This chapter contains sections titled: Eeew! Sucks to be a Porn Star! Get Out Of My Bed! Ways of Valuing Lives Climax: Happy Slaves, Oppression, and Quality of Life Afterglow Notes.

Working as a peacekeeper is associated with the exposure to acute and/or catastrophic events and chronic stressors. Hence, the meager literature about peacekeepers’ wellbeing has mainly analyzed Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This study aims to deep the analysis of the wellbeing of peacekeepers military. Based on the few studies on this population, we hypothesized that Italian peacekeeper military officers and enlisted men (n = 167; 103 males, 6 females, 58 missing) exhibit lower levels of internalizing symptoms (i.e., PTSD, depression, general (...) anxiety, obsessions, and somatization) as compared to a control group (n = 60; 32 males, 28 females). Moreover, we hypothesized that peacekeepers have higher levels of psychological resources (i.e., self-efficacy, self-esteem, social support) and quality of life (i.e., higher life satisfaction and lower general stress). We compared the groups by means of MANOVAs on the subscales of the Psychological Treatment Inventory (PTI; Gori et al., 2015). We found that Italian peacekeepers have lower internalizing symptoms and higher levels of self-efficacy and self-esteem than the control group; however, no statistically significant differences were observed on perceived social support. Finally, peacekeepers have a higher quality of life: scores reflect higher life satisfaction and lower distress than the control group. This study is in line with previous literature supporting the claim that Italian peacekeeper military officers have sufficient psychological resources for coping with the stressful situations implied in peacekeeping missions. Future studies should deepen the analysis of the military’s psychological characteristics by comparing war veterans and peacekeeper military. (shrink)

The Renaissance of Prudential Psychology Philosophical reflection on the good life in coming decades will likely owe a tremendous debt to the burgeoning science of subjective well-being and the pioneers, like Ed Diener, who brought it to fruition. While the psychological dimensions of human welfare now occupy a prominent position in the social sciences, they have gotten surprisingly little attention in the recent philosophical literature. The situation appears to be changing, however, as philosophers inspired by the empirical research (...) begin to examine more seriously the psychology of human flourishing. This is not to say that the philosophers of any era have kept entirely silent about such matters. While the term ‘subjective well-being’ has yet to take a significant place in the philosophical lexicon, philosophers have always evinced some interest in the subjective or psychological dimensions of human welfare, and sometimes quite a lot. Philosophical work on the good life has traditionally been the province of ethical theory, which may be understood broadly to include all aspects of value theory. Ethics in this broad sense is one of three main branches of philosophical inquiry, alongside metaphysics and epistemology. Philosophers sometimes use ‘ethics’ more narrowly, as a synonym for ‘morality’ or ‘moral theory’. But ethical theorists frequently claim to be in the business of trying to answer Socrates’ question: how ought one to live? And this question ranges well beyond matters of right and wrong, dealing also with matters of well-being, flourishing, welfare, eudaimonia, or pruden- tial value. There is some dispute about the precise equivalence of these expressions, which carry differing connotations. But all seem to concern the same cluster of issues: what benefits a person, is in her interest, or makes a person’s life go best for her. Thus contemporary theories of “wellbeing” or “welfare” appear to be direct competitors to ancient theories of “eudaimonia.” It can be useful, then, to employ these expressions interchangeably, whether or not they are strictly synonymous.. (shrink)

The paper introduces a virtue-theoretic critique of recent “prosocial” revisions of shareholder primacy. The paper aims at widening the scope of virtue-based business ethics beyond its nearly exclusive focus on the character and virtue of managers, employees, and organizations. In contrast to MacIntyre-inspired research, the paper takes a “good intentions” approach that looks squarely at shareholders, regarding them as real people (not algorithms or institutions) occupying distinctive roles as principals of firms who are, ideally, virtuous moral agents. It is argued (...) that virtue ethics can play a part in questioning normative features of shareholder primacy and the objective function of the firm. Probing deeper than prudential and instrumental concerns, the paper poses normative questions about interpreting shareholder motivations: what _ought_ shareholders to prefer/want/desire?; _ought_ shareholders to desire profit maximization versus profit satisficing?; _ought_ shareholders to prefer other, prosocial goals, alongside of wealth?; should self-interested motivation in profit-seeking be considered virtuous? To lend focus, the paper taps Hart and Zingales’ recently revised “pro-social” version of shareholder primacy, as well as Munger and Russell’s analysis of “virtuous profit-seekers,” as normative frames of reference. Doing so enables a critical engagement with their respective accounts from the standpoint of virtue theory. Taking a “virtuous shareholders” perspective provides an aretaic standpoint, one that is appropriate, given that shareholders care about matters of justice and the common good. Shareholders are not simply concerned about making money. Hence it is the moral intentions and motivations of ideally virtuous shareholders which ought to modulate the profit-seeking activities of shareholders in accordance with maximizing their welfare. (shrink)

Quality of life is part of many different discourses and has been used in a variety of meanings ranging from purely descriptive (as in some medical contexts) to distinctly evaluative meanings (as in some social science and political contexts). The paper argues that there are good normative reasons to make the concept as descriptive as possible at least in its medical applications and, furthermore, to reconstruct it in a thoroughgoing subjectivist way, making the reflexive self-evaluation of the subject (...) him- or herself the ultimate standard. Attention is drawn to the fact that only few of the measures of quality of life applied in present-day medicine correspond to these requirements. (shrink)

Emotion-processing impairment represents a risk factor for the development of somatic illness, affecting negatively both health-related quality of life and disease management in several chronic diseases. The present pilot study aims at investigating the associations between alexithymia and depression, anxiety, and HRQoL in patients with Hashimoto’s thyroiditis ; examining the association between these three psychological conditions together with HRQoL, and thyroid autoantibodies status as well as thyroid echotexture in patients with HT; and comparing the intensity of all these (...) clinical psychological features in patients with HT versus controls. Twenty-one patients with serologically or ultrasonographically verified HT and 16 controls with non-toxic goiter or postsurgical hypothyroidism were recruited for this study. Serum thyrotropin and free thyroxine, as well as thyroid autoantibodies, were assayed. Alexithymia, depression, anxiety, and HRQoL were assessed with Toronto Alexithymia Scale; Beck Depression Inventory, second edition; Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale; and Health Survey Short-Form 36, respectively. A negative relationship between the difficulty to describe feelings and the cognitive component of depression was found. Besides, patients with seronegative HT had lower somatic anxiety than patients with HT who tested positive. Besides, no statistically significant difference was found between patients with HT and controls with regard to somatic anxiety. The present study suggests the relevance of alexithymia in patients suffering from HT, which may be intertwined with a possible state of underreported depression that is mainly expressed through physical complaints. Promoting the capability to describe and communicate feelings could contribute to psychological elaboration and coping with the disease and, consequently, to the improvement of self-management and perceived HRQoL. (shrink)

Social bonds may assist in cultivating a more positive attitude to life through commonly shared meanings about the COVID-19 pandemic. The key challenge, however, is how to foster social bonds meeting the changing demands in a post pandemic world. Yet, it is in the middle of a crisis that the conversation needs to start about how to strategically plan for the recovery. This is important not only in the current pandemic, but also in a post pandemic world. Reinforcing or (...) fostering new social bonds is likely to bring positive experiences. The latter is central to human health and wellbeing, and has potential to contribute greatly in enhancing people’s quality of life. In an attempt to foster place social bonding in the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond to subsequently contribute to wellbeing, this paper develops and proposes a new conceptual framework suggesting the need for adaptive social bonding interventions in the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. This is an essential measure to manage the significant impacts on our global health services due to a decline in people’s mental health in addition to COVID-19 physical impacts. The paper discusses how promoting adaptive social bonding interventions can make people more resilient. It further discusses how they can be empowered psychologically, socially, and emotionally in the current challenging times. The conceptual framework posits that social bonding interventions can assist in maintaining better mental, physical, emotional, and spiritual wellbeing and discusses how these wellbeing outcomes may also be experienced post the pandemic. This has important benefits and is of relevance to governments, policy makers and healthcare professionals in delivering better health care and equipping people with coping mechanisms both throughout the pandemic and in the long run. (shrink)

Ethics and Qualities of Life looks at what enters into ethical judgment and choice. Interpretation of a case and of what the options are is always a factor, as is a sense of the possible values at stake. Intuitions also enter in, but often are unreliable. For a long time it seemed only fair that oldest sons inherited, and struck few people as unfair that women were not allowed to attend universities. A moral judgment is putatively part of a (...) moral order in a society that any reasonable person would accept. But what counts as "reasonable" is generally contestable. The unreliability of intuitions leads naturally to ethical theory. Kantian, contractualist, and consequentialist theories all have some important truth in them, but not the whole truth. Contractualism lacks the resources required for a fully determinate account of what counts as "reasonable". Broad general rules are important to Kant and are at the center of everyday morality. But can Kantian ethics explain why they have to have this central role? Our evolving social contract now contains elements that once would have seemed counter-intuitive to most people. But could consequentialists have predicted with entire confidence the consequences of social changes that we now think were desirable? The last part of this book contains a double argument. One is that ethical theory is employed by humans in a state of semi-ignorance of relevant factors, grasping at likely truths and evolved intuitions. The other is that consequentialist considerations have a major role at the fundamental level, but much more in justification or criticism than in ethical discovery. (shrink)

