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Jonathan Vogel [35]Jonathan Maxwell Vogel [1]
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Jonathan Vogel
Amherst College
  1. Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (11):658-666.
  2. Reliabilism leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.
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  3. Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - In Michael David Roth & Glenn Ross (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29.
  4.  61
    Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602.
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  5. Inference to the Best Explanation.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):419.
  6. Epistemic Bootstrapping.Jonathan Vogel - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):518-539.
  7. The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):155-180.
  8. The refutation of skepticism.Jonathan Vogel - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 72--84.
  9. Cartesian skepticism and the inference to the best explanation.Jonathan Vogel - 1998 - In Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 352--9.
  10. Tracking, closure, and inductive knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 197--215.
     
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  11.  40
    Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology.Jonathan Vogel & Susan Haack - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):621.
    For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalism and coherentism has narrowed lately, and Susan Haack attempts to synthesize (...)
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  12. Subjunctivitis.Jonathan Vogel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.
    Subjunctivitis is the doctrine that what is distinctive about knowledge is essential modal in character, and thus is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One principal formulation of subjunctivism invokes a ``sensitivity condition'' (Nozick, De Rose), the other invokes a ``safety condition'' (Sosa). It is shown in detail how defects in the sensitivity condition generate unwanted results, and that the virtues of that condition are merely apparent. The safety condition is untenable also, because it is too easily satisfied. A powerful motivation (...)
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  13. Skeptical arguments.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.
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  14. Internalist Responses to Skepticism.Jonathan Vogel - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
  15. Accident, Evidence, and Knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 2017 - In Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 117-133.
    I explore and develop the idea that (NA) knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. The applicable notion of non-accidentality differs from that of ‘epistemic luck’ discussed by Pritchard. Safety theories may be seen as a refinement of, or substitute for, NA but they are subject to a fundamental difficulty. At the same time, NA needs to be adjusted in order to cope with two counterexamples. The Light Switch Case turns on the ‘directionof-fit’ between a belief and the facts, while the Meson (...)
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  16. Luminosity and indiscriminability.Jonathan Vogel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):547-572.
  17. Dismissing skeptical possibilities.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):235 - 250.
  18. The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism”.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):875-887.
  19. Sklar on methodological conservatism.Jonathan Vogel - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):125-131.
    In an important study, Lawrence Sklar has defended a doctrine of methodological conservatism (very roughly, the principle that a proposition derives some sort of epistemic warrant from being believed). I argue that Sklar's careful formulation of methodological conservatism remains too strong, and that a yet weaker version of the doctrine cannot be successfully defended. I also criticize Sklar's argument that the rejection of methodological conservatism would result in total skepticism. Finally, I turn to a closely related issue, and try to (...)
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    Space, Structuralism, and Skepticism.Jonathan Vogel - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    The chapter takes structuralism to be the thesis that if F and G are alike causally, then F and G are the same property. It follows that our beliefs about the world can be true in various brain-in-a-vat scenarios, giving us refuge from skeptical arguments. The trouble is that structuralism doesn’t do justice to certain metaphysical aspects of property identity having to do with fundamentality, intrinsicality, and the unity of the world. A closely related point is that the relation…lies-at-some-spatial-distance-from…obeys necessary (...)
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  21.  33
    Skepticism and Foundationalism.Jonathan Vogel - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:11-28.
    Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism. (The latter is, approximately, the view that there is such a thing as knowledge of the extemal world in general, which the skeptic can take as a target). I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the (...)
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  22. Skepticism and Foundationalism.Jonathan Vogel - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:11-28.
    Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism. (The latter is, approximately, the view that there is such a thing as knowledge of the extemal world in general, which the skeptic can take as a target). I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the (...)
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  23. Externalism Resisted.Jonathan Vogel - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):729-742.
  24. Is Cartesian Skepticism Too Cartesian?Jonathan Vogel - 2018 - In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.), The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations. Boston: Brill. pp. 24-45.
    A prominent response is that Cartesian skepticism is too Cartesian. It arises from outmoded views in epistemology and the philosophy of mind that we now properly reject. We can and should move on to other things. §2 takes up three broadly Cartesian themes: the epistemic priority of experience, under-determination, and the representative theory of perception. I challenge some common assumptions about these, and their connection to skepticism. §3 shows how skeptical arguments that emphasize causal considerations can avoid some suspect Cartesian (...)
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  25. Counting Minds and Mental States.Jonathan Vogel - 2014 - In David J. Bennett & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 393-400.
    Important conceptual and metaphysical issues arise when we try to understand the mental lives of “split-brain” subjects. How many distinct streams of consciousness do they have? According to Elizabeth Schechter’s partial unity model, the answer is one. A related question is whether co-consciouness, in general, is transitive. That is, if α and β are co-conscious experiences, and β and γ are co-conscious experiences, must α and γ be co-conscious? According to Schechter, the answer is no. The partial unity model faces (...)
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  26. The exorcist's nightmare: A reply to Crispin Wright.Thomas Tymoczko & Jonathan Vogel - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):543-552.
    Crispin Wright tried to refute classical 'Cartesian' skepticism contending that its core argument is extendible to a reductio ad absurdum (_Mind<D>, 100, 87-116, 1991). We show both that Wright is mistaken and that his mistakes are philosophically illuminating. Wright's 'best version' of skepticism turns on a concept of warranted belief. By his definition, many of our well-founded beliefs about the external world and mathematics would not be warranted. Wright's position worsens if we take 'warranted belief' to be implicitly defined by (...)
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  27. BonJour on explanation and skepticism.Jonathan Vogel - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):413-421.
    Laurence BonJour, among others, has argued that inference to the best explanation allows us to reject skeptical hypotheses in favor of our common-sense view of the world. BonJour considers several skeptical hypotheses, specifically: our experiences arise by mere chance, uncaused; the simple hypothesis which states merely that our experiences are caused unveridically; and an elaborated hypothesis which explains in detail how our unveridical experiences are brought about. A central issue is whether the coherence of one’s experience makes that experience more (...)
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  28. Causation and subjectivity.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  29.  24
    Externalism Resisted.Jonathan Vogel - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):729 - 742.
  30. Speaking of knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):501–509.
  31.  22
    Judgement and Justification. [REVIEW]Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):233-236.
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    Empirical Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jonathan Vogel - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):428-430.
    This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empirical knowledge will be valuable to all students of epistemology and philosophy. The author begins from an explanationist analysis of knowing—a belief counts as knowledge if, and only if, its truth enters into the best explanation for its being held. Defending common sense and scientific realism within the explanationist framework, Alan Goldman provides a new foundational approach to justification. The view that emerges is broadly empiricist, counteracting the recently dominant trend that rejects that (...)
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  33. Review: Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. [REVIEW]Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Mind 113 (451):552-555.
  34.  29
    Evidence and Inquiry. [REVIEW]Jonathan Vogel - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):621-623.
    For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalism and coherentism has narrowed lately, and Susan Haack attempts to synthesize (...)
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  35.  30
    Judgement and Justification. [REVIEW]Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):233-236.