a history of individualism culled from U.S. history and the history of Western philosophy, this paper describes what role the individual played in philosophical and political thought from the early Greek and Western religious influences up to and including modern times. The purpose of this research is to develop a theoretical, normative model of authentic individualism--a journeyman philosophy--that can be adopted by the individual citizen and public administrator as a basis for action, and consider the ramifications of that model for organizational theory, leadership theory, and ethics in government. ;The resulting model of authentic individualism focuses on self only in the context of social responsibility and larger considerations of the whole. An other-regarding world view emerges from this model whose essence is in human dignity and commonalty and which: judges every decision by whether it protects or undermines the dignity of the human person; teaches government and organizational leaders to view people as morally developmental individuals driven by values, principles and the desire to do good rather than acquisitive wants, needs, and desires for goods; forces organizations to take a greater societal role with the same responsibility toward others as is expected of individuals; helps managers define their organizations to facilitate total personhood, rather than to demean the individual by treating humans as property; and defines management as a sacred trust for the well-being of others placed in one's care. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to look at Cassirer's relation to critical philosophy from a new perspective. Most discussions concerning Cassirer's Kantianism have so far centered on his relation to neo-Kantianism and the Marburg school. My focus will not be on neo-Kantianism but on Cassirer's notion of a "critique of culture." In an often cited paragraph from the introduction to The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer says that his aim is to broaden Kant's critical approach to all various forms (...) of culture, to language as well as myth and art, and thus to transform the "critique of reason" into the "critique of culture." I will explore Cassirer's concept of the "critique of culture" and suggest that it can best be understood by placing it in the context of early twentieth century German philosophy. More precisely, I will aim to show that Cassirer's critique can be seen as an effort to find a middle path between Lebensphilosophie and the positivism of the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

Far from being straightforward, as Jewish and Christian tradition might suggest, Abram’s call raises questions about the exact time it took place and was followed up. After surveying the solutions suggested so far, the current article looks into various evidence offered in the text to deliberate on this matter: Abram’s birth in relation to Terah’s genealogy, Abram’s family in relation to Terah’s death, the form of the ‘calling’ verb, the country Abram departed from, and the narrative art of the literary (...) piece. We reached the conclusion that God called Abram to leave Ur in order to travel to Canaan, and he did that before Terah’s death, although he stopped on the way in Haran for a while. Abram’s example provides a model to obey God’s highest call over any other human duty and responsibility. (shrink)

Must the interpreter of the Platonic dialogues choose between the so-called "unwritten teachings" reported by Aristotle in Metaphysics A6 and the dialogues? I argue, on the contrary, that a reading of the dialogues that is sensitive to their pedagogical irony will find the "unwritten teachings" exhibited in them. I identify the key teachings in Metaphysics A6, show how the Parmenides and the Philebus point to them, and explicate a full exhibition of them in the Statesman.

In this article the author, in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of H. L. A. Hart’s The Concept of Law, reconsiders the moderate indeterminacy of law thesis, which derives from the open texture of language. For that purpose, he intends: first, to analyze Hart’s moderate indeterminacy thesis, i.e. determinacy in “easy cases” and indeterminacy in “hard cases”, which resembles Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean”; second, to criticize his moderate indeterminacy thesis as failing to embody the virtues of a center (...) in between the vices of the extremes, by insisting that the exercise of discretion required constitutes an “interstitial” legislation; and, third, to reorganize an argument for a truly “mean” position, which requires a form of weak interpretative discretion, instead of a strong legislative discretion.Resumen:En este artículo el autor, en el contexto del cincuenta aniversario de El concepto del derecho de H. L. A. Hart, reconsidera la tesis de la indeterminación moderada del derecho, la cual deriva de la textura abierta del lenguaje. Para tal propósito, pretende: primero, analizar la tesis de la indeterminación moderada del derecho, i.e. determinación en los “casos fá- ciles” e indeterminación en los “casos difíciles”, la cual recuerda la “doctrina del término medio” de Aristóteles; segundo, criticar la tesis de la indeterminación moderada del derecho por fracasar en dar lugar al término medio virtuoso entre extremos viciosos, al insistir que el ejercicio de la discreción requerida constituye una legislación “intersticial”; y, tercero, reorganizar un argumento para una verdadera posición intermedia, la cual requiere de una forma de discreción interpretativa débil, en lugar de una forma de discreción legislativa fuerte. (shrink)

This article examines the dog-like aspects and associations of two marine monsters of Graeco-Roman antiquity: Scylla and the κῆτος. Both harbour recognizably canine features in their depictions in ancient art, as well as being referenced as dogs or possessing dog-like attributes in ancient texts. The article argues that such distinctly canine elements are related to, and probably an extension of, the conceptualization of certain marine animals, most prominently sharks, as ‘sea dogs’. Accordingly, we should understand these two sea monsters (...) and the sea dogs as being interrelated in the ancient imagination. Such a canine resonance to certain sea creatures offers a valuable insight into the Graeco-Roman imagination of the marine element as being the abode of creatures reminiscent of terrestrial dogs. (shrink)

The Scylla and Charybdis of institutions of cooperative enterprises are the potential for free riders, on the one hand, and the fact that some people may not value certain public goods. If we go to the one side, we encourage people who do value the public goods but whom cannot be excluded from enjoying them, to refuse to pay their share of the costs of providing them; if we go to the other side and force everyone to pay for (...) them, we make people who do not value the public goods subsidize those who do and who perhaps have gained special control over the agenda of selecting which public goods are to be required. (shrink)