Moral people (i) have good goals in acting in a challenging situation; and (ii) use their rightly disposed intellectual and voluntary capacities (virtues) and resources to choose a good action in that situation. This requires (iii) sound ethical deliberation and decision-procedures for realising practically the abstract values and principles relevant in the concrete situation. After deliberation about sub-goals and means, they (iv) choose to execute the best particular action plan. They will have canvassed possible outcomes of the intended act, which, (...) when executed, will have a particular result and (v) consequent outcomes for themselves, and for others; and (vi) it will show respect for the wellbeing of the community or wider society, represented by the state, and reflected in state law. A comprehensive third-party moral judgement on the act will encompass the intention and execution of the act in the situation.Part 1, Sections I-IV of this paper argue that organisations can be said to be quasi-persons, personal and moral. As artificial organisational quasi-persons, with a similar structure to natural persons, they can also have analogues of the moral features of natural persons’ moral acts: i)-vi): good goals, rightly disposed capacities and resources, ethical decision procedures, good acts or activities, with good outcomes for others, and respect for society’s norms represented in state law. An ethical acronym, GREAOS, capturing the six dominant features shared with natural persons, is suggested.In Part 2, an application of GREAOS is then made to assess a concrete organisational case, Mondragon Corporation, in order to show how if the analogy between persons and organisations is sound in principle, the acronym’s application can be made to ethically unpack a case. The acronym gives Mondragon Corporation at least a pass on ethics. Although a work in progress, its success in realising ideals of economic democracy can be an exemplar of stakeholder capitalism, an alternative to an unbridled shareholder capitalism, which has had its day. (shrink)

This study was aimed at examining the impacts of the Sharing economy on the individual and community Quality of Life and wellbeing by looking at their associated influencing factors using Village Savings and Loans Associations as a model of sharing economy in Malawi. An online community-based cross-sectional study design was conducted from November 2020 through January 2021. In the survey, 402 Village Savings and Loans Associations members from the Mzuzu City area participated, recruited using snowball and respondent-driven sampling (...) techniques. The sample size was computed using a single population proportion using the Yamane formula. Descriptive statistics and ordinal logistic regression model techniques were also employed. Additionally, we used the Chi-Square test, two-way ANOVA, and Ordinal regression model to determine statistical associations between socioeconomic data and QOL and wellbeing variables with a 5% level of significance. On the aspect of community wellbeing, the findings of our study indicated that income provided members with options to live a better QOL and wellbeing within the community by either facilitating payment for better education, eating healthier foods, acquiring assets, etc. Further, the absence of discrimination provided a platform for voice, inclusion, and social trust, enhancing freedom of expression. We also found that education facilitated better earnings and knowledge of public health-related issues. As for the contribution to the sharing economy, our study has emphasized the role played by trust in enhancing sharing economy. We recommend and encourage people to join these VSLAs so as to improve their QOL and wellbeing. However, there is a need to replicate the study on a larger scale to validate our study findings for effective policy formulation and implementation geared to improving the overall quality of people’s lives. Based on these findings, we further recommend that authorities reinstate programs like National Strategy for Financial Inclusion 2016–2020 and Savings and Loan Groups Best Practice Guidelines 2016–2017 that could further enhance the future of VSLAs, which are vital for QOL and community wellbeing of the people in developing countries like Malawi. (shrink)

While psychotherapists are trained to improve their clients’ quality of life, little work has examined the quality of life experienced by psychotherapist trainees themselves. Yet their life satisfactions and stresses would plausibly affect both their ability to learn new skills and conduct psychotherapy. Therefore, in the Society for Psychotherapy Research Interest Section on Psychotherapist Development and Training study, we investigated the patterns of self-reported life quality and their correlates in a multinational sample of (...) 1,214 psychotherapist trainees. A comprehensive questionnaire was used at the outset of trainings to assess trainees’ professional background, current life situation, personal characteristics, family background, and social and national origin. The findings indicated 54.3% of trainees’ lives could be characterized as fortunate or happy, whereas 14.3% could be characterized as clearly distressed or troubled. The strongest correlates of high life stress, a contributor to poor life quality, were economic insecurity, self-protectiveness, and attachment-related anxiety in relationships, and economic or psychological hardship in childhood. In turn, greater wellbeing was most strongly associated with a warm and open interpersonal style, being married, having sufficient economic means, and material and emotional security in childhood. While the results indicate the majority of therapists experience a relatively good quality of life, the findings also suggest potential targets for increasing trainees’ life quality when it may be deficient, such as those on a societal level, training program level, and individual level, in order to promote effective learning and therapy practice. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has had unprecedented effects on our daily lives. This study aimed to assess the quality of life at two time points during the COVID-19 pandemic with lockdown restrictions according to gender, age, and urbanization level. Qualtrics® recruited representative Austrian population samples in April 2020 and December 2020/January 2021. ANOVAs and the Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests were conducted to investigate differences between April and December 2020 and to compare with pre-pandemic data. Although the quality of (...) class='Hi'>life changed from pre-pandemic to April 2020, there were no significant changes between April and December. Living location, gender, and age showed an effect on the quality of life. All domains of quality of life have decreased since the onset of the pandemic, and this decline has been maintained over the course of the first year of the pandemic. Creative measures should be implemented to assist people in improving one or more areas of quality of life, within the lockdown restrictions to improve the overall wellbeing of the population. (shrink)

This essay claims that one can consistently maintain a sanctity of human life principle that is explicitly grounded in theology, while making a kind of quality-of-life judgment regarding withholding or discontinuing life-sustaining treatments for those with advanced illnesses. For those who embrace them, resources that are specific to the Christian tradition delineate the parameters of responsibility for people dying with advanced illness and those who care for them. Those who embrace the sanctity of human life (...) for the theological reasons provided in this essay are under no moral obligation to continue merely to sustain life at the end of life—that is, when, in view of our best available judgment, the human being (who remains inherently valuable nonetheless) will not ever be able to exemplify other human values that contribute to human flourishing, theologically understood. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to describe three different attempts, which have been made by philosophers, to define what quality of life is; and to spell out some of the difficulties that faces each definition. One, Perfectionism, focuses on the capacities that human beings possess: capacities for friendship, knowledge and creative activity, for instance. It says that the good life consists in the development and use of these capacities. Another account, the Preference Theory, urges that (...) satisfying one's preferences, or desires, is what improves one's quality of life. And a third account, Hedonism, sees life-quality as consisting in the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The paper describes and evaluates objections to each of these views, thereby displaying their weaknesses and strengths. Since no view comes out as the right one there is a choice to be made. At the end of the paper it is being discussed how well each of the views cohere with different methodologies used in quality of life research. Also it is suggested that considerations about what the research is to be used for are relevant. (shrink)

What is it for something to be good for you? It is for that thing to contribute to the appeal of being in your position or, more informally, “in your shoes.” To be in one’s position or shoes in the broadest possible sense is to have that person’s life. Accordingly, something is good or bad for a person in the broadest possible sense if and only if it contributes to or detracts from the appeal of having her life. (...) What, then, is a prudentially good life, or a life that goes well for the one living it? It is an appealing life. More precisely, it is a life such that having it is worthy of appeal, in and of itself. This dissertation is a defense and exploration of this way of understanding prudential value. I call it the "appealing life analysis." In Chapter I, I argue that this analysis fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of concern, love, pity, and envy; yields promising analyses of the concepts of well-being, luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice, and paternalism; and succeeds where three rival analyses fail. I also examine how this analysis bears on the relationship between prudence and morality and the debate between subjectivists and objectivists about prudential value. Chapter II draws upon the appealing life analysis to interpret a long-standing puzzle about prudential value and time. I highlight various ways in which this interpretation is informative and moves us closer to a solution to the puzzle. Chapter III provides a preliminary investigation and defense of an ethical theory that I call "prudentialism," which prescribes maximizing the appeal of having one’s own life. On certain conceptions of the appealing life, this theory has the virtue of avoiding the charge of being either too morally demanding or not morally demanding enough. I examine the structure of this theory, sketch a partial, substantive account of the appealing life, and discuss how the prudentialist can respond to various objections. (shrink)

Euthanasia advocates argue that end-of-life decisions should be based on patients’ autonomous evaluations of their own quality of life. The question is whether a patient’s quality of life has deteriorated so far as to make death a benefit. Criteria for evaluating quality of life are, however, unavoidably arbitrary and unjust. The concept is difficult to define, and human autonomy has limits. This essay discusses the moral issues raised by quality-of-life judgments at (...) the end of life: who makes them, what criteria they use, and what clinical actions the conclusions justify. It then looks at ways in which quality of life can be considered legitimately, in relation not to euthanasia, which is always illicit, but to specific proposed treatments. If a patient decides to forgo treatment, the decision should be based on the judgment that the treatment, its side effects, or its long-term consequences would be excessively burdensome or useless. (shrink)

The evaluation of whether an animal has a life worth living (LWL) has been suggested as a useful concept for farm animal policymaking. But there are a number of different ways in which the concept could be applied. This paper attempts to identify and evaluate candidate ethical principles based on the concept. It suggests that an appropriate principle by which to apply the concept is one that (1) is framed in terms of preventing an animal having a life (...) worth avoiding (LWA), rather than ensuring they have LWL, (2) is based on a prospective, rather than retrospective, concept of a life’s worth, and (3) relates to both the perpetuation and creation of an animal at all times during its life. The paper concludes by endorsing an overarching principle that no animal should be unreasonably caused to be, or allowed to remain, in a position of having a prospective LWA. (shrink)

Judgments about how well things are going for people during particular periods of time, and about how well people’s entire lives have gone or will go, are ubiquitous in ordinary life. Those judgments are about well-being—or, equivalently, welfare or quality of life. This article examines the concept of well-being and the related concepts of prudential value and disvalue (i.e., goodness or badness for someone). It distinguishes these concepts from ones with which they might be conflated, exhibits (...) some of the roles they play in ethical thought, and examines some attempts to analyze or define them. (shrink)

This article attempts an overall assessment of the Ecumenical Patriarchate document on Orthodox social ethics, For the Life of the World, articulated along three dimensions: a) Radicalism, in terms of the radical reminders on Orthodox morality that the document succeeds in highlighting, b) Pervasiveness, with regard to the question on how the principles exposed in the document are (or should be) valid across all local Orthodox Churches, and c) Consistency, as the inner harmony between these principles and other aspects (...) of Orthodox ecclesiastical life. It is opined that this document is of historical significance and that it can be of great benefit for the entire Church, if applied. Amidst an advanced modernity and on a critical crossroad with post-modernity, a renewal of Orthodox social ethics that both takes under consideration scientific findings and speaks a contemporary ‘language’ that faces subjectivity seriously, was especially necessary. Hereafter, what is at stake is the degree this document will be disseminated, accepted and influential. (shrink)

