Excuse without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance

In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 72-95 (2010)
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Abstract

Can moral ignorance excuse? This chapter argues that philosophical debate of this question has been based on a mistaken assumption: namely that excuses are all-or-nothing affairs; to have an excuse is to be blameless. The chapter argues that we should reject this assumption. Excuses are not binary but gradable: they can be weaker or stronger, mitigating blame to greater or lesser extent. This chapter explores the notions of strength of excuses, blame miti- gation and the relationship between excuses and moral responsibility. These ideas open up some principled middle-ground between the two positions staked out in the literature. Moral ignorance may well excuse but it does not exculpate.

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Paulina Sliwa
University of Vienna

Citations of this work

Taking Responsibility.Paulina Sliwa - 2023 - In Ruth Chang & Amia Srinivasan, Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Being Fully Excused for Wrongdoing.Daniele Bruno - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
The Problem of Morally Repugnant Beliefs.Declan Smithies - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 18. Oxford University Press. pp. 218-241.
Reasonable standards and exculpating moral ignorance.Nathan Biebel - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):1-21.

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References found in this work

Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980.Bernard Williams - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Timothy Schroeder.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson, Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Shaping the Normative Landscape.David Owens - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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