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The Lottery Paradox Generalized?Jake Chandler - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):667-679.details
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Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.details
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Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):511-534.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Distorted reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.details
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Should subjective probabilities be sharp?Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):277-289.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.details
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Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 37-47.details
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Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 75--93.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.details
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Belief and the will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 235-256.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-293.details
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Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):265-275.details
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The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 89–131.details
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There is immediate justification.James Pryor - 2005 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 181--202.details
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.details
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Figures in a Probability Landscape.Bas van Fraassen - 1990 - In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap. Boston, MA, USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 345-356.details
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The logic of scientific discovery.Karl Raimund Popper - 1934 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Hutchinson Publishing Group.details
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Infinite Lotteries, Perfectly Thin Darts and Infinitesimals.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):81-89.details
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Probability, Regularity, and Cardinality.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):231-240.details
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Metaepistemology and Skepticism.Richard A. Fumerton - 1995 - Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment.Bruno de Finetti - 1970 - New York: John Wiley.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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Gambling with truth.Isaac Levi - 1967 - Cambridge,: MIT Press.details
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How probable is an infinite sequence of heads?Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):173-180.details
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How probable is an infinite sequence of heads?Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):173-180.details
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Fair infinite lotteries.Sylvia Wenmackers & Leon Horsten - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):37-61.details
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Updating, Undermining, and Independence.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.details
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The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.details
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How probable is an infinite sequence of heads? A reply to Williamson.Ruth Weintraub - 2008 - Analysis 68 (299):247-250.details
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Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge.Jonathan Weisberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-197.details
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Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers.Jonathan Weisberg - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):793-812.details
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Bootstrapping in General.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.details
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Is Conditioning Really Incompatible with Holism?Carl Wagner - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):409-414.details
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Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602.details
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Epistemic Bootstrapping.Jonathan Vogel - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):518-539.details
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Tell me you love me: bootstrapping, externalism, and no-lose epistemology.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):119-134.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.details
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A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces.Martin Smith - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.details
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Causal necessity: a pragmatic investigation of the necessity of laws.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - New Haven: Yale University Press.details
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A contrast between two decision rules for use with (convex) sets of probabilities: Γ-maximin versus e-admissibilty.T. Seidenfeld - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):69 - 88.details
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