Introduction. Cities play a key role in the development of countries and regions. The authors of the article emphasize the importance of the largest cities’ development, which is based on an industrial model that has not exhausted its potential. The authors show possibilities of urban development on the basis of the industrial sector effective functioning in order to improve the citizens’ welfare, meet their needs and improve the life quality. In this regard, the authors formulate a hypothesis that (...) the largest Russian cities developing according to the industrial model have and are able to realize their potential in order to improve the life quality, preserve and increase the population on their territory. The authors set a goal: to identify the possibilities for developing industrial-type megalopolises to improve the population’s life quality of the (PLQ). Methods. The authors use the following information base: strategic documents of different levels, statistical data, scientific literature, analytical documents, and expert assessments of the megalopolises’ development. The authors also use an industrial model for developing the largest cities; they determine conditions under which the potential of megacities can be realized to improve the citizens’ life quality and carry out an analysis of the demographic and social situation in the largest Russian industrial cities. The authors evaluate some approaches and theses of the study as exemplified by the following cities with a million-plus population: Yekaterinburg, Krasnoyarsk, Chelyabinsk, and Omsk and they group the cities according to the signs of growth and decline, which is illustrated by favorable or unfavorable demographic trends. To confirm the identified trends and problems of the largest cities, the authors provide the results of expert assessments on the population’s life quality and the state of the urban environment and emphasize the need for a systemic integrated development of the largest cities of industrial type to improve the life quality of the population of megalopolises. The scientific novelty of the study consists in substantiating the prospects for the socio-economic development of the largest industrial cities of Russia on the basis of an industrial model that provides for the technological transformation of the economy, the use of agglomeration effects, the formation of a friendly urban environment for residents and the achievement of socialization of urban space. Results and conclusions. As a result of the analysis and typology of the largest cities by functional specialization, two groups of cities were identified: one group with signs of demographic growth, the second with signs of decline. The cities of the first group have a greater economic potential, opportunities for agglomeration, provide more comfortable living and consolidation of the population on their territory. On the contrary, cities with signs of decreasing have fewer opportunities (resources), are less diversified, the urban environment in them is less comfortable, which is reflected in the citizens’ life quality and is accompanied by the population’s outflow. At the same time, it was revealed that all analyzed cities actively use digital technologies, realizing, in particular, the concept of a «smart city». At the same time, cities with signs of decreasing show high IQ indicators of cities. Taking into account the identified problems, the authors propose promising directions for the development of industrial megalopolises with signs of decline. (shrink)

BackgroundSarcomas are a diverse group of neoplasms that vary greatly in clinical presentation and responsiveness to treatment. Given the differences in the sites of involvement, rarity, and treatment modality, a multidisciplinary approach is required. Previous literature suggests patients with sarcoma suffer from poorer quality of life especially physical and functional wellbeing. Adolescent and young adult patients are an underrepresented population in cancer research and have differing factors influencing QoL.MethodsRetrospective analysis of Young Adult patients enrolled in the Sarcoma Tissue (...) Repository at University of Iowa. QoL was assessed using the self-report FACT-G questionnaire at enrollment and 12 months post-diagnosis; overall scores and the 4 wellbeing subscales were calculated. Linear mixed effects models were used to measure the association between the rate of change in FACT-G subscale scores and baseline clinical, comorbidity, and treatment characteristics.Results49 patients were identified. 57.1% of patients had a malignancy involving an extremity. Mean FACT-G scores of overall wellbeing improved from baseline to 12 months. Social and emotional wellbeing did not differ significantly between baseline and 12 months. Physical wellbeing and functional wellbeing scores improved from baseline to 12 months. No difference was seen for FACT-G overall scores for age, sex, laterality, marital status, performance status, having children, clinical stage, limb surgery, chemotherapy, or tumor size. A difference was demonstrated in physical wellbeing scores for patients with baseline limitation compared to those with no baseline limitation. A difference was demonstrated in social wellbeing based on anatomical site.ConclusionYoung adults with sarcoma treated at a tertiary center had improvements in overall reported QoL at 12 months from diagnosis. Overall baseline QoL scores on FACT-G were lower than the general adult population for YA patients with sarcoma but at 12 months became in line with general population norms. The improvements seen merit further investigation to evaluate how these change over the continuum of care. Quality of life changes may be useful outcomes of interest in sarcoma trials. (shrink)

The overall aim of this paper is to compare the human development and social quality approaches in the context of quality of life in general and in relation to development in particular. It commences with a broad overview of several perspectives including: prudential values; Sen's capability approach; Berger-Schmitt and Noll's overarching quality of life construct; Phillips' quality of life construct; and Doyal and Gough's theory of Human Needs. en HD and SQ are (...) introduced. HD emphasises well-being, enlarging people's choices, living a long and healthy life, being educated and enjoying a decent standard of living. All this is predicated on the UNDP's insistence that it is people who comprise the real wealth of nations: HD emphasises the well-being of individuals. Two sets of tensions are then discussed: first between the ability to exercise individual freedom and the constraints upon freedom imposed by the provision of compulsory education of children which facilitates that freedom ; and secondly, the relationship between personhood, social relationships and collective capabilities. This is followed by an exploration of whether HD's individualistic orientation is a weakness or whether its explicit incompleteness is a strength. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible ways forward in developing the HD construct, either by incorporating the notion of 'the social' within its framework or else via strategies of using it in partnership with the social quality theory that can both extend it and provide it with a richer theoretical justification. (shrink)

Donors to biobanks are typically asked to give blanket consent, allowing their donation to be used in any research authorized by the biobank. This type of consent ignores the evidence that some donors have moral, religious, or cultural concerns about the future uses of their donations – concerns we call “non-welfare interests”. The nature of non-welfare interests and their effect on willingness to donate to a biobank is not well understood. In order to better undersand the influence of non-welfare interests, (...) we surveyed a national sample of the US population using a probability-based internet panel. Logistic regression models assessed the demographic and attitudinal characteristics associated with participants’ willingness to give consent for unspecified future uses of their donation when presented with 7 research scenarios that raised possible non-welfare interest concerns. Most people had non-welfare interests that significantly affect their willingness to donate to a biobank using blanket consent. Some non-welfare interests are associated with subgroups but others are not. A positive attitude toward biomedical research in general was associated with increased willingness to donate, while concerns about privacy and being African American were associated with decreased willingness. Non-welfare interests matter and can diminish willingness to donate to a biobank. Our data suggest that trust in research promotes willingness to donate. Ignoring non-welfare interests could erode this trust. Donors’ non-welfare interests could be accommodated through greater transparency and easier access to information about the uses of donations. (shrink)

True Darwinian Ethics -/- Darwin’s model for the evolution of morality as presented in Descent of Man (1871) is shown to comprise three major stages that are here referred to as empathic premorality, tribal morality, and universalizing morality. Empathy, the key component of Darwin’s “social instincts” that started moral evolution, is here recognized as the principal cognitive device that conveys epistemic credibility to moral agency. The two constitutive elements of the tribal morality are conscience that Darwin conceived of as a (...) conflict between a lasting social motive and an immediate selfish impulse, and true altruism that evolved as a result of group (community) selection. Darwin’s genius recognized the uniqueness of group selection in human evolution as being dependent on mental faculties and speech that facilitated habit formation through praise and blame form other group members, with empathy as a gauge of others’ emotional reactions. Contrary to repeated claims, Darwin did not derive morality from reciprocity that he (and his contemporaries) considered to be “a low motive”, and adduced it only as a mechanism of habit formation. The universalizing morality was brought about by the increasing powers of intellect that led to respecting individual lives (rather than group interests only) and extending humane concerns beyond one’s group, ultimately to all sentient beings, which places Darwin among the spiritual fathers of modern humanitarianism. In terms of substantive ethics, Darwin’s views support moral individualism that requires to treat each subject according to his/her individual characteristics rather than any group membership. Darwin’s moral individualism and universalism have been elaborated by Peter Singer as the principle of equal consideration of interests and the expanding circle of ethics, respectively. Darwin’s model of moral evolution, which starts with intuitive but epistemically reliable moral agency and then allows for its rational improvement, provides a way out of the moral subjectivism of evolutionary ethics that reduces morality to an adaptation to social life. The primary or core morality that relies on empathy and implements reciprocity supports welfare (wellbeing) of a group and its members. Welfare (which has been defined by Darwin) is a basic “terminal” (ultimate) value that constitutes an objective, measurable fact. Since the primary morality supports welfare, it is objectively good, which justifies an ethical reasoning that such morality ought to be extended (with appropriate adjustments) to all sentient beings. Confusion over the status of morality is largely due to the lack of appreciation of its complexity: not only had its motivational apparatus (known as the moral agency) evolved by superposition of many emotional and pure cognitive mechanisms, but it has subsequently been co-opted to implement prudential, religious and possibly other norms that are accidental and sometimes contrary to its original social function. Those secondary morality norms are now enforced by the moral agency but lack moral objectivity and thus may support the perception of moral subjectivism and relativism. In short, true Darwinian ethics is based on the scientific axiology that recognizes evolutionary origins of all values, requires respecting all values that are experienced by each and every subject according to its individual characteristics, and calls for a critical assessment of each and every received morality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Most medical learned societies have endorsed both "equivalence" between all forms of withholding or withdrawing treatment and the "discontinuity" between euthanasia and practices to withhold or withdraw treatment. While the latter are morally acceptable insofar as they consist in letting the patient die, the former constitutes an illegitimate act of actively interfering with a patient's life. The moral distinction between killing and letting die has been hotly debated both conceptually and empirically, most notably by experimental philosophers, with inconclusive results. (...) This article employs a "revisionary" intuititionist perspective to discuss the results of a clinical ethics study about intensivists' perceptions of withhold or withdraw decisions. The results show that practitioners' moral experience is at odds with both the discontinuity and equivalence theses. This outcome allows us to revisit certain concepts, such as intention and causal relationship, that are prominent in the conceptual debate. Intensivists also regard end-of-life decisions as being on a scale from least to most active, and whether they regard active forms of end-of-life decisions as ethically acceptable depends on the overarching professional values they endorse: the patient's best chances of survival, or the patient's quality of life. (shrink)

In “ReImagining the Quality of Life,” Lorraine Besser challenges the frameworks typically used for evaluating the quality of people’s lives, especially those with Alzheimer’s disease or those in minimally conscious states (MCS). These frameworks rely on two standards: agency and sentience. The first assumes that the absence of agency makes a life prudentially worthless (worthless to the individual whose life it is), because cognitive activity is prudentially valuable “only when it reflects agency;” whereas the second (...) assumes that the absence of pleasure makes a life prudentially worthless, because pleasure is the only experiential value. Besser argues, however, that cognitive engagement with an activity or experience that a patient finds interesting is also prudentially valuable, even if it doesn’t reflect agency, and even if it isn’t pleasurable. The interesting “describes a qualitative aspect of our experience of a robust form of cognitive engagement, which resonates with us in a fashion similar to pleasure.” Besser’s view is an important contribution to the literature on the quality of life, and to the lives of patients with Alzheimer’s or MCS. However, I challenge Besser’s view that interesting experiences need not have a positive resonance to such patients, even though they are similar to pleasure. (shrink)

Young migrants have been the major migrant labor force in urban China. But they may be more vulnerable in quality of life and mental health than other groups, due to their personal characteristic and some social/community policies or management measures. It highlights the need to focus on psychological wellbeing and probe driving and reinforcing factors that influence their mental health. This study aimed to investigate the influence of subjective/objective status and possible pathways of young migrants’ life satisfaction (...) and psychological distress. Data on 9838 young migrants in the China Migrants Dynamic Survey were analyzed by LISREL 8.8. A total of 94.03% migrated for jobs or business. Subjective status, including subjective socioeconomic status, social adaptation, and psychological integration, had positive effects on life satisfaction, whereas social adaptation and psychological integration negatively affected psychological distress. Objective status, including objective socioeconomic status and health insurance, had adverse effects on life satisfaction, whereas they positively affected psychological distress. Social participation and city belonging had only significant positive mediating roles on life satisfaction. It is essential to increase social adaptation and decrease integration stress according to younger internal migrants’ practical needs. It is also necessary to enhance community/social resources and activities in the context of developing sustainability in the community to assist in mental health promotion. (shrink)

Although there is growing recognition that trauma can negatively impact students in business and management, discussions have focused primarily upon medically recognized conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) involving serious forms of violence or harm. Notwithstanding the criticality of this focus, there has been limited consideration of moral injury (MI), which occurs when deeply held moral values are violated, resulting in profound relational, spiritual, and psychological suffering. To address the latter, this article focuses on four areas. First, the nature (...) of teaching-related MI is clarified through its elaboration and distinction from PTSD. Second, the violations of moral values associated with MI are problematized within humanistic management education, in which the protection and promotion of dignity and its associated values are seen as foundational for wellbeing. Third, trauma-informed (TI) teaching and a prospective alternative, that of contemplative pedagogy (CP), are evaluated for their potential in the teaching-related prevention of MI and promotion of wellbeing. Despite its potential benefits, TI teaching is insufficient for these purposes. CP offers substantial advantages; however, is best implemented within the context of dignity-infused, TI teaching principles. Fourth, a holistic constellation comprising a dignity-infused, TI-CP for supporting humanistic assumptions in management education as well as a paradigmatic shift from economistic to humanistic management is described. Based on this constellation, and in contrast to an economistic metaphor of education as banking (Freire in Pedagogy of the oppressed. Penguin Books, London, 1970/1993), a humanistic metaphor of gardening for ecological (i.e., relational) vitalization, as well as co-creative humanistic innovation in the management classroom (and beyond) is offered. (shrink)

This chapter argues that virtue is a component of wellbeing. It argues on the “virtue is its own reward” side; specifically, the claim is that moral virtue is an intrinsic prudential benefit. Virtues are often classified as ‘self‐regarding’ and ‘other‐regarding’ depending on whether the primary benefit of the virtues accrues to the virtuous agent, or some other. Applying the method of difference argument shows that moral virtue is a benefit to the agent. A different means of assessing whether moral (...) virtue ought to be included on our objective list has been suggested by Brad Hooker, who applies the sympathy test to the question of whether moral virtue is a benefit to the agent. There are limitations to the sympathy test: specifically, the test seems to track matters other than wellbeing. Besides, the author believes a better application of the sympathy test will reveal that moral virtue is an intrinsic benefit. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has brought unexpected changes in important aspects of young people’s lives. The academic literature contains many studies on the risks and adverse effects, while any potential positive aspects have been side-lined. This paper examines quality of life and relationships among young people in emerging and young adulthood in order to identify the negatives and benefits of the pandemic. In this qualitative research a “letter to a friend” free-writing exercise was used as the data collection method (...) on a total sample of 107 young people aged 18-34 years. Using reflective thematic analysis, the statements were then grouped into two themes: “Covid as a misfortune” and “Covid as a benefit”. (shrink)

This article examines one of the sources of David Benatar’s anti-natalism. This is the view that ‘all procreation is [morally] wrong.’ (Benatar and Wasserman, 2015:12) One of its sources is the claim that each of our lives is objectively bad, hence bad whether we think so or not. The question I will pose is whether the constraints of metaphysical naturalism allow for an objective devaluation of human life sufficiently negative to justify anti-natalism. My thesis is that metaphysical naturalism does (...) not have the resources to support such a negative evaluation. Metaphysical naturalism is the view that causal reality is exhausted by nature, the space-time system and its contents. The gist of my argument is that the ideal standards relative to which our lives are supposed to be axiologically substandard cannot be merely subjective expressions of our desires and aversions; they must be (i) objectively binding standards that are (ii) objectively possible in the sense of concretely realizable. The realizability condition, however, cannot be satisfied on metaphysical naturalism; ergo, failure to meet these ideal standards cannot show that our lives are objectively bad. (shrink)

In the past years, many students had problems with their finances, especially their expenses for education. Many of the students are affected by the crisis financially, emotionally, and by their wellbeing. That is why the government provides programs that will help the students with their problems with school expenses, and that is through the Tertiary Education Subsidy (TES) of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). Further, the primary goal of this study is to explore the TES Grantees' lived experiences, challenges, (...) and coping mechanisms. Furthermore, these are the study's findings: (1) The grantees find the TES very helpful regarding finances that will tackle their academic needs, such as tuition fees and school learning materials. (2) Many students value government assistance that motivates them to maintain their grades. (shrink)

This present article explores the effects of cultural value, economic prosperity, and community mental wellbeing through multi-sectoral infrastructure growth projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. The implications of the social exchange theory are applied to observe the support of the local community for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This study explores the CPEC initiative, it’s direct social, cultural, economic development, and risk of environmental factors that affect residents’ lives and the local community’s wellbeing. CPEC is a multibillion-dollar project to uplift (...) economic growth and free trade between Pakistan, China, and other regional stakeholders. Although CPEC is still in its initial phases with partial startups, policymakers and government officials claim this mega project as a “game-changer” in the region, mainly for Pakistan and China. This gigantic project offers the significant potential to generate business slews and employment opportunities with international outreach. Due to the term’s newness, numerous studies have recently explored the macro and microeconomic benefits of the CPEC initiatives; still, these projects are theoretical. The existing literature insufficiently explored how helpful CPEC would be to a specific group and how residents perceive its advantages. This study fills in the literature gaps and explores the likely advantageous potential of the CPEC for the regional states. The study applied a convenient sampling technique for the data collection process. It used a mixed-method approach to gain scientific results, with a standardized questionnaire survey of 459 people from five major cities of Pakistan. The study results designate that residents believe that CPEC infrastructure projects will significantly improve residents’ life quality through more job openings and community poverty reduction. Still, they raised their concerns regarding environmental protection issues in the region. The findings specified that residents had an optimistic approach to better educational productivity by adopting environment-oriented policies. Policymakers should establish new CPEC study centers in different areas, and investors should be encouraged to participate in the industrial sector. Officials can overwhelm community worries about environmental degradation. Government officials in both countries can utilize the findings to raise public awareness about CPEC’s social, economic, cultural, mental wellbeing, and ecological implications. (shrink)

This paper deals with the moral issues relevant to medical decisions to terminate the life of a human organism. The expression “termination of life” will be used to cover both (1) active intervention to bring about a state of an Organism that will cause its death, and (2) a failure to intervene in causal processes that will otherwise result in the death of an organism. I shall attempt to distinguish the different cases in which the decision to terminate (...) life is morally justified and to isolate the considerations that are morally relevant to such decisions. -/- Decisions to terminate life: some possibly relevant considerations -/- There are a number of considerations that different people think relevant to medical decisions to terminate life and that are taken into account in actual medical practice. The following questions capture, I hope, the main ones: 1. Can the Organism in question be characterized as a person? 2. If the Organism is not a person, is it at least a potential person; that is such as will develop into a person? 3. If the Organism is a person, does he or she desire his or her own death, and if so is that desire a rational one? 4. If the Organism is a potential person, will this potential person express a rational desire to die once it becomes capable of expressing such a desire? 5. What quality of life will this person enjoy 6. What quality of life will this potential person enjoy? 7. What is the cost of maintaining the life of this person? 8. What is the cost of allowing this potential person to become a person, and then of maintaining his or her life? 9. Are we dealing with an unconscious person whom it is technologically impossible to restore to consciousness? 10. Is the termination of life a matter of active intervention or only a matter of refraining from saving the life of the organism? 11. Are we dealing with the case of “direct” killing or only one of “indirect” killing? 12 Does it require “ extraordinary” or only “ordinary” means to keep the person alive? 13. Is the individual suffering from a fatal illness? There are two ways in which each of these considerations might be relevant to a decision to terminate life. First, it might bear upon the question of whether it is morally permissible to terminate life. Secondly, if termination of life is morally permissible it may be relevant to the question of whether there is any positive reason for terminating life. (shrink)

Employee reporting dishonesty is a significant area of concern for firms. In this study, we investigate how providing information about their prosocial actions, such as organizational citizenship behaviors, affects the extent of employee reporting dishonesty. We distinguish prosocial actions whose welfare effects are mutually beneficial (i.e., that help others and the employee), which are common in business practice, from those that are selfless in nature (i.e., that help others at a personal cost to the employee). In addition to examining the (...) effect of the type of prosocial action on the extent of employee reporting dishonesty, we also examine the effect of construal (the manner in which individuals perceive and interpret the action). Using an experiment, we find that participants with high moral identity are less dishonest when they describe their selfless prosocial actions than when they describe their mutually beneficial prosocial actions, but only when they abstractly construe this information. However, we do not find evidence that the reporting dishonesty of participants with low moral identity is influenced by the type of prosocial action they provide information about or the construal of that information. We discuss implications of these results for theory and practice. (shrink)

Modern biomedical technologies managed to revolutionise the End-of-Life Care (EoLC) in many aspects. The dying process can now be "engineered" by managing the accompanying physical symptoms or by "prolonging/hastening" death itself. Such interventions questioned and problematised long-established understandings of key moral concepts, such as good life, quality of life, pain, suffering, good death, appropriate death, dying well, etc. This volume examines how multifaceted EoLC moral questions can be addressed from interdisciplinary perspectives within the Islamic tradition. Contributors (...) Amir Abbas Alizamani, Beate Anam, Hamed Arezaei, Asma Asadi, Pieter Coppens, Hans Daiber, Khalid Elzamzamy, Mohammed Ghaly, Hadil Lababidi, Shahaboddin Mahdavi, Aasim Padela, Rafaqat Rashid and Ayman Shabana. (shrink)

BackgroundOver the last decades there has been a change in the way schooling is perceived recognizing that children’s learning is closely linked to children’s health. Children spend most of their time at school, which is often the place where problems are identified and interventions are offered, not only for treatment but also prevention. Embedding arts therapies into the educational system may help address children’s emerging needs and have a positive impact on their wellbeing.MethodsA pilot cross-over randomized controlled design was employed (...) to investigate the effectiveness of an arts therapies intervention on a series of child- and teacher-reported outcome measures, specifically, health related quality of life, wellbeing and life functioning, emotional and behavioral difficulties, as well as duration of sleep. Sample size calculations for future large-scale studies were also performed, and the sustained impact of the intervention was evaluated at 3, 6, and 12 months follow-up. The pluralistic theoretical and therapeutic framework of this intervention was informed by a systematic review on school-based arts therapies interventions and is presented in detail in the study protocol. Participants were 62 children with mild emotional and behavioral difficulties.ResultsImprovements in HRQOL and CORS were greater in those engaged in the arts therapies intervention than the control groups and were maintained at the follow-up stages. Significant improvements were only found for duration of sleep and SDQ. Minimal clinically important differences as defined in the published protocol were found for CORS, SDQ and duration of sleep, but not HRQOL.DiscussionFindings indicate that the arts therapies interventions were having a clinically significant effect on life functioning, duration of sleep, emotional and behavioral difficulties. Findings also indicate a small effect size for health related quality of life, suggesting the intervention was having a small positive effect on this outcome measure. The study indicates that all outcome measures assessed here would be suitable for inclusion in a larger randomized controlled study utilizing these arts therapies interventions, and that a sample size of 225 participants would be required if these outcome measures were used. (shrink)

Theories of well-being purport to identify the features of lives, and of intervals within lives, in virtue of which some people are high in well-being and others are low in well-being. They also purport to identify the properties that make some events or states of affairs good for a person and other events or states of affairs bad for a person. This article surveys some of the main theories of well-being, with an emphasis on work published since the turn of (...) the century. (shrink)

As a philosopher, whose theory about economics and business is systematically connected to a moral and political philosophy, Aristotle provides a rich conceptual framework to reflect upon personal wellbeing, the wealth of households, and the welfare of the state. Even though Aristotle has mainly been portrayed as an enemy of business, interest in his teachings has been on the rise among management scholars. Several articles have examined Aristotle's position with regard to current managerial approaches such as total quality management, (...) knowledge management, crisis management, and networking. Even though Aristotle is a constant reference point for business ethics scholars, only rarely have there been attempts to see what consequences his thinking would have for reorienting business philosophy and organizational strategy. In this study, we wiD outline how Aristotle's theory of household management can be applied to the management of modern corporations. We argue that conceptions of chrematistike and oikonomia provide a basis to discuss the relationship between business and society and to draw important conclusions for business management. (shrink)

ContextPeople with mental disorders can acquire long-term disabilities, which could impair their functioning and quality of life (QoL), requiring permanent care and social support. Systematic data on QoL and functioning, which could support a better management of these people, were not available.ObjectiveTo analyze the QoL, level of functioning and their association with sociodemographic and clinical factors of people with mental disorders who underwent deinstitutionalization using assisted living facilities.MethodsA Cross-sectional study was conducted between July 2018 and July 2019, through (...) interviews using the World Health Organization Quality of Life (WHOQOL-BREF) to determine the QoL scores, and the World Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule (WHODAS 2.0) to determine the level of functioning. All adults (≥18 years old) with mental disorders, who underwent deinstitutionalization, users of assisted living facilities and assisted by the Psychosocial Assistance Centers III, in a city in the state of São Paulo, Brazil, were selected. For statistical analysis of the associated factors, Student’st-test was used for dichotomous variables and ANOVA for polynomial variables. Pearson correlation coefficient was used to measure the association between QoL and functioning scores.ResultsOut of 359 people who underwent deinstitutionalization with mental disorders, 147 met the eligibility criteria. The mean total score for the WHOQOL-BREF was 66.5 ± 13.4 and the mean score for WHODAS 2.0 was 10.4 ± 7.6. An association was found between people who were studying (n= 65.8; 95%CI, 63.5–68.1vs. n= 73.9; 95%CI, 67.5–80.3;p= 0.04) and better WHOQOL-BREF QoL scores or WHODAS 2.0 levels of functioning (n= 10.9; 95%CI, 9.6–12.2vs. n= 5.1; 95%CI, 2.5–7.7;p= 0.01). A weak negative correlation (r= 0.41) emerged between higher QoL scores and functioning improvement.ConclusionThis study indicates that the QoL of the sample is associated by their functioning levels, which, in turn, may reflect on their social interactions. Public policies that favor interventions increasing socialization of this population can result in better health outcomes. The QoL and functioning scores provide valuable insights to develop public policies more suited to this population profile. (shrink)

In his 1993 health-care reform proposal, Bill Clinton offered health care as a civil right. If his proposal had been accepted, all Americans would have been guaranteed a basic package of health care. At the same time, they would have been forbidden to provide or purchase better basic health care, as a cost of participating in a national system to which they were compelled to contribute. A welfare entitlement would have been created and an egalitarian ethos enforced. This essay will (...) address why such egalitarian proposals are morally unjustifiable, both in terms of the establishment of a uniform health-care welfare right, and in terms of the egalitarian constraints these proposals impose against the use of private resources in the purchase of better-quality basic health care, not to mention luxury care. (shrink)

In his 1993 health-care reform proposal, Bill Clinton offered health care as a civil right. If his proposal had been accepted, all Americans would have been guaranteed a basic package of health care. At the same time, they would have been forbidden to provide or purchase better basic health care, as a cost of participating in a national system to which they were compelled to contribute. A welfare entitlement would have been created and an egalitarian ethos enforced. This essay will (...) address why such egalitarian proposals are morally unjustifiable, both in terms of the establishment of a uniform health-care welfare right, and in terms of the egalitarian constraints these proposals impose against the use of private resources in the purchase of better-quality basic health care, not to mention luxury care. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo determine the factors associated with quality of life and depressive symptoms in Peruvian university students during the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodsMulticentre study in 1,634 students recruited by convenience sampling. The quality of life was assessed with the European Quality of Life-5 Dimensions at three levels and depressive symptoms with the Patient Health Questionnaire-9. To assess factors associated with QoL and depressive symptoms, linear regressions and fitted regressions were used, with robust coefficients of variance information.ResultsA 345 (...) reported problems in performing daily activities, 544 reported pain and discomfort, 772 were moderately/very anxious or depressed. Furthermore, 207 had moderate-severe and severe depressive symptoms. Men reported better QoL than women and fewer depressive symptoms. Ayacucho’s residents had more depressive symptoms than Ancash’s residents and Piura’s residents had fewer depressive symptoms than Ancash’s residents. Students who left home during quarantine reported more depressive symptoms.ConclusionProblems performing daily activities, pain and discomfort, as well as mild to severe depressive symptoms were found in more than three-quarters of the sample. Authorities could consider depression care to improve quality of life in regions where high rates of infection occurred during the pandemic. (shrink)

ART and, in particular, IVF and ICSI, are essentially a laboratory experiment, but which, due to its specificity, goes beyond the disciplinary boundaries, explicitly acquiring an ethical-axiological dimension in the interaction zone of the members of a particular community involved in child-bearing. At the same time, it is noted that the activity and choice of a way to solve problems with childbirth has a characteristic severity, due to the traditions and level of civil and social maturity of a country, due, (...) among other things, to the level and achievements of technical equipment in this industry of knowledge and practice. According to foreign studies, about half of all subfertile people in developed countries are trying to overcome their infertility with the help of medicine, and research data indicate that the proportion of such individuals is growing. The most difficult problems of reproduction are associated with low quality of oocytes or low ovarian reserve ; aspermia and deep teratozoospermia, can not give hope to a couple to have genetically related offspring. However, donor programs create additional opportunities for social motherhood / paternity. Donation of oocytes is found in ART programs at least 3 times more often than donation of spermatozoa. At the moment, donation of gametes and embryos raises a number of ethical, legal, medical and socio-psychological issues that require competent support from experts of a wide range of specialists, as well as competent, non-commercial, primarily due to the interaction between donors and recipients. The analysis of possible modifications of family and kinship ties is based on the idea of transforming social relations, in which assisted reproductive technologies play a fundamental role, building a system of “new kinship and new family.” By entering into the intimate process of the birth of life and acting as a regulator of the composition of participants in this process through the stimulation of responsibility to present and future relatives, reproductive technologies affect the initial moral requirements in the community, redefining universal values based on the specific situation. Scenarios of childbearing through ART with the involvement of additional participants are possible in the context of the legal field, but legally fixed anonymity of the donor leaves many unresolved issues related to the problems of hereditary diseases, genetic abnormalities and epigenetic changes; in addition, there is a problem associated with the possibility of unintentional incest, as well as the difficulties of the child’s self-identification and the closeness of his genealogy. Solutions to these issues are postponed until later, thereby initiating future dramatic situations, ethical conflicts and dilemmas with a poorly predictable positive outcome. (shrink)

