The Argument from the Persistence of Moral Disagreement

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:75-86 (2008)
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Citations of this work

Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-104.
Disagreement Without Error.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):143-154.
Contextualism, Moral Disagreement, and Proposition Clouds.Jussi Suikkanen - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. pp. 47-69.
Naturalism and normative cognition.Matthew S. Bedke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):147-167.

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