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  1. Hybrid Accounts of Ethical Thought and Talk.Teemu Toppinen - 2018 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 243-259.
    This is a draft of a chapter for the Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by David Plunkett and Tristram McPherson. I offer an overview of hybrid views in metaethics, with main focus on hybrid cognitivist views such as those defended by Daniel Boisvert and David Copp, and on hybrid expressivist views such as those defended by Michael Ridge and myself.
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  2.  96
    Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.
    Many philosophers believe that judgments about propositional attitudes, or about which mental states are expressed by which sentences, are normative judgments. If this is so, then metanormative expressivism must be given expressivist treatment. This might seem to make expressivism self-defeating or worrisomely circular, or to frustrate the explanatory ambitions central to the view. I argue that recent objections along these lines to giving an expressivist account of expressivism are not successful. I shall also suggest that in order to deal with (...)
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  3.  56
    Expressivism and Moore's Paradox.Teemu Toppinen - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-6.
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  4.  87
    How Norms (Might) Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.
    Belief normativism is roughly the view that judgments about beliefs are normative judgments. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss suggest that there are two ways one could defend this view: by appeal to what might be called ‘truth-norms’, or by appeal to what might be called ‘norms of rationality’ or ‘epistemic norms’. According to G&W, whichever way the normativist takes, she ends up being unable to account for the idea that the norms in question would guide belief formation. Plausibly, if belief (...)
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  5.  76
    Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?Teemu Toppinen - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):437-460.
    I argue that Jonas Olson’s argument from irreducible normativity is not a secure basis for an argument for error theory (section 1) and that a better basis is provided by the argument from supervenience, which has more bite against non-naturalist moral realism than Olson is willing to allow (section 2). I suggest there may be a view which can allow for the existence of irreducibly normative facts while remaining unaffected by the kinds of arguments that work against non-naturalist realism. This (...)
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  6.  64
    Moral Fetishism Revisited.Teemu Toppinen - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):307-315.
    In this paper the 'moral fetishism' argument originally presented by Michael Smith against moral judgment externalism is defended. I argue that only the internalist views on the relation of moral judgment and motivation can combine two attractive theses: first, that the morally admirable are motivated to act on the reasons they take to ground actions' being right, and second, that their virtuousness need not be diminished by their acting on their thinking something right. Lastly, some possibilities are envisaged for internalists (...)
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  7. Rule consequentialism at top rates.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv065.
  8.  82
    Mahdollisuus.Ilkka Niiniluoto, Tuomas Tahko & Teemu Toppinen (eds.) - 2016 - Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland.
    Proceedings of the 2016 "one word" colloquium of the The Philosophical Society of Finland. The word was "Possibility".
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  9.  36
    Relational Expressivism and Moore's Paradox.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2):1-8.
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  10.  67
    Why We Should Not Worry about the Triviality of Normative Supervenience.Vilma Venesmaa & Teemu Toppinen - 2023 - Ethics 133 (3):355-380.
    A common worry regarding normative supervenience theses is that they are easily trivialized unless we somehow restrict the set of descriptive base properties on which the normative properties supervene. The idea is that if all descriptive properties are included in the base, any two individuals that share all their base properties must be the same individual in the same world, from which it follows that they have the same normative properties. We argue that this trivial explanation for unrestricted normative supervenience (...)
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  11.  33
    Non-Naturalism Gone Quasi: Explaining the Necessary Connections between the Natural and the Normative.Teemu Toppinen - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
    Non-naturalism—roughly the view that normative properties and facts are sui generis—may be combined either with cognitivism or with non-cognitivism. The chapter starts by explaining how the metaphysically necessary connections between the natural and the normative raise an explanatory challenge for realist non-naturalism, and how it is not at all obvious that quasi-realism offers a way of escaping the challenge. Having briefly explored different kinds of accounts of what it is to have thoughts concerning metaphysical necessity, it then proceeds to argue (...)
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  12.  51
    Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):943-955.
    I explore the prospects of capturing and explaining, within a non-cognitivist framework, the enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires of N that, if N believes that she herself ought to perform an action, φ, N intends to φ. Capturing this principle involves making sense of both the possibility and irrationality of akrasia – of failing to intend in accordance with one’s ought thought. In the first section, I argue that the existing non-cognitivist treatments of enkrasia/akrasia by Allan (...)
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  13.  62
    Neil Sinclair, Practical Expressivism: A Metaethical Theory.Teemu Toppinen - 2022 - Ethics 133 (1):152-156.
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  14. Action, Value and Metaphysics - Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Finland Colloquium 2018, Acta Philosophica Fennica 94.Jaakko Kuorikoski & Teemu Toppinen (eds.) - 2018 - Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica.
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  15.  56
    Gibbard, Allan. Meaning and Normativity.New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 336. $55.00.Teemu Toppinen - 2014 - Ethics 124 (4):905-910.
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  16.  30
    Goading or Guiding? Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Practical Reasoning.Teemu Toppinen - 2013 - SATS 14 (2):119-141.
    Name der Zeitschrift: SATS Jahrgang: 14 Heft: 2 Seiten: 119-141.
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