Although healthcare workers play a crucial role in helping curb the hazardous health impact of coronavirus disease 2019, their lives and major functioning have been greatly affected by the pandemic. This study examined the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the quality of life of Malaysian healthcare workers and its predictive factors. An online sample of 389 university-based healthcare workers completed questionnaires on demographics, clinical features, COVID-19-related stressors, psychological experiences, and perceived social support after the movement lockdown was (...) lifted. All domains of QoL were within the norms of the general population except for social relationship QoL, which was lower than the norm. Multiple linear regression analysis indicated that COVID-19-related stressors and psychological sequelae predicted lower QoL. Conversely, greater perceived social support from friends and significant others predicted higher QoL. Clinical and demographic characteristics predicted QoL to a lesser extent: A history of pre-existing medical illness was associated only with lower physical health QoL, whereas older age and being single, divorced, or widowed were only predictive of higher environmental QoL. Efforts to enhance QoL among healthcare workers in response to the pandemic should focus on mitigating COVID-19-related stressors and psychological sequelae and facilitating social support. (shrink)

A new word has recently entered the British medical vocabulary. What it stands for is neither a disease nor a cure. At least, it is not a cure for a disease in the medical sense. But it could, perhaps, be thought of as an intended cure for a medicosociological disease: namely that of haphazard or otherwise ethically inappropriate allocation of scarce medical resources. What I have in mind is the term ‘QALY’, which is an acronym standing for quality adjusted (...) life year. Just what this means and what it is intended to do I shall explain in due course. Let me first, however, set the scene. (shrink)

Community development, or the socio-economic transformation of local communities, has been a significant focus of organizational ethics. Such community development programmes—whether led by state, civil society, or businesses—are animated by modernization and have involved, I argue, the production of a new moral order. As part of which, communities were imagined in particular ways, historically. Drawing on a periodization of history of philanthropy of the Tata Group (India’s leading multinational conglomerate) from the 1860s onwards, I outline the four stages involved in (...) the production of this new moral order—each with a distinct formulation of community—as part of India’s development. The shifts in imaginaries of community, I conclude, were justified and legitimized by the elites as part of the wider nation-building efforts. (shrink)

continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...) has been a defense against horror and madness. Kant's prohibition on speculative metaphysics such as dogmatic metaphysics and transcendental realism, on thinking beyond the imposition of transcendental and moral constraints, has been challenged by numerous figures proceeding him. One of the more interesting critiques of Kant comes from the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land stating, “Kant’s critical philosophy is the most elaborate fit of panic in the history of the Earth.” And while Alain Badiou would certainly be opposed to the libidinal investments of Land's Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, he is likewise critical of Kant's normative thought-bureaucracies: Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Everything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism—always asking Quid Juris? Or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—combined, as in today’s United States, with a religiosity that is all the more dismal in that it is both omnipresent and vague. The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy, while giving great succour to the academy, which loves nothing more than to rap the knuckles of the overambitious [….] That is how I understand the truth of Monique David-Menard’s reflections on the properly psychotic origins of Kantianism. I am persuaded that the whole of the critical enterprise is set up to to shield against the tempting symptom represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against ‘diseases of the head’, as Kant puts it. An entire nexus of the limits of reason and philosophy are set up here, namely that the critical philosophy not only defends thought from madness, philosophy from madness, and philosophy from itself, but that philosophy following the advent of the critical enterprise philosophy becomes auto-vampiric; feeding on itself to support the academy. Following Francois Laruelle's non-philosophical indictment of philosophy, we could go one step further and say that philosophy operates on the material of what is philosophizable and not the material of the external world. [1] Beyond this, the Kantian scheme of nestling human thinking between our limited empirical powers and transcendental guarantees of categorical coherence, forms of thinking which stretch beyond either appear illegitimate, thereby liquefying both pre-critical metaphysics and the ravings of the mad in the same critical acid. In rejecting the Kantian apparatus we are left with two entities – an unsure relation of thought to reality where thought is susceptible to internal and external breakdown and a reality with an uncertain sense of stability. These two strands will be pursued, against the sane-seal of post-Kantian philosophy by engaging the work of weird fiction authors H.P. Lovecraft and Thomas Ligotti. The absolute inhumanism of the formers universe will be used to describe a Shoggothic Materialism while the dream worlds of the latter will articulate the mad speculation of a Ventriloquil Idealism. But first we must address the relation of philosophy to madness as well as philosophy to weird fiction. /1/ – Philosophy and Madness There is nothing that the madness of men invents which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored. Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization. The moment I doubt whether an event that I recall actually took place, I bring the suspicion of madness upon myself: unless I am uncertain as to whether it was not a mere dream. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3. Madness is commonly thought of as moving through several well known cultural-historical shifts from madness as a demonic or otherwise theological force, to rationalization, to medicalization psychiatric and otherwise. Foucault's Madness and Civilization is well known for orientating madness as a form of exclusionary social control which operated by demarcating madness from reason. Yet Foucault points to the possibility of madness as the necessity of nature at least prior to the crushing weight of the church. Kant’s philosophy as a response to madness is grounded by his humanizing of madness itself. As Adrian Johnston points out in the early pages of Time Driven pre-Kantian madness meant humans were seized by demonic or angelic forces whereas Kantian madness became one of being too human. Madness becomes internalized, the external demonic forces become flaws of the individual mind. Foucault argues that, while madness is de-demonized it is also dehumanized during the Renaissance, as madmen become creatures neither diabolic nor totally human reduced to the zero degree of humanity. It is immediately clear why for Kant, speculative metaphysics must be curbed – with the problem of internal madness and without the external safeguards of transcendental conditions, there is nothing to formally separate the speculative capacities for metaphysical diagnosis from the mad ramblings of the insane mind – both equally fall outside the realm of practicality and quotidian experience. David-Menard's work is particularly useful in diagnosing the relation of thought and madness in Kant's texts. David-Menard argues that in Kant's relatively unknown “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” as well as his later discussion of the Seer of Swedenborg, that Kant formulates madness primarily in terms of sensory upheaval or other hallucinatory theaters. She writes: “madness is an organization of thought. It is made possible by the ambiguity of the normal relation between the imaginary and the perceived, whether this pertains to the order of sensation or to the relations between our ideas” Kant's fascination with the Seer forces Kant between the pincers of “aesthetic reconciliation” – namely melancholic withdrawal – and “a philosophical invention” – namely the critical project. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is a combination and reversal of Kant's split, where an aesthetic over engagement with the world entails prolific conceptual invention. Their embrace of madness, however, is of course itself conceptual despite all their rhizomatic maneuvers. Though they move with the energy of madness, Deleuze and Guattari save the capacity of thought from the fangs of insanity by imbuing materiality itself with the capacity for thought. Or, as Ray Brassier puts it, “Deleuze insists, it is necessary to absolutize the immanence of this world in such a way as to dissolve the transcendent disjunction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves”. That is, whereas Kant relied on the faculty of judgment to divide representation from objectivity Deleuze attempts to flatten the whole economy beneath the juggernaut of ontological univocity. Speculation, as a particularly useful form of madness, might fall close to Deleuze and Guattari’s shaping of philosophy into a concept producing machine but is different in that it is potentially self destructive – less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality. Speculative madness is always a potential disaster in that it acknowledges little more than its own speculative power with the hope that the gibbering of at least a handful of hysterical brains will be useful. Pre-critical metaphysics amounts to madness, though this may be because the world itself is mad while new attempts at speculative metaphysics, at post-Kantian pre-critical metaphysics, are well aware of our own madness. Without the sobriety of the principle of sufficient reason we have a world of neon madness: “we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of things”. Speculative thought may be participatory in the screaming tumult of the world or, worse yet, may produce its spectral double. Against theology or reason or simply commonsense, the speculative becomes heretical. Speculation, as the cognitive extension of the horrorific sublime should be met with melancholic detachment. Whereas Kant's theoretical invention, or productivity of thought, is self -sabotaging, since the advent of the critical project is a productivity of thought which then delimits the engine of thought at large either in dogmatic gestures or non-systematizable empirical wondrousness. The former is celebrated by the fiction of Thomas Ligotti whereas the latter is espoused by the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. /2/ – Weird Fiction and Philosophy. Supernatural horror, in all its eerie constructions, enables a reader to taste treats inconsistent with his personal welfare. Thomas Ligotti Songs of a Dead Dreamer. I choose weird stories because they suit my inclination best—one of my strongest and most persistent wishes being to achieve,momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis H.P. Lovecraft. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction” Lovecraft states that his creation of a story is to suspend natural law yet, at the same time, he indexes the tenuousness of such laws, suggesting the vast possibilities of the cosmic. The tension that Lovecraft sets up between his own fictions and the universe or nature is reproduced within his fictions in the common theme of the unreliable narrator; unreliable precisely because they are either mad or what they have witnessed questions the bounds of material reality. In “The Call of Cthulhu” Lovecraft writes: The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. Despite Lovecraft's invocations of illusion, he is not claiming that his fantastic creations such as the Old Ones are supernatural but, following Joshi, are only ever supernormal. One can immediately see that instead of nullifying realism Lovecraft in fact opens up the real to an unbearable degree. In various letters and non-fictional statements Lovecraft espoused strictly materialist tenets, ones which he borrowed from Hugh Elliot namely the uniformity of law, the denial of teleology and the denial of non-material existence. Lovecraft seeks to explore the possibilities of such a universe by piling horror upon horror until the fragile brain which attempts to grasp it fractures. This may be why philosophy has largely ignored weird fiction – while Deleuze and Guattari mark the turn towards weird fiction and Lovecraft in particular, with the precursors to speculative realism as well as contemporary related thinkers have begun to view Lovecraft as making philosophical contributions. Lovecraft's own relation to philosophy is largely critical while celebrating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This relationship of Lovecraft to philosophy and philosophy to Lovecraft is coupled with Lovecraft's habit of mercilessly destroying the philosopher and the figure of the academic more generally in his work, a destruction which is both an epistemological destruction and an ontological destruction. Thomas Ligotti's weird fiction which he has designated as a kind of “confrontational escapism” might be best described in the following quote from one of his shortstories, “The human phenomenon is but the sum of densely coiled layers of illusion each of which winds itself on the supreme insanity. That there are persons of any kind when all there can be is mindless mirrors laughing and screaming as they parade about in an endless dream”. Whereas Lovecraft's weirdness draws predominantly from the abyssal depths of the uncharted universe, Ligotti's existential horror focuses on the awful proliferation of meaningless surfaces that is, the banal and every day function of representation. In an interview, Ligotti states: We don't even know what the world is like except through our sense organs, which are provably inadequate. It's no less the case with our brains. Our whole lives are motored along by forces we cannot know and perceptions that are faulty. We sometimes hear people say that they're not feeling themselves. Well, who or what do they feel like then? This is not to say that Ligotti sees nothing beneath the surface but that there is only darkness or blackness behind it, whether that surface is on the cosmological level or the personal. By addressing the implicit and explicit philosophical issues in Ligotti's work we will see that his nightmarish take on reality is a form of malevolent idealism, an idealism which is grounded in a real, albeit dark and obscure materiality. If Ligotti's horrors ultimately circle around mad perceptions which degrade the subject, it takes aim at the vast majority of the focus of continental philosophy. While Lovecraft's acidic materialism clearly assaults any romantic concept of being from the outside, Ligotti attacks consciousness from the inside: Just a little doubt slipped into the mind, a little trickle of suspicion in the bloodstream, and all those eyes of ours, one by one, open up to the world and see its horror [...] Not even the solar brilliance of a summer day will harbor you from horror. For horror eats the light and digests it into darkness. Clearly, the weird fiction of Lovecraft and Ligotti amount to a anti-anthrocentric onslaught against the ramparts of correlationist continental philosophy. /3/ – Shoggothic Materialism or the Formless Formless protoplasm able to mock and reflect all forms and organs and processes—viscous agglutinations of bubbling cells—rubbery fifteen-foot spheroids infinitely plastic and ductile—slaves of suggestion, builders of cities—more and more sullen, more and more intelligent, more and more amphibious, more and more imitative—Great God! What madness made even those blasphemous Old Ones willing to use and to carve such things? H.P. Lovecraft. “At the Mountains of Madness” On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit. Georges Bataille. “Formless”. The Shoggoths feature most prominently in H.P. Lovecraft's shortstory “At the Mountains of Madness” where they are described in the following manner: It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train – a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self -luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter. The term is a litmus test for materialism itself as the Shoggoth is an amorphous creature. The Shoggoths were living digging machines bio engineered by the Elder Things, and their protoplasmic bodies being formed into various tools by their hypnotic powers. The Shoggoths eventually became self aware and rose up against their masters in an ultimately failed rebellion. After the Elder Ones retreated into the oceans leaving the Shoggoths to roam the frozen wastes of the Antarctic. The onto-genesis of the Shoggoths and their gross materiality, index the horrifyingly deep time of the earth a concept near and dear to Lovecraft's formulation of horror as well as the fear of intelligences far beyond, and far before, the ascent of humankind on earth and elsewhere. The sickly amorphous nature of the Shoggoths invade materialism at large, where while materiality is unmistakably real ie not discursive, psychological, or otherwise overly subjectivist, it questions the relation of materialism to life. As Eugene Thacker writes: The Shoggoths or Elder Things do not even share the same reality with the human beings who encounter them—and yet this encounter takes place, though in a strange no-place that is neither quite that of the phenomenal world of the human subject or the noumenal world of an external reality. Amorphous yet definitively material beings are a constant in Lovecraft's tales. In his tale “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadatth” Lovecraft describes Azathoth as, “that shocking final peril which gibbers unmentionably outside the ordered universe,” that, “last amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blashphemes and bubbles at the centre of all infinity,” who, “gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time”. Azathoth's name may have multiple origins but the most striking is the alchemy term azoth which is both a cohesive agent and a acidic creation pointing back to the generative and the decayed. The indistinction of generation and degradation materially mirrors the blur between the natural and the unnatural as well as life and non-life. Lovecraft speaks of the tension between the natural and the unnatural is his short story “The Unnameable.” He writes, “if the psychic emanations of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coherent representation could express or portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”. Lovecraft explores exactly the tension outlined at the beginning of this chapter, between life and thought. At the end of his short tale Lovecraft compounds the problem as the unnameable is described as “a gelatin—a slime—yet it had shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory”. Deleuze suggests that becoming-animal is operative throughout Lovecraft's work, where narrators feel themselves reeling at their becoming non-human or of being the anomalous or of becoming atomized. Following Eugene Thacker however, it may be far more accurate to say that Lovecraft's tales exhibit not a becoming-animal but a becoming-creature. Where the monstrous breaks the purportedly fixed laws of nature, the creature is far more ontologically ambiguous. The nameless thing is an altogether different horizon for thought. The creature is either less than animal or more than animal – its becoming is too strange for animal categories and indexes the slow march of thought towards the bizarre. This strangeness is, as aways, some indefinite swirling in the category of immanence and becoming. Bataille begins “The Labyrinth” with the assertion that being, to continue to be, is becoming. More becoming means more being hence the assertion that Bataille's barking dog is more than the sponge. This would mean that the Shoggotth is altogether too much being, too much material in the materialism. Bataille suggests that there is an immanence between the eater and the eaten, across the species and never within them. That is, despite the chaotic storm of immanence there must remain some capacity to distinguish the gradients of becoming without reliance upon, or at least total dependence upon, the powers of intellection to parse the universe into recognizable bits, properly digestible factoids. That is, if we undo Deleuze's aforementioned valorization of sense which, for his variation of materialism, performed the work of the transcendental, but refuse to reinstate Kant's transcendental disjunction between thing and appearance, then it must be a quality of becoming-as-being itself which can account for the discernible nature of things by sense. In an interview with Peter Gratton, Jane Bennett formulates the problem thusly: What is this strange systematicity proper to a world of Becoming? What, for example, initiates this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your student’s question: “How can we account for something like iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the right question. Philosophy has erred too far on the side of the subject in the subject-object relation and has furthermore, lost the very weirdness of the non-human. Beyond this, the madness of thought need not override. /4/ - Ventriloquial Idealism or the Externality of Thought My aim is the opposite of Lovecraft's. He had an appreciation for natural scenery on earth and wanted to reach beyond the visible in the universe. I have no appreciation for natural scenery and want the objective universe to be a reflection of a character. Thomas Ligotti. “Devotees of Decay and Desolation.” Unless life is a dream, nothing makes sense. For as a reality, it is a rank failure [….] Horror is more real than we are. Thomas Ligotti. “Professor Nobody's Little Lectures on Supernatural Horror”. Thomas Ligotti's tales are rife with mannequins, puppets, and other brainless entities which of replace the valorized subject of philosophy – that of the free thinking human being. His tales such as “The Dream of the Manikin” aim to destroy the rootedness of consciousness. James Trafford has connected the anti-egoism of Ligotti to Thomas Metzinger – where the self is at best an illusion and we plead desperately for someone else to acknowledge that we are real. Trafford has stated it thus, “Life is played out as an inescapable puppet show, an endless dream in which the puppets are generally unaware that they are trapped within a mesmeric dance of whose mechanisms they know nothing and over which they have no control”. An absolute materialism, for Ligotti, implies an alienation of the idea which leads to a ventriloquil idealism. As Ligotti notes in an interview, “the fiasco and nightmare of existence, the particular fiasco and nightmare of human existence, the sense that people are puppets of powers they cannot comprehend, etc.” And then further elaborates that,“[a]ssuming that anything has to exist, my perfect world would be one in which everyone has experienced the annulment of his or her ego. That is, our consciousness of ourselves as unique individuals would entirely disappear”. The externality of the idea leads to the unfortunate consequence of consciousness eating at itself through horror which, for Ligotti, is more real than reality and goes beyond horror-as-affect. Beyond this, taking together with the unreality of life and the ventriloquizing of subjectivity, Ligotti's thought becomes an idealism in which thought itself is alien and ultimately horrifying. The role of human thought and the relation of non-relation of horror to thought is not completely clear in Ligotti's The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Ligotti argues in his The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,that the advent of thought is a mistake of nature and that horror is being in the sense that horror results from knowing too much. Yet, at the same time, Ligotti seems to suggest that thought separates us from nature whereas, for Lovecraft, thought is far less privileged – mind is just another manifestation of the vital principal, it is just another materialization of energy. In his brilliant “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism” Iain Grant rallies against the negative definition of dogmatism and the transcendental, and suggests that negatively defining both over-focuses on conditions of access and subjectivism at the expense of the real or nature. With Schelling, who is Grant's champion against the subjectivist bastions of both Fichte and Kant, Ligotti's idealism could be taken as a transcendental realism following from an ontological realism. Yet the transcendental status of Ligotti's thought move towards a treatment of the transcendental which may threaten to leave beyond its realist ground. Ligotti states: Belief in the supernatural is only superstition. That said, a sense of the supernatural, as Conrad evidenced in Heart of Darkness, must be admitted if one's inclination is to go to the limits of horror. It is the sense of what should not be- the sense of being ravaged by the impossible. Phenomenally speaking, the super-natural may be regarded as the metaphysical counterpart of insanity, a transcendental correlative of a mind that has been driven mad. Again, Ligotti equates madness with thought, qualifying both as supernatural while remaining less emphatic about the metaphysical dimensions of horror. The question becomes one of how exactly the hallucinatory realm of the ideal relates to the black churning matter of Lovecraft's chaos of elementary particles. In his tale “I Have a Special Plan for This World” Ligotti formulates thus: A: There is no grand scheme of things. B: If there were a grand scheme of things, the fact – the fact – that we are not equipped to perceive it, either by natural or supernatural means, is a nightmarish obscenity. C: The very notion of a grand scheme of things is a nightmarish obscenity. Here Ligotti is not discounting metaphysics but implying that if it does exist the fact that we are phenomenologically ill-equipped to perceive that it is nightmarish. For Ligotti, nightmare and horror occur within the circuit of consciousness whereas for Lovecraft the relation between reality and mind is less productive on the side of mind. It is easier to ascertain how the Kantian philosophy is a defense against the diseases of the head as Kant armors his critical enterprise from too much of the world and too much of the mind. The weird fiction of both Lovecraft and Ligotti demonstrates that there is too much of both feeding into one another in a way that corrodes the Kantian schema throughly, breaking it down into a dead but still ontologically potentiated nigredo. The haunting, terrifying fact of Ligotti's idealism is that the transcendental motion which brought thought to matter, while throughly material and naturalized, brings with it the horror that thought cannot be undone without ending the material that bears it either locally or completely. Thought comes from an elsewhere and an elsewhen being-in-thought. The unthinkable outside thought is as maddening as the unthought engine of thought itself within thought which doesn't exist except for the mind, the rotting décor of the brain. /5/ - Hyperstitional Transcendental Paranoia or Self -Expelled Thought Weird fiction has been given some direct treatment in philosophy in the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land. Nick Land along with others in the 1990s created the Cyber Culture Research Unit as well as the research group Hyperstition. The now defunct hyperstitional website, an outgrowth of the Cyber Culture Research Unit, defined hyperstition in the following fourfold: 1-Element of effective culture that makes itself real. 2-Fictional quantity functional as a time-traveling device. 3-Coincidence intensifier. 4-Call to the Old Ones. The distinctively Lovecraftian character of hyperstition is hard to miss as is its Deleuzo-Guattarian roots. In the opening pages of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari write, “We have been criticized for over-quoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into”. The indisinction of literature and philosophy mirrors the mess of being and knowing as post-correlationist philosophy, where philosophy tries to make itself real where literature, especially the weird, aims itself at the brain-circuit of horror. The texts of both Lovecraft and Ligotti work through horror as epistemological plasticity meeting with proximity as well as the deep time of Lovecraft and the glacially slow time of paranoia in Ligotti. Against Deleuze, and following Brassier, we cannot allow the time of consciousness, the Bergsonian time of the duree, to override natural time, but instead acknowledge that it is an unfortunate fact of existence as a thinking being. Horror-time, the time of consciousness, with all its punctuated moments and drawn out terrors, cannot compare to the deep time of non-existence both in the unreachable past and the unknown future. The crystalline cogs of Kant's account of experience as the leading light for the possibility of metaphysics must be throughly obliterated. His gloss of experience in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics could not be more sterile: Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding makes entirely out of sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in sensuous intuition [....] Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Here it is difficult to dismiss the queasiness that Kant's legalism induces upon sight for both Badiou and David-Menard. Kant's thought becomes, as Foucault says when reflecting on Sade's text in relation to nature, “the savage abolition of itself”. For Badiou, Kant's philosophy simply closes off too much of the outside, freezing the world of thought in an all too limited formalism. Critical philosophy is simply the systematized quarantine on future thinking, on thinking which would threaten the formalism which artificially grants thought its own coherency in the face of madness. Even the becoming-mad of Deleuze, while escaping the rumbling ground, makes grounds for itself, mad grounds but grounds which are thinkable in their affect. The field of effects allows for Deleuze's aesthetic and radical empiricism, in which effects and/or occasions make up the material of the world to be thought as a chaosmosis of simulacra. Given a critique of an empiricism of aesthetics, of the image, it may be difficult to justify an attack on Kantian formalism with the madness of literature, which does not aim to make itself real but which we may attempt to make real. That is, how do Lovecraft's and Ligotti's materials, as materials for philosophy to work on, differ from either the operative formalisms of Kant or the implicitly formalized images of Deleuzian empiricism? It is simply that such texts do not aim to make themselves real, and make claims to the real which are more alien to us than familiar, which is why their horror is immediately more trustworthy. This is the madness which Blanchot discusses in The Infinite Conversation through Cervantes and his knight – the madness of book-life, of the perverse unity of literature and life a discussion which culminates in the discussion of one of the weird's masters, that of Kafka. The text is the knowing of madness, since madness, in its moment of becoming-more-mad, cannot be frozen in place but by the solidifications of externalizing production. This is why Foucault ends his famous study with works of art. Furthermore extilligence, the ability to export the products of our maligned brains, is the companion of the attempts to export, or discover the possibility of intelligences outside of our heads, in order for philosophy to survive the solar catastrophe. To borrow again from Deleuze, writing is inseparable from becoming. The mistake is to believe that madness is reabsorbed by extilligence, by great works, or that it could be exorcised by the expelling of thought into the inorganic or differently organic. Going out of our heads does not guarantee we will no longer mean we cannot still go out of our minds. This is simply because of the outside, of matter, or force, or energy, or thing-in-itself, or Schopenhauerian Will. In Lovecraft’s “The Music of Erich Zahn” an “impoverished student of metaphysics” becomes intrigued by strange viol music coming from above his room. After meeting the musician the student discovers that each night he plays frantic music at a window in order to keep some horridness at bay, some “impenetrable darkness with chaos and pandemonium”. The aesthetic defenses provided by the well trained brain can bear the hex of matter for so long, the specter of unalterability within it which too many minds obliterate, collapsing everything before the thought of thought as thinkable or at least noetically mutable on our own terms. Transcendental paranoia is the concurrent nightmare and promise of Paul Humphrey's work, of being literally out of our minds. It is the gothic counterpart of thinking non-conceptually but also of thinking never belonging to any instance of purportedly solid being. As Bataille stated, “At the boundary of that which escapes cohesion, he who reflects within cohesion realizes there is no longer any room for him” Thought is immaterial only to the degree that it is inhuman, it is a power that tries, always with failure, to ascertain its own genesis. Philosophy, if it can truly return to the great outdoors, if it can leave behind the dead loop of the human skull, must recognize not only the non-priority of human thought, but that thought never belongs to the brain that thinks it, thought comes from somewhere else. To return to the train image from the beginning “a locomotive rolling on the surface of the earth is the image of continuous metamorphosis” this is the problem of thought, and of thinking thought, of being no longer able to isolate thought, with only a thought-formed structure. [1] One of the central tenets of Francois Laruelle's non-philosophy is that philosophy has traditionally operated on material already presupposed as thinkable instead of trying to think the real in itself. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, remains fixated on transcendental synthesis which shatters immanence into an empirical datum and an a prori factum which are then fused by a third thing such as the ego. For a critical account of Laruelle's non-philosophy see Ray Brassier's Nihil Unbound. (shrink)

