23 found
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Andrew Sepielli
University of Toronto, Mississauga
  1. What to Do When You Don’T Know What to Do.Andrew Sepielli - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:5-28.
  2. Moral Uncertainty and Fetishistic Motivation.Andrew Sepielli - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2951-2968.
    Sometimes it’s not certain which of several mutually exclusive moral views is correct. Like almost everyone, I think that there’s some sense in which what one should do depends on which of these theories is correct, plus the way the world is non-morally. But I also think there’s an important sense in which what one should do depends upon the probabilities of each of these views being correct. Call this second claim “moral uncertaintism”. In this paper, I want to address (...)
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  3. What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do….Andrew Sepielli - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):521-544.
  4. Moral Uncertainty and the Principle of Equity Among Moral Theories1.Andrew Sepielli - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):580-589.
  5. Subjective and Objective Reasons.Andrew Sepielli - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
  6. Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.
    Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) any (...)
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  7. How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7.
  8. Subjective Normativity and Action Guidance.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. II. Oxford University Press.
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    'Along an Imperfectly-Lighted Path': Practical Rationality and Normative Uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - unknown
    Nobody's going to object to the advice "Do the right thing", but that doesn't mean everyone's always going to follow it. Sometimes this is because of our volitional limitations; we cannot always bring ourselves to make the sacrifices that right action requires. But sometimes this is because of our cognitive limitations; we cannot always be sure of what is right. Sometimes we can't be sure of what's right because we don't know the non-normative facts. But sometimes, even if we were (...)
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  10. Should You Look Before You Leap?Andrew Sepielli - 2014 - The Philosophers' Magazine 66:89-93.
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    What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do….Andrew Sepielli - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):521-544.
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  12. Moral Realism Without Moral Metaphysics.Andrew Sepielli - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume XI. Oxford University Press.
  13. How to Challenge Common-Sense Morality (Handout).Andrew Sepielli - manuscript
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    Moral Realism Without Moral Metaphysics.Andrew Sepielli - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11.
    This chapter explores the possibility of a metaphysically deflationist, explanatorily robust version of moral realism. The view has no truck with inquiries into the naturalness, constitution, or reducibility of moral properties, and purports to dissolve, rather than solve, the “placement problem.” But it offers a general explanation from outside the ethical domain of how we can accurately represent the world in moral thought and talk; this distinguishes it from some versions of expressivism and constitutivism, and from quietism. It is often (...)
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  15.  78
    The Law’s ‘Majestic Equality’.Andrew Sepielli - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (6):673-700.
    Anatole France’s The Red Lily is best known for this ironic aphorism: ‘The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.’ The laws mentioned in this aphorism are open to two criticisms. The first criticism is that they forbid conduct that oughtn’t to be forbidden. The second criticism is that they unfairly place greater burdens of compliance on some than on others. It (...)
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  16. Decision-Making Under Moral Uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - forthcoming - In Karen Jones, Mark C. Timmons & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology.
  17. Quietism and Counter-Normativity.Andrew Sepielli - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
  18. Consequentialism and the Evaluation of Action Qua Action.Andrew Sepielli - forthcoming - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy.
  19. Pragmatism and Metaethics.Andrew Sepielli - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 582-594.
  20. Review of David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously. [REVIEW]Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  21. Book ReviewsTed Lockhart,. Moral Uncertainty and Its Consequences.New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. 232. $55.00. [REVIEW]Andrew Sepielli - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):601-604.
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    Holly M. Smith, Making Morality Work.Andrew Sepielli - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):141-144.
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  23. Pragmatist Quietism: A Metaethical System.Andrew Sepielli - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Some philosophers argue that nothing can be morally right or wrong because there are no moral values in the world, just as there are no ghosts or goblins. Others argue that nothing can be right or wrong because the moral "ought" can't be defined in non-moral terms, or otherwise lacks "content" or "sense". Some philosophers reply to these charges via moral metaphysics -- trying to show that there are moral values in the world after all -- or via moral semantics (...)
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