Abstract
The conceptual ethics of normativity involves normative reflection on normative thought and talk.
One motive for engaging in this project is to seek to either vindicate or improve one’s existing
normative concepts. This paper clarifies and addresses a deep challenge to the conceptual ethics of
normativity, when it is motivated in this way. The challenge arises from the fact that we need to
use some of our own normative concepts in order to evaluate our normative concepts. This might
seem objectionably circular, akin to trying to verify the accuracy of a ruler by checking it against
itself. We dub this the vindicatory circularity challenge. If the challenge cannot be met, it would
suggest that all normative inquiry (not just the conceptual ethics of normativity) rests on worryingly
arbitrary foundations. We defend a way of answering the challenge that adapts anti-skeptical
resources from epistemology. Along the way, we reject several alternative replies to the challenge.
These include dismissing the challenge because it cannot be formulated with our concepts,
answering it by appeal to a distinctive normative concept, and answers that appeal to certain
metaphysical or metasemantic resources.