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Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.details
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Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.Chris Tucker - 2013 - In Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 1-29.details
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Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 89–131.details
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Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence.Susanna Schellenberg & Juan Comesaña - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):607-616.details
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Defeating looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Synthese 195 (7):2985-3012.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Updating, Undermining, and Independence.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.details
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Bootstrapping in General.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.details
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A probabilistic epistemology of perceptual belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):1-25.details
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Is Conditioning Really Incompatible with Holism?Carl Wagner - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):409-414.details
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How can perceptual experiences explain uncertainty?Susanna Siegel - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (2):134-158.details
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Objects of Choice.Wolfgang Schwarz - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Diachronic Norms for Self-Locating Beliefs.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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General Dynamic Triviality Theorems.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & John Hawthorne - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):307-339.details
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Having a look at the Bayes Blind Spot.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3801-3832.details
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Perceptual experience and degrees of belief.Thomas Raleigh & Filippo Vindrola - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):378-406.details
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Open-Minded Orthodox Bayesianism by Epsilon-Conditionalization.Eric Raidl - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (1):139-176.details
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Explanatory Coherence and the Impossibility of Confirmation by Coherence.Ted Poston - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):835-848.details
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Logical ignorance and logical learning.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9991-10020.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
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Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.details
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Updating, undermining, and perceptual learning.Brian T. Miller - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2187-2209.details
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How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist.Brian T. Miller - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):766-780.details
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Holistic Conditionalization and Underminable Perceptual Learning.Brian T. Miller - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):130-149.details
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Jeffrey conditioning, rigidity, and the defeasible red jelly bean.Lydia McGrew - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):569-582.details
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Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat.Timothy R. Kearl - 2023 - Synthese 202 (2):1-22.details
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How much are bold Bayesians favoured?Pavel Janda - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-20.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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For True Conditionalizers Weisberg’s Paradox is a False Alarm.Franz Huber - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):111-119.details
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Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.details
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Cognitive Mobile Homes.Daniel Greco - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):93-121.details
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Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.details
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How to Learn from Theory-Dependent Evidence; or Commutativity and Holism: A Solution for Conditionalizers.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):493-519.details
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The value of cost-free uncertain evidence.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz & Dominika Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13313-13343.details
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Reliability for degrees of belief.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.details
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Evidential externalism.Jeffrey Dunn - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):435-455.details
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Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.details
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A probabilistic analysis of cross‐examination using Bayesian networks.Marcello Di Bello - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):41-65.details
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Rigidity, symmetry and defeasibility: On Weisberg's puzzle for perceptual justification.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):54-70.details
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On Sturgeon’s “The rational Mind”. [REVIEW]Juan Comesaña - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10):3205-3213.details
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Higher-Order Beliefs and the Undermining Problem for Bayesianism.Lisa Cassell - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):197-213.details
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Commutativity, Normativity, and Holism: Lange Revisited.Lisa Cassell - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):159-173.details
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Bayesian coherentism.Lisa Cassell - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9563-9590.details
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Learning from experience and conditionalization.Peter Brössel - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2797-2823.details
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Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.details
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Bayesianism and self-doubt.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2225-2243.details
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Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.details
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The many ways of the basing relation.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2019 - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. London: Routledge.details
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