- Two thought experiments reviewed: comments on J. A. Fodor's paper: "Cognitive science and the twin-Earth problem".Tyler Burge - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):284-94.details
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Perceptual entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.details
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Perceptual Entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-548.details
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Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.details
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Two for the Knowledge Goal of Inquiry.Christoph Kelp - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):227-32.details
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The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Cognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, Reflection: Philosophical Essays, Vo.Tyler Burge - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.details
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Knowing by Perceiving.Alan Millar - 2019 - Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Perception, history and benefit.Mona Simion - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):61-76.details
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Norms of Belief.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Perception First.Lisa Miracchi - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (12):629-677.details
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Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):897-905.details
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Algorithm and Parameters: Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism.Jack C. Lyons - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):463-509.details
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The C account of assertion: a negative result.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):125-137.details
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Why is Warrant Normative?Peter J. Graham - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128.details
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Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.details
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Good and Evil.Peter Geach - 1956 - Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.details
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The epistemology of belief.Fred I. Dretske - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):3 - 19.details
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Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.details
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Entitlement: The Basis for Empirical Epistemic Warrant.Tyler Burge - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-142.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
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Why Should Warrant Persist in Demon Worlds?Peter J. Graham - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 179-202.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Mind and body.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - In Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge University Press.details
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