Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another (...) way forward, an intermediate position that appeals both to skeptical and anti-skeptical intuitions concerning the possibility and scope of philosophical knowledge. The main advantage of our account is that it’s able to recover some philosophical knowledge while also being compatible with philosophical skepticism. (shrink)

Maria Bussmann is a visual artist with a unique artistic project: creating drawings that present the ideas of great philosophers in visual form. In 1996, Bussma.

In the Ethics, Spinoza is not expressly concerned with skepticism and the possibility envisaged by Descartes that clear and distinct ideas or conceptions may not be true. There is reason for this, as he was of the opinion that, if as in the Ethics we proceed in our thinking in the right order, doubt will not arise. In his earlier works, however, he is concerned with skepticism and, in particular, with the questioning of clear and distinct ideas. In (...) the Prolegomenon in Part One of Descartes’ Principles, he sets forth what he takes to be Descartes’ attempt to allay doubts about clear and distinct perceptions. He finds there that Descartes does not succeed in answering an objection to his procedure, and he proposes an alternative way of escape from doubt. This alternative is also stated in the Improvement of the Understanding in the section on doubt or idea dubia ; and considerable light is cast upon it by his discussion in this section of the nature of doubt. Distinguishing genuine doubt and merely verbal doubt, i.e. professions of doubt when “the soul does not doubt,” he explains what leads to genuine doubt and how such doubt is to be removed. In my paper, I shall explicate the view stated in these passages and raise questions about the relations of this view to other views of Spinoza’s. I shall also be concerned with a short and cryptic passage earlier in the Improvement of the Understanding in which he deals with professions of doubt that, farther on, he deems merely verbal. In a final section, I shall assemble the views about skeptical doubt stated in the various places and give a summary statement of Spinoza’s attitude toward philosophical skepticism. (shrink)

Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context (...) constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned social and epistemic power and that it should be resisted on epistemic and pragmatic grounds. I conclude that skepticism is a problem that feminists can and should take up as they address the social aspects of traditional epistemological problems. (shrink)

Intractable disagreement among philosophers is ubiquitous. An implication of such disagreement is that many philosophers hold false philosophical beliefs (i.e. at most only one party to a dispute can be right). Suppose that we distribute philosophers along a spectrum arranged from philosophers with mostly true philosophical beliefs on one end (high‐reliability), to those with mostly false philosophical beliefs on the other (low‐reliability), and everyone else somewhere in‐between (call this is the reliability spectrum). It is hard to see (...) how philosophers could accurately locate themselves on the reliability spectrum; they are prima facie as well positioned as their peers with respect to philosophical matters (call this the placement problem). In this paper, I argue that the reliability spectrum and placement problem lend support to modest meta‐philosophical skepticism: we have a pro tanto (but not an all‐things‐considered) reason to withhold ascent to philosophical claims. (shrink)

Knowledge may be defined in terms of four necessary conditions: belief, justification, truth and gettier. I argue that a form of philosophical skepticism may be raised with respect to each.

The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism leads to a previously unrecognized self-undermining dilemma: it either leads (...) to a reductio ad absurdum, or to avoid this reductio the skeptic must accept that this argument is epistemically idle—it does not provide any support for external world skepticism. Either way, this Cartesian argument cannot legitimately threaten or even call into question our beliefs about the external world. And thus, either way, this Cartesian argument for external world skepticism is not epistemically significant—it is not a genuine paradox and adequately responding to it need not reveal anything epistemically important. (shrink)

Vander Veer's aim is to show that ordinary-language analysis is a failure. To show that something is a failure of course requires a discussion of what counts as success. Here the yardstick is the defeat of skepticism; and the book is a long argument that ordinary-language methods do not send the skeptic packing. Two questions naturally arise concerning this enterprise: First, is there really some common set of doctrines, procedures, problems, attitudes, or styles of argument which can be taken (...) as characterizing ordinary-language philosophy? Second, is defeat of skepticism a clearly defined goal and is it a fair test of ordinary-language philosophy? (shrink)

This paper aims to show that Sosa’s theory of knowledge based on safety condition can provide a convincing response to the problem of philosophical skepticism. With regard to that, it is divided in three sections. The first section is dedicated to presenting the form of skeptical argument and few options we encounter when skeptic rises the challenge in the form of the so-called radical alternatives. The second section consists of the presentation of Sosa’s theory and safety condition, as (...) well as its differences and similarities with Nozick’s sensitivity condition and Dretske’s condition of conclusive reason. Finally, the third section evaluates Sosa’s theory in the light of Comesana’s counterexample. After the careful analysis of the hypothetical situation, it is shown that Comesana overlooks one important moment when he fixes the initial set of circumstances, which allows a successful defense of Sosa’s analysis of knowledge and safety condition. (shrink)

How should we react to philosophical skepticism? Whitman answers this question by examining analytic and post-analytic responses to the problem. He tests analytic theories of knowledge and the post-analytic responses of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty against skeptical arguments. Whitman concludes that embracing a theoretical version of philosophical skepticism has advantages over post-analytic responses—both in the realm of philosophical inquiry and in everyday life.

This chapter serves as an opinionated introduction to the problem of convergence (that there is no clear convergence to the truth in philosophy) and the problem of peer disagreement (that disagreement with a peer rationally demands suspending one’s beliefs), and some of the issues they give rise to, namely, philosophical skepticism and progress in philosophy. After introducing both topics and surveying the various positions in the literature we explore the prospects of an alternative, hinge-theoretic account.

This study examines Itō Jinsai’s 伊藤仁斎 (1627–1705) criticisms of the Great Learning (C: Daxue 大學 J: Daigaku). Three primary sources are considered: Jinsai’s Shigi sakumon 私擬策問 (Personal Essays, 1668); the Daigaku teihon 大學定本 (The Definitive Text of the Great Learning, manuscript 1685); and his essay, “Daigaku wa Kōshi no isho ni arazaru no ben” 大學非孔氏之遺書辨 (The Great Learning is not a Writing Confucius Transmitted, 1705), appended to his Gomō jigi 語孟字義. The study suggests that Jinsai’s critical inclinations grew from his (...) acceptance of Zhu Xi’s views about the value of doubt for progress in learning. The study also suggests that Jinsai’s thinking on the Great Learning had political implications derived in many respects from Jinsai’s overall approach to philosophizing via analysis of words and their meanings. (shrink)

It may be possible to scientifically test philosophical skepticism; at least this is what I shall maintain. The argument develops the naturalistic insight that there may be no particular reason to suppose that nature has selected Homo sapiens’ epistemic capacities such that we are ideally suited to forming a true theory of everything, or indeed, a true theory of much of anything. Just as chimpanzees are cognitively limited - there are many concepts, ideas, and theories beyond their grasp (...) - so too might our conception of the universe seem limited from the point of view of some creature more “evolved” than humans. On the other hand, some physicists (et al.) have argued that humans are on the verge of discovering a “final theory of everything”. Such epistemic “optimism” seems to directly contradict the idea that we might be cognitively limited. To adjudicate between these views I shall suggest the outlines of several “crucial tests” that involve attempting to create creatures who stand to us, with respect to intelligence and wisdom, as we do to apes. A positive result from any of these experiments will indicate that the skeptical view is correct, while failure to create “higher” intelligences lends support to the epistemic optimists’ position. 2. (shrink)

One of the most basic methods of philosophy is, and has always been, the consideration of counterfactual cases and imaginary scenarios. One purpose of doing so obviously is to test our theories against such counterfactual cases. Although this method is widespread, it is far from being commonly accepted. Especially during the last two decades it has been confronted with criticism ranging from complete dismissal to denying only its critical powers to a cautious defense of the use of thought experiments as (...) counterexamples. One of the strongest criticisms of the method of thought experimentation is "modal skepticism" as explicated and defended by Peter van Inwagen. Van Inwagen argues that the philosopher's notion of logical possibility is confused and that its epistemology is dubious. I argue that van Inwagen's skepticism is unwarranted. There is a sufficiently clear notion of logical possibility and a sufficiently straightforward way of getting to know what is logically possible. In the remainder of the paper I show how that connects with the methodology of thought experimentation in philosophy. (shrink)

Starting with its tenth volume, Philosophical Issues will be a yearly one-volume supplement to Nous. Each year it will be devoted to invited papers and book symposia in a specific area of philosophy. The yearly has attained distinction through the uniformly high quality of its previous nine volumes and the fact that its authors include many of the most distinguished philosophers active today. The topic of Volume 10 is controversies at the interface of epistemology with philosophy of language and (...) philosophy of mind, including discussion of the sorites paradox and linguistic contextualism on attributions of knowledge. (shrink)

The scientific community, we hold, often provides society with knowledge—that the HIV virus causes AIDS, that anthropogenic climate change is underway, that the MMR vaccine is safe. Some deny that we have this knowledge, however, and work to undermine it in others. It has been common to refer to such agents as “denialists”. At first glance, then, denialism appears to be a form of skepticism. But while we know that various denialist strategies for suppressing belief are generally effective, little (...) is known about which strategies are most effective. We see this as an important first step toward their remediation. This paper leverages the approximate comparison to various forms of philosophical skepticism to design an experimental test of the efficacy of four broad strategies of denial at suppressing belief in specific scientific claims. Our results suggest that assertive strategies are more effective at suppressing belief than questioning strategies. (shrink)

Some societies used to impose liability on inanimate objects, a practice we’d now regard as silly and confused. When we punish corporations today, are we making similar mistakes? Here I consider some important sources of philosophical skepticism about imposing criminal liability on corporations, and I argue that they admit of answers, which places punishing corporations on stronger footing than punishing inanimate objects. First, I consider the eligibility challenge, which asserts that corporations are not the right kind of thing (...) to be punished. Second, the reductionist challenge insists that corporate culpability always reduces to individual culpability. I suggest that progress can be made in addressing these challenges by asking the right law-focused questions and attending to recent developments in criminal law theory and moral philosophy. (shrink)

Though most of analytic philosophy is based upon intuitions, some philosophers are beginning to question whether intuitions are an appropriate basis for philosophical theory. This paper responds to the arguments of some contemporary philosophers who hold that intuitions should not be treated as evidence for anything other than our contingent psychological constitution. It begins with a demonstration that skeptical arguments by Gilbert Harman and Alvin Goldman are variations on an argument with the potential to undermine the use of intuitions (...) in much philosophical inquiry. After a demonstration that Nicholas Sturgeon’s response to Harman’s argument is inadequate, it argues that all of the instances of the skeptical argument are unsuccessful because they are epistemically self-defeating. (shrink)

What Do Philosophers Do? takes up the leading arguments for radical skepticism from an everyday point of view. A range of philosophical methods are examined and employed, for a revealing portrait of what philosophers do, and perhaps a quiet suggestion for what they should do, for what they do best.

그리스 철학사에서 피론은 그리스 최초의 회의주의자임과 동시에, 아이네시데모스가 창설한 피론학파의 시조였다. 그는 삶의 문제에 있어서 ‘초연함(adiaphoria)’과 ‘태연함(apatheia)’ 그리고 ‘마음의 평정(ataraxia)’을 강조하였으며, 외부 대상에 대한 ‘이해불가능성(acatalepsia)’과 ‘판단유보(epoche)’의 원리를 정립하였다.BR 서구철학사에 나타나는 피론의 모습은 다양하고, 기이하며, 이중적이고, 모순적이기까지 하다. 필자는 디오게네스 라에르티오스의 『유명한 철학자들의 생애와 사상』, 아리스토클레스의 『철학에 대하여』그리고 에우세비오스의 『복음의 준비』등에 대한 연구를 통해, 일차적으로는 그의 회의주의가 피론주의가 아니라는 테오도시오스의 시각을 불식시킴과 아울러, 궁극적으로는 그의 회의주의가 후대의 피론주의와 연속하는 철학임을 밝혔다.BR 에우세비오스의 『복음의 준비』에 나타난 아리스토클레스의 토막글들은, 피론 철학에 대한 다양한 모습과 (...) 복잡한 해석가능성들을 잘 보여준다. 특히, 아리스토클레스의 단편 C는 복잡한 논쟁을 불러일으키는 문제적 토막글이다. 이것에 대한 해석에는 주관적(인식론적) 해석과 객관적(형이상학적) 해석이 존재하는데, 전자의 입장을 대표하는 연구자로는 E. 젤러가 있고, 후자의 입장을 대표하는 학자로는 연구자로는 S. H. 스바르브손과 R. 베트 등이 있다. 그런데, 주관적 해석을 강조하게 되면 피론의 회의주의와 피론주의와의 연속성을 확보할 수 있는 장점이 있으나, 텍스트를 일부 수정해야 한다는 단점이 있다. 객관적 해석을 강조하게 되면, 텍스트를 해석하는데 있어서는 논리성을 확보할 수 있으나, 피론의 회의주의와 피론주의와의 연속성을 확보할 수 없다는 문제점이 노출된다. 이에, 필자는 객관적 해석 또는 형이상학적 해석과 일정한 거리를 두면서, 피론을 회의주의자로, 그리고 피론의 회의주의를 피론주의와 연속하는 철학임을 밝혔다. (shrink)

Skepticism has been (and remains) a central concern of the theory of knowledge. Indeed, some philosophers think that, without the problem of skepticism, we would not know what to make of the idea of distinctively philosophical theories of knowledge. However, a philosopher who thinks along these lines is likely to have in mind a rather special form of skepticism. Let us call it philosophical skepticism. Philosophical skepticism has a long history. Indeed, it (...) is almost coeval with systematic philosophy itself. (shrink)

External World Skepticism: The Deception of the Senses.

Abstract Timothy Williamson has recently proposed to undermine modal skepticism by appealing to the reducibility of modal to counterfactual logic ( Reducibility ). Central to Williamson’s strategy is the claim that use of the same non-deductive mode of inference ( counterfactual development , or CD ) whereby we typically arrive at knowledge of counterfactuals suffices for arriving at knowledge of metaphysical necessity via Reducibility. Granting Reducibility, I ask whether the use of CD plays any essential role in a Reducibility-based (...) reply to two kinds of modal skepticism. I argue that its use is entirely dispensable, and that Reducibility makes available replies to modal skeptics which show certain propositions to be metaphysically necessary by deductive arguments from premises the modal skeptic accepts can be known. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-19 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9784-4 Authors Juhani Yli-Vakkuri, Wolfson College, Oxford University, Oxford, OX2 6UD UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)

What do Philosophers do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy. By Maddy Penelope.

Nozick analyzes fundamental issues, such as the identity of the self, knowledge and skepticism, free will, the foundations of ethics, and the meaning of life.