Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Trusting on Another's Say-So.Grace Paterson - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.
    We frequently trust others—even strangers—based on little more than the good word of a third party. The purpose of this paper is to explain how such trust is possible by way of certain speech acts. I argue that the speech act of vouching is the primary mechanism at work in many of these cases and provide an account of vouching in comparison to the speech act of guaranteeing. On this account, guaranteeing and vouching both commit the speaker to certain actions (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Another Dimension to Deep Disagreements: Trust in Argumentation.Moira Kloster - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1187-1204.
    It has typically been assumed that affective and social components of disagreement, such as trust and fair treatment, can be handled separately from substantive components, such as beliefs and logical principles. This has freed us to count as “deep” disagreements only those which persist even between people who have no animosity towards each other, feel equal to one another, and are willing to argue indefinitely in search of truth. A reliance on such ideal participants diverts us from the question of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Humble trust.Jason D’Cruz - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):933-953.
    I challenge the common view that trust is characteristically risky compared to distrust by drawing attention to the moral and epistemic risks of distrust. Distrust that is based in real fear yet fails to target ill will, lack of integrity, or incompetence, serves to marginalize and exclude individuals who have done nothing that would justify their marginalization or exclusion. I begin with a characterization of the suite of behaviors characteristic of trust and distrust. I then survey the epistemic and moral (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Trust within Limits.Jason D’Cruz - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):240-250.
    There have two recent challenges to the orthodoxy that ‘X trusts Y to ø’ is the fundamental notion of trust. Domenicucci and Holton maintain that trust, like love and friendship, is fundamentally two-place. Paul Faulkner argues to the more radical conclusion that the one-place ‘X is trusting’ is explanatorily basic. I argue that ‘X trusts Y in domain D’ is the explanatorily basic notion. I make the case that only by thinking of trust as domain-specific can we make sense of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
    You shouldn’t have done it. But you did. Against your better judgment you scrolled to the end of an article concerning the state of race relations in America and you are now reading the comments. Amongst the slurs, the get-rich-quick schemes, and the threats of physical violence, there is one comment that catches your eye. Spencer argues that although it might be “unpopular” or “politically incorrect” to say this, the evidence supports believing that the black diner in his section will (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Trust, Reliance and the Participant Stance.Berislav Marušić - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
    It is common to think of the attitude of trust as involving reliance of some sort. For example, Annette Baier argues that trust is reliance on the good will of others, and Richard Holton argues that trust is reliance from a participant stance. However, it is puzzling how trust could involve reliance, because reliance, unlike trust, is responsive to practical reasons: we rely in light of reasons that show it worthwhile to rely, but we don’t trust in light of reasons (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations