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Philosophical skepticism not relativism is the problem with the Strong Programme in Science Studies and with Educational Constructivism
Science & Education 17 (6):573-611 (2008)
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Citations of this work
International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching.Michael R. Matthews (ed.) - 2014 - Springer.
Reflections on 25 Years of Journal Editorship.Michael R. Matthews - 2015 - Science & Education 24 (5-6):749-805.
Research on Student Learning in Science: A Wittgensteinian Perspective.Wendy Sherman Heckler - 2014 - In Michael R. Matthews (ed.), International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching. Springer. pp. 1381-1410.
Survey Exploring Views of Scientists on Current Trends in Chemistry Education.Xenofon Vamvakeros, Evangelia A. Pavlatou & Nicolas Spyrellis - 2010 - Science & Education 19 (2):119-145.
References found in this work
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.Wesley C. Salmon - 1984 - Princeton University Press.
The advancement of science: science without legend, objectivity without illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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