Path dependency is a most valuable tool for understanding Russian history since 1480, which coincides with the ending of the “Mongol yoke,” Moscow’s annexation of northwest Russia, formerly controlled by Novgorod, and the introduction of a new method for financing the cavalry—the core of a new service class. The cavalry had to hold off formidable adversaries for Muscovy to retain its independence. Russia in 1480 was a poor country lacking subsurface mineral resources and with a very poor climate and (...) soil for the support of agriculture. These basic problems inspired autocratic power and by 1515 an ideology was in place justifying it. Religion, literature, and law were employed to support the autocracy. A variant of a caste society was created to support the army. This made up the substance of the first service-class revolution in which all resources were mobilized to support a garrison state. After 1667 the external threats to Muscovy diminished, but the service class kept its privileges, especially the land fund and the peasant-serfs. Russia faced major foreign threats again in 1700 and in the 1920s and 1930s. Those threats precipitated the second and third service-class revolutions. The second and third service-class revolutions broadly paralleled the first. Reinvigorated service classes were created with state institutions to support them. As society became more complex, so did the service classes and their privileges. Ideologies were converted into devices to support the infallible autocratic ruler and his elites. Almost the entire population was bound to state service, either directly, working to support the service state, or paying taxes. The church and clergy were harnessed first by Peter’s Holy Synod and then Stalin’s Department 5 of the Secret Police after he revived the church during World War II. Writers and artists were also put into uniform, until they finally rebelled—but the arts retained their civic functions, first supporting the regime, and then criticizing it. Finally, law retained its traditional programmatic functions in regimes themselves beholden to no law. As the foreign threats diminished, the service classes lost their function, but the elite servicemen kept their privileges as the service states disintegrated and the service classes lost their collective élan. Both the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Empire collapsed almost without a whimper. (shrink)

To some extent, the current Russian-Ukrainian may be described as a conflict between two visions of nation, respectively, ethnic and civic models. Putin believes that a language defines a nation. In his understanding, since many Ukrainians are Russian speakers, they are Russians. His perception of Ukraine is anachronistic. He has failed to notice Ukraine's radical transformation since it gained independence. The current Ukrainian identity has a strong civic component. Its core is represented by a new urban middle class (...) with a new set of values. Sustainability of this identity largely depends on longevity and results of the war. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.2 (2001) 335-358 [Access article in PDF] Between East and West: Hegel and the Origins of the Russian Dilemma Ana Siljak Nikolai Berdiaev, the eminent twentieth-century Russian philosopher, wrote that the "problem of East and West" was an "eternal" one for Russia. 1 Attempting to make sense of the violent upheavals that shook Russia in 1917, Berdiaev believed that the source (...) of Russian troubles lay in the "inconsistency of the Russian spirit" due to the "conflict of the Eastern and Western elements in her." 2 Russia, he argued, always contained within its wide territory an invisible and shifting border between two continents, and thus Russian society was forever torn between two cultures. Berdiaev insisted that Russia could not discover its true calling or its place in the world until it resolved its internal conflict between East and West. 3Berdiaev was contemplating the course of the nineteenth century, when Russia's geographical destiny had deeply troubled Russian intellectuals. In the late 1830s Russian thinkers began their minute analyses of cultural and historical sources, hoping to determine the essential character of their nation and believing that their research would enable them to predict Russia's future. Often, diverse questions of progress and stagnation, tradition and innovation, and the individual and society were all framed within this overarching problem of East versus West.It is tempting to see this Russian dilemma as longstanding and natural, given Russia's position between two continents. Indeed, many recent scholars have argued that Russian encounters with Asia, taking place within the framework of Russia's territorial expansion eastward, forced Russians to examine their relationships [End Page 335] with the Eastern, Asian world. 4 It is true that European geographers and historians have debated the location of the border between Asia and Europe since the Middle Ages. But before the nineteenth century this ambiguity hardly troubled Russian minds. The Muscovite state of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for example, was well acquainted with cultures and lands to its East, engaging in trade and diplomatic relations with Muslim Tatars and others. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that Muscovy was concerned about its position between Eastern and Western countries. 5 Even Peter the Great, whom historians have credited for bringing European customs into Russia, was little concerned with the European/Asian divide in Russian culture. For him the most important geographical question was Russia's place among the northern states, and he was particularly obsessed with Sweden as Russia's primary military rival. 6After Peter's reign, educated Russians, as they became increasingly acquainted with Western European culture, experienced their first pangs of envy and self-doubt in the face of perceived European superiority. Nonetheless, throughout the eighteenth century few cultured Russians had trouble embracing a diverse historical legacy and national character--German, Slavic, Asian. After all, Europeans themselves were proud of their barbarian past. Peter the Great's chief historian, V. N. Tatishchev, wrote with full confidence and little concern that the Russian empire was located "in both Europe and Asia," noting that though more Russian people lived in Europe, Russia had more territory in Asia. In passing he mentioned that "where the border between these two large and most important cultures is located, no one has as yet determined for certain." 7 According to him, the Slavic people as a whole could be divided into Asian and European branches, thus both cultures were of importance in Russian history. 8The first of the great nineteenth-century Russian historians, Nikolai Karamzin, was proud of Russia's diverse heritage. Russia, he wrote, [End Page 336] raising its head between the Asiatic and European kingdoms, represented within its civic life the characteristics of these two parts of the world: a mixture of old Eastern customs, brought by the Slavs into Europe and renewed, so to speak, by our long connection with the Mongols; Byzantine customs borrowed by the Russians along with the Christian religion, and some German customs imparted by the Varangians.... 9This cultural "mixture... (shrink)

