Summary To understand the present situation we must know something about its history. The ‘Rise of the West’, which grew out of the ‘European Miracle’, is a special case of cultural evolution. The development of science is an important element in this process. Cultural evolution went hand in hand with biological evolution. Evolutionary epistemology illuminates the achievements and the evolution of cognitive sensory apparatus of various species. Man's cognitive sensory apparatus is adapted to the ‘mesocosmos’, the world of medium-sized dimensions. (...) The biological structures constitute the hardware of the cognitive sensory apparatus, while certain expectations and theories, which are ontogenetically apriori, constitute the corresponding system software. A distinction is introduced between ‘primary theories’ (linked to the sensory apparatus) and ‘secondary theories’. The latter are the result of attempts to meet the demand for an explanation of phenomena that cannot be explained in terms of ‘primary theories’. Two subsets of ‘secondary theories’ are compared: spiritualistic-personalized theories and scientific theories. From the historical point of view the scientific secondary theories are but a special subset of the class of secondary theories. From the systematic point of view it is instructive to focus on a comparison of the two subsets: what do they have in common? in what respects do they differ? The rise of scientific thinking is closely linked to the ‘European Miracle’. How (and when and why) did the West grow rich? To answer this question we must first produce an explanation of the principle: theories about the consequences of institutional arrangements. Then we can give a historical explanation of why this development took place in Europe and only there. It is claimed that the secret of success, economic wealth and the first approximations to relatively free societies, was the taming of the state, the taming of cleptocracy (independent of the nature of the agency having cleptocratic appetites, be it princes or parliaments). The taming of the state is a pre-democratic achievement. Finally, the consequences of institutional arrangements for scientific progress and innovation are examined. Only if the system is market-like, will it link individual effort with reward and, through the competitive process, encourage the wide dissemination and use of new ideas. There is no tradeoff between freedom on the one hand and economic success and the growth of scientific knowledge on the other. Freedom and the ensuing flexibility is the key to the past and to the future. (shrink)

(1) What may be gained by applying concepts generalised from economics to methodological problems? The perspective of cost-benefit analysis ('CBA' for short) may help the researcher to see what sorts of questions he should take into account when dealing with particular methodological problems. This claim is supported by applying generalised CBA-thinking to two standard problems of methodology. (2) In the practice of research the handling of basic statements does not normally constitute any problem, and no conscious decision is involved. In (...) the methodological reconstruction the key questions are: 'How can a particular basic statement be criticised?' and 'What are the costs of defending a statement that is "problematic"?' The problem of the empirical 'base' is an investment problem: whether or not to invest time and effort into processing a particular basic statement into a falsifying hypothesis for the theory we wish to test. The valuation of the costs of rejecting or, as the case may be, of defending a basic statement, are objective. (3) With respect to theories, in basic science, the issue is not one of acceptance or rejection of a single theory, but rather of theory preference. Both the rational response to a falsification and rational theory preference are governed by CBA-considerations. The option for one of two competing theories is based upon a CBA where the valuation of benefits and costs is objective. Theory change is an objective process, at least in those fields, where theorising is closely controlled by empirical testing: the better theory drives out the less good theory. The costs of defending a theory that is less good than its competitor are mainly epistemic resources forgone. The use of CBA in methodology not only is compatible with Popper's position, but it may pay to view Popper's methodology as an application of CBA to epistemic situations. (shrink)

In our century, the philosophy of science has been overshadowed by two towering figures: Popper and Wittgenstein, both Viennese emigrants, who have become subjects to the Queen (cf., e.g., Radnitzky [1987a] Entre Wittgenstein et Popper ... ). The discussion has been structured by two great controversies: from the 30s Popper versus logical positivism (or falsificationism versus verificationism/probabilism), and from the 60s 'the new philosophy of science' versus Critical Rationalism. (Exemplary contributions to thes two controversies can be found, e.g., in the (...) two collections Radnitzky and Andersson (eds.) [1978], Progress... Science, and [1979], Structure...Science.) Wittgenstein's Tractatus has been the idee directrice of the Vienna Circle and its successor, Logical Empiricism. The cynosure of 'the new philosophy of science' is Wittgenstein's later philosophy as presented, in particular, in his Philosophical Investigations. If you apply it to the philosophy of science, you will view 'normative' methodology as a counterpart of ideal language philosophy, and hence regard any methodological prescriptions as unrealistic and claim that philosophy of science cannot do more than describe the practice of science, preferably in terms of case studies culled from the history of science. You will be placed on the road to relativism (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hiibner, and others). An interesting variant of relativism is Stegmiiller's attempt, with the help of the formal methods developed by Sneed, to give Kuhn's results a more exact form (Sneed, Stegmiiller, Moulines, Mostarin)-what Feyerabend has called 'the Sneedification of science'. Today, departments of philosophy of science are dominated by philosophers who either sympathize with logical empiricism or with 'the new philosophy of science'. Critical Rationalism has an outsider position, but enjoys the sympathy of many scientists (Bartley [1989], Unfathomed Knowledge .. .; see also Bartley [198 7b], 'Philosophy of biology ... ', and Munz [1987], ' ... the mirror of Rorty'). (shrink)

Popper's methodology does not entail any playing down of the various indispensible distinctions such as the distinction between knowing and guessing, the distinction between myth and science, the distinction between the observational and the theoretical, and between the vernacular and technical sublanguages or technical vocabulary. By avoiding both the totalization that led to the foundationalist position and the scepticist reactions to these frustrated foundationalist hopes, Popper's methodology makes it possible to combine fallibilism with a realist view of theories. It combines (...) the perennial willingness to re-examine positions, statements, etc. with the claim that a particular theory (as an item of knowledge in the objective sense) constitutes cognitive progress over its rivals. However, some of his formulations have been deliberately provocative and in this way have given rise to certain misgivings about possible paradoxical implications, even in philosophers congenial with Popper's approach. The concept of knowledge in the objective sense is, of course, an explicatum which Popper proposes primarily for use in methodology and epistemology. The concept is an expression of the acknowledgment of fallibility in principle. The phrasing that ‘knowledge is conjectural’ or ‘knowledge is fallible’, even when it refers to knowledge in the objective sense, is but an abbreviation for: since our methods for ascertaining the truth-value of a particular statement about empirical reality are fallible in principle, there cannot be any certain knowledge about reality. In everyday life and in politics tolerance will be possible to the extent to which the recognition of this fallibility is more than a declaration. (shrink)

This analysis examines fundamental questions at the intersection of social science and social technology as well as problems of disciplinary divisions and the challenge of cross-disciplinary cooperation. Its theoretical-empirical context is provided by post-communist transformations, a set of profound societal changes in which institutional design plays a central role. The article critically reappraises the contribution of Karl Popper's philosophy to this problem context, examines neoliberalism as social science and social technology, and examines the role of experts and disciplinary divisions in (...) the reform process. Building on Mario Bunge's social philosophy, it sketches basic elements of a cross-disciplinary approach to "social change by design." Key Words: post-communist transformation • social change • institutional design • Karl Popper • Mario Bunge. (shrink)

A growing interest in and concern about the adequacy and fairness of modern peer-review practices in publication and funding are apparent across a wide range of scientific disciplines. Although questions about reliability, accountability, reviewer bias, and competence have been raised, there has been very little direct research on these variables.

John Preston has claimed that we must understand Paul Feyerabend's later, post-1970, philosophy in terms of a disappointed Popperianism: that Feyerabend became a sceptical, relativistic, literal anarchist because of his perception of the failure of Popper's philosophy. I argue that this claim cannot be supported and trace the development of Feyerabend's philosophy in terms of a commitment to the central Popperian themes of criticism and critical explanatory progress. This commitment led Feyerabend to reject Popper's specific methodology in favour of a (...) pluralistic methodology, but the commitment to the central values of criticism and critical explanatory progress remained . Moreover, methodological pluralism does not imply scepticism, relativism, or literal anarchism. Feyerabend was not a disappointed Popperian, but, in many respects, a die-hard pluralistic Popperian. (shrink)

Abstract The market is sometimes thought to be a largely neutral means for coordinating cooperation among strangers under complex conditions because it is, as Hayek noted, a ?spontaneous order.? But in fact the market actively shapes the kinds of values it rewards, as do other spontaneous orders. Recognizing these biases allows us to see how such orders impinge on one another and on other communities basic to human life, sometimes negatively. In this way we may come to acknowledge the inevitability (...) of placing limits on spontaneous orders. (shrink)

Bartley’s pancritical rationalism is seen by some as being a refinement of Popper’s critical rationalism. I contest this view and argue that pancritical rationalism is obtained from critical rationalism by removing some of its most important and useful features. The remainder consists of a restatement of some of Popper’s key ideas and an interpretation of others that I attempt to show is not entirely faithful to what Popper says.

