Knowledge‐first functionalism

Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,764

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Proper Functionalism.Kenneth Boyce - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Functionalism and belief.Stephen R. Schiffer - 1986 - In Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press.
The failure of Lewis's functionalism.Joseph Owens - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):159-73.
Qualia. E. Feser - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):3-20.
Normative Functionalism and its Pragmatist Roots.Dave Beisecker - 2012 - Normative Funcitonalism and the Pittsburgh School.
Consciousness, neural functionalism, real subjectivity.Ted Honderich - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):369-381.
Functionalism and sensations.Mark Brown - 1983 - Auslegung 10:218-28.
Colors, functions, realizers, and roles.Jonathan Cohen - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):117-140.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-09-03

Downloads
73 (#202,877)

6 months
9 (#143,289)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mona Simion
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.
Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe.Mona Simion - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):203-216.
The ‘should’ in conceptual engineering.Mona Simion - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8):914-928.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

View all 60 references / Add more references