This article deals with civil society organizations active in the field of family policy and demographic issues in contemporary Russia. This article uses Michel Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and governmentality and later developments discussing technologies of citizenship. More specifically, using interviews, documents, and participant observations, so-called “daddy-schools” that have emerged in and around Saint Petersburg since 2008, are studied as a mode of governmentality. The analysis shows how the civic initiative studied attempted to empower fathers and how it has altered (...) demographic discourses while approaching similar societal goals as the state does in its biopolitical strategies. Thus, the daddy-schools provide a complementary discourse concerning fatherhood while approaching the same perceived demographic crisis that the Russian state is challenged by. (shrink)

The history of Russian esthetic thought is one of the most important components of our culture. The philosophical and theoretical significance, the civic spirit, the many-sidedness, diversity, and depth of esthetic ideas make the Russian esthetic heritage a vital and permanent value in the life of the spirit of developed socialism.

The Russian philosopher and cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin has traditionally been seen as the leading figure in the group of intellectuals known as the Bakhtin Circle. The writings of other members of the Circle are considered much less important than his work, while Bakhtin's achievement has been exaggerated in proportion to the downgrading of the thinkers with whom he associated in the 1920s. This volume, which includes new translations and studies of the work of the most important members of (...) the Circle, sets out to correct the distortions in the established representations of its activity. The original contributions to literary and linguistic theory made by Valentin Voloshinov and Pavel Medvedev (but frequently credited to Bakhtin) are assessed, and the distinctiveness of their approaches is highlighted. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to understand the nature of political religion using Russian Orthodoxy as an example. Political religion is different from the use of religion for political purposes: from "public religions" seeking to be a part of a pluralistic society; from "civic religion" (sacralization of political processes and institutions) and from fundamentalism. Contrary to fundamentalism, political religions aim not at revitalizing the past, but at addressing the most vital issues of modernity. Politicization of Orthodoxy in Russia may (...) seem unlikely due to obvious political passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church and to the fact that people in Russia are rather religiously indifferent and theologically ignorant. But the paper demonstrates that political activity is typical not for the leaders of an institutionalized religion but for a religiously minded intelligentsia. Global experience also shows that politicization is most likely to occur in an area where people have just returned to their semi-forgotten religious beliefs and where the majority of population does not observe the rituals and does not know the fundamentals of religion. Growing number of people who identify themselves as Russian Orthodox, having, at the same time, no sufficient knowledge of this religion provokes the emergence of mediatory ideologies, which are Pan-Slavism (the idea of a union of all Orthodox Slavic nations) and Eurasianism (the idea of a union between the Orthodox and the Islamic world). From the fundamentalist viewpoint both ideologies should be defined as heretic. Pan- Slavism is heretic because it views Orthodoxy as a kind of Slavic tribal religion and strips Orthodoxy from its universalism. Eurasianist vision of Orthodoxy is so broad that any difference between "Orthodoxy" and "non-Orthodoxy" disappears. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to understand the nature of political religion using Russian Orthodoxy as an example. Political religion is different from the use of religion for political purposes: from "public religions" seeking to be a part of a pluralistic society; from "civic religion" (sacralization of political processes and institutions) and from fundamentalism. Contrary to fundamentalism, political religions aim not at revitalizing the past, but at addressing the most vital issues of modernity. Politicization of Orthodoxy in Russia may (...) seem unlikely due to obvious political passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church and to the fact that people in Russia are rather religiously indifferent and theologically ignorant. But the paper demonstrates that political activity is typical not for the leaders of an institutionalized religion but for a religiously minded intelligentsia. Global experience also shows that politicization is most likely to occur in an area where people have just returned to their semi-forgotten religious beliefs and where the majority of population does not observe the rituals and does not know the fundamentals of religion. Growing number of people who identify themselves as Russian Orthodox, having, at the same time, no sufficient knowledge of this religion provokes the emergence of mediatory ideologies, which are Pan-Slavism (the idea of a union of all Orthodox Slavic nations) and Eurasianism (the idea of a union between the Orthodox and the Islamic world). From the fundamentalist viewpoint both ideologies should be defined as heretic. Pan- Slavism is heretic because it views Orthodoxy as a kind of Slavic tribal religion and strips Orthodoxy from its universalism. Eurasianist vision of Orthodoxy is so broad that any difference between "Orthodoxy" and "non-Orthodoxy" disappears. (shrink)

