Wrongness and Reasons: A Re-examination

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:5-20 (2007)
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Wrongness and Reasons: A Re-examination.T. M. Scanlon - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work

Normative Reference Magnets.J. Robert G. Williams - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (1):41-71.
De dicto desires and morality as fetish.Vanessa Carbonell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):459-477.
“But it would be wrong”.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):135-157.
More seriously wrong.Thomas Hurka - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5:41-58.
Contractualism and Punishment.Hon-Lam Li - 2015 - Criminal Justice Ethics 34 (2):177-209.

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