Oxford Studies in Metaethics

(ed.)
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2010)
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Abstract

The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves ...

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2019

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BJ1012.O89 2019

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9780199588596   0199588597   0199588600   9780199588602   0192897462   0192865609   9780198841449

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Chapters

A Sentimentalist Solution to the Moral Attitude Problem.Antti Kauppinen
Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation.Errol Lord
Agents and “Shmagents”: An Essay on Agency and Normativity.Connie S. Rosati
Aggregating Personal Value.Christopher Fruge
An Explanation of the Essential Publicity of Practical Reasons.Alisabeth Ayars
Approving on the Basis of Moral and Aesthetic Testimony.Daniel Wodak
Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson
Belief Pills and the Possibility of Moral Epistemology.Neil Sinclair
Belief pills and the possibility of moral epistemology.Neil Sinclair
Believing in Expressivism.T. Toppinen
Changing Minds and Hearts: Moral Testimony and Hermeneutical Advice.Paulina Sliwa
Cognitivism about Moral Judgement.Alison Hills
Cognitivism, Expressivism, and Agreement in Response.Joshua Gert
Commitments, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang
Contextualist Solutions to Three Puzzles about Practical Conditionals.Janice L. Dowell
Contra Meta-Ethics and Meta-Normativity.Jack Robert June Edmunds-Coopey
Difficult Cases and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Belief.Joshua Schechter
Disagreement, Correctness, and the Evidence for Metaethical Absolutism.Gunnar Börjnsson
Elusive Reasons 1.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge
Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson
Explaining the Quasi-Real.Jamie Dreier
Expressivism and Normative Metaphysics.Billy Dunaway
Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances.Graham Oddie
From thought to action.Jonathan Dancy
Grounding the Autonomy of Ethics.Barry Maguire
How To Be a Moral Platonist.Knut Olav Skarsune
How to Learn about Aesthetics and Morality through Acquaintance and Deference.Errol Lord
Hume on Practical Morality and Inert Reason.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
Humean Constructivism in Moral Theory.James Lenman
Humean Theories of Motivation.Melissa Barry
Inferential Expressivism and the Negation Problem.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder
Infinitism about cross-domain conflict.David Killoren
Intuition, Self-Evidence, and Understanding.Philip Stratton-Lake
It Ain't Necessarily So.Nomy Arpaly
Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality.Justin Clarke-Doane
Locating Morality: Moral Imperatives as Bodily Imperatives.Kate Manne
Moorean Arguments Against the Error Theory: A Defense.Eric Sampson
Moral Necessitism and Scientific Contingentism.Harjit Bhogal
Moral Obligation and Accountability.Stephen Darwall
Moral Realism without Moral Metaphysics.Andrew Sepielli
Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement in Nietzsche.Brian Leiter
Moral Testimony: Going on the Offensive.Eric Wiland
Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison.Amelia Hick
Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism.Cristian Constantinescu
Non-Naturalism Gone Quasi: Explaining the Necessary Connections between the Natural and the Normative.Teemu Toppinen
Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities.Stephanie Leary
Normative Language in Context.Alex Silk
Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It.Sharon Street
On the (In)Significance of Moral Disagreement for Moral Knowledge 1.Jason Decker & Daniel Groll
On the Meaning of “Ought” 1.Matthew Chrisman
Ought to Is: The Puzzle of Moral Science.John Basl & Christian Coons
Parfit's Case against Subjectivism 1.David Sobel
Particularism and Supervenience.Caj Strandberg
Proleptic Reasons.Agnes Callard
Rationality and Moral Authority.David Copp
Rawls and Moral Psychology.Thomas Baldwin
Reason and respect.Kenneth Walden
Reason without Reasons For.Michael G. Titelbaum
Reason, Reasons and Normativity.Joseph Raz
Relax? Don’t Do It! Why Moral Realism Won't Come Cheap.Sarah McGrath
Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker
Tempered expressivism.Mark Schroeder
The Argument from the Persistence of Moral Disagreement.Frank Jackson
The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods
The Fundamentality of Fit.Christopher Howard
The Goals of Moral Worth.Nathan Robert Howard
The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty.Elizabeth Harman
The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth.Janice L. Dowell
The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth.Janice Dowell J. L.
The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg
The Rationality of Ends.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir
The grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism.Ralf M. Bader
Truth, Beauty and Goodness.Simon Blackburn
Value and Autonomy in Kantian Ethics.Robert N. Johnson
Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way
Vindicating Practical Norms: Metasemantic Strategies.Hille Paakkunainen
We Can Have Our Buck and Pass It, Too.Zöe Johnson King
Weighing Reasons Against.Chris Tucker
What is a Moral Law?Gideon Rosen
When do goals explain the rules that advance them?Jamie Dreier
Who’s on first.Daniel Wodak
Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?Debbie Roberts
Why Plan-Expressivists Can't Pick Up the Moral Slack.Margaret Shea
Wrong Kinds of Reason and the Opacity of Normative Force.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson
Wrongness and Reasons: A Re-examination.T. M. Scanlon
Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory 1.  (pages 1-36)David Copp
How Principles Ground.  (pages 1-22)David Enoch
The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth.  (pages 1-27)Janice Dowell, J. L.
The Relational Nature of the Good.  (pages 1)Christine M. Korsgaard
1. Wedgwood's argument.  (pages 5--153)James Dreier
1. how to share a flat.  (pages 5--175)James Lenman
The significance of desire.  (pages 5-45)David O. Brink
Truth, Beauty and Goodness.  (pages 5--295)Simon Blackburn
What to do when you don’t know what to do.  (pages 5-28)Andrew Sepielli
When Do Goals Explain the Norms that Advance Them?  (pages 5--153)James Dreier
Wrongness and Reasons: A Re-examination.  (pages 5-20)T. M. Scanlon
Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.  (pages 18-44)John Brunero
An outline of an argument for robust metanormative realism.  (pages 21-50)David Enoch
The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.  (pages 23-46)Eric Sampson
Value and the right kind of reason.  (pages 25-55)Mark Schroeder
Are all practical reasons based on value?  (pages 27-53)Benjamin Kiesewetter
The Natural and the Normative.  (pages 29-52)Brad Majors
How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts1.  (pages 33)Allan Gibbard
“Saying what we Mean: An Argument against Expressivism.  (pages 35-71)Terrence Cuneo
Laws of nature, laws of freedom, and the social construction of normativity.  (pages 37)Kenneth Walden
Moral Testimony: Once More with Feeling.  (pages 45-73.)Guy Fletcher
Fitting attitudes and welfare.  (pages 47-73)Chris Heathwood
Non-Descriptive Relativism: Adding Options to the Expressivist Marketplace.  (pages 48-70)Matthew Bedke
On Being Social in Metaethics.  (pages 50)Kate Manne
Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?  (pages 51-76)Michael Ridge
Doubts about the Supervenience Of The Ethical.  (pages 53-90)Nicholas Sturgeon
Doubts about the Supervenience of the Evaluative.  (pages 53-92)Nicholas L. Sturgeon
Taking Prudence Seriously.  (pages 70-94)Guy Fletcher
Excuse without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance.  (pages 72-95)Paulina Sliwa
Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No!  (pages 73-98)Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons
Fitting attitudes, finkish goods, and value appearances.  (pages 74-101)Graham Oddie
The Argument from the Persistence of Moral Disagreement.  (pages 75-86)Frank Jackson
Debunking Evolutionary Debunking.  (pages 76-101)Katia Vavova
Cognitivism, Expressivism, and Agreement in Response.  (pages 77-110)Joshua Gert
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.  (pages 79-106)Chris Heathwood
Mental agency and metaethics.  (pages 80-109)Matthew Evans & Nishi Shah
Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise.  (pages 87-108)Sarah McGrath
Non-Naturalism: The Jackson Challenge.  (pages 87-110)Jussi Suikkanen
A Theory of Hedged Moral Principles.  (pages 91-132)Pekka Väyrynen
Internalism and Prudential Value.  (pages 95-120)Jennifer Hawkins
Internalism and Prudential Value.  (pages 95-120)Jennifer Hawkins
Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value.  (pages 99-126)Daniel Jacobson & Justin D'Arms
Does MITE Make Right?: On Decision-Making under Normative Uncertainty.  (pages 102-128)Brian Hedden
No Coincidence?  (pages 102-125)Matthew S. Bedke
Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.  (pages 104-133)Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett
Moral Knowledge and Experience1.  (pages 107)Sarah McGrath
The Authoritative Normativity of Fitting Attitudes.  (pages 108-137)R. A. Rowland
Moral Dependence.  (pages 109-128)Nick Zangwill
How Objectivity Matters.  (pages 111-52)David Enoch
Moral Obligation and Accountability.  (pages 111-132)Stephen Darwell
Two Dualisms of Practical Reason1.  (pages 114)Dale Dorsey
Desiring under the Proper Guise.  (pages 121-143)Michael Milona & Mark Schroeder
The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation.  (pages 123-144)Adam Lerner
Particularism and Supervenience.  (pages 129-158)Caj Strandberg
Ethical Neo-Expressivism.  (pages 133-166)Dorit Bar-On & Matthew Chrisman
Value and Autonomy in Kantian Ethics.  (pages 133-148)Robert N. Johnson
The Epistemic vs. the Practical.  (pages 137-162)Antti Kauppinen
Rationality, Normativity, and-1 Commitment.  (pages 138)Jacob Ross
What's in an Aim?  (pages 138-165)Keshav Singh
Getting a Moral Thing Into a Thought: Metasemantics for Non-Naturalists.  (pages 140-169)Preston J. Werner
Where the laws are.  (pages 149-171)Mark Lance & Margaret Little
The accidental error theorist.  (pages 153)Richard Joyce
Reasons, oughts, and requirements.  (pages 155-181)Justin Snedegar
Robust ethical realism, non-naturalism, and normativity.  (pages 159-205)William Joseph FitzPatrick
Realist-expressivism and conventional implicature.  (pages 167-202)David Copp
Practical Reasons and Moral "Ought".  (pages 172-199)Patricia Greenspan
Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism1.  (pages 181)Jonas Olson
Open-Mindedness and.. Normative Contingency.  (pages 182)Valerie Tiberius
What is (In)coherence?  (pages 184-206)Alex Worsnip
Moral feelings and moral concepts.  (pages 195-215)Allan Gibbard
Quasi-Dependence.  (pages 195-218)Selim Berker
The Humean Theory of Reasons.  (pages 195-219)Mark Schroeder
Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms1.  (pages 195)Alex Silk
Guilt-free morality.  (pages 203-14)Gilbert Harman
A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism.  (pages 205-18)Campbell Brown
A new and improved supervenience argument for ethical descriptivism.  (pages 205-218)C. Brown
Constructivism about reasons.  (pages 207-45)Sharon Street
Evaluation Turned on Itself: The Vindicatory Circularity Challenge to the Conceptual Ethics of Normativity.  (pages 207-232)Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett
Teleology and Normativity.  (pages 214-240)Matthew Silverstein
Reasons as Evidence.  (pages 215-42)Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star
Wrong Kinds of Reason and the Opacity of Normative Force.  (pages 215-244)Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson
Irreducibly Normative Properties.  (pages 216–244)Chris Heathwood
Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for their Solution.  (pages 217-233)James Dreier
Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency 1.  (pages 219)Paul Katsafanas
Properties for Nothing, Facts for Free? Expressivism’s Deflationary Gambit.  (pages 223-51)Terence Cuneo
Explaining our Knowledge of Normative Supervenience.  (pages 233-256)Vilma Venesmaa
Direction of Fit and Motivational Cognitivism.  (pages 235-64)Sergio Tenenbaum
Direction of fit and motivational cognitivism.  (pages 235-264)Sergio Tenenbaum
Thick Concepts: Where’s Evaluation?  (pages 235-70)Pekka Väyrynen
Normativity.  (pages 240-266)Judith Jarvis Thomson
How to be a Cognitivist about Practical Reason.  (pages 243-281)Jacob Ross
On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege–Geach to Illuminate Expressivism’s Problem with Objectivity.  (pages 244-264)David Faraci
Rawls and Moral Psychology.  (pages 247-270)Thomas Baldwin
Authoritatively Normative Concepts.  (pages 253-277)Tristram McPherson
Why be an Internalist about Reasons?  (pages 255)Julia Markovits
Expressivism and Varieties of Normativity.  (pages 265-293)Daniel Wodak
Misunderstanding metaethics: Korsgaard's rejection of realism.  (pages 265-294)Nadeem Hussain & Nishi Shah
Actions, Acting, and Acting Well.  (pages 271-298)Matthew Hanser
Etiological Debunking Beyond Belief.  (pages 274-298)Joshua Schechter
Instrumental rationality.  (pages 280-309)Ralph Wedgwood
Archimedeanism and Why Metaethics Matters.  (pages 283-302)Paul Bloomfield
The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology.  (pages 284-308)Matt Lutz
The Predicament of Choice.  (pages 294-313)Ralph Wedgwood
Resisting the buck-passing account of value.  (pages 295-324)Pekka Vayrynen
Hume on Practical Morality and Inert Reason.  (pages 299-320)Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency.  (pages 303-333)Luca Ferrero
Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.  (pages 309-332)Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke
Normativity.  (pages 325-80)Derek Parfit
Bi-polar obligation.  (pages 333)Stephen Darwall

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Citations of this work

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