Language has traditionally been an important marker of Ukrainian identity which, due to a lack of independent statehood, has been ethnic rather than civic. The contradictory policies of the Soviet regime produced a large discrepancy between ethnocultural identity and language use. In independent Ukraine this discrepancy persisted, as increased identification with the Ukrainian nation was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in the use of the Ukrainian language, even though the latter was predominantly valued as a symbol of nationhood. The (...) Euromaidan and the subsequent Russian aggression further detached language use from national identity, as many Russian speakers came to identify strongly with the inclusive Ukrainian nation without abandoning their accustomed language or even adding Ukrainian as an active part of their communicative repertoire. The post-Maidan leadership refrained from an active promotion of Ukrainian for fear of provoking alienation among Russian speakers, but this policy exacerbates the disadvantaged position of the titular language in various domains and causes discontent among those viewing it as a crucial component of national identity. (shrink)

The article explores the relationship between the dialogical way of existence of religion and social stability. The author argues that dialogue is becoming a way of existence of religion in societies with a high level of religious freedom. The author emphasizes constructive types of communication between religions, one of which is traditionally interreligious (interfaith) dialogue. The definition of religious dialogue as a broad communication phenomenon is considered, which, in particular, involves the interaction of not only religions with each other (interreligious, (...) interfaith dialogue), but also communication between religion and society (religious and social dialogue) on important issues of the present, and reactions to them. It is substantiated that the reluctance of a certain religious institution to engage in dialogue may be based on the theological position of the church caused by the phenomenon of «ambivalence of the sacred». Some ways to restore the dialogue of religions and overcome the conflict conditions of their interaction are proposed. In conclusion, it is noted that the «war of civilizations» launched by the Russian Federation in Ukraine brings the dialogue of religions to a new level, namely: requires a revision of certain theological theories, the formation of new theological visions; significantly actualizes the issues of justice, heroism, good and evil, the impossibility of violence, ethical problems and their reflection in theological thought; requires religions to take a civic stance, where it is no longer possible to speak of secularization in the sense of separation of religion from politics; sharpens and problematizes the attitude of religions to the national question as a result of the Russian Federation’s provoked terrorist methods of warfare, and thus the threat to humanity of genocide on a national basis; raises the issue of universal values, the humanistic paradigm and personal responsibility, which brings all religious systems too close together; meta-anthropologizes religion, absolutizes humanism as a value when a believer «goes beyond» mere existence to approach eternal truths, where the concept of «salvation» loses its narrowly individualistic characteristic. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show the activities of the non-governmental organization ‘Memorial’ that are aimed at building historical memory and developing civic awareness of state terror and crimes committed by the communist regime. ‘Memorial’ also aims to show the politics of memory pursued by the Russian authorities after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The author analyses the contemporary narrative of the Great Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine in two contexts: the policy towards the state’s memory after 1991 and academic historiography. The first part of the article points to the fact that the Great Famine has become a modern foundational myth of Ukraine. The myth is compared with the myth of Sweden, which also relates to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century history and the fight to ensure food self-sufficiency of the nation. However, the messages (...) of these myths turn out to be different. While in Sweden it expresses the society’s successful fight for the fruits of the earth, in Ukraine it has remarkably martyrological connotations – from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, the neighbouring nations and states have been playing the roles of perpetrators of poverty and misery of the Ukrainian people. The second part of this paper is devoted to the analysis of differences in the interpretations of the Great Famine made by two contemporary Ukrainian historians: Stanisław Kulczycki and Heorhiy Kasyanov. The former has eventually come to the conclusion that the Great Famine was caused by the genocidal policy of the Soviet authorities towards Ukrainians as a civic nation. On the other hand, Kasyanov claims that the Great Famine was triggered unintentionally by the state authorities. In his opinion, it resulted from the chaos of forced collectivization policy, and then was used by Moscow to break the emancipatory aspirations of the Ukrainian elite. While the author admits that the second of these interpretations is more relevant, he does not fully agree with Kasyanov’s postulates regarding the way of presenting the disaster to the public. The “antropologization” of the narrative would be convincing for academic historians, but others would find it hard to understand. According to the author, the Great Famine was the second largest disaster caused by man in the history of Europe, next to the extermination of Soviet prisoners of war and the population of the occupied territories of Eastern Europe by the Third Reich. As such, it marks the history of Ukraine in a special way. The author agrees with Kasyanov’s criticism of presenting Holodomor as the genocide of the Ukrainian people carried out by Russians. (shrink)