In what respects is Western civilization superior or inferior to its rivals? In raising this question we are addressing a particularly strong form of the problem of relativism. For in order to compare civilizations one with another we would need to be in possession of a framework that is neutral and objective, a framework based on principles of evaluation which would be acceptable, in principle, to all human beings. Morality will surely provide one axis of such a framework (and we (...) note in passing that believers in Islam might quite reasonably claim that their fellow-believers are characteristically more moral than are many in the West). Criteria such as material wellbeing, too, will need to play a role, as also will happiness or pleasure (and again we note that it is not clear a priori that there is more happiness in the West than there is among the citizens of other civilizations). Since, however, these axes of evaluation do not run in tandem, we cannot expect to be able to formulate some single criterion which would enable us to rank civilizations in a simple unilinear order. Even happiness (pace some proponents of the utilitarian philosophy) comes in different types, and to count in the civilization stakes the happiness involved would presumably need to be of the right kind. Thus it is not clear that happiness derived from, say, taking drugs or torturing small animals is going to be able to count in favor of a civilization as much as, say, happiness derived from reading poetry or planting corn. Hence, for these and other reasons, we will have to deal with a multidimensional framework, in which some civilizations may excel along some axes but do badly on others. A further problem turns on the fact that there is no such relation as better than. Rather, when A is better than B then this is always in some respect C. Yet even when we compare one thing with another in some given respect we are not always dealing with a simple linear order. This is because the relation ‘being better than in respect C’ is not in every case transitive.. (shrink)

Rotter’s theory of internal-external locus of control evolved from Carl Jung’s work. In Psychological Types (1923), Jung defined two opposing tendencies in personality introversion and extroversion. While both tendencies are present in all individuals, one tends to dominate the other. The internal–external control construct was conceived as a generalized expectancy to perceive reinforcement either as contingent upon one’s own behaviors (internal control) or as the result of forces beyond one’s control, such as chance, fate, or powerful others (external control) (Lefcourt, (...) 1981, p. 15). Locus of control refers to those causes to which individuals attribute their successes and failures. Individuals are responsive to some external motivators (e.g. better jobs, promotions, higher salaries), but the more powerful are internal pressures (the desire for increased job satisfaction, self-esteem, and quality of life). Research indicates that an individual’s internal–external locus of control impacts their ethical behavior in an organization. Rotter’s I–E Scale (1966, Psychological Monographics 80(1), 1–28), a 29 item forced choice instrument, is the most widely used instrument to measure the degree of internality versus externality. Each respondent’s score for this scale had a potential range from 0 to 23. As there are six filler items used to mask the intent of the questionnaire a score of 23 being extremely external in nature and a score of zero being extremely internal in nature. The I Scale (Internal Scale) measures the extent to which people believe that they have control over their own lives; the E Scale (External Scale) measures the extent to which people believe that they do not have control over their own lives. This study utilized the I–E Scale. Jones (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation) and Deflumeri (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation) investigated the likelihood of an individual to engage in unethical behavior in an organization. This research suggests that when employees perceive that locus of control resides internally they themselves decide what is appropriate behavior, but with an external locus of control, employees will look at others to decide appropriate behavior. The researcher in this study investigated the relationship between managers’ locus of control and their moral reasoning. (shrink)