In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. pp. 72-95 (2020)

Authors
Paulina Sliwa
University of Vienna
Abstract
Can moral ignorance excuse? This chapter argues that philosophical debate of this question has been based on a mistaken assumption: namely that excuses are all-or-nothing affairs; to have an excuse is to be blameless. The chapter argues that we should reject this assumption. Excuses are not binary but gradable: they can be weaker or stronger, mitigating blame to greater or lesser extent. This chapter explores the notions of strength of excuses, blame miti- gation and the relationship between excuses and moral responsibility. These ideas open up some principled middle-ground between the two positions staked out in the literature. Moral ignorance may well excuse but it does not exculpate.
Keywords blame  moral responsibility  moral ignorance  excuse  moral luck
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
The Realm of Rights.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Shaping the Normative Landscape.David Owens - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

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