The children’s reader, Udmurtiia naveki s Rossiei, celebrates the “450th anniversary of the voluntary entry of Udmurtia into the Russian State structure”. Published in Russian, one of its aims is to familiarize young children (aged 10 and under) with “key events” in Udmurt-Russian relations leading up to the inclusion of Udmurt-inhabited areas in the Russian Empire; emphasizing throughout the absence of inter-ethnic conflict in a “multi-ethnic Udmurtia”. Drawing on history, corpus linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis, we (...) show how the official representations of Udmurtia and Udmurts, as presented in the reader, fail to provide them with a distinct ethnic voice – separate from Russia – within today’s Russian Federation. Specific attention is paid to the consequences of using ‘unity’ as an argument for achieving ethno-linguistic equality via a Russian civic identity; the way(s) in which this serves the Russian government’s agenda; and its effect on the construction of Udmurt identity. (shrink)

The dynamics of political processes in the postcommunist states of Eastern Europe in the 2000s to early 2020s demonstrated a significant number of new challenges and caused many issues, including those related to the transformation of the ways and models of political behavior, civic participation, protest actions, and so on. All these elements of social and political life, in my opinion, have a gender dimension deserving a detailed analysis. In this article, based on Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian cases, I (...) consider what role women have played up to this point, and continue to play, in the public policy of the region and what ideological background serves the theoretical basis of this activity. In particular, these issues are analyzed in relation to the conflict situation—the war in Ukraine, which aggravated not only political, but also sociocultural and ideological confrontation in the studied societies. More or less commonplace is the conviction that to date none of these countries, considering all their fundamental differences, has achieved a sustainable gender balance in the highest governing institutions, and the gender approach is not sufficiently and/or effectively integrated into the policy-formulation process. At the same time, it is impossible to deny the fact that bright, charismatic persons who have appeared in the last 15 years—such as Yulia Tymoshenko, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Maria Kalesnikava, Yulia Galyamina, Yulia Navalnaya, and more—have made up a kind of collective “female face of politics” in postcommunist societies of Eastern Europe. I examine the practical consequences of these changes, and also look at those ideas and ideologies that influenced the formation of this portrait of a new sociopolitical reality. The range of these ideas is very wide and includes the legacy of the Soviet female-emancipatory project, European liberal thought, post-Soviet national projects, and other similar phenomena. (shrink)

On the basis of analysis of Russian and foreign scholars, the work is aimed at studying the specificity of the transformation of antique stories and images, which is the desired model in the art of the 20th century thanks to its fluidity and unlimited variability. Actualization of antique stories and images in the works of German-language writers account for life-changing moments of social life, the periods of losing of constant moral landmarks and the periods of looking for new moral (...) and aesthetic ideals. The analysis of the reception and transformation of mythological stories and images in the contemporary literature proves the conception of its polysemy. The built-in contradiction of myths is realized through the transformation of mythological stories and images in the literary works of contemporary writers and is explained by the individuality of writers and theirs aesthetic aims. On the one side, the absence de facto in German drama of the 20th century of interpretations of the story about Achilles and of the image of Achilles, and numerous variations on the topic of moral strivings of fearless and peccant Ulysses, on the other side, are proving the statements of classic aesthetic that the tragedy is based on the conflict, which is close to lofty and linked with the idea of dignity of the man, which is ready and capable of promoting the views of his own by the real acts that are often lead to suffer and death. According to Aristotle, the sympathy for the character leads to catharsis - the basis of education of real civic-mindedness and humanness. (shrink)

