In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics volume 11. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-27 (2016)

Abstract
What considerations place genuine constraints on an adequate semantics for normative and evaluative expressions? Linguists recognize facts about ordinary uses of such expressions and competent speakers’ judgments about which uses are appropriate. The contemporary literature reflects the widespread assumption that linguists don’t rely upon an additional source of data—competent speakers’ judgments about possible disagreement with hypothetical speech communities. We have several good reasons to think that such judgments are not probative for semantic theorizing. Therefore, we should accord these judgments no probative value for the development of a semantics for our moral terms. Such judgments can no longer be presumed to put pressure on theories according to which our moral expressions share a semantics with ordinary, descriptive terms. Many rivals to pure, Descriptivist theories count among their advantages the ability to accommodate these judgments. If these judgments have no probative value, such theories lose an important source of support.
Keywords metaethics  semantics  Ruth Millikan  moral twin earth  Philosophical methodology  metasemantics  moral realism  moral language
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts.N. G. Laskowski - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):39-51.
Moral Supervenience.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):592-615.
Normative Reference Magnets.J. Robert G. Williams - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (1):41-71.
XV—Normative Non-Naturalism and the Problem of Authority.Shamik Dasgupta - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):297-319.
A Simple Escape From Moral Twin Earth.Pekka Väyrynen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):109-118.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth.Janice Dowell J. L. - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2000 - Synthese 124 (1-2):139-152.
Moral Realism and Twin Earth.Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis & Angus Dawson - 1999 - Facta Philosophica 1 (1):135-165.
Biting the Bullet on Moral Twin Earth.Michael Rubin - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):285-309.
Goodness and Moral Twin Earth.Christopher Freiman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):445-460.
Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake?Katalin Farkas - 2003 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169.
Internal Realism and Twin Earth.Lawrence Pasternack - 2001 - Idealistic Studies 31 (1):73-80.
Moore on Twin Earth.Neil Levy - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):137-146.
Return to Moral Twin Earth.David Merli - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):207-240.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-05-30

Total views
697 ( #11,240 of 2,519,513 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
43 ( #19,825 of 2,519,513 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes