What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on

Synthese 200 (3):1-14 (2022)
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Abstract

Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another way forward, an intermediate position that appeals both to skeptical and anti-skeptical intuitions concerning the possibility and scope of philosophical knowledge. The main advantage of our account is that it’s able to recover some philosophical knowledge while also being compatible with philosophical skepticism.

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Author Profiles

Louis Doulas
McGill University
Annalisa Coliva
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - 2024 - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge.
Kant als metaphilosophischer Skeptizist?Daniel Minkin - 2023 - Kantian Journal 42 (3):97-129.

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Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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