In 2013-2022, the Ukrainian ethnic group faced numerous external and internal challenges, which were largely the result of its previous historical development and profound transformations in the public consciousness.These changes, in turn, have become a natural reaction to a number of historical processes and phenomena that have taken place in the territory of the people from ancient times to the present. In this article, the author aims to analyze some factors of stress genesis of the ethnic legal mentality of the (...) Ukrainian ethnic group and show their impact on the content of its behavioral stereotypes. The methodology of this study is comprehensive and is based on socio-philosophical and philosophical and legal analysis of behavioral attitudes of Ukrainians in the field of legal understanding.Results. In the course of analyzing the scientific works of a number of researchers, we found that during its historical existence, the Ukrainian ethnic group has experienced a number of events, phenomena and processes of objective reality, which led to the transformation of the content of its behavioral stereotypes. Factors of stress genesis can be divided into endogenous and exogenous. Exogenous sources of Ukrainian ethnopsychologists include, for example, continuous invasions of various aggressors (Tatar, Polish, Russian, German) and various attempts to acculturate Ukrainians.According to them, endogenous factors include various migration processes that have generated marginality and betrayal by Ukrainian leaders of their people. In the future, the established guidelines play or may play a destructive role in the process of nationbuilding.Conclusions. We found that the stress genesis of domestic political and legal can be defined as the process of creating political and legal mentality of the Ukrainian ethnos under the influence of events, phenomena, processes of its sociohistorical development, as well as factors of geographical location and environmental conditions. community and, as a consequence, cause transformations in the content of its guidelines. In addition, the border situation of Ukrainian lands, long statelessness of the ethnic group, serfdom in the homeland and other factors of socio-historical development of the national ethnic group have led to the emergence or deepening in the people’s consciousness such destructive stereotypes as anarchism, legal nihilism, freedom “, absenteeism and civic passivity, deep corruption traditions and nepotism, low status of state property, etc. (shrink)

The spiritual geography of Russian cosmism. General characteristics ; Recent definitions of cosmism -- Forerunners of Russian cosmism. Vasily Nazarovich Karazin (1773-1842) ; Alexander Nikolaevich Radishchev (1749-1802) ; Poets: Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov, (1711-1765) and Gavriila Romanovich Derzhavin (1743-1816) ; Prince Vladimir Fedorovich Odoevsky (1803-1869) ; Aleksander Vasilyevich Sukhovo-Kobylin (1817-1903) -- The Russian philosophical context. Philosophy as a passion ; The destiny of Russia ; Thought as a call for action ; The totalitarian cast of mind -- The (...) religious and spiritual context. The kingdom of god on earth ; Hesychasm: two great Russian saints ; The Third Rome ; Pre-Christian antecedents -- The Russian esoteric context. Early searches for "deep wisdom" ; Popular magic ; Higher magic in the time of Peter the Great ; Esotericism after Peter the Great ; Theosophy and anthroposophy -- Nikolai Fedorovich Fedorov (1829-1903), the philosopher of the common task ; The one idea ; The unacknowledged prince ; The village teacher ; First disciple: Dostoevsky and Tolstoy ; The Moscow librarian ; Last years: Askhabad: the only portrait -- The "common task" ; Esoteric dimensions of the "common task" ; Fedorov's legacy: projectivism, delo, regulation -- The religious cosmists. Vladimir Sergeevich Solovyov (1853-1900) ; Sergei Nikolaevich Bulgakov (1871-1944) ; Pavel Aleksandrovich Florensky (1882-1937) ; Nikolai Aleksandrovich Berdyaev (1874-1948) -- The scientific cosmists. Konstantin Edouardovich Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935) ; Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky (1863-1945) ; Alexander Leonidovich Chizhevsky (1897-1964) ; Vasily Feofilovich Kuprevich (1897-1969) -- Promethean theurgy. Life-creation ; Cultural immortalism ; God-building ; Re-aiming the arrows of Eros ; Technological utopianism ; Occultism -- Fedorov's twentieth century followers. Nikolai Pavlovich Peterson (1844-1919) and Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kozhevnikov (1852-1917) ; Svyatogor and the biocosmists ; New wine and the universal task ; Alexander Konstantinovich Gorsky (1886-1943) and Nikolai Alexandrovich Setnitsky (1888-1937) ; Valerian Nikolaevich Muravyov (1885-1932) ; Vasily Nikolaevich Chekrygin (1897-1922) -- Cosmism and its offshoots today. The N.F. Fedorov museum-library ; The Tsiolkovsky museum and Chizhevsky center ; ISRICA - Institute for Scientific Research in Cosmic Anthropoecology ; Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev (1912-1992) and neo-eurasianism ; The hyperboreans ; Scientific immortalism: Igor Vishev, Danila Medvedev ; Conclusions about the Russian cosmists. (shrink)

This study investigated the effects of internal and demographic variables on civic development in late adolescence using the construct civic purpose. We conducted surveys on civic engagement with 480 high school seniors, and surveyed them again two years later. Using multivariate regression and linear mixed models, we tested the main effects of civic purpose dimensions (beyond-the-self motivation, future civic intention), ethnicity, and education on civic development from Time 1 to Time 2. Results showed that while there is an overall decrease (...) in civic engagement in the transition out of high school, both internal and social factors protected participants from steep civic decline. Interaction effects varied. Ethnicity and education interacted in different ways with the dimensions of civic purpose to predict change in traditional and expressive political engagement, and community service engagement. (shrink)

Many democratic theorists hold that when a decision is collectively made in the right kind of way, in accordance with the right procedure, it is permissible to enforce it. They deny that there are further requirements on the type of reasons that can permissibly be used to justify laws and policies. In this paper, I argue that democratic theorists are mistaken about this. So-called public reason requirements follow from commitments that most of them already hold. Drawing on the democratic ideal (...) of civic equality, I show that it can successfully explain why political decision-making must have the right sort of procedure-independent justification. However, contra standard accounts of public reason, I argue that laws and policies need to be justified with convergence accessible, not shared, reasons. Public reasons are those that are accessible in light of evaluative standards shared by all, or in light of every citizen’s private evaluative standards. Since this will make the set of public reasons wider, it makes the theory more palatable to sceptics while retaining the framework’s justificatory potential. (shrink)

Public reason views hold that the exercise of political power must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. A growing number of philosophers argue that this reasonable acceptability principle (RAP) can be justified by appealing to the value of civic friendship. They claim that a valuable form of political community can only be achieved among the citizens of pluralistic societies if they refrain from appealing to controversial ideals and values when justifying the exercise of political power to one another. This paper (...) argues against such accounts. In order to justify RAP, one must explain and defend a conception of reasonableness. Civic friendship is unfit to perform this task, rendering it unable to ground public reason alone. Meanwhile, pluralist views that combine civic friendship with other considerations in order to specify RAP either fail or make civic friendship a spare wheel in the argument for public reason. (shrink)

This paper defends a neorepublican account of civic virtue as consisting of stable traits of character, understood in broadly Aristotelian terms, that exhibit excellences associated with the role of citizen, and that contribute to the secure protection of freedom as non-domination. Such an account is important for the neorepublican project because neither laws nor social norms can yield reliable support for republican freedom without a parallel input from civic virtue. The paper emphasizes the need to distinguish civic virtue from desirable (...) norms, which can operate in tandem. Against other neorepublican accounts of civic virtue, it argues that the primary function of such virtue is not to support the stability of republican regimes. Rather, it has a corrective function, and may in fact challenge institutions, laws, and informal norms if they allow for the exercise of arbitrary power. Finally, the paper argues that this account of civic virtue is better positioned than a stability-focused account to shed light on the relationship between civic virtue and the common good. (shrink)

While civic education may not always be explicitly included in school curriculums, it can still be imparted through various non-teaching practices and in different places. In this article, we will delve into three potential educational spaces -memorials, museums, and libraries- that are commonly found in Western democracies. We will explore the significance and scope of each of these spaces and discuss their respective ethical, political, and aesthetic responsibilities. Additionally, we will examine how they possess agency and can influence the educational (...) process, recognizing that even non-human entities, such as nature itself, can play an important role in shaping our understanding of civic education. (shrink)

In Professional Ethics and Civic Morals , Emile Durkheim outlined the core of his theory of morality and social rights which was to dominate his work throughout the course of his life. In Durkheim's view, sociology is a science of morals which are objective social facts, and these moral regulations form the basis of individual rights and obligations. This book is crucial to an understanding of Durkheim's sociology because it contains his much-neglected theory of the state as a moral institution, (...) and it provides an understanding of his critique of anomie and egoistic individualism. The growing interest in cultural revolution and moral regulation make this edition of Durkheim's classic work especially timely. The new preface by Bryan Turner sets the book in its intellectual and historical context, and illustrates the relevance of this work to present day debates on the state, society, and moral regulation. (shrink)

