Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14 (2019)
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Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point.R. M. Hare (ed.) - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy.Philippa Foot - 1978 - Oxford University Press.
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