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A Non-Identity Dilemma for Person-Affecting Views.Elliott Thornley - manuscriptdetails
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Second-Order Confidence in Supervaluationism.Jonas Karge - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 55 (1):43-58.details
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Perspectival Plurality, Relativism, and Multiple Indexing.Dan Zeman - 2018 - In Rob Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline Heycock, Brian Rabern & Hannah Rohde (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21. Semantics Archives. pp. 1353-1370.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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Transformative experience and the knowledge norms for action: Moss on Paul’s challenge to decision theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - In John Schwenkler & Enoch Lambert (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change. Oxford University Press.details
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Money-Pump Arguments.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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A deference model of epistemic authority.Sofia Ellinor Bokros - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12041-12069.details
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Uncertain Values: An Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2021 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.details
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Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences.Jiji Zhang, Teddy Seidenfeld & Hailin Liu - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6571-6597.details
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Epistemic Modals and Sensitivity to Contextually‐Salient Partitions.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):134-146.details
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Seeming incomparability and rational choice.Leo Yan - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (4):347-371.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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Indeterminate Oughts.J. Robert G. Williams - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):645-673.details
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An Argument for the Principle of Indifference and Against the Wide Interval View.John E. Wilcox - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):65-87.details
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On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities.Gregory Wheeler & Fabio G. Cozman - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3761-3782.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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General-Purpose Institutional Decision-Making Heuristics: The Case of Decision-Making under Deep Uncertainty.David Thorstad - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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A Utility Based Evaluation of Logico-probabilistic Systems.Paul D. Thorn & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):867-890.details
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Reliabilism and imprecise credences.Weng Hong Tang - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1463-1480.details
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A forward looking decision rule for imprecise credences.Rohan Sud - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):119-139.details
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Acting on belief functions.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2023 - Theory and Decision 95 (4):575-621.details
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Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?Mattias Skipper - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11561-11585.details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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Thick credence and pragmatic encroachment.Jeremy Shipley - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):339-361.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Decision making in the face of parity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):263-277.details
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Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
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Unsharp Sharpness.Nils-Eric Sahlin & Paul Weirich - 2013 - Theoria 80 (1):100-103.details
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Groupthink.Jeffrey Sanford Russell, John Hawthorne & Lara Buchak - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1287-1309.details
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Chance without Credence.John T. Roberts - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):33-59.details
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Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
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The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity.Patricia Rich - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9669-9698.details
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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Safeguards of a Disunified Mind.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):356-383.details
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Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2009 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.details
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Demystifying Dilation.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Subjective Rightness and Minimizing Expected Objective Wrongness.Kristian Olsen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):417-441.details
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The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue.Daniel Nolan - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):623-644.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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Maximal Cluelessness.Andreas Mogensen - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):141-162.details
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How to co-exist with nonexistent expectations.Randall G. McCutcheon - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2783-2799.details
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The dispositional account of credence.Anna Mahtani - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):727-745.details
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