Several scholars have claimed that small-scale agriculture in which farmers sell goods to the local market has the potential to strengthen social ties and a sense of community, a phenomenon referred to as “civic agriculture.” Proponents see promise in the increase in the number of community supported agriculture programs, farmers markets, and other locally orientated distribution systems as well as the growing interest among consumers for buying locally produced goods. Yet others have suggested that these novel or reborn distribution mechanisms (...) are still primarily means of instrumental economic exchange and that optimistic characterizations of a renewed sense of community emerging from these practices are unfounded. This study provides an empirical assessment of the extent to which these community-based agriculture markets are associated with connection to community, volunteerism, and civic and political activities. In order to assess the relationship between civic agriculture and community engagement, we surveyed over 1,300 people in the Mid-Hudson region of New York State. The study design includes “civic agriculture participants” as the unit of analysis, defined as CSA farm members, shoppers at independent health food stores, and farmers market patrons. For comparison, a telephone survey of randomly selected residents of the region’s general population was also conducted. Unlike studies that focus solely on the perceptions of certain civic agriculture participants, by comparing the perceptions and behaviors of those engaged in a range of civic agriculture practices, we are able to identify the effects of different forms of participation. The results demonstrate higher levels of voluntarism and engagement in local politics among civic agriculture participants relative to the general population. In addition, we found variation among those engaged in different forms of civic agriculture, with those immersed in more socially embedded forms of exchange demonstrating greater community and political involvement. These findings lend empirical support to the civic agriculture thesis. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the problem children, conceived of as future citizens, pose to understanding the scope and limits of Rawls’s Political Liberalism by focusing on the civic education of children. Can a politically liberal state provide all children the opportunity to become reasonable citizens? Or does the cultivation of reasonableness require comprehensive liberalism? I show that educating children to become reasonable in the way Rawls outlines imposes a demanding requirement that conflicts with Rawls’s aim of including a wide (...) constituency in the scope of political liberalism. Rawls’s aim of making reasonableness broadly inclusive for political purposes is in tension with his goal of using reasonableness as the standard that delineates the scope of liberal legitimacy. I argue that political liberalism can and should try to cultivate the reasonableness of its future citizens through the civic education of children. However, a defensible version of political liberal civic education requires introducing a bifurcation within Rawls’s conception of reasonableness. A political liberal form of civic education should aim towards the inclusive scope of reasonableness by cultivating reasonableness in only two of what appear to be three senses that Rawls emphasizes. Teaching children that legitimacy requires embracing public reason demands more than may be justifiably required by a state that seeks to be broadly inclusive. (shrink)

We formulate a distinctly 'political liberal' conception of mutual respect, which we call 'civic respect', appropriate for governing the public political relations of citizens in pluralist democratic societies. A political liberal account of education should aim at ensuring that students, as future citizens, learn to interact with other citizens on the basis of civic respect. While children should be required to attend educational institutions that will inculcate in them the skills and concepts necessary for them to be free and equal (...) citizens, parents should be granted as much freedom as is compatible with the requirements of civic respect to raise their children in accordance with their respective 'comprehensive doctrines' (systems of beliefs and values, including religious doctrines). We consider an objection to our position drawn from the account of upbringing recently advanced by Matthew Clayton, namely, that the conception of civic respect that we advance rests on an implausible view about the limited scope of the requirements of political justice. We develop an account of the 'basic structure of society' as the appropriate subject of political justice that can overcome this objection. (shrink)

This paper describes student outcomes from participating in a week-long out-of-school action civics program designed to increase students’ civic and political competence and engagement. Using analysis from four years of survey data, this paper presents findings related to changes in students’ civic competence as a result of participating in the program, including findings related to both first time and repeat campers. Data revealed that participants experienced gains in half of the civic competence construct variables, with first-time campers experiencing significant gains (...) in five of the civic competence construct variables. Data analysis suggests that iEngage, an action civics summer experience, was effective in increasing elements of students’ civic competence, including their ability to get people to care about a problem, organize and run a meeting, write an opinion letter or contact a media outlet to express their views, and contact an elected official or community leader to address an issue. (shrink)