From the pre-Socratics to the present, one primary aim of philosophy has been to learn from arguments. Philosophers have debated whether we could indeed do this, but they have by and large agreed on how we would use arguments if learning from argument was at all possible. They have agreed that we could learn from arguments either by starting with true premises and validly deducing further statements which must also be true and therefore constitute new knowledge, or that we could (...) start from putative premises and validly deduce false consequences thereby showing that our premises were false. Our aim in this paper is to suggest a third alternative: we can learn from plausible arguments through criticism of such arguments which enable us to discover new problems. (shrink)

ROBERT L. CAMPBELL finds Tibor Machan's book, Ayn Rand, to be a thoroughgoing introduction to every part of Rand 's system except the esthetics. Machan's presentation is knowledgeable and sympathetic but entirely non-sectarian, it offers several significant criticisms of Rand 's views. Campbell focuses on Machan's discussion of Rand 's philosophical axioms, her ethics, and her antipathy to Immanuel Kant. Certain questions that Machan asks prompt Campbell to inquire whether Rand 's avoidance of cosmology in metaphysics is an example to (...) be followed in epistemology. (shrink)

In order to understand consciousness one would benefit from developing a more eclectic intellectual style. Consciousness is, as proposed by almost everyone except the stubborn reductionists, a truly mysterious concept. Its study and dissection merits a multidisciplinary approach. Waving this multidisciplinary flag has positively enlarged the discussion and neurologists, psychiatrists, mathematicians, and so on, have moved to the philosophy of mind arena, first with caution and now with a more powerful voice. Identifying what we mean by consciousness is a first (...) step even when we want to deny its existence. The link between consciousness and some other mental activity is a logical next step and there is abundant literature doing this, but not all of them differentiate among associated yet different phenomena. (shrink)

No evangelistic erroneous network of ideas can guarantee the satisfaction of these two demands : (1) propagate the network without revision and (2) completely insulate itself against losses in credibility and adherents through criticism. If a network of ideas is false, or inconsistent or fails to solve its intended problem, or unfeasible, or is too costly in terms of necessarily forsaken goals, its acceptability may be undermined given only true assumptions and valid arguments. People prefer to adopt ideologies that (i) (...) are logically consistent, (ii) are more truth-like and of higher information content than their rivals, (iii) are systematically organised, (iv) solve their problems better than their rivals, (v) do not contain unfeasible demands, and (vi) do not contain uneconomic demands. Truth and validity therefore act as Darwinian-like filters on ideologies. Using Popper's notion of situational analysis and with reference to Darwinian evolution, considered as a special case of the former, and Bartley's theory of comprehensively critical rationalism I argue that a propagandist cannot guarantee his message or his movement from sound criticism. All positions are in a methodological sense open to argument. Moreover, the logic of a propagandist's situation constrains him into making his message and himself open to criticism in order to maximize its chances of being propagated through the population. But he then loses control of the message in two respects. Firstly, his audience are disposed to select from the competing ideas they encounter those that satisfy (i) to (vi) because of man's evolutionary history. Secondly, he cannot guarantee protection from criticism even a privileged section of his message because he cannot predict in a systematic way what logical repercussions each protective reformulation of the ideology will have on other sections of the ideology and what criticism the ideology will encounter. He cannot do the latter because of certain logical properties of theories that endow them with unfathomable depths. Marxism and Freudianism serve as case studies, especially for the analysis of Popper's notion of the immunizing stratagem, a methodological/logical device that is supposed to save theories from criticism. "Immunizing stratagems" either abandon the ideology they are meant to protect or seriously lower its chances of being reproduced. (shrink)

This essay examines sections relevant to libertarianism in Will Kymlicka’s Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (2nd ed.), making and explaining the following criticisms. Kymlicka’s “preface” misconstrues political philosophy’s progress, purpose, and its relation to libertarianism. In his “introduction”, his “project” mistakes libertarianism as “right-wing”, justice as compromise among “existing theories”, and equality as the “ultimate value.” His “a note on method” in effect takes as axioms, beyond philosophical examination, various alleged desiderata and the necessary moral role of the state. Moreover, (...) his “ultimate test” being “our considered convictions” amounts to a conservative and illogical justificationism at odds with radical and coherent critical rationalism. Kymlicka’s chapter on “libertarianism” mistakes it as, inherently and unavoidably, free-marketist, anti-consequentialist, deontological, Nozickian, requiring “a foundational moral premiss, without objective content, unmaximisable, indistinguishable from license, equality-based, anti-anarchist, “self-defeating”, indefensibly “unfair”, impractically “philosophical”, and without influence. A different version of libertarianism easily withstands all Kymlicka’s antipathetic criticisms. (shrink)

In this paper I develop and defend a form of argumentative normativity that is not based on fundamental principles. I first argue that research agendas that aim to discover fundamental principles of ‘good’ argumentative discourse share one crucial weak spot, viz. circularity. I then argue that this weak spot can be avoided in a pancritical view of normativity.

I argue that so-called 'background knowledge' in confirmation theory has little, if anything, to do with 'knowledge' in the sense of mainstream epistemology. I argue that it is better construed as 'background information', which need not be believed in, justified, or true.