Abstract
Several philosophers have recently argued that decision-theoretic frameworks for rational choice under risk fail to provide prescriptions for choice in cases of moral uncertainty. They conclude that there are no rational norms that are “sensitive” to a decision maker’s moral uncertainty. But this chapter argues that one sometimes has a rational obligation to take one’s moral uncertainty into account in the course of moral deliberation. It first provides positive motivation for the view that one’s moral beliefs can affect what it is rational for one to choose. It then addresses the problem of value comparison, according to which one cannot determine the expected moral value of one’s actions. The chapter argues that we should not infer from the problem of value comparison that there are no rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty.
Keywords moral uncertainty, value comparison, decision theory, moral deliberation, moral risk
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DOI 10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0008
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Living with Moral Disagreement.Roger Crisp - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.

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