When polarization occurs on issues of race and gender, political boundaries are increasingly drawn along racial and gendered lines. One approach to improving the current political climate is by focusing on education for the civic virtues. While talk of citizenship or civic virtue might sound quaint or old-fashioned, the civic virtues are simply the habits that citizens need to support a healthy, well-functioning political community. These virtues are especially critical for liberal democracies, as democratic nations ultimately depend on the political (...) engagement of their citizens. (shrink)

Is the civic duty to report crime and corruption a genuine moral duty? After clarifying the nature of the duty, I consider a couple of negative answers to the question, and turn to an attractive and commonly held view, according to which this civic duty is a genuine moral duty. On this view, crime and corruption threaten political stability, and citizens have a moral duty to report crime and corruption to the government in order to help the government’s law enforcement (...) efforts. The resulting duty is triply general in that it applies to everyone, everywhere, and covers all criminal and corrupt activity. In this paper, I challenge the general scope of this argument. I argue that that the civic duty to report crime and corruption to the authorities is much narrower than the government claims and people might think, for it only arises when the state (i) condemns genuine wrongdoing and serious ethical offenses as “crime” and “corruption,” and (ii) constitutes a dependable “disclosure recipient,” showing the will and power to hold wrongdoers accountable. I further defend a robust duty to directly report to the public—one that is weightier and wider than people usually assume. When condition (ii) fails to obtain, I submit, citizens are released of the duty to report crime and corruption to the authorities, but are bound to report to the public, even when the denunciation targets the government and is risky or illegal. (shrink)

Civic Republicanism is a valuable critical introduction to one of the most important topics in political philosophy. In this book, Iseult Honohan presents an authoritative and accessible account of civic republicanism, its origins and its problems. The book examines all the central themes of this political theory. In the first part of the book, Honohan explores the notion of historical tradition, which is a defining aspect of civic republicanism, its value and whether a continued tradition is sustainable. She also discusses (...) the central concepts of republicanism, how they have evolved, in what circumstances civic republicanism can be applied and its patterns of re-emergence. In the second part of the book, contemporary interpretation of republican political theory is explored and question of civic virtue and participation are raised. What is the nature of the common good? What does it mean to put public before private interests and what does freedom mean in a republican state? Honohan explores these as well as other questions about the sustainability of republican thought in the kind of diverse societies we live in today. Civic Republicanism will be essential reading for students of politics and philosophy. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that there are limits to the ways we can permissibly treat people, even in the service of good ends. For example, we may not steal someone’s wallet, even if we plan to donate the contents to famine relief, or break a promise to help a colleague move, even if we encounter someone else on the way whose need is somewhat more urgent. In other words, we should observe certain constraints against mistreating people, where a constraint is (...) a moral principle that we should not violate, even when that is the only way to prevent further, similar violations or other, greater evils. But, despite its intuitive appeal, the view that there are constraints has drawn considerable criticism, and attempts to provide a rationale for constraints have been, at best, substantially incomplete. In this paper, I develop a novel rationale for constraints that fills important gaps left by views in the literature. The account helps make sense of constraints by identifying a morally significant relation that we bear to people when, and only when, we observe certain constraints against mistreating them. Put roughly, observing these constraints is a condition for being worthy of a form of trust that I call civic trust, and being worthy of such trust is an essential part of living with others in the sort of harmony that characterizes morally permissible interaction. By focusing, in ways other accounts do not, on the role that observing constraints plays in our psychological lives, this approach not only makes the structure of constraints more intelligible, but also helps us better appreciate the force of our reason to observe constraints, and better understand the kind of moral community to which we should aspire. (shrink)

We formulate a distinctly ‘political liberal’ conception of mutual respect, which we call ‘civic respect’, appropriate for governing the public political relations of citizens in pluralist democratic societies. A political liberal account of education should aim at ensuring that students, as future citizens, learn to interact with other citizens on the basis of civic respect. While children should be required to attend educational institutions that will inculcate in them the skills and concepts necessary for them to be free and equal (...) citizens, parents should be granted as much freedom as is compatible with the requirements of civic respect to raise their children in accordance with their respective ‘comprehensive doctrines’ (systems of beliefs and values, including religious doctrines). We consider an objection to our position drawn from the account of upbringing recently advanced by Matthew Clayton, namely, that the conception of civic respect that we advance rests on an implausible view about the limited scope of the requirements of political justice. We develop an account of the ‘basic structure of society’ as the appropriate subject of political justice that can overcome